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“Acknowledge the Tragedy, Consider the Legacy, Lest we Forget” 
Permanent Memorial to Honour the Victims of Slavery and the Transatlantic Slave Trade, Ark of 
Return, United Nations Headquarter, New York  
 
“[E]nding exploitation starts when you are regularised. It is then when the person 
can breathe. […]”  
(female from Sub-Saharan Africa, domestic worker, regular migrant) 
	
“In Nepal, and in Asia, in general, there is this thinking about Europe: in Europe they 
treat people with respect for human rights; they treat people in a nice way.”  
(male from Southern Asia, agriculture, regular migrant) 
 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Protecting migrant workers from exploitation in the 
























The agreement of the international definition of human trafficking in the 2000 Palermo 
Protocol is a noteworthy achievement, welcomed for providing the first internationally 
agreed definition of the offence. However, this international definition fails to provide 
clarity as to the exact scope and meaning of exploitation. Instead, it consists of an open-
ended list of forms of exploitation that “at a minimum” amount to exploitation. Labour 
exploitation is enumerated as forced or compulsory labour, slavery or practices similar 
to slavery and servitude. This adds confusion since these forms of exploitation are also 
separately legally defined and criminally prohibited. Despite the international 
recognition of these severe forms of labour exploitation, the current legal framework 
thus engenders a lack of clarity as to the threshold between decent working conditions 
and labour exploitation. This thesis will address this legal gap by seeking to legally 
conceptualise labour exploitation. 
The state-of-the-art legal understanding of labour exploitation reveals that the 
international definition of human trafficking has, in the most part, been replicated in 
both regional and domestic settings (Part I). However, the contemporary understanding 
of labour exploitation remains thwarted by confusion and conflation of legal terms, as 
we exemplify in this thesis by reference to the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights. Legal ambiguity hinders the full understanding and implementation of 
existing legal frameworks that seek to combat labour exploitation and fails to protect 
those who are subject to exploitative working practices, regardless of whether they are 
considered to be trafficked persons or not.  
The research adopts a cross-disciplinary exploration of the topic using a legal 
analysis (Part I) and a political theory analysis (Part II). Building on these findings, we 
comparatively analyse the judicial interpretation of labour exploitation in 72 criminal 
cases of two European national legal orders: Belgium and England & Wales (Part III). 
This allows us to develop a roadmap of its judicial understanding from which we 
conceptualise labour exploitation as: A knowingly taking unfair advantage of B’s 
position of vulnerability by means of the exercise of control showing a lack of respect 
for B’s human dignity, in order to gain a benefit. 
The proposed conceptualisation and its accompanying key constituent elements 
provide for consistency and legal certainty (Part IV). They are envisaged as a 
springboard for future efforts seeking to tackle labour exploitation. Whilst the thesis’ 
emphasis is premised upon the analysis of criminalised forms of relational exploitation 
(exploitation by individuals on other individuals), we acknowledge the need to ensure 
that not only criminal law is galvanised to tackle this issue. Other law and policy areas 
are needed to address not only relational but also the structural features of our global, 
neo-liberal labour market and societies that exacerbate and fuel the instrumentalisation 
of millions of workers in a precarious situation. As such, this conceptualisation must 
be complementary to additional measures that secure the respect for the human and 
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0. Introduction and structure of the chapter 
 
In recent decades, there has been much focus on human trafficking in law, policy and 
academia with a significant achievement being the promulgation of an internationally 
agreed definition in Article 3(a) of the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (hereinafter the Palermo 
Protocol). The Palermo Protocol defines the international crime of human trafficking 
as:  
Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring 
or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, 
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent 
of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others 
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices 
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs [emphasis added].1 
 
	
1 Article 3 United Nations, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, New York, 15 November 2000, UNTS, 
vol. 2237, p. 319, Doc. A/55/383.  
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The definition of human trafficking consists of three constituent elements, the 
action, the means and the purpose. The emphasis in this thesis is the latter as the 
Palermo Protocol fails to define the meaning of the term exploitation. Instead, different 
forms of exploitation are non-exhaustively listed. Moreover, the use of a phrase “at a 
minimum” suggests that there is room for manoeuvre. The adoption of a non-exhaustive 
and enumerative approach to exploitation in international law means that the concept 
remains undefined. This thesis will address this legal lacuna by seeking to better 
understand the interpretation of the material scope of exploitation in the context of 
human trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation,2 wherein the enumerated 
forms of exploitation include, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude.3 More broadly, in this thesis we use labour exploitation to refer to 
the criminalised standalone forms of exploitation. It can also be used to encapsulate an 
as yet undefined broader understanding. Namely, those working conditions that do not 
amount to decent work but equally do not satisfy the definitions of any of the standalone 
prohibited forms of exploitation. Such conditions could in fact amount to exploitative 
working conditions but are not formally categorised as such due to the lack of clarity 
as to the threshold of labour exploitation – it could be argued that this grey area is 
recognised and captured in the trafficking definition by use of the phrase “at a 
minimum”.  
 
The international community’s focus on human trafficking has led to a global 
response premised upon the criminalisation of individuals who seek to exploit others. 
However, in the context of human trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation, the 
effectiveness of such a global prohibition regime falls into question when the most 
recent International Labour Organisation (ILO) global estimate of 24.9 million people, 
at any given time in 2016, subjected to forced labour is contrasted with a low – but 
admittedly slowly increasing – number of prosecutions. 4 It is important to highlight 
	
2 We recognise that “trafficking for the purposes of labour exploitation” is not articulated as such in the international legal 
definition, but we wish to use this term to collectively refer to the forms of labour exploitation that are explicitly listed in the 
Palermo Protocol, namely: forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude. Hereinafter, in order to make 
a clear distinction between the different forms of labour exploitation in law, when discussing human trafficking we will collectively 
refer to these forms as human trafficking for the purposes of labour exploitation and when discussing these forms of labour 
exploitation outside of the trafficking context, we will refer to them as standalone offences. 
3  This understanding of human trafficking for labour exploitation follows the Council of Europe who makes the same 
categorisation, see Council of Europe, 7th General Report on GRETA’S Activities (2018), p. 34; Council of Europe, Ready for 
future challenges - Reinforcing the Council of Europe - Report by the Secretary General for the Ministerial Session in Helsinki, 
16-17 May 2019, CM-Public SG (2019) 1 01/04/2019, p. 29. 
4 ILO, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage, Geneva, September 2017; UNODC, Global 
Report on Trafficking in Persons (Vienna: United Nations, 2018), pp. 45-46.  
	 3	
that even here the lack of clarification of labour exploitation comes to the fore, whereby 
the recent ILO estimate of forced labour mentioned above has been combined with 
forced marriage and child labour to reach an estimated 40.9 million people in “modern 
slavery”. Notwithstanding the discrepancies and discussions regarding the accuracy of 
estimates of the scale of labour exploitation, the disparity between the scale of the 
problem and the efforts at tackling them are indicative of the complexity of this 
phenomenon. We acknowledge that criminal prosecutions alone will not address the 
issue requiring a broader response that goes beyond the law, and in particular the 
criminal law. However, we contend that the existing criminal law framework for 
combating labour exploitation still also requires attention to ensure that measures that 
seek to prevent and protect those who are vulnerable to exploitation are effective. The 
need for continued evaluation of the existing platforms for combatting human 
trafficking for labour exploitation is demonstrated by the fact that not only is it 
increasing – the UNODC Global Report states that one victim out of three detected 
globally are victims of labour exploitation – but in many countries it is now the 
predominant form of human trafficking.5 
 
The aim of this introductory chapter is to present an initial exploration of the 
topic of the thesis, namely the conceptualisation of labour exploitation in criminal law 
both in the context of trafficking in human beings and the existing standalone offences. 
Section 1 discusses the object of enquiry with a presentation of the problem and the 
research question. Section 2 is devoted to the presentation of the broader research 
context. Section 3 presents general methodological considerations. Section 4 discusses 
the added value of the research to wider scholarship and Section 5 outlines the structure 






5 UNODC (2018), supra n.4, p. 29; Council of Europe (2018), supra n.3, p. 6.  
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1. The object of enquiry: the lack of a definition of labour exploitation in 
human trafficking law 
 
In 1994 Hill wrote that ‘no clearly defined necessary and sufficient conditions govern 
the application of the concept of exploitation’ in law. 6  The situation remains 
unchanged. Thus, the international community’s increased emphasis on tackling human 
trafficking for labour exploitation requires further investigation as to how effective anti-
trafficking measures are in practice. In particular, human trafficking for labour 
exploitation poses particular problems as a number of challenges have emerged that put 
into question the sustainability of efforts to tackle the phenomenon as will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 1 (Section 2). These challenges emanate from the ‘differences […] 
in practice in the interpretation and application of labour standards and in defining 
labour exploitation.’7 As such, the articulation of a legal conceptualisation of labour 
exploitation is the focus of this thesis. More specifically, the principal object of enquiry 
is the lack of a definition of labour exploitation in human trafficking. This section will 
briefly outline the problem definition and the research question. 
 
1.1 The problem definition 
 
The international law human trafficking definition presents a non-exhaustive list of 
forms of exploitation that “at a minimum” amount to labour exploitation: forced labour 
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery and servitude.8 A paradox emerges 
here, as the aforementioned enumerated prohibited forms of labour exploitation are 
defined in international law, however the exact scope of labour exploitation in the 
context of human trafficking remains uncertain and has led to an unharmonised 
application of the offence in national legal orders. 9  
 
The ambiguous nature of the international human trafficking definition is not a 
new phenomenon in the context of transnational criminal law. The creation of 
	
6 Hill, J., ‘Exploitation’, (1994) Cornell Law Review 79, 631, p. 635. 
7 Council of Europe (2018), supra n.3, p.32. 
8 Article 4, Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005), Article 2, Directive 2011/36/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and 
protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101, 15.4.2011, p. 1–11. NB this thesis 
will situate the discussion in the context of European anti-trafficking law that has adopted the international definition of human 
trafficking proscribed in Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol.  
9 Council of Europe (2018), supra n.3, p.34-35.  
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international crimes and their subsequent incorporation into national legal orders is 
characterised by the creation of a double layered structure of domestic criminal offences 
and international offences. The conceptualisation of this double layered structure is a 
major challenge for scholars working on international and transnational criminal law.10 
In the context of human trafficking, one concrete implication of the ambiguous 
definition is that ‘restrictive interpretations by courts of what constitutes human 
trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation may result in acquittals or the cases 
being considered as labour law violations or exploitation which does not involve human 
trafficking.’ 11 Another concern arises from the fact that the circumstances surrounding 
situations of labour exploitation are extremely complex making identification difficult. 
For example, exploitation may occur in legitimate economic sectors and workers may 
appear to tacitly accept or tolerate exploitative working conditions. Furthermore, where 
individuals are subject to bad working conditions that do not necessarily meet the legal 
threshold of trafficking it may be difficult to address borderline cases. The UNODC 
highlighted that the failure to identify human trafficking for the purpose of labour 
exploitation can result in highly exploitative conduct being addressed as an 
administrative offence or even going unpunished.12 Following this line of argument, 
Mantouvalou posits that the narrow focus on ‘extreme forms of exploitation legitimates 
unfair treatment at work and obscures the moral wrong of exploitation.’ 13 Indeed, we 
see the non-engagement with exploitation in law as permitting legal structures to be 
implicit in creating vulnerability and fostering exploitation, which has, quite rightly, 
led to Mantouvalou’s call for the concept of exploitation to be revisited. 14  
 
Whilst we acknowledge the need for broader engagement with the concept of 
structural accounts of exploitation,15 our focus here will remain on the narrow setting 
of the criminal law, where the prohibition of exploitation tackles relational accounts of 
	
10 Duff, R.A., Farmer, L., Marshall, S.E., Renzo, M. & Tadros, V. (eds) Criminalisation: the political morality of the criminal law, 
(Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 16. 
11 Council of Europe (2018), supra n.3, p.34-35. 
12 UNODC, Issue paper, The International Legal Definition of Trafficking in Persons: Consolidation of research findings and 
reflection on issues raised, (Vienna: United Nations, 2018), p. 26 
13  Mantouvalou V., ‘Legal construction of structures of exploitation’ in Collins, H., Lester, G., & Mantouvalou V., (eds) 
Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law, (Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 188.  
14 Mantouvalou, V., ‘The Right to Non-Exploitative Work,’ in Mantouvalou V., (ed.) The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical 
Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2015); Mantouvalou, V., (2018), supra n. 13.  
15 Structural exploitation is a property of institutions or systems in which the “rules of the game” unfairly benefit one group of 
people to the detriment of another see Zwolinksi, M., & Wertheimer, A., Exploitation, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first 
published 2001, revised 2016). 
Structural exploitation is discussed by Zwolinski, M., ‘Structural Exploitation’, (2011) Social Philosophy and Policy 29(1), 154-
179. p159; Wolff, J., ‘Structures of exploitation’ in Collins, H., Lester, G., & Mantouvalou V., (eds) Philosophical Foundations of 
Labour Law, (Oxford University Press, 2018); Mantouvalou, V., (2018), supra n. 13.  
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exploitation,16 as we contend that there is still a lot to be done in this area. For instance, 
national criminal legal frameworks have failed to embed even the most serious forms 
of exploitation,17 and those that have are still grappling with a novel area of criminal 
law in its embryonic phases of implementation in domestic contexts.  
 
The contemporary framing of the aforementioned forms of labour exploitation 
as “modern slavery”, in both academic and populist discourse, has led to further 
confusion and conflation in legal terms. The jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights exemplifies this situation wherein the Court held that human trafficking 
falls within the scope of Article 4 of the European Convention for the protection of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, 1950 (ECHR) without providing further 
interpretative clarity of the prohibited practices that are listed in the provision. This 
begs the question: does such an omission conflate and equate human trafficking with 
these practices, effectively rendering human trafficking equivalent to slavery?18  
 
To investigate this conundrum further, it is important to interrogate the extent 
to which the focus on human trafficking and “modern slavery” has hindered the full 
understanding and implementation of legal frameworks that effectively combat labour 
exploitation in general and fail to protect those who are subject to exploitative working 
practices, regardless of whether they are considered to be trafficked persons or not. For 
scholars and practitioners alike, it is not clear where decent work turns into a form of 
exploitation.19 One way in which the concept of exploitation can be further clarified is 
through judicial engagement, however as there has, to date, been limited caselaw, the 
exact parameters of the nature of exploitation and the threshold between bad working 
conditions and labour exploitation remain unclear.20 The persisting ambiguities in the 
	
16 Relational exploitation is a property of a discrete transaction between two or more individuals see Zwolinksi, M., & Wertheimer, 
A., (2001) supra n.15. Also known as interpersonal exploitation, transactional exploitation, interrelational exploitation, 
opportunistic exploitation.  
17 UNODC, Issue Paper: The Concept of "Exploitation" in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol (New York: United Nations, 2015); 
European Commission, Study on case-law relating to trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation Final report (2015); 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Severe labour exploitation: workers moving within or into the European Union 
States’ obligations and victims’ rights, June 2015. 
18 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 7 January 2010, Application No. 25965/04. 
19 Rijken, C., ‘Trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation: cooperation in an integrated approach’, (2013) European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21, 9-35, p. 12; Skrivankova, K., Between decent work and forced labour: 
examining the continuum of exploitation, JRF programme paper (November 2010), p. 16. O’Connell Davidson, J., “New Slavery, 
Old Binaries: Human Trafficking and the Borders of ‘freedom,’” (2010) Global Networks 10(2), 244–61, p. 252. 
20 Shamir, H., ‘A labor paradigm for human trafficking’, (2012) UCLA Law Review 60, 76 – 136, p. 85-86; Stoyanova, V., ‘Dancing 
on the Borders of Article 4: Human trafficking and the European Court of Human Rights in the Rantsev case’ (2012) Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 30(2), 163-194, p. 185; Gallagher, A., ‘The International Legal Definition of “Trafficking in Persons”: 
Scope and Application’ in Kotiswaran, P., (ed.) Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern 
Slavery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
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definition are complicating the efforts of States to prosecute human trafficking,21 as a 
recent study by Scarpa concluded: definitional ambiguity ‘increases the complexity of 
the trafficking framework and dilutes its consistency.’22 
 
With this in mind, we suggest that a conceptualisation of exploitation in law is 
key to distinguishing between labour exploitation and poor working conditions. Such 
an exercise will ensure that criminal law as the most severe form of punishment is 
applied in a proportionate manner (principle of ultima ratio) and only applies to the 
most severe forms of labour exploitation, whereas violations of labour standards would 
be handled by other areas of law including labour or administrative law.23  
 
We note that there is resistance to attempts at clarifying exploitation, 
particularly with regard to a possible reduction in flexibility, wherein a narrow focus 
may lead to oversight in certain situations. 24  The necessity of determining the 
parameters of exploitation is further questioned by Allain. He considers that 
exploitation is clearly enumerated in law, for instance, the understanding of exploitation 
in human trafficking as defined in the Palermo Protocol is to be understood with 
reference to the legal instruments, which define these practices: these legal standards 
are the pivot.25 Therefore, in the view of these authors, there is no need to define 
exploitation in law, as it is categorical rather than definitional and any forms of 
exploitation that do not reach the threshold of those enumerated practices are in fact 
violations of international labour standards, as outlined by the ILO. 26 Thereby, in the 
context of labour exploitation, it is these international labour standards that establish 
the threshold between exploitative labour and legitimate labour. 27      
 
	
21 UNODC Issue paper (2018), supra n. 12, p. 23. 
22 For discussion on impact of lack of international standardization of definitions along the lines of the trafficking protocol see 
Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, Study on Contemporary forms of slavery, (December 2018), p.29; UNODC, 
Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (New York: United Nations, 2014), p. 16. 
23 Government of Netherlands, Team Work! Manual for experts on multidisciplinary cooperation against trafficking in human 
beings for labour exploitation, January 2016, p.65. 
24 UNODC (2018), supra n.4, p. 25; Skrivankova, K., ‘Defining exploitation in the context of trafficking – what is a crime and 
what is not,’ in Piotrowicz, R., Rijken, C., and Uhl, B. H., (eds) Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking, (Routledge, 2017), 
p.112. 
25 Allain, J., ‘No Effective Trafficking Definition Exists: Domestic Implementation of the Palermo Protocol’, (2014) Albany 
Government Law Review 14, 1-22, p. 3. 
26 Allain (2014), supra n.25, p. 3. The ILO has identified four categories of fundamental principles and rights at work: freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour, the effective abolition of child 
labour and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. See ILO, Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, 18 June 1998.   
27 Allain, J., Slavery in international law of human exploitation and trafficking, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), p. 
212. 
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Nevertheless, ample evidence exists from international and regional research on 
labour exploitation that law makers, judges, legal professionals and policy makers have 
a difficulty in applying and understanding ‘the multiplicity of forms of labour 
exploitation and legal provisions relevant to it.’28 Gallagher for instance emphasises 
that practitioners are struggling to distinguish between human trafficking and the 
various forms of exploitation. 29  Moreover, in the absence of a clear definition of 
exploitation, it is difficult to draw the line between exploitation in terms of violations 
of labour rights and extreme exploitation amounting to forced labour, servitude or 
slavery.30 We follow this line of reasoning. Clarifying the scope of exploitation is 
important to ensuring that the identification of potential victims of human trafficking 
and their access to effective remedies is facilitated by the legal certainty that a clear 
conceptualisation of the phenomenon would provide, overcoming the difficulties that 
arise where a workers situation is not deemed serious enough to meet the threshold of 
human trafficking for labour exploitation.31   
 
1.2 The research question  
 
The overall objective of the thesis is to legally conceptualise labour exploitation. In 
effect, how can labour exploitation be conceptualised in law specifically in the context 
of human trafficking and should it be established as a standalone criminal offence?  
 
The route to answer this overarching research question is facilitated by the 
following subsidiary research questions:  
• What is the current state-of-the-art legal understanding of labour exploitation 
(namely, human trafficking for labour exploitation, slavery, servitude, practices 
similar to slavery and forced or compulsory labour) in international and 
regional law? (Chapters 1-3) 
	
28 FRA (2015), supra n.17, p.15; European Commission (2015), supra n.17, p.22 & p. 79. See UNODC, Global Report on 
Trafficking in Persons (Vienna: United Nations, 2016), p. 16. 
29 Gallagher, A., ‘Two Cheers for the Trafficking Protocol’, (2015) Anti-Trafficking Review Issue 4, 14—32. See also Directorate-
General for External Policies Policy Department (2018), supra n. 22, p.9. 
30 Skrivankova (2010), supra n.19, p. 16. See also Dottridge, M., ‘Trafficked and Exploited: The Urgent Need for Coherence in 
International Law’, in Kotiswaran, P., (ed.) Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 76-77. 
31 For discussion of R v N; R v LE (2012) EWCA Crim 189, para 90-9 in the Court of Appeal also brought into question the 
voluntariness of the appellant - he was untroubled by the conditions or the work see Skrivankova, (2017), supra n.24, K., p.117. 
Contrast with the Dutch case, where the distinction is to be made between the objective standards, and not the subjectivity or free 
will of the individual. Hof Aarnem Leeuwarden, 16 march 2017 ECLI; GHARLL 2017: 2189 “Vrijwilligheid en subjectief 
welbevinden van slachtoffers in uitbuitingszaken is echter niet van belang voor beoordeling van de vraag of die slachtoffers zijn 
uitgebuit in de zin der wet.” Hoge Raad, 19 March 2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:383. 
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• What are the obstacles to the legal clarification of labour exploitation? 
(Chapter 4) 
• How do exploitation theories conceptualise labour exploitation? (Chapter 5) 
• What are the conditions of exploitation that emerge from theory? (Chapter 6) 
• How is labour exploitation substantively and formally criminalised in Belgium 
and England & Wales? (Chapter 8) 
• How does the judiciary interpret the material scope of labour exploitation? 
(Chapters 9 & 10) 
• How can labour exploitation be conceptualised in criminal law? (Chapters 11 
& 12) 
 
Overall, the thesis seeks to determine whether or not a lack of definition of 
exploitation has hindered the effective implementation of legal frameworks that seek 
to combat labour exploitation. We will investigate the extent to which the judicial 
interpretation of labour exploitation can assist in clarifying the legal concept of labour 
exploitation primarily in the context of human trafficking but also by extension to 
instances of labour exploitation that occur outside of the scope of the human trafficking 
offence and are captured either as an existing standalone criminal offence (i.e. forced 
labour, slavery or servitude), or indeed as a standalone offence of general exploitation. 
It is envisaged that the latter offence could be applied not only to situations of 
exploitation that are not captured as human trafficking due to a lack of constituent 
elements, but also to situations where exploitation has taken place but does meet the 
definition of forced labour. 32 This will be a critical point of discussion throughout the 
thesis, in particular in Chapter 1 when determining the impact of a lack of definition of 
exploitation and again in concluding chapters. Such an approach seeks to position the 
phenomenon of exploitation in such a way that provides an understanding that is of 
utility to legal decision-making and policy. Indeed, recent developments in 
supranational arenas suggests that such an intellectual, academic engagement with this 
subject is very timely, since there have been calls for future legal reform that would 
seek to tackle the problem of human trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation 
in order for it to be properly recognised.33 
	
32 Stoyanova, (2012), supra n. 20, pp. 183-184. 
33 For example, the 2019 Secretary General Report of the Council of Europe recommends a protocol to the Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings and a recent study for the European Parliament suggests the possibility of drafting a new 
treaty on contemporary forms of slavery, as a way to facilitate conceptual clarification. Council of Europe (2019) supra n.3, p. 29; 
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2. The research context: tackling exploitation in a globalised labour market 
 
As mentioned above, the most recent 2017 ILO global estimate suggests that more 
people are being subjected to exploitative labour conditions than at any point in 
history.34 The global component of human exploitation is further galvanised by the 
neoliberal tenets of a globalised labour market characterised by free trade, market 
liberalisation, and deregulation, fiscal austerity and privatisation. 35  Whilst the 
globalised nature of the labour market is characterised by the unrestricted international 
exchange of capital and goods and an increase in demand for labour, the supply of such 
labour has been stunted by restrictions on flows of people, with the movement of people 
constrained by the limited availability of legal migration channels.36 Importantly, as 
Chuang notes, such a labour gap is only set to increase, with ‘labour shortages, skills 
shortages, and increased tax burdens on the working population.’37 In short, the need 
for a supply of labour is inevitable; however mechanisms ‘to facilitate lawful migration 
have diminished as favoured destination countries tighten their borders.’38 This leaves 
migrant workers with very little choice but to submit to exploitative recruitment and 
labour practices, exacerbating the risk of forced or compulsory labour.39 It is important 
to emphasise that the regularity of a person’s migration status does not entirely negate 
the possibility of being at risk of exploitation, it is also possible for regular migrants to 
be denied labour and human rights; for example those who are tied to their employer.40 
Nevertheless, it is well-documented that irregular migrants are more vulnerable,41 as 
exploiters make ‘instrumental use of precarious immigration status as a tool of coercion 
and control of exploitation labour relation.’ 42 
	
Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department (2018), supra n.22, p.6. See also calls from Ms. Maria Grazia 
Giammarinaro, UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children on the need for a broader 
application of labour exploitation in presentation given at JUSTICE AT LAST - European Action for Compensation for Victims 
of Crime International Exchange Seminar 27-28 May 2019.  
34 ILO (2017), supra n. 4. 
35 Lewis, H., Dwyer, P., Hodkinson, S., & Waite, L., (eds) Precarious lives: forced labour, exploitation and asylum, (Bristol: 
Policy Press, 2015), p. 19. 
36 Chuang, J., ‘Beyond a snapshot: Preventing human trafficking in the global economy’, (2006) Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 13(1), 137-163, P. 140.  
37 Chuang (2006), supra n.36, pp. 140 – 144. 
38 Chuang, J., ‘Rescuing trafficking from ideological capture: prostitution reform and anti-trafficking law and policy,’ (2010) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 158(6), 1655-1728, p. 1660; Shelley, L., Human Trafficking: A global perspective, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 42. 
39 Aronowitz, A., Human Trafficking, Human Misery: The Global Trade in Human Beings, (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press Inc., 
2013), p. 12; Gallagher, A., ‘Exploitation in migration: unacceptable but inevitable’, (2015) Journal of International Affairs 68(2), 
55-74, p. 67; Lewis,et al (2015), supra n.35, p. 19. 
40 International Organisation for Migration Is trafficking in human beings demand driven? A multi-country pilot study, Anderson, 
B., & O’Connell Davidson, J., Migration Research Series (2003), p. 8. 
41 Aronowitz (2013), supra n.39, p. 23. Ollus, N., ‘Regulating forced labour and combating human trafficking: the relevance of 
historical definitions in a contemporary perspective’ (2015) Crime Law and Social Change 63(5), 221-246, p. 224. 
42 Lewis et al (2015), supra n. 35, p. 15. 
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As such, the aforementioned figure of 24.9 million people who are considered 
to be in a position of forced labour, implicates a wide range of actors and not just States, 
especially taking into account the increasing prevalence of multinational corporations 
in global structures of power.43 Inevitably, human trafficking is one form of illicit 
enterprise that has profited from the neoliberal state of affairs, with the opportunities 
offered by the globalised labour market seen as a viable source of potential wealth for 
those who wish to benefit. Despite the increased emphasis on tackling human 
trafficking, regulatory efforts to respond to labour exploitation have been limited to 
relational forms of exploitation that are characterised by the intentional exploitation of 
another, rather than the structural processes, such as the globalised labour market, that 
exacerbate and in some instances create exploitation.44 O’Connell Davidson & Quirk 
have on many occasions made note of the extent to which exploitation is being 
tolerated, with an emphasis on the ‘politics of exception’45  or ‘depoliticisation of 
extreme exploitation’,46 that has a ‘self-serving effect of concealing large parts of 
exploitation.’47 With this in mind, any efforts made to further conceptualise labour 
exploitation in law must also seek to be applicable to the broader context of both 
structural and relational exploitation, hopefully to the benefit of future regulatory 
efforts. In order for such efforts to be effective, they must exercise caution, however, 
as already, the narrow concept of the term exploitation is overused not only when 
referring to the most extreme cases but also when addressing transactions that leads to 
an imbalanced outcome.48 As noted by Sample, this is a slippery slope as ‘not all 
transactions involving unequally divided benefits are exploitative or morally 
	
43 Dahan, Y., Lerner, H., Milma-Sivan, F., ‘Global labor rights as duties of justice’, in Dahan, Y., Lerner, H., Milma-Sivan, F., 
(eds) Global Justice and International Labour Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2016), p.70-77. 
44 Mantouvalou (2018), supra n.13 p. 188; Wolff (2018), supra n.15, p.178 & p.183. Gebrewold, B., ‘Human Trafficking and 
Structural Violence’ in Gebrewold, B., Kostenzer, J., & Müller, A. T., Human trafficking and exploitation: Lessons from Europe, 
(Routledge, 2017).Goodin, R., ‘Exploiting a situation and exploiting a person’, Reeve, S., (ed.) Modern Theories of exploitation 
(Sage Publishing, 1987), p26; See Muller re the requirement for criminal offences under Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol to be 
committed intentionally Müller, A.T., ‘The Promise and Pitfalls of Criminalizing Trafficking in Persons at the International Level. 
An Analysis from the Perspective of International and European Criminal Law’ in Gebrewold, B., Kostenzer, J., & Müller, A. T., 
(eds) Human trafficking and exploitation: Lessons from Europe, (Routledge, 2017), p49-53. For discussion on shift to structural 
contributors to human trafficking phenomenon see Chuang, J., ‘Contemporary Debt Bondage, “Self-Exploitation,” and the Limits 
of the Trafficking Definition’, in Kotiswaran, P., (ed.) Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and 
Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p.113 For discussion on the role of state immigration regimes 
on perpetuating exploitation see O’Connell Davidson, J., ‘The Right to Locomotion? Trafficking, Slavery and the State’, in 
Kotiswaran, P., (ed.) Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), p.166-168. 
45 Quirk, J. & Bunting, A., ‘The Politics of Exception: the Bipartisan Appeal of Human Trafficking’ in Quirk, J., & O’Connell 
Davidson, J., (eds) E-Book on Popular and Political Representations (Open Democracy Series, 2016). 
46 O’Connell Davidson (2010), supra n.19, pp. 244–261. 
47 Quirk, J. & O’ Connell Davidson, J., ‘Introduction’ in Quirk, J., & O’Connell Davidson, J., (eds) E-Book on Popular and Political 
Representations, (Open Democracy Series, 2016). 
48 Wolff (2018), supra n.15, p. 175. 
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objectionable’49  and exploitation can lose its significance when it is insufficiently 
understood and improperly employed. 
3. Methodology  
 
The meaning of concepts […] is grounded by the overall structure of theories in which they 
are embedded. They cannot be understood apart from the discursive space they occupy in 
relation to other concepts.50  
 
The above citation by Brewer clearly signifies the rationale for the adoption of a mixed 
methods approach in the present thesis: i) legal positivist analysis and ii) exploratory 
theoretical analysis. Legal positivism is understood as the description and explanation 
of the law as it is, including the analysis of legal texts to determine their meaning. It is 
a suited method of analysis in the present thesis, as we seek to systematise legal norms, 
by analysing the outputs of the courts and checking for coherence and accuracy in their 
application of legal sources. 
 
The legal positivist analysis is twofold. The first stage consists of an expository 
review of the international and regional laws that prohibit labour exploitation (Part I). 
The second stage entails a qualitative comparative analysis of two national legal orders 
by way of analysis of the legislation and a file study on criminal cases to examine the 
domestic implementation of the international prohibition of labour exploitation, both in 
terms of formal and substantive law (Part III). 51 The explorative theoretical analysis 
complements the two stages of the legal analysis process by adopting an explorative 
approach to the existing understanding of exploitation in political theory (Part II). The 
exploratory analysis of the political theory on exploitation seeks to provide information 
so as to further develop the legal analysis and ensure that the research is normatively 
grounded.  
 
The mixed method approach is applicable in the context of research on labour 
exploitation because it not only acknowledges the increasing permeability of domestic 
	
49 Sample, R., Exploitation: What it is and why it’s wrong, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003), p. 1. 
50 Brewer, J., ‘The Scottish Enlightenment’, in Reeve, S., (ed) Modern Theories of exploitation (Sage Publishing, 1987), p. 12-13. 
51 Hervey, T., Cryer, R., Sokhi-Bulley, B., Bohm, A., Research Methodologies in EU and International Law, (Hart, 2011), p.38.  
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legal systems to external regulatory efforts but also the role of legal orders in handling 
moral issues. 52 Indeed, at both stages of analysis of the law in action, an awareness of 
the surrounding contextual factors that may influence the outcome and decision making 
of those who interpret, reform, and implement the law is required. 53  The multi-
disciplinary engagement with political theory permits a holistic contextualised 
understanding of the functioning of the law, achieved by not only taking account of 
legislative rules, judicial decisions, the ‘law in the books’, but also, in fact, everything 
that helps to understand human conduct in the situation under consideration. 54 
Similarly, a contextualised approach recognises that the domestic implementation of 
supranational legal standards requires equivalence functionalism rather than 
unification. This is of relevance to the present thesis and the comparison of two national 
legal orders that are subject to EU Law where, as Michaels reminds us, the principle of 
mutual recognition requires equivalence not similarity. 55 
 
International and regional legal standards do not require domestic jurisdictions to 
apply the law word for word. Supranational standards are merely a minimum basis for 
domestic jurisdictions to apply in their own national legislation, balancing deference to 
national sovereignty and flexibility for the developing/evolutionary nature of the 
concept of exploitation, with a need to minimise the risk of ‘a race to the bottom’ by 
States who seek to pursue their own self-interest. 56 The focus in Part III on two national 
legal orders will begin to demonstrate an understanding of the elements and indicators 
that play a role in practice in the application of very different domestic criminal legal 
frameworks, thus ensuring consistency that will facilitate judicial cooperation and 
prevent double incrimination.57 Importantly, Belgium and England & Wales are two 
Council of Europe member States where labour exploitation has been identified as the 
	
52 Benvenisti E., & Downs, G. W., ‘National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law’, (2009) 
European Journal of International Law 20(1), 59 – 72, p.60.  
Brand, O., ‘Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal Studies,’ 2007 Brook. Journal of 
International Law 32, 405, p. 413; Palmer, V. V., ‘From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’, 
(2005) American Journal of Comparative Law 53, 261, p283. 
54 Lomio, J. Paul, et al. Legal Research Methods in a Modern World: A Coursebook, (Djøf Forlag, 2011), p. 62. Ewald, W., ‘The 
Jurisprudential Approach to Comparative Law: A Field Guide to Rats’, (1998) American Journal of Comparative Law 46, 701, 
p.702.Palmer (2005), supra n.52, p288. 
55 Michaels, R., ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’, in Reimann M., & Zimmermann, R., (eds) The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Law (2nd edition), (Oxford University Press: 2019), p. 376-378. 
56 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 
Warsaw, 16.V.2005 (2005); Langille, B., ‘Global justice and the grammar of law,’ in Dahan, Y., Lerner, H., Milma-Sivan, F., (eds) 
Global Justice and International Labour Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 201. 
57 Article 83 TFEU Harmonisation of substantive criminal law, Huberts, C., ‘Les innovations de la loi du 10 août 2005 modifiant 
diverses dispositions en vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite et le trafic des êtres humains et contre les pratiques des marchands 
de sommeil’, (2006) Journal du Droit des Jeunes n°251, 6-22, p. 22; see Müller (2017), supra n. 44, p56. For example, like 
Belgium, the Netherlands has no standalone offences, which calls for concern over the lack of alternatives where there is not 
sufficient evidence of trafficking. European Agency for Fundamental Rights (2015), supra n. 17, p.39. 
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predominant form of trafficking.58 With this in mind, a number of criteria explains the 
choice of case studies: 
 
i) Belgium has a civil law system whereby in complex criminal cases an 
examining judge [juge d’instruction] may direct the investigation and deal 
with pre-trial matters, whereas England & Wales’ common law system has 
a judge led pre-trial hearing, the trial itself involves a jury with the role of 
the judge being to provide legal directions. Thus, there is a distinction in the 
role of the judge in the substantive criminalisation of labour exploitation; 
ii) In addition to human trafficking for the purposes of labour exploitation, 
three standalone offences of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory 
labour are criminalised in England & Wales. By contrast, in Belgium the 
only relevant offence is human trafficking for economic exploitation, 
notwithstanding the existence of a Social Criminal Code prohibiting certain 
labour market violations; 
iii) Labour exploitation in the human trafficking offence is broadly understood 
in Belgium, whereas in England & Wales, the offence must involve an 
action of arranging or facilitating travel, limiting the scope of its application; 
iv) The physical access to judgments in both countries are in languages that are 
consistent with the linguistic capabilities of the researcher. As we will 
explain in Chapter 7, the file study in Belgium is restricted to francophone 
cases only. 
 
Finally, the two national legal orders are representative of two influential 
domestic policy approaches in terms of the regional and international purview of the 
prohibition of labour exploitation. Belgian practitioners highlight the influential role of 
existing domestic law in the development of the EU legal framework that we will 
discuss in Chapter 1, which culminated in the Directive 2011/36/EU and two additional 
forms of exploitation in the EU definition of trafficking, i.e. forced begging and 
exploitation of forced criminality. These two purposes of exploitation have been present 
in Belgian legislation since 2005.59 Similarly, the UK government’s engagement in 
	
58 Council of Europe (2018), supra n.3, p.38. 
59 The Belgian authorities who held the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU in 2010 also referred to the swift completion 
of the Directive’s negotiations. An agreement among Member States was obtained at the JHA Council of 2 and 3 December 2010 
(Doc. 16918/10), and the Parliament approved the text on 14 December 2010 (P7_TA (2010) 0471, A7-0348/2010), allowing the 
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modern slavery as a criminal justice priority (despite initial denial of any need for such 
a law and policy framework) has influenced subsequent domestic legal reform beyond 
the borders of Europe.60  
4. The added-value  
 
The present thesis contains original work that will significantly contribute to the field 
of human trafficking and labour exploitation research, an area which is still lacking 
despite an increased emphasis on research on this phenomenon in recent years.61 In 
particular, the combination of the law and theory on exploitation is unique and ensures 
a strong normative foundation for its future functionality.  
 
Prosecutions and criminal cases of human trafficking for labour exploitation are 
rarely subject to expert analysis on the role of courts in interpreting the international 
definition, as there is a weak evidence base due to a short timeframe in some instances 
of introduction of the offences in domestic criminal law and consequently the number 
of cases being ‘thin on the ground.’62  Therefore, the comparative analysis of the 
application and interpretation of the substantive criminal law in national legal orders is 
unique. The judicial interpretation and adjudication of the law is crucial to its effective 
application and to provide legal certainty and consistency to the national criminal 
justice policy on combatting human trafficking for labour exploitation. 63 However, to 
date there have been concerns raised as to the domestic courts failure to fully understand 
the gravity of labour exploitation or the nexus with human trafficking.64 One of the 
main reasons for this is that there has been very few cases to handle what is understood 
to be a particularly “novel” area of law. As a result, there is a limited understanding of 
	
adoption of the Directive by the Council on 21 March 2011. For more details about the role of Belgium in the development of the 
EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, see Weyembergh, A., & Brière, C., ‘La Belgique: moteur de l'espace européen de 
justice pénale?’, (2013) Revue des affaires européennes, 105, p. 105. Huberts, C., & Minet, J.-F., ‘La loi du 29 avril 2013 visant à 
modifier l’article 433quinquies du Code pénal en vue de clarifier et d’étendre la définition de la traite des êtres humains: analyse 
et mise en perspective’ (2014) Revue de Droit Pénal de de Criminologie, 34, p. 6 – 7. 
60 Theresa May brought the issue to the fore in a speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2017 that was 
followed by an adoption of a ‘Political Declaration to on the Implementation of the United Nations Global Action Plan to Combat 
Trafficking in Persons’ on 27 September 2017 (UN/GA/ 11995).  
The drafting and implementation of the Australian Modern Slavery Act 2018 was heavily influenced by the legislative 
developments in the UK.  
61 Council of Europe (2018), supra n. 3, pp.39-41. 
62 Gallagher, A., ‘Editorial: The Problems and Prospects of Trafficking Prosecutions: Ending impunity and securing justice’, (2016) 
Anti-trafficking Review Issue 6, 1-5, pp. 4-5. Esser, L.B., & Dettmeijer-Vermeulen, C.E., ‘The Prominent Role of National Judges 
in Interpreting the International Definition of Human Trafficking’ (2016) Anti-trafficking Review, Issue 6, 91-105, p. 91. 
63 Müller (2107), supra n. 44, p58. 
64 On this point see the discussion of the role of the Greek courts in ECHR case of Chowdury in Council of Europe (2018), supra 
n.3, p. 6.  
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what constitutes trafficking for forced labour and the meaning and scope of 
exploitation. 65 We note that research conducted by the European Commission reveals 
that the scope of the meaning of forced labour, and in some instances a restrictive 
interpretation by courts, can lead to acquittals or cases being prosecuted under 
alternative offence provisions.66  
 
The importance of deciphering the judicial understanding of labour exploitation 
will improve prosecutions and effective investigations,67  in particular by ensuring 
improved identification of victims (who do not always perceive themselves as victims 
or do not trust authorities due to their irregular migration status) and improved access 
to legal redress and compensation.68 Furthermore, it will contribute to addressing the 
knowledge gap when it comes to identifying this form of exploitation amongst 
professionals. For example, law enforcement authorities do not always recognise 
potential victims of human trafficking when they complain of non-payment of wages, 
as such a violation is not seen as a criminal matter but as a civil matter.69 A better 
understanding of exploitation will also contribute to ensuring that victims’ rights are 
implemented. For instance, as noted by Burland, recognition of the compulsion to 
criminal activity as a modus operandi of traffickers, will ensure adherence to the 
principle of non-prosecution of victims, recognising them as victims of trafficking and 
not perpetrators.70 
 
Finally, in recognition of the fact that a criminal justice response does not 
address the structural factors that contribute to exploitation, namely, poor protection of 
worker’s rights, increased risk to exploitation in certain sectors, restrictive migration 
regimes, and lack of regulation of labour market compliance; we contend that the 
conceptualisation of exploitation, as it is grounded in both theory and practice, provides 
a normative basis upon which the legal reconceptualisation can also address the 
	
65 See examples of Cyprus where coercion is not recognised, UK where reference is made to the uneven knowledge amongst judges 
and the emphasis on irregular migration status and France where GRETA highlights the prosecution of victims of trafficking as 
offenders in Council of Europe (2018), supra n.3, pp.65-66. 
66 European Commission (2015), supra n. 17.  
67 European Commission (2015), supra n. 17; Gallagher (2016) supra n.62, p. 8. 
68  See examples of Belgium where the possibility for increased compensation was introduced and UK where contradictory 
legislation effectively criminalises trafficking victims, as a result of the entry into force of the new offence of illegal working in 
the Immigration Act 2016 in Council of Europe (2018), supra n. 3, pp.59-66.  
69 See example of UK and reports received from civil society of law enforcement failing to identify potential victims of trafficking 
in Council of Europe (2018), supra n. 3, p.59.  
70 Burland, P., ‘Still punishing the wrong people: the criminalisation of potential trafficked cannabis gardeners’, in Craig, G., Balch, 
A., Lewis, H., & Waite, L., (eds) Modern slavery agenda: policy, politics and practice in the UK (Policy press, 2019), p. 173. 
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structural injustices that create exploitation. Whilst the focus in the present thesis 
remains on clarification of exploitation in the  criminal legal sphere, such a process can 
assist beyond the context of the criminal law, in determining policy and legal measures 
that will regulate and address labour exploitation that is ‘below the line,’71 recognising 
an understanding of exploitation that is integral to wider economic systems, including 
labour markets, migration governance and global inequalities.72 
5. Structure  
 
Bearing in mind the overall purpose and object of enquiry of the thesis and the 
subsidiary research questions; the structure of the thesis not only depicts a cross-
disciplinary exploration of law and political theory, but also interacts with supranational 
and national legal spaces in order to arrive at a scientifically robust response to the main 
research question. 
 
PART I – State-of-the-art understanding of labour exploitation in international 
and regional law  
 
Part I investigates the impact of the lack of a definition of exploitation in international 
and regional law by adopting an expository review of the prohibited forms of labour 
exploitation, namely human trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation (Chapter 
1), slavery and servitude (Chapter 2) and forced or compulsory labour (Chapter 3). Each 
chapter considers the judicial interpretation of these prohibited forms and identifies the 
legal lacunas that emerge from the lack of clarification of their material scope. Chapter 
4 takes stock of the state-of-the-art analysis by preliminarily identifying the elements 
of exploitation that emerge from the prohibited forms of labour exploitation and 
discusses the legal, moral and political obstacles to the legal clarification of labour 
exploitation. 73  
 
	
71 Balch, A., ‘Defeating ‘modern slavery’, reducing exploitation? The organisational and regulatory challenge?’, in Craig, G., 
Balch, A., Lewis, H., & Waite, L., (eds) Modern slavery agenda: policy, politics and practice in the UK, (Policy press, 2019), p. 
91. 
72 Lewis, H., & Waite, L., ‘Migrant illegality, slavery and exploitative work,’ in Craig, G., Balch, A., Lewis, H., & Waite, L., (eds) 
Modern slavery agenda: policy, politics and practice in the UK (Policy press, 2019), p. 219. 
73 Hervey et al (2011), supra n. 51, p.9. 
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PART II – Exploitation and its main elements in political theory  
 
Part II of the thesis shifts away from law and explores exploitation in political theory, 
with a view to identifying those features that can be of relevance to the legal 
understanding of exploitation. Cross-fertilisation of disciplines ensures that the 
normative sources that form the basis of the “external” morality of the law are 
identified.74 The exploratory analysis of exploitation in political theory in Chapter 5 
provides the normative basis for a typology of exploitation and the development of a 
theoretical model that identifies the conditions of exploitation in Chapter 6.  
 
PART III – Labour exploitation in the criminal law of Belgium and England & 
Wales 
 
Part III problematises the lack of a definition of exploitation in law by analysing how 
national legal orders domestically implement the supranational legal framework 
prohibiting labour exploitation. Overall, the analysis compares two national legal 
orders: Belgium and England & Wales. Following a brief overview of the composition 
of the file study and the contextualisation of the two comparison countries in Chapter 
7, the comparative legal analysis is three-fold. First, Chapter 8 considers the formal and 
substantive criminalisation of labour exploitation in the national legal frameworks by 
reviewing the ingredients of the offences and how they have been understood in 
practice. Secondly, we will consider the judicial interpretation of the material scope of 
labour exploitation and taking into account the conditions of exploitation in theory, 
assess the extent to which the judiciary’s interpretation aligns with the understanding 
of exploitation that emerged from the legal and theoretical analysis in Parts I and II 
(Chapter 9). Finally, we will discuss how the judiciary qualify exploitation by using 
indicators as part of their assessment of the existence (nature) and severity (degree) of 
exploitation (Chapter 10) . The focus on the judiciary in this Part highlights the role of 
the judge as being at the forefront of legal developments since judicial precedent is 
generally regarded as binding on future decisions.75  
 
	
74 Langille (2016), supra n. 56, p. 194. 
75 Du Plesssis, J., ‘Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems’, in Reimann M., & Zimmermann, R., (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2nd edition), (Oxford University Press: 2019), p 479. 
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PART IV – Towards a legal conceptualisation of labour exploitation  
 
Bearing in mind the main research question of this thesis - how can labour exploitation 
be conceptualised in law specifically in the context of human trafficking and should it 
be established as a standalone criminal offence? - Chapter 11 draws upon the analysis 
of labour exploitation in law and theory and its domestic prohibition in two national 
legal orders with a view to conceptualising labour exploitation in human trafficking law 
and as a standalone offence. Chapter 12 deliberates on six reflections that need to be 
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0. Introduction and structure of the chapter 
 
Overall this chapter aims to introduce the current legal understanding of labour 
exploitation in the human trafficking law and policy framework. Section 1 outlines the 
international and regional legal instruments that have dealt with human trafficking 
following the entry into force of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000 which promulgated 
an internationally accepted definition of trafficking in persons (Article 3) – hereinafter 
the Palermo Protocol. As seen in the introduction, the definition of human trafficking 
contains three constituent elements that must be identified to meet the legal threshold 
of the offence: the action, the means, and the purpose of exploitation. The object of 
enquiry in the present thesis is the third element: the purpose of exploitation. It is 
contended that the non-exhaustive list of forms of exploitation in the 2000 Palermo 
Protocol perpetuates a categorical as opposed to a definitive understanding of 
exploitation.  
 
Since exploitation is not defined in the Palermo Protocol, Section 2 explores the 
impact of the lack of a legal definition of exploitation on the effective implementation 
of the human trafficking prohibition. Whilst it is accepted that the non-exhaustive 
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categorical list of forms of exploitation constituting the purpose element of the human 
trafficking offence in the Palermo Protocol is to be viewed as a minimum standard that 
permits flexibility to States when dealing with human trafficking domestically, a 
number of difficulties have been identified that stifle the effective tackling of the 
transnational phenomenon. In particular, four problems arise from the lack of a 
definition of exploitation in human trafficking law: a conflation and confusion in 
terminology (Section 2.1) fosters a stereotypical understanding of labour 
exploitation (Section 2.2) and fragmented and inconsistent domestic implementation 
(Section 2.3) that perpetuates legal uncertainty (Section 2.4). 
 
Section 3 introduces the crucial role that the judiciary plays in determining 
the parameters of a concept that is not defined in law. An analysis of the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights highlights the impact of a lack of a definition of 
exploitation. The case law reveals a conflation of human trafficking with other forms 
of exploitation, the lack of understanding of the complexities of the human 
trafficking offence and the need to give the forms of exploitation listed in the 
purpose element as standalone offences a separate handling in law, so that when 
the action and means elements of human trafficking are not present, the situations can 
be attributed to other forms of exploitation.  
 
1. Labour exploitation in international and regional legal definitions of human 
trafficking  
 
Historically, the international understanding of exploitation in human trafficking law 
was restricted to instances of sexual exploitation, or the white slave trade.1  In 2000, the 
transnational crime of human trafficking was defined in one of three Additional 
	
1 International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic (1904) Paris, 18 May 1904, 1 LNTS 83, entered into force on 
18 July 1905, amended by a Protocol approved by the UN General Assembly on 3 December 1948, UNTS, Vol. 30, p. 23; League 
of Nations, Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children, 30 September 1921, 9 LNTS 415; League of Nations, 
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age, 11 October 1933, 150 LNTS 431; UN General Assembly, 
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 2 December 1949, 
A/RES/317, UNTS, Vol. 96, p. 271; UN General Assembly, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Geneva, 7 September 1956, UNTS, vol. 266, p. 3; UN General Assembly, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, UNTS, vol. 999, p. 171; UN General Assembly, 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, UNTS, vol. 993, p. 3; UN General Assembly, 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979, UNTS, vol. 1249, p. 13.  
 See Chuang, J., ‘Redirecting the Debate over Trafficking in Women: Definitions, Paradigms, and Contexts’, (1998) Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 11, 65, pp. 73-78; Allain, J., Slavery in international law of human exploitation and trafficking, (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), p.340; Ollus, N., ‘Regulating forced labour and combating human trafficking: the relevance 
of historical definitions in a contemporary perspective’ (2015) Crime Law and Social Change 63(5), 221-246, p. 222.  
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Protocols to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 
The entry into force of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 (hereinafter the Palermo 
Protocol) is considered as a ‘watershed in galvanising the global movement against 
trafficking’ 2  as it not only addresses gaps in existing legal frameworks 3  but also 
includes a ‘universally accepted’ 4 definition:  
 
Article 3(a). Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or 
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or 
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs [emphasis 
added].5 
 
The definition consists of three constituent elements that must all be present for 
a situation to constitute trafficking in persons under international law: (i) an action; (ii) 
a means by which that action is achieved (except where the victim is a child; it is not 
necessary to prove that one of the acts was accomplished through the use of any of the 
listed means6); and (iii) a purpose of exploitation. Whilst it is acknowledged that 
exploitation is dol specialis requiring evidence of an action and means for the ‘purpose 
of exploitation’, a recent UNODC Issue Paper on the international definition of human 
trafficking notes that in practice, the existence of exploitative situations trigger 
investigations and constitute the ‘most compelling evidence of intention to exploit.’7 
Thus, in practice, the application of the exploitation element is of great value to the 
	
2 Ezeilo, J., ‘Achievement of the Trafficking Protocol: Perspectives from the former UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in 
Persons’, (2015) Anti-trafficking review 4, 144-149, p.144. 
3 van der Wilt, H., ‘Trafficking in human beings, enslavement, crimes against humanity: Unravelling the concepts’ (2014) Chinese 
Journal of International law 13, 297-334, p. 301. 
4 Ezeilo (2015), supra n.2, p.145. 
5 Article 3 United Nations, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, New York, 15 November 2000, UNTS, 
vol. 2237, p. 319, Doc. A/55/383.  
6 Article 3(c), Ibid. 
7 UNODC, Issue paper, The International Legal Definition of Trafficking in Persons: Consolidation of research findings and 
reflection on issues raised, (Vienna: United Nations, 2018), p. 17.  
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identification of human trafficking, reinforcing the importance of clarifying its legal 
meaning. We will further develop this point in the forthcoming chapters that highlight 
the relevance of de facto exploitation (Chapters 2 & 4) and its role in determining the 
existence of the offence (Chapter 9). 
 
Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol extends the scope of the purpose element. 
The element is no longer restricted to the sexual exploitation of women and children,8 
but instead posits a categorical, non-exhaustive list of forms that amount to the 
minimum basis for the types of exploitation to be considered serious enough, when 
combined with the constituent elements of action and means, to constitute the crime of 
human trafficking. For the purpose of the expository review of labour exploitation in 
law in the remainder of Part I, the following forms of labour exploitation that are listed 
in the international definition are the principle focus of enquiry: slavery or practices 
similar to slavery, servitude (Chapter 2) and forced or compulsory labour (Chapter 3). 
 
Crucially, the Palermo Protocol does not define exploitation. Therefore, and 
bearing in mind the overall purpose of this thesis, the present chapter explores the 
promulgation of the categorical manifestation of the purpose element in the human 
trafficking definition and, in particular, the representation of labour exploitation.  
 
Despite the lack of a definition of exploitation in the Palermo Protocol, many 
authors, including Chuang, Edwards, Shelley and Rittich, believe that the extension of 
the purpose element of human trafficking beyond sexual exploitation has triggered a 
shift towards a broader understanding of exploitation and recognition of the 
exploitation phase as being fundamental to the trafficking experience. 9  Chuang 
critiqued the previous anti-trafficking legal framework for being ‘illusory and 
	
8 Supra n.1. 
9 For further discussion and examples of the expansion of the definition see Edwards, A., ‘Trafficking in human beings: At the 
intersection of criminal justice, human rights, asylum/migration and labor’, (2007-2008) Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy 36, 9-53, p. 14.  
For discussion on exploitation as key element of offence see Shelley, L., Human Trafficking: A global perspective, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 11. UNODC Issue paper (2018), supra n.7, p.14; Rittich, K., ‘Representing, Counting, 
Valuing: Managing Definitional Uncertainty in the Law of Trafficking’, in Kotiswaran, P., (ed.) Revisiting the Law and 
Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017),  p247; Chuang, 
J., ‘Contemporary Debt Bondage, “Self-Exploitation,” and the Limits of the Trafficking Definition’, in Kotiswaran, P., (ed.) 
Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), p.118. See regional and international policy reports that recognise emphasis on exploitation element in the international 
definition in Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security, Report of the Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings. 
Brussels, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security (Brussels, 22 December 2004), p.53; ILO, Report I(B), A global 
alliance against forced labour Report of the Director General, Global Report under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 2005, International Labour Conference, 93rd Session, Geneva, 2005, p. 7. 
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ineffective’10  as it failed to take into account the complexity of exploitation. For 
instance, individuals who were vulnerable to trafficking but not sexually exploited were 
not included in the scope of human trafficking. With this in mind, it is important to note 
that whilst the international definition emphasises the fundamental nature of the 
exploitation element, not all exploitation amounts to human trafficking. Indeed, when 
clarifying the interpretation of the definition, the aforementioned UNODC Issue Paper 
confirms that exploitation that occurs in the absence of an act and means (just an act 
for minors), ‘will not constitute trafficking in persons under international law and 
should be addressed by alternative legislative provisions or approaches.’11  
 
Whilst we acknowledge that the extension of the exploitation element in the 
Palermo Protocol is to be applauded, there is some cause for concern, as the categorical 
approach to exploitation (resulting in a non-exhaustive list of forms of exploitation), 
has created definitional uncertainties. The extent to which such uncertainties are due to 
a lack of elaboration of the exploitation element in favour of the two other constituent 
elements during the drafting process is contested. Authors such as Kotiswaran and 
Wijers contend that the means and action elements received far more attention than the 
exploitation element during the drafting and negotiations of the instrument.12 However, 
the UNODC Issue Paper on the international definition refers to the travaux 
préparatoires in order to demonstrate that ‘considerations of exploitation were a central 
part of the negotiations, not just in terms of the definition but also more broadly in 
establishing the Trafficking in Persons Protocol’s scope of application.’ 13  Indeed, 
exploration of the travaux préparatoires reveals attempts to include and broaden the 
scope and understanding of labour exploitation in the definition during the drafting 
process. In particular, the submissions of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) sought clarity of the 
scope of the Protocol and the forms of exploitation it addressed.  
The UN Special Rapporteur proposed that ‘the purpose of the protocol should 
include trafficking of persons into slavery-like conditions, in order to encompass 
	
10 Chuang (1998) supra n.1, p. 66. 
11 UNODC Issue paper (2018), supra n. 7, p.32. 
12 Kotiswaran, P., ‘Protocol at the Crossroads: Rethinking anti-trafficking law from an Indian labour law perspective’ (2015) Anti-
trafficking Review, issue 4, 33-35 pp. 33-55; Wijers, M., ‘Purity, Victimhood and Agency: Fifteen years of the UN Trafficking 
Protocol, (2015) Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 4, 56-79. 
13 UNODC Issue paper (2018), supra n. 7, p.15. 
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trafficking for domestic work, forced marriages and forced motherhood, which were 
not traditionally encompassed under the term “forced labour”.’14  
The ILO proposed the deletion of the reference to sexual exploitation and an 
amendment to include the term ‘trafficking in persons for the purpose of labour 
exploitation in particular forced labour and serfdom.’ 15  Similarly, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights called for trafficking for labour exploitation to be 
understood beyond a restrictive approach of trafficking for forced labour, whereby ‘a 
preferable and more accurate description of purposes would include reference to forced 
labour and/or bonded labour and/or servitude.’16  
 
Ultimately, the subsequent concerns raised by scholars are prima facie well 
founded as, regardless of the efforts made to secure recognition of certain forms of 
labour exploitation in the definition of trafficking, “labour exploitation” as an 
exploitative purpose was expressly excluded, 17  whilst the purpose element of the 
definition clearly includes the rather broad term “other forms of sexual exploitation.”  
 
The travaux préparatoires also demonstrate that the inclusion of a non-
exhaustive list versus an exhaustive list was a divisive point of discussion.18  The 
insertion of the phrase “at a minimum” was intended to allow State parties the 
possibility to go beyond the offences listed in this definition and to make it possible for 
the Protocol to cover future forms of exploitation.19 Indeed, there are some forms of 
exploitation that were omitted from the Palermo Protocol, but that are now prominent 
in other legal instruments, such as forced begging and forced ciminality.20  Edwards 
suggests that their explicit non-inclusion can be overcome by virtue of the non-
exhaustive nature of the list. Thus, subject to the presence of an action and a means, the 
omitted forms of exploitation could in fact be considered as forms of trafficking.21 
	
14 UNODC, Travaux préparatoires, of the negotiations for the elaboration of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto (New York: United Nations, 2006), p. 334. 
15 UNODC (2006), supra n. 14, p. 354; ILO, Note by the International Labour Organization on the additional legal instrument 
against trafficking in women and children, A/AC.254/CRP.14, 1999. 
16 UNODC (2006), supra n. 14, p. 354; Informal note by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime Fourth session Vienna, 28 June-9 July 
1999, A/AC.254/16, para. 8. 
17 UNODC Issue paper (2018), supra n. 7, p. 18. 
18 UNODC (2006), supra n. 14, p. 344, footnote 30.  
19 UNODC (2006), supra n. 14, p. 343, footnote 22. See for example, child soldiers and trafficking, Tiefenbrun, S., ‘Child Soldiers, 
Slavery and the Trafficking of Children’ (2007) Fordham International Law Journal 31(2), 417-486. 
20 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking 
in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101, 15.4.2011, p. 
1–11 
21 Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.9, p. 44.  
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Ultimately, the principal rationale for a non-exhaustive list of the forms of exploitation 
in the Palermo Protocol was to ensure flexibility for States when implementing their 
own domestic prohibition of human trafficking, particularly with regards to responses 
to sexual exploitation. Such an open-ended international approach purports to enable 
domestic legislative frameworks to adapt according to local contexts, securing the 
implementation of the definition of trafficking whilst assuring political cooperation.22 
In this sense, Gallagher and Parkes emphasise that the Palermo Protocol should be 
regarded as providing a set of minimum standards to be implemented by States 
according to their domestic context.23  
 
This thesis contends that the rationale for the lack of a definition of exploitation 
overlooks the importance of legal clarity in definitions and the possible adverse impact 
upon the consideration of labour exploitation. The mere fact that the Palermo Protocol’s 
domestic legal implementation in practice is characterised by a continued emphasis on 
the criminalisation of trafficking for sexual exploitation despite the extension of the 
Palermo Protocol to trafficking for labour exploitation suggests that such an critique is 
well-founded.24 Ultimately, the lack of determination of the scope of the offence with 
regards to labour exploitation enables varying interpretations and inconsistencies in the 
understanding of what situations amount to exploitation within context of human 
trafficking in national legal orders (see Section 2.3).  
 
Thus, when coupled with a lack of further explanation as to what constitutes 
exploitation, the categorical approach leads to a lack of conceptual and legal clarity for 
those who must implement the framework in regional and national contexts. Without a 
monitoring mechanism - notwithstanding the limited monitoring and implementation 
role of the Conference of Parties25  - to ensure the application of the international 
	
22 UNODC Issue paper (2018), supra n. 7, p. 22. 
23 Gallagher, A., The International Law of Human Trafficking, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 501; Parkes, 
C., ‘The trafficking protocol has advanced the global movement against human exploitation: the case of the United Kingdom’, 
(2015) Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 4, 150-155, p. 150. 
24 For discussion on criminalisation of sexual exploitation using the trafficking model see Chuang, J., ‘Rescuing trafficking from 
ideological capture: prostitution reform and anti-trafficking law and policy,’ (2010) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 158(6), 
1655-1728. See also Chapter 4 and discussion on obstacles to legal clarification of exploitation. 
25 Article 32, United Nations, Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, New York, 2000, UNTS, Vol. 2225, p. 209. 
Gallagher provides insight into state parties poor engagement with the monitoring mechanism and the limitations of the powers of 
the Conference of Parties to request further information or dialogue with state parties in 2004, in Gallagher, A., ‘Improving the 
effectiveness of the international law of human trafficking: a vision for the future of the US Trafficking in Persons Report’, (2011) 
Human Rights Review 12, 381-400. For more recent discussion on the implementation of the Convention and Protocols see 
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), Resolution 9/1, 
Establishment of the Mechanism for the Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
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definition ‘the onus is placed on individual States to act within their own domestic 
jurisdictions’ and crucially, ‘decide what constitutes trafficking in persons within their 
own jurisdiction.’26 The newly adopted Resolution in the Conference of State Parties 
in 2018 may see a shift in this regard with the Establishment of the Mechanism for the 
Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto.27  The impact of the new mechanism 
remains to be seen. 
 
The flexibility of the Palermo Protocol can be further ascertained when 
considering regional anti-trafficking legal frameworks. A three-pronged approach 
emerges to the regional adoption of the international definition of human trafficking:  
 
i) no regional anti-trafficking instrument but explicit recognition of the 
international definition. In the absence of specific anti-trafficking legal framework, 
both the Inter-American Commission28 and Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS)29 have politically recognised the implementation of the international 
definition at a regional level.30  
 
ii) establishment of a regional anti-trafficking instrument which replicates the 
international definition. Both Article 4(a) of the Council of Europe Convention 
against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005) and Article 2 of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children (2016) replicated the international definition of human 
trafficking. For the Council of Europe, this approach was favoured in recognition of the 
‘fundamental importance to use a definition of trafficking in human beings on which 
	
Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto, adopted by Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) at ninth session, Vienna, 15-19 October 2018. 
26 Allain (2013), supra n. 1, p.342; Allain, J., ‘No Effective Trafficking Definition Exists: Domestic Implementation of the Palermo 
Protocol’, (2014) Albany Government Law Review 14, 1-22, p. 1. 
27 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), Resolution 9/1, 
Establishment of the Mechanism for the Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto, adopted by Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) at ninth session, Vienna, 15-19 October 2018. 
28 Article 6(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights (Adopted at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human 
Rights, San José, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969) prohibits slavery, servitude, trafficking in women and slaves in all its forms and 
Article 6(2) prohibits requiring someone to perform forced or compulsory labour.  
29 Article 5 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ rights (Adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 
I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986) focuses upon right to respect of dignity and prohibits all forms of exploitation 
and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment. 
30 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights of Migrants, Refugees, Stateless Persons, Victims of Human 
Trafficking and Internally Displaced Persons: Norms and Standards of the Inter-American Human Rights System (December 
2015), Para 220; Economic Community of West African States, Declaration on the Fight against Trafficking in Persons, Twenty-
Fifth Ordinary Session of Authority of Heads of State and Government, Dakar, (December 2001). 
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there is international consensus.’31 The modelling of the regional definitions on the 
Palermo Protocol is also a trend observed at national level, as noted by Eriksson.32 
 
iii) establishment of a regional anti-trafficking instrument that extends the 
definition of human trafficking. The European Union initially adopted a definition of 
human trafficking that was very similar in scope to the international definition. The 
Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking 
in human beings sought slight variation with an additional “act” of exchange or transfer 
of control and the specificity of pornography as a form of sexual exploitation:  
 
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, subsequent reception of a 
person, including exchange or transfer of control over that person, where: 
(a) use is made of coercion, force or threat, including abduction, or 
(b) use is made of deceit or fraud, or 
(c) there is an abuse of authority or of a position of vulnerability, which is such that 
the person has no real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved, 
or 
(d) payments or benefits are given or received to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person 
for the purpose of exploitation of that person's labour or services, including at least 
forced or compulsory labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery or 
servitude, or 
for the purpose of the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, including in pornography. 
 
The definition within the Framework Decision was acknowledged when it 
comes to the inclusion of human trafficking in Article 5(3) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.33 
 
	
31 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 
Warsaw, 16.V.2005 (2005), para 72. 
32 Eriksson, M., ‘The prevention of human trafficking – Regulating domestic criminal legislation through the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, (2013) Nordic Journal of international Law 82, 339-368, p. 357. 
33 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–407; Explanation on Article 5 — 
Prohibition of slavery and forced labour, Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303, 14.12.2007. 
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In 2011, following an evaluation of the Framework Decision34 and in light of 
subsequent criticism regarding the lack of focus on the protection of the rights of the 
victims (unlike the aforementioned Council of Europe Convention), a proposal was 
made for a new Directive on the basis of Article 82 (2) and Article 83(1) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union.35 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking 
in human beings and protecting its victims (EU Directive 2011/36/EU) expanded the 
scope of human trafficking by adopting a slightly modified version of the international 
definition. Article 2(1) defines human trafficking as: 
 
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or reception of persons, 
including the exchange or transfer of control over those persons, by means of the threat 
or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments 
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for 
the purpose of exploitation.36 
 
Article 2(3) retains the categorical, non-exhaustive approach but explicitly adds 
two forms of exploitation to the list of types of forced labour or services: begging and 
exploitation of criminal activities. 37 Such an expansion of the forms of exploitation in 
the EU Directive’s articulation of the human trafficking offence is indicative of the lack 
of a definition of the exploitation element. 
 
A common thread of all the international and regional definitions of human 
trafficking is the listing of all forms of labour exploitation as, at a minimum, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour. Rather than 
provide further clarification as to the exact scope and meaning of these forms of 
	
34 Commission of European Committees, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament based on 
article 10 of the Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings, Brussels, 02.05.2006 
COM (2006) 187 final.  
35 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and combating 
trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, Brussels, 29.3.2010 COM 
(2010)95 final 2010/0065 (COD).  
36 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking 
in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101, 15.4.2011, p. 
1–11. 
37 European Commission (2010), supra n.35, p.10. European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion of the European Economic 
and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and combating 
trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA’, 17.2.2011 COM(2010) 95 
final — 2010/0065 (COD), para 3.6-3.7. 
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exploitation, and despite efforts to include such clarification at drafting stages,38 the 
default position in the final adopted texts has been to refer to other international and 
regional instruments or - in the case of the Council of Europe informed by regional 
human rights case law.39 However, the international and regional instruments discussed 
thus far, fail to provide clarity as to the scope and meaning of labour exploitation in two 
ways. First, they reinforce the categorisation of exploitation rather than define the 
concept and secondly, they sanction the expansion of the forms of exploitation, thus 
encouraging domestic law makers to expand human trafficking leading to increased 
fragmentation at a national level and possible dilution of human trafficking. In a 
European context, such a position hampers efforts to enhance judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters within the European Union as explicitly mentioned in Article 82 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 40 Despite human trafficking being 
an offence whereby the double criminality requirement is waived in many EU 
instruments, 41  it is nevertheless difficult for cross-border cooperation where the 
constituent elements of the offence vary, leading to exploitative conduct being 
recognised as human trafficking in one country but not in another.  
 
Whilst, as we have seen in this section that the flexibility offered to States is 
deliberate, there are significant implications on definitional clarity (and indeed 
definitional ambiguity) due to the substantial and wide-ranging consequences for 
States, the perpetrators and the victims when characterising conduct as trafficking.42 
The next section addresses such concerns by determining the impact of a lack of 
definition of exploitation in human trafficking.  
 
2. The impact of a lack of a definition of exploitation in human trafficking law 
 
Overcoming ambiguity, seeking clarity, and ensuring effective anti-trafficking 
measures can only be achieved by placing an increased emphasis on ‘understanding 
	
38 See proposals for definition of terms such as forced labour, servitude, slavery in UNODC (2006), supra n. 14, p. 339-345. 
39 Council of Europe (2005), supra n.31, para 89-95. 
40 Article 82 & Article 83, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Document C2012/326/01; Beernaert, M-A., & Le 
Coq, P., ‘La loi du 10 août 2005 modifiant diverses dispositions en vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite et le trafic des êtres 
humains et contre les pratiques des marchands de sommeil’, (2006) Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 86(4), 335-406, p. 343.  
41 Article 2, Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States - Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, OJ L 190, 
18.7.2002, p. 1–20; Article 11, Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the 
European Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, p. 1–36. 
42 UNODC Issue paper (2018), supra n. 7, p.2. 
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what constitutes trafficking and correctly applying international definitions.’ 43 The 
way in which terms are framed will inevitably impact upon initiatives that seek to offer 
a solution and tackle labour exploitation.44 In particular, previous research conducted 
at both a regional and national level has demonstrated that one of the main issues of 
contention created by the imprecision of international and regional trafficking 
definitions, is the determination of the point at which employment practices become 
exploitative,45 especially given the lack of global consensus on employment rights and 
‘variation between countries and variation between economic sectors in the same 
country in terms of what is socially and legally constructed as acceptable employment 
practice.’ We will further consider this proposition in subsequent chapters wherein the 
contextualised nature of exploitation becomes apparent in the diversity between 
geographical and temporal norms (see the analysis of Tang in Chapter 2) and the need 
to assess a situation on a case by case basis (see Chapter 9).46 The EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights concludes that, ‘the lack of a succinct concept and term impedes 
the drawing of clear boundaries, in relation both to distinguishing between different 
criminal offences and to differentiating between criminal and mere civil and labour law 
issues.’47 Concretely, as argued by Weitzer, such a situation creates difficulties when 
applying and interpreting the legal standards in practice due to confusion and 
uncertainty. 48  
 
The present section addresses four problems that arise from the lack of a 
definition of exploitation in the human trafficking context: a conflation and confusion 
in terminology (Section 2.1) fosters a stereotypical understanding of labour 
exploitation (Section 2.2) and fragmented and inconsistent domestic implementation 





43 The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, Before the Harm is Done Examining the UK’s response to the prevention of trafficking, 
(September 2018), p. 10.  
44 For discussion on shift of focus on labour violations initially, rather than more than severe extreme cases that are addressed by 
criminal offences, framing exploitation from labour law perspective, as well as shift away from context of migration, see Radeva 
Berket, M., Labour exploitation and trafficking for labour exploitation—trends and challenges for policy-making, ERA Forum 
(2015) 16, 359–377. 
45 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Severe labour exploitation: workers moving within or into the European Union 
States’ obligations and victims’ rights, June 2015, p.38-39.  
46 Anderson, B., & Rogaly, B., Forced Labour and Migration to the UK, Compas, Trade union congress: 2005, p. 17-18. 
47 FRA (2015), supra n.45, p.38-39.  
48 Weitzer, R., ‘Human trafficking and contemporary slavery’, Annual Review of Sociology (2015) 41, 223-242, p. 225. 
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2.1 Confusion and conflation between forms of exploitation  
 
The lack of a definition of exploitation and the categorical approach discussed above 
has led to the interchangeable use of terminology. For instance, the terms forced labour, 
trafficking, “modern slavery” and slavery are often conflated, despite the fact that they 
have different meanings (in both legal and non-legal terms) and thus require distinct 
measures in order to be tackled effectively. 49 Conflation of terminology is illustrated 
by the variety of interpretations in literature, that are briefly outlined by reference to 
some illustrative examples from both academic and policy standpoints. 
 
On the one hand, there are those who subscribe to forced labour as the umbrella 
term. For instance, Skrivankova notes that:  
 
Trafficking is a sub-set of forced labour, rather than a synonym of forced labour, as 
sometimes erroneously understood. The existence of forced labour, independent of 
trafficking, implies that if forced labour is punishable only when linked to trafficking, 
those in non-trafficked forced labour find it even more difficult, if not impossible, to 
seek justice.50 [emphasis added]  
 
Similarly, Andrees & van der Linden summised that:  
 
Trafficking appears to be part of the larger occurrence of forced labour, which in turn 
is a subgroup of forced labour outcomes of migration, which, finally, belongs to the 
encompassing category of abuses and exploitation related to labour migration.51 
[emphasis added] 
 
Conversely, Ollus, for example, frames human trafficking as the umbrella term, as she 
writes that:  
 
	
49 For example, conflation and equation of trafficking with forced labour by the Obama Administration Trafficking in Persons 
Office cited in Chuang (2017), supra n.9, p.115. See also Rijken, C., (ed.) Combating trafficking in human beings for labour 
exploitation (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011), p. 35, p. 41, p. 118, p.352. 
50 Skrivankova, K., Between decent work and forced labour: examining the continuum of exploitation, JRF programme paper 
(November 2010), p. 9. 
51 Andrees, B., & van der Linden, M., ‘Designing Trafficking Research from a Labour Market Perspective: The ILO Experience,’ 
(2005) International Migration 43(1/2), 66, p. 66. 
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Since the [Palermo] Protocol definition of trafficking sees forced labour as one form 
of exploitation in the crime of trafficking, forced labour could instead be seen as 
subordinate to (labour) trafficking. It is evident that the two phenomena are indeed 
closely related and partly overlapping rather than encompassing one or the other.52 
[emphasis added] 
 
As can be seen from the above examples, assessments of the interrelationship 
between human trafficking for labour exploitation and the standalone forms of labour 
exploitation vary, which significantly impacts the overall understanding of labour 
exploitation. In particular, as Gallagher highlights, the ambiguities of the human 
trafficking definition has seen an increase in slavery, forced labour and other forms of 
exploitation, that had hitherto been clearly distinguished, being equated with human 
trafficking. 53 For instance, Edwards discusses the marked increase in the reference to 
human trafficking in the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee as 
well as Member States being asked about their efforts to eliminate human trafficking, 
despite the non-prohibition of human trafficking in Article 8 of the ICCPR. 54 Similarly, 
Gallagher notes the frequent assimilation between slavery and human trafficking by the 
UN General Assembly.
 
55  Rijken has critiqued the fluctuating position of the ILO 
between an emphasis on forced labour as the umbrella term which includes human 
trafficking, to then recognising, in line with a more generally held view, that not all 
forms of forced labour fall within the definition of human trafficking – the latter view 
being one that also exists amongst legal scholars.56 More recently, the ILO has co-opted 
for the umbrella term of “modern slavery” to refer to a set of specific legal concepts 
including forced labour, debt bondage, forced marriage, other slavery and slavery like 
practices and human trafficking.57  
 
In legal terms, the Palermo Protocol considers forced labour to be one of the 
possible outcomes of human trafficking. So, it is possible for human trafficking and 
	
52 Ollus (2015), supra n.1, p. 237. 
53 Gallagher, A., ‘Two Cheers for the Trafficking Protocol’, (2015) Anti-Trafficking Review Issue 4, 14—32. 
54 Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.9, p. 26. 
55 Gallagher, A., ‘Using international human rights law to better protect victims of human trafficking: the prohibitions on slavery, 
servitude, forced labour and debt bondage’ in Sadat, L.N., & Scarf, M.P., (eds) The Theory and Practice of International Criminal 
Law: Essays in Honour of M. Cherif Bassiouni, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) pp 397 – 430. 
56 Rijken, C., ‘Trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation: cooperation in an integrated approach’, (2013) European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21, 9-35, p. 16. See also, Weitzer (2015) supra n.48, p. 227; Plant, R., 
‘Combating Trafficking for Labour Exploitation in the Global Economy: The Need for a Differentiated Approach’, in Kotiswaran, 
P., (ed.) Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017). Chuang (2017), supra n.9, p. 118. 
57 ILO, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage, Geneva, September 2017, p.9. 
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forced labour to be interrelated. However, this thesis supports existing literature that 
calls for a definitive shift away from the conflation of all forced labour as human 
trafficking as they are not synonymous legal terms,58 especially since, as Gallagher 
emphasises that ‘[human] trafficking was not even identified as an analogous or similar 
practice but was dealt with through a different set of instruments lends considerable 
weight to the argument that States never intended the prohibition to extend to this 
particular practice.’59 Such conflation of concepts also leads to the application of the 
human trafficking label to a particular situation where there is a risk of hampering 
proper identification, investigation, and prosecution of cases as all the elements of the 
crime of trafficking may not be present or may be difficult to prove.60 Furthermore, in 
the absence of a legal definition of labour exploitation, the conflation of human 
trafficking with standalone forms of exploitation has, as Chuang reminds us, 
implications for the ‘individuals directly affected by the legal regimes designed to 
identify perpetrators and provide redress to victims of slavery, trafficking and forced 
labour practices.’ 61  
 
On the one hand, conflation of trafficking with other forms of exploitation could 
risk raising the threshold for what counts as trafficking, as not all forms of labour 
exploitation amount to forced labour or slavery but they may be sufficient to cross the 
threshold of human trafficking, should all other elements of the crime be present.62 For 
instance, as indicated by the ILO Handbook for labour inspectors on human trafficking 
and forced labour, ‘the lack of viable economic alternatives that makes people stay in 
an exploitative work relationship does not in itself constitute forced labour though it 
may constitute a position of vulnerability as defined by the Palermo Protocol.’ 63 On 
the other hand, conflating human trafficking with slavery or forced labour could dilute 
the legal standards of the latter two forms of exploitation, as Bakirci puts forward, by 
	
58 Vijeyarasa, R., & Villarino J.M.B., ‘Modern-day slavery? A Judicial Catchall for Trafficking, Slavery and Labour Exploitation’ 
(2012) Journal of International Law and International Relations 8, 36-61, p.36; Piotrowicz, R., “‘States’ Obligations under Human 
Rights Law towards Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings: Positive Developments in Positive Obligations”, (2012) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 24(2), 181–201; O’Connell Davidson, J., “New Slavery, Old Binaries: Human Trafficking 
and the Borders of ‘freedom,’” (2010) Global Networks 10(2), 244–61; Allain, J., ‘Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia: The European 
Court of Human Rights and Trafficking as Slavery’, (2010) Human Rights Law Review 10(3), 546–57; Gallagher, (2010), supra n. 
23, p. 189; van der Wilt (2014) supra n.3, p. 314 & p. 334; Gallagher (2008), supra n.55. 
59 Gallagher (2008), supra n.55. 
60 Paavilainen, M., ‘Towards a Cohesive and Contextualised Response: When is it necessary to distinguish between forced labour, 
trafficking in persons and slavery?’, (2015) Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 5, 158–161, p. 159; See also the findings of the EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency research on severe labour exploitation, FRA (2015), supra n.45, p.42.  
61 Chuang, J., ‘The Challenges and Perils of Reframing Trafficking as “Modern-Day Slavery”’, (2015) Anti-Trafficking Review, 
issue 5, 146–149, p. 146-147.  
62 Chuang (2015), supra n.61, p. 146-147; FRA (2015), supra n.45.  
63 ILO, Forced labour and human trafficking: a handbook for labour inspectors, Andrees, B., Geneva, 2008, p.5.  
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defining ‘any kind of labour resulting from human trafficking […] as forced labour 
regardless of the nature of the work or working conditions.’64  
 
Labelling all human trafficking for labour exploitation as forced labour, 
neglects any consideration of the elements of the legal definition of forced labour 
(involuntary provision of work or service under a menace of any penalty – see Chapter 
3) and instead prioritises the elements of the crime of human trafficking. This is 
particularly risky, as the same situation of exploitation in isolation from the means and 
act elements may not be sufficient to amount to forced labour. Such a situation must be 
avoided. Here it is important to reflect upon the findings of the EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights which concluded that efforts to overcome such scenarios are 
hampered by the ‘lack of understanding of labour exploitation – in particular when it 
occurs within the contractual framework of an employment relationship – comes with 
the risk that cases of severe labour exploitation will be overlooked or not taken 
seriously.’65 
 
Indeed, such oversight is further provoked by misconceptions of human 
trafficking, such as the role of coercion. For instance, a significant misconception is the 
assumption that it is essential for human traffickers to employ extreme modus operandi 
(both in relation to the use of means and the actual exploitation), including use of force, 
violence, kidnapping and deprivation of liberty.66 Such a stereotypical understanding, 
however, fails to consider the subtler forms of coercion that can engender exploitation 
and can be attributed to the lack of definition that has led to the lack of understanding 
of the parameters of the context. 67 Luckily, subtler forms of coercion are increasingly 
being recognised in the application of the human trafficking offence. 
Acknowledgement of the agency of migrants seeking a better life means that there is 
increasing acceptance that it is no longer necessary for workers ‘to be forced at gunpoint 
	
64 Bakirci, K., ‘Human trafficking and forced labour: a criticism of the International Labour Organisation’, (2009) Journal of 
Financial Crime 16(2), 160-165, p. 163. 
65 FRA (2015), supra n.45, p. 42.  
66 Ollus, N., & Jokinen, A., Trafficking for Forced Labour and Labour Exploitation – Setting the Scene, in Ollus, N., & Jokinen, 
A., & Aromaa, K., (eds.) Trafficking for Forced Labour and Labour Exploitation in Finland, Poland and Estonia, FLEX-HEUNI 
(2011), p. 131. 
67 It is important to note that such a stereotypical understanding is not only limited to human trafficking similar misconceptions 
prevails regarding the requirement for the actual use of violence leading to oversight of possible exploitative situations. For further 
discussion and examples of misconceptions of human trafficking see FRA (2015), supra n.45, p. 15 and Economic Community of 
West African States Community Court of Justice, Hadijatou Mani v. Republic of Niger (2008), ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08, (27 October 
2008), para 79. For discussion on ECOWAS case see ILO, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking Casebook of Court Decisions: 
a training manual for judges, prosecutors and legal practitioners, Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour, Geneva, 
2009, p.37. 
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to work under hazardous conditions.’ 68  Instead, there is evidence of increased 
recognition that precarious working conditions are maintained through a combination 
of subtler forms of coercion, such as psychological pressure, intimidation and long 
working hours, control of the use of money, retention of passports, debt due to high 
recruitment and travel costs, and poor accommodation.69 Such a shift towards increased 
recognition of subtle forms of coercion is an important development for the criminal 
justice process, since it is very often difficult to ‘persuade a jury that these subtle forms 
of coercion and deception can make up the criminal offences of forced labour or labour 
trafficking’ resulting in very few prosecutions.70 Therefore, in this thesis we contend 
that a clearer understanding of the parameters of these prohibited practices will 
contribute towards overcoming such misconceptions by minimising confusion and 
conflation and enabling professionals to better inform and direct those who then come 
face to face with a factual situation.  
 
2.2 Stereotypical understandings: a spotlight on vulnerability and consent  
 
The impact of conflation and confusion has led to misconceptions, as highlighted in the 
previous section with regards to coercion. In this section, we wish to further address 
the stereotypical understanding of human trafficking with regards to two specific 
definitional elements that as we will see in later chapters are of relevance to the material 
scope of exploitation: the first considers the understanding of position of vulnerability 
and the second refers to the principle of irrelevance of consent.  
 
The abuse of a position of vulnerability is explicitly included in the human trafficking 
definition as a means by which persons can be subjected to a range of actions such as 
recruitment, harbouring etc. for the purpose of exploitation. The concept of 
vulnerability is not explicitly referred to in the definition of other forms of labour 
exploitation. It is however contended that the lack of explicit reference to vulnerability 
in the latter does not preclude its significance when determining whether or not 
someone has been exploited. The relationship between the lack of a definition of 
	
68 ILO, Forced labour and trafficking in Europe: how people are trapped in, live through and come out, Andrees, B., Working 
Paper, WP.57, Geneva, 2008, p. 7. 
69 Ollus (2015), supra n.1, p. 240. 
70 Plant, R., ‘Forced Labour, Slavery and Human Trafficking: When do definitions matter?’, (2015) Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 
5, 153–157, p. 155. 
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exploitation and the vulnerability of an individual is of relevance for two reasons: i) the 
susceptibility or risk of being exploited and ii) the extent to which this vulnerability is 
abused as a means of perpetrating exploitation.71  
 
Like exploitation, the presentation of abuse of a position of vulnerability in the 
human trafficking definition has been criticised as the concept is ambiguous lacking 
any further clarification as to the scope of its meaning. 72 The travaux préparatoires do 
provide some assistance wherein the concept is ‘understood to refer to any situation in 
which the person involved has no real or acceptable alternative but to submit to the 
abuse involved.’73 An individual’s vulnerability should be determined on a case-by-
case basis and ‘in determining whether the victim’s belief that he or she has no real or 
acceptable option is reasonable, the personal characteristics and circumstances of the 
victim should be taken into account.’74 The travaux préparatoires’ failure to further 
elaborate upon the meaning of “real and acceptable alternative” or how it is to be 
applied in practice, causes further confusion when applying the notion of abuse of 
position to vulnerability to a domestic criminal law framework.75 Further efforts have 
been made to address this deficit by outlining factors that make people vulnerable and 
requiring that, when applied in practice, there must not only be credible evidence of the 
existence of vulnerability but also of the abuse of that position of vulnerability.76 
However, such efforts have also been subject to critique as they fail to provide guidance 
on the abuse of a vulnerable position and how these indicators can or should be applied 
in the context of victim or perpetrator identification, criminal investigation or 
prosecution. 77  
 
The impact of this international haziness has been a disjointed domestic 
application of the concept, despite the need for criminal law provisions to clearly and 
specifically state what constitutes vulnerability and when its abuse constitutes a 
	
71 Gallagher, A., & McAdam, M., ‘Abuse of a position of vulnerability within the definition of trafficking in persons’, in Piotrowicz, 
R., Rijken, C., & Uhl, B. H., (eds) Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking, (Routledge, 2017), p. 186. 
72 Vijeyarasa & Villarino (2012), supra n.58, p. 49. 
73 UNODC (2006), supra n. 14, p. 347. 
74 UNODC, Guidance Note on ‘abuse of a position of vulnerability’ as a means of trafficking in persons in Article 3 of the Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Vienna: United Nations, 2012), para. 2.5.  
75 UNODC Issue paper (2018), supra n. 7, p, 3. 
76 For discussion on different types of vulnerability (personal, situational, circumstantial) Gallagher, A., ‘The International Legal 
Definition of “Trafficking in Persons”: Scope and Application’ in Kotiswaran, P., (ed.) Revisiting the Law and Governance of 
Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 89-92; UNODC (2012), 
supra n.74, para. 2.3. 
77 Gallagher & McAdam (2017), supra n.71, p.187 
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criminal act.78 In addition to lack of clarity, the application of abuse of a position of 
vulnerability has been fragmented (see more on fragmentation in next section). For 
example in some States, the abuse of position of vulnerability (or any means) is not a 
constituent element of the offence but an aggravating factor; the combination of abuse 
of position of vulnerability with another form of means; or the connection between 
abuse of position of vulnerability and intent to exploit where, for example, conditional 
intent is sufficient due to the exploiter’s awareness of the vulnerable position.79 The 
latter can be problematic as the fact of vulnerability rather than its abuse is sufficient to 
satisfy the means element, which could lead to including conduct that otherwise would 
not reach the threshold of human trafficking being prosecuted as such. 80  Thus it 
becomes clear that the mere existence of vulnerability is not sufficient, such a position 
of vulnerability must be subsequently abused.  
 
The ILO provides possible insight to this distinction by providing explicit 
examples of abuse of position of vulnerability: threats of denunciation to the authorities, 
is a means of coercion where an employer deliberately and knowingly takes advantage 
of the vulnerability of a worker to compel him or her to work; taking advantage of the 
limited understanding of a worker with an intellectual disability; threatening women 
workers with dismissal or with being forced into prostitution if they refuse to comply 
with the employer’s demands; and taking deliberate advantage of an individual’s 
obligation to stay in a job due to the absence of alternative employment opportunities 
by imposing more extreme working conditions than would otherwise be possible.81  
 
In spite of these efforts by the ILO to provide insight into the meaning of abuse 
of position of vulnerability, a number of misconceptions pertaining to the meaning of 
abuse of position of vulnerability lead to the oversight of factors that could in fact 
exacerbate vulnerability to exploitation, such as type of exploitation, gender and 
	
78 For more examples of domestic interpretation of vulnerability in Germany, France and Italy see Malpani, R., ‘Criminalsing 
human trafficking and protecting the victims,’ in Andrees, B., & Belser, P., (eds) Forced Labour: Coercion and Exploitation in 
the private economy (New York: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2009), p.132-135. 
79 For example of a Dutch case of Chinese restaurant manager, conditional intent was sufficient due to his awareness of the 
vulnerable situations, irregular workers “’begged for work’’ which was provided less than minimum wage and provided 
accommodation in shared room see discussion in Gallagher & McAdam (2017), supra n.71, p. 189 – 191. 
80 Gallagher & McAdam (2017), supra n.71,  p. 193. 
81 ILO, Hard to see, harder to count - Survey guidelines to estimate forced labour of adults and children, Geneva, 2012, p. 16. See 
also ICMPD work on vulnerability to trafficking in migration context: Study on Trafficking Resilience and Vulnerability en route 
to Europe (STRIVE), https://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Project_Description_STRIVE.pdf; ICMPD, Targeting 
Vulnerabilities The Impact of the Syrian War and Refugee  Situation on Trafficking in Persons A Study of Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, 
Jordan and Iraq, (2015). 
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migration status. For example, the exploitation of migrant workers in economic sectors 
unrelated to the sex industry is not taken as seriously.82 Similarly, a further distinction 
is made according to the gender of migrant workers. 83 Where females are found to be 
in exploitative working conditions, there is an immediate response based upon an 
identification as a victim of human trafficking, whereas male victims are considered to 
be irregular migrants in violation of migration law. 84  The result being counter-
trafficking responses that prioritise females and fail to address the needs of male 
victims,85 leading to structural reinforcement of stereotypical views that obscures the 
reality of human trafficking.  A final example arises where the issue is dealt with first 
and foremost in the context of irregular migration rather than as one of abusive labour 
conditions. Such an approach does not take into account the reality that many migrant 
workers may have entered a country by legal means, but that immigration restrictions 
have increased their vulnerability and by consequence the risk that they could be 
subjected to abusive labour conditions.86 Herein lies a vicious circle, as ‘the poorer the 
working conditions of the most vulnerable, the greater the risks of and opportunities for 
serious forms of exploitation.’87 However, such working conditions are compounded 
by the complexity of the situation for a migrant worker. Thus, the context in which 
exploitation occurs may increase the risk of more severe forms of exploitation.  
 
The understanding of vulnerability must be sufficiently broad to capture the 
diversity of precarity encountered by those who are subjected to exploitative working 
conditions. It is also important to avoid a narrow stereotypical understanding of 
exploitation that focuses upon the “ideal” victim. In order to reflect the reality of the 
	
82  Guardian, Rape and abuse: the price of a job in Spain’s strawberry industry? 14 April 2019, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/apr/14/rape-abuse-claims-spains-strawberry-industry. The article reports 
that ten Moroccan women say Spanish authorities have ignored claims they were trafficked, assaulted and exploited. 
83 Eriksson (2013) supra n.32, p. 359. 
84 Chuang (2010), supra n.24, p. 1711. 
85 Ibid. 
86 On structural exploitation and the role of state based initiatives (e.g. restrictive immigration policy) that increase vulnerability to 
exploitation in Chuang (2010), supra n.24, p. 1726-1727 and Mantouvalou, V., ‘The Right to Non-Exploitative Work,’ in 
Mantouvalou V., (ed.) The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2015).  
Consider specific implications of tied visas scheme on domestic workers: Weatherburn, A., & Muraskiewicz, J., ‘The impact of 
the 2012 Domestic Workers in a Private Household Visa on human trafficking for domestic servitude’, (2016) Journal of 
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 30 (3), 204-221.  
It is acknowledged that illegality does not necessarily guarantee that the individual will be subjected to exploitation, it is possible 
for individuals with an irregular migration status to not be subjected to exploitation, see further in Oudejans, N., ‘The Right not to 
Have Rights: A New Perspective on Irregular Immigration’ (2019) Political Theory 1–28. Research conducted with migrants in 
Amsterdam revealed that 2/3 of the migrants interviewed in the Amsterdam area mentioned that their jobs were relatively stable: 
in the sense that their working hours each week were quite predictable and stable. However, only half of the migrants who indicated 
that their jobs were stable, mentioned that they earned sufficient income to support themselves and their significant others, see 
Berntsen, De Lange & Rijken, De sociaaleconomische- en rechtspositie van migranten zonder verblijfsvergunning in Nederland, 
(Amsterdam University Press, forthcoming).  
87 Ollus, (2015), supra, n.1, p. 225. 
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situations encountered, it is important to consider different types of vulnerability, both 
intrinsic and created, including: economic vulnerability, social and cultural 
vulnerability, linguistic vulnerability, and legal/structural vulnerability.88 In particular, 
people are trafficked not because they are vulnerable, but because someone decides to 
exploit them. It is not the victims who should be blamed for taking risks, but those 
recruiters and employers who take advantage of their desperation and exploit them. The 
demand of workers for labour is largely a question of inequality. Any work is better 
than no work, taking into account global economic disparities and increasing global 
mobility. Therefore, addressing workers’ weak bargaining power, substandard working 
conditions, and lack of rights would be a shift in the right direction.89  
 
The agency and bargaining powers of workers to accept such sub-standard 
conditions is now discussed with regards to the principle of irrelevance of consent. 
The Palermo Protocol human trafficking definition affirms the principle of irrelevance 
of consent to any exploitation where any of the specified means are used to secure the 
act (Article 3(b)). This raises two issues that require further consideration as to i) the 
irrelevance of consent and the understanding of involuntariness in the other standalone 
forms of labour exploitation and; ii) the nullification of consent regardless of the means 
used.  
 
First, in the context of standalone forms of labour exploitation, whilst the role 
of consent is not explicitly excluded, there are elements of the legal definitions that 
point to the presence of coercion or involuntariness in these forms of exploitation (as 
we will see in Chapters 2 & 3). Thus, it also appears that the exploitation element of 
human trafficking which could be interpreted as also implying an involuntary element, 
which in some instances may lead to the application of a double requirement of 
coercion, in relation to both the act and purpose element. Similarly, by virtue of the 
human trafficking definition’s sole focus of the means element on the action element 
leads to failures to address abuses where there are no means of deception or coercion 
to achieve, inter alia, recruitment, transportation or transfer but instead the means are 
used with a view to exploitation. 
	
88 Radeva Berket (2015) supra n. 44, p.365; Ollus, N., & Jokinen, A., ‘Exploitation of migrant workers and trafficking in human 
beings: a nexus of the demand by employers, workers and consumers’, in Piotrowicz, R., Rijken, C., and Uhl, B. H., (eds) Routledge 
Handbook of Human Trafficking, (Routledge, 2017); Gallagher & McAdam (2017), supra n.71. 
89 Ollus & Jokinen (2017), supra n.88, p.498. 
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 Second, consent is irrelevant regardless of the type of means used. However, in 
practice the extent to which such a position goes uncontested differs. On the one hand, 
where nullifying means such as force, abduction and gross deception are used the 
application of irrelevance is uncontested. Conversely, when it comes to softer means 
such as an abuse of position of vulnerability, the nullification of consent is sometimes 
difficult to determine. 90 Furthermore, it appears that the irrelevance of consent faces a 
higher standard where there is an abuse of position of vulnerability: the person to whom 
the consent is given must have abused an existing or created vulnerability in order to 
secure an act intended to result in exploitation. 91 The use of means alone is not enough; 
the result of the use of those means to execute the relevant act must be that the victim’s 
consent is vitiated.  
 
Despite the irrelevance of consent in the legal understanding of human 
trafficking, there is however a hesitancy to completely disregard the agency of workers 
and their apparent acceptance of exploitative labour conditions.92  The demand for 
labour by workers means that there is always an element of willingness and expression 
of agency to take risks in order to improve their socio-economic position. This includes 
not only the migratory journey but also the labour standards that they are willing to 
endure for payment. 93 The impact of this leads to ‘legitimising the migrant’s exclusion 
from assistance or victimhood’ and the emergence of a distinction between deserving 
and undeserving victims, with the latter being deprived of political agency. 
Furthermore, it is potentially dangerous to argue that workers’ have consented to 
exploitative working practices as this will impact upon the understanding and scope of 
the absolute prohibition on slavery and forced labour in international law.94 Such a 
situation can be avoided by redefining labour exploitation, not on the basis of agency 
and willingness but on the basis of any of the conditions that prevent the worker from 
leaving the exploitative conditions of employment.95 Such a condition would mean that 
	
90 Gallagher & McAdam (2017), supra n.71, p. 191. 
91 Gallagher (2017), supra, n.76, p. 96. 
92 Lasocik, Z., ‘Human Trafficking: a challenge for the European Union and its member states (with particular reference to Poland)’ 
in Holmes, L., (ed.) Trafficking and human rights – European and Asia-Pacific Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 2010), p. 24. 
Aronowitz, A., Human Trafficking, Human Misery: The Global Trade in Human Beings, (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press Inc., 2013), 
p. 5 
93 Ollus & Jokinen (2017), supra n.88, p.498; Ollus, (2015), supra n.1, p. 225; Richards, K., ‘The trafficking of migrant workers: 
what are the links between labour trafficking and corruption?’, (2004) International Migration 42(5), 147-168, p. 154; Chuang 
(2017), supra n.9, p. 119. 
94 Lasocik (2010), supra n.92, p. 25; Borg Jansson, D., Modern Slavery: A comparative study on the definition of trafficking in 
persons, (Brill Publishers, 2014), p. 90. 
95 Ollus, (2015), supra n.1, p. 240. Rittich (2017), supra n.9, p. 250. 
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the mere violation of labour rights alone does not amount to exploitation, the vitiation 
of consent arises only in situations where the individual’s situation reduces their ability 
to change their circumstances.  
 
The issue of consent and voluntariness is of vital importance to the 
understanding of forms of exploitation that do not necessarily meet the high threshold 
of those practices prohibited by law. In particular, the assessment of whether or not 
someone chose to engage in a particular situation, should not require that the individual 
felt exploited at the time, and similarly, the range of limited choices available to them 
should be determined on a case by cases basis.96 Additionally, and as seen in the context 
of a position of vulnerability, it is important to take note of the severe limitations 
enforced on personal choice fostered by a lack of alternatives. 97 To this assessment it 
is again important not to make a distinction between those who are deserving of 
protection (e.g. trafficking victims), and those who are willing (e.g. economic migrants) 
whereby there is an assumption that one precludes the other, leading to ‘a rhetoric that 
suggests that agency and exploitation are mutually exclusive.’98 Such a focus ‘misses 
an opportunity to identify what might actually be driving the cycle of exploitation. As 
a matter of law, statutory interpretation, and practice, we must acknowledge that the 
desire to improve one's life, a desire born of human nature, and a human characteristic 
lauded in other arenas, leads people to migrate.’99 
 
Despite the issues raised regarding the irrelevance of consent, we emphasise 
that the important aspect to consider in the context of labour exploitation is not the 
exercise of agency to seek alternative employment, nor the willingness to accept 
working conditions at the point of recruitment, it is, as previously mentioned, the 
assessment of an individual’s ability to make a choice in light of limited alternative 
options. The principle vessel through which such an assessment can be determined is 
the level of employer’s control over the worker, the employer’s ability to determine, 
for instance, migration status, non-payment of wages, or arbitrary wage deductions; all 
	
96 For discussion on subjectivity of coercion and different understanding of what constitutes extreme abuse and dangers of leaving 
see Brennan, D., ‘Subjectivity of Coercion: Workers’ Experiences with Trafficking in the United States’, in Kotiswaran, P., (ed.) 
Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), p. 141.  
97 Haynes, D. F., ‘Exploitation Nation: The Thin and Grey Legal Lines between Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers’, 
(2009) Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 23(1), 1 -70, p. 18-20.  
98 Haynes (2009), supra n.97, p. 43-48 O’Connell Davidson, J., ‘Troubling freedom: migration, debt, and modern slavery’, (2013) 
Migration Studies 1(2): 176-195, p.177. 
99 Haynes (2009), supra n.97, p. 48.  
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limit the personal choices of the individual and exacerbates the dependency of the 
individual on the employer.
 100 Ultimately, it is also debatable whether when a person 
is in a situation where s/he has only one opportunity, one choice, freedom of choice can 
truly be achieved.101 
 
2.3 Fragmented and inconsistent domestic implementation  
 
Allain writes that the Palermo Protocol has facilitated the advent of a neo-abolitionist 
era (see Chapter 4) that can be characterised by unprecedented engagement with the 
prohibition of human trafficking by States at the domestic level.102 There is, however, 
cause for concern. In particular, many scholars, including Allain, consider the success 
of the global consensus on the definition of human trafficking to have been to the 
detriment of global legal clarification; ‘as even in situations where the Palermo Protocol 
definition of trafficking in persons is reproduced, it does not necessarily mean the same 
thing or constitute the same crime.’ 103  Therefore, despite the consensus of an 
internationally agreed definition, Rijken correctly asserts that  ‘this does not necessarily 
mean that its scope […] is fully clear. The definition does not comprise clearly defined 
elements and terms and thus leaves room for different interpretation.’104 Gallagher 
nevertheless advocates for continued recognition of the value of the international legal 
definition since it has accommodated a shift in focus from the criminalisation of the 
process of trafficking to the criminalisation of exploitation.105 Indeed, much of the 
literature that raises concerns regarding the piecemeal approach to its domestic 
application shows that more is still to be done. However, we suggest that rather than 
overhauling the existing international framework, there is a need for continued efforts 
to harmonise regional and national counter-trafficking responses. 106    
	
100 Amnesty International, Abusive Labour Migration Policies: submission to the UN Committee on Migrant Workers’ Day of 
general discussion on workplace exploitation and workplace protection (7 April 2014), p. 8. See also third-party intervention from 
AIRE centre and PICUM that emphasised the notion of control in Chowdury and others v. Greece, 30 March 2017, Application 
no. 21884/15, para 67; see also Chapter 10. 
101 Skrivankova (2010), supra n.50, p.6. ILO (2005) supra n.5, p.6.  
102 Allain (2014) supra n.26, p.6.  
103 Allain (2014) supra n.26, p.9. See also Andrees & van Linden (2005), supra n. 51, p. 58; Kelly, L., ‘A conducive context: 
trafficking of persons in Central Asia’, in Lee, M. (ed.) Human Trafficking, (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2007), p. 86. International 
Organisation for Migration Is trafficking in human beings demand driven? A multi-country pilot study, Anderson, B., & O’Connell 
Davidson, J., Migration Research Series (2003), p. 7. Coghlan, D., & Wylie, G., ‘Defining Trafficking/Denying Justice? Forced 
Labour in Ireland and the Consequences of Trafficking Discourse’, (2011) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37 (9), 1513-
1526, p. 1516 
104 Rijken. C., ‘A human rights-based approach to trafficking in human beings’ (2009) Security and human rights, 3, 212-222, p. 
214. 
105 Hansard, Joint Committee on the draft Modern Slavery Bill. Dr Anne Gallagher - written evidence, MSB0094, 19 March 2014; 
Parkes (2015) supra n.23, pp. 150—155. 
106 For discussion of domestic implementation of human trafficking definition see huang, J., ‘The United States as global sheriff: 
using unilateral sanctions to combat human trafficking,’ (2005-2006) Michigan Journal of International Law 27, 437, p. 468; 
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Whilst the rationale for an ambiguous wording and construction of the Palermo 
Protocol definition is clear (providing States with legal sovereignty when determining 
the exact material scope of the crime of human trafficking within their jurisdiction – as 
discussed in Section 1) the implications are twofold. First of all, by default, and as 
Allain writes, a non-exhaustive categorical definition has led to an expansion of the 
types of exploitation to be included as trafficking,107 which consequently does not assist 
with providing clarity in the context of labour exploitation. Secondly, we can consider 
the work of Allain, Eriksson and Stoyanova who have explored the domestic 
implementation of the international human trafficking definition. 108  This thesis 
contends that the research draws attention to the impact of the lack of a definition of 
exploitation. For instance, Stoyanova concludes that the ‘simplistic incorporation of the 
international law definition of [human trafficking] leads to inadequacies’ and a lack of 
harmonisation. 109 More specifically, the Protocol’s failure to set the parameters of the 
‘purpose’ of trafficking has led to the inclusion of a wide range of practices both 
regionally, e.g. begging and forced criminality as additional forms in the European 
Union Directive, and nationally. The extension of the forms of exploitation are 
illustrated by both Allain and Gallagher, with the inclusion of illegal, unethical 
adoptions; commercial surrogacy; begging; prostitution/pornography; involvement in 
criminal activities; use in armed conflict or religious rituals; and kidnapping for 
purposes of extortion or political terrorism.110  
 
On the one hand, some countries have more expansively defined certain forms 
of labour exploitation within their domestic trafficking definition. For example, prior 
to the revision of the Criminal Code in 2016, Germany had domestically defined human 
trafficking for the purpose of forced labour more expansively than the ILO forced 
labour definition. 111 Section 232(1) of the Criminal Code (human trafficking) refers to 
- in addition to slavery, servitude or bonded labour - making a person work under 
	
Vijeyarasa & Villarino (2012), supra n.58, p. 65; van Voorhout, J. C., ‘Human trafficking for labour exploitation: interpreting the 
crime’ (2007) Utrecht Law Review 3(2), 44-69, p. 58; Allain (2014), supra n.26, p.8; Parkes (2015) supra n.23, p. 150. 
107 Allain (2014), supra n.26, p.8. 
108 For analysis of GRETA country reports, including inter alia Croatia, Denmark and Slovak Republic see Stoyanova, V., ‘Article 
4 of the ECHR and the obligation of criminalizing slavery, servitude, forced labour and human trafficking’, (2014) Cambridge 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 3(2), 407-433, p. 434.  
For analysis of domestic interpretation see Allain (2014), supra n.26, p.8.  
For discussion on domestic implementation of Palermo Protocol with analysis of jurisprudence from European Court of Human 
Rights see Eriksson (2013) supra n.32, pp.349-357. 
109 Stoyanova (2014), supra n.108, p. 434. 
110 For examples of different forms of exploitation in national law going beyond the international definition see Gallagher, (2015), 
supra n.53 and Allain (2014), supra n.26, p.9-10. 
111 Malpani (2009), supra n.78, p.139. 
	 48	
working conditions that are in clear discrepancy to those of other workers performing 
the same or a similar activity”.112 In France, Article 225-14-1 of the Criminal Code 
defines “forced labour” as the act of forcing a person, through violence or threat, to 
carry out work without remuneration or for remuneration manifestly bearing no relation 
to the scale of the work carried out. In Romania, prior to the entry into force of the new 
Criminal Code in 2014, a very broad definition of labour exploitation provided that 
violations of legal rules on working conditions, wages, health and security constitute 
exploitation. 113 The travaux préparatoires of the Palermo Protocol clearly demonstrate 
that such expansive domestic interpretations are contrary to the intentions of the drafters 
of the international definition.114  
 
On the other hand, in certain domestic settings, an expansive approach to human 
trafficking has moved beyond the categorical understanding of exploitation, with 
reference to concepts that have no precedent in international law: for example, in 
Belgium, trafficking for economic exploitation is defined as working or living 
conditions contrary to human dignity, which will be discussed in more detail when we 
outline the national legal framework in Chapter 8. This brief insight into the different 
national approaches to criminalising human trafficking, reinforces the findings of the 
EU Fundamental Rights Agency which concluded that the forms of exploitation 
enumerated in the Protocol are in fact the lowest common denominator.115  
 
Consequently, Edwards correctly asserts that the lack of consistency in 
domestic definitions of human trafficking leads to ‘a piecemeal, uncoordinated and 
ineffective response’. 116  Overall, the lack of harmonisation in law regarding the 
meaning of exploitation and regarding acceptable employment practices can be 
detrimental to combatting labour exploitation. Rijken draws attention to the impact of 
such a position as it may ‘have negative consequences for the awareness of [human 
trafficking] and the erosion of the crime. In these occasions it is perfectly possible that 
in the end people will not consider [human trafficking] to be a severe crime, which will 
	
112 Council of Europe, 7th General Report on GRETA’S Activities (2018), p. 34. 
113 For previous Criminal Code see in Zaharia, G.C., ‘Combating Trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation in Romania,’ 
in Rijken, C., (ed.) Combating trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011), pp.164-166. For 
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114 UNODC (2006), supra n. 14. 
115 FRA (2015), supra n.45, p.42.  
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diminish all the efforts that have been made to put [human trafficking] on the (political) 
agenda.’ 117  
 
One solution for achieving harmonisation, according to Allain, could be for 
scholars and practitioners to turn to international labour standards in order to establish 
a line between exploitative labour and legitimate labour.118 However, such an approach 
may not be quite so simple, as the understanding of exploitation in employment 
practices is also much disputed.’119 As outlined by Anderson & O’Connell Davidson in 
their report on human trafficking and demand, there is a lack of global consensus on 
minimum labour standards, leading to ‘variations between countries and different 
economic sectors within a country concerning what are socially and legally acceptable 
employment practices.’ 120  
 
With the lack of consensus regarding the international minimum labour 
standards, an alternative viewpoint proposes that the term exploitation should be 
understood as a free-standing concept - a proposition made during the process of 
legislative reform in England and Wales, as will be seen in Chapter 8 - in addition to 
those forms enumerated and defined in other legal instruments. If this approach were 
to be adopted, Stoyanova contends that exploitation itself would be understood as a 
form of abuse with a lower threshold than other listed forms of exploitation, thus 
permitting the concept of human trafficking to encompass lesser forms of harm. 121 In 
relation to labour exploitation, such an understanding could include abuses and 
violations of labour rights that are not criminalised.122 Indeed, such an interpretation 
may align with the intention of the drafters of the Palermo Protocol, as the forms of 
exploitation are to include “at a minimum” those outlined in the text of the treaty. On 
the one hand, this reading offers a degree of flexibility. However, on the other hand, 
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the lack of clarity on this point, which is, in part, due to a lack of international 
jurisprudence (see Section 3), impedes the advancement of such an interpretation.  
 
Notwithstanding, the need for a harmonised and clear approach to these 
concepts is particularly important at a national level since, as Paavilainen writes ‘law 
enforcement authorities need clear guidelines on how to apply their own national 
legislation and how to identify a case of forced labour, trafficking in persons or 
slavery.’123 Therefore, it is important to develop a common understanding of what is 
meant by exploitation in order to avoid a dilution of the high standards required in 
international law, that could subsequently undermine prospects of securing successful 
prosecutions. Such a note of caution mirrors that which has been broached by scholars 
- including inter alia Gallagher, Nicholson, van der Wilt, Chuang, Ford, Vijeyarasa & 
Villarino - when considering the consequences of legal uncertainty due to the lack of 
definition of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour.124   
 
2.4 Lack of legal certainty  
 
In legal terms, Chuang emphasises that an indeterminate interpretation of the scope of 
the exploitation element in the human trafficking offence ‘risks violating the principle 
that crimes and punishments should be clearly defined in the law (nullum crimen sine 
lege, nulla poena sine lege), thus compromising the rights of the accused.’125 The need 
for a clear definition is of great importance when ensuring certainty in a legal 
framework. Such certainty will help to secure the punishment of perpetrators and 
guarantee the rights of victims of labour exploitation (whether victims of human 
trafficking or not), including labour rights (such as wage arrears and social protection) 
and compensation for material and moral damages. These considerations were a key 
part of the discussion amongst experts when discussing the adoption of a supplementary 
instrument to the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930.126  
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International Journal of Human Rights 14(5), 705-720, p. 712; van der Wilt, H (2014), supra n.3, p. 313; Chuang (2010), supra 
n.24, p. 1709; Vijeyarasa & Villarino (2012), supra n.58, p. 41; Ford, M., ‘Trade Unions, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking’, 
Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 5, 2015, pp. 11–29, p.14. 
125 Chuang (2015), supra n.61, p. 146-147.  
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Legal certainty is of great importance especially when, as Allain reminds us, 
that the law is the principal vessel by which efforts are made to ‘seek to end human 
exploitation.’ 127 Ensuring legal certainty would better equip frontline professionals, 
such as labour inspectors and police officers, to identify and tackle the issue as they 
would possess better knowledge and greater awareness of the many forms of 
exploitation. In criminal law, the principle of legality provides that the behaviour which 
amounts to a criminal offence must be clearly defined in order to provide legal 
certainty.128 Furthermore, it is important that the criminal law is not ambiguous, so as 
to ensure that the defendant is aware of the criminalised conduct. 129  Importantly, 
Stoyanova highlights that it is not necessarily the labels that are required to determine 
sufficient criminalisation of certain offences in national law – although as has been seen 
in Section 2.1, clarification of terminology is crucial to conceptualising labour 
exploitation in law – it is that the national legal framework provides the opportunity for 
a broad and consistent interpretation of the criminal offences that constitute forms of 
labour exploitation. 130 
 
Legal uncertainty impacts upon how exploitation is understood in practice. For 
instance, much of Chuang’s argument when discussing the idea of “expansionist 
creep”131 rests on its detrimental impact on legal certainty. For instance, Gallagher 
asserts that: 
 
Making all exploitation ‘trafficking’ […] complicates the task of those who are at the 
front line of investigating and prosecuting trafficking, presenting particular challenges 
in countries that lack specialist capacity and robust criminal justice systems. In all 
countries the expansionist creep risks diluting attention and effort, and potentially 
deflecting attention from the worst forms of exploitation that are most difficult for 
States to address. 132  
 
	
127 Allain (2013), supra n.1, p.108. 
128 Article 7 of the ECHR; More literature on principle of legality required. Shahabuddeen, M., ‘Does the Principle of Legality 
Stand in the Way of Progressive Development of Law?’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1007.  
129 See for instance, ECtHR, Siliadin v. France, 26 July 2005, Application No. 73316/01.  
130 Stoyanova (2014), supra n.108, p. 424-425. 
131 Chuang, J., ‘Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law’, (2014) American Journal of International Law 
108, 609. 
132 Gallagher (2015), supra n.53. 
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Equally connected to the impact of “expansionist creep”, is Rijken’s contention 
that the ambiguity of the concept of exploitation leads to difficulties for national 
judiciaries to successfully prosecute alleged human traffickers. 133  
 
It must be noted that the suggested ambiguity of exploitation in human 
trafficking is contested by Allain who argues that since the prohibited practices are 
clearly enumerated in law, exploitation should therefore be understood with reference 
to the legal instruments that define these practices. For Allain, these legal standards are 
the pivot and, when read in conjunction with the international labour standards, 
establish a line between exploitative labour and legitimate labour.134 Thus, the role of 
the courts is to determine exactly what constitutes labour exploitation according to these 
legal standards.135 Notwithstanding, there are examples of practical difficulties when it 
comes to the application of the ambiguous elements of the human trafficking definition. 
For example, judiciaries face significant difficulties in interpreting the meaning and 
scope of the offence. 136  Varying judicial interpretations can lead to different 
outcomes, 137  and lack of sufficient legal direction to juries. 138  Such procedural 
irregularity is borne out of the lack of clarity in the law and can lead to miscarriages of 
justice.  
 
The role of the courts and judiciary is therefore crucial but can only be bolstered 
with legal certainty which requires further legal guidance. At present, there is limited 
guidance and assistance on the material scope of the treaty provisions that enumerate 
forms of exploitation. This gap could be addressed by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee - which as previously mentioned, increasingly employs the term human 
trafficking - in a General Comment providing clarification as to the material scope of 
the prohibited practices under Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
	
133 Rijken, (2011), supra n.49, p. ii.  
134 Allain (2013), supra n.1, p. 3 & p. 212. 
135 Allain (2013), supra n.1, p. 8. 
136  Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), 27 October 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BI7099 
(http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BI7099& key (accessed 31 July 2013), cited in van der 
Wilt, H., (2014), supra n.3, p. 323-324. 
137 van Voorhout (2007) supra n.106, p. 58. For instance, in the Netherlands, it has been explicitly left to the judiciary to further 
define exploitation see, Rijken, (2013) supra n.56, p. 14. 
138 See discussion on Court of Appeal case R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691 in Stoyanova (2014), supra n.108, p. 433;  
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law’, (2009) Melbourne Journal of International Law 10, 246-257, p. 248 and Tully, S., ‘Sex, slavery and the High Court of 
Australia: The contribution of R v Tang to International Jurisprudence’, (2010) International Criminal Law Review 10, 403-423, 
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Political Rights (ICCPR)..139 Indeed, the Committee’s lack of engagement has been 
critiqued.140 Promisingly, the first ever UN Treaty Body General Recommendation on 
human trafficking is currently being drafted by CEDAW Committee.141 Whilst this is 
a laudable development, it is potentially limiting in scope as the mandate of this 
particular treaty body may lead to an overemphasis on human trafficking of women and 
girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation (see Chapter 4).  
 
At a European regional level, it is increasingly noted that not all types of 
exploitation would qualify as human trafficking. As the latter is ultimately a distinct 
concept, then broader discussion is needed to clarify what is meant by exploitation in 
human trafficking as being distinct from the standalone forms of exploitation. Not too 
long ago, there was a lack of impetus and limited engagement to clarify what these 
forms are and how they should be handled in the legal framework.142 At the time of 
writing, there does appear to have been more of a recent shift towards clarifying the 
scope of labour exploitation, as mentioned in the Introduction. 143 
 
This shift is extremely promising, as the examples above reinforce Nicholson’s 
argument that ‘a lack of clarity can be fatal to proper interpretation, implementation 
and/or enforcement of the law and therefore in providing protection or satisfaction to 
individuals.’ 144 Again, taking into account the need for international and regional anti-
trafficking instruments to be enforced through domestic legal frameworks, Nicholson 
argues that ‘any ambiguity may result in inconsistency of implementation from State to 
State, which may raise issues of fair labelling and/or result in a lack of equality of 
protection.’145 She argues that any lack of clarity will not only make it difficult for those 
who are in a position to identify situations of labour exploitation, but also for those who 
are suffering from exploitative labour conditions but are discouraged from seeking 
	
139 For discussion on scope of indirect engagement with human trafficking in General Comments see Edwards (2007-2008), supra 
n.9. 
140 Gallagher, A., ‘Human Rights and Human Trafficking: Quagmire or Firm Ground? A Response to James Hathaway’, (2009) 
Virginia Journal of International Law 49, 799-848, p. 821. 
141 UN CEDAW Committee, Concept Note, prepared for the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on 
its elaboration of a General Recommendation on Trafficking in Women and Girls in the Context of Global Migration, available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/Trafficking/ConceptNote.docx.  
142 Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, Report on implementation of the Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011 
on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims from a gender perspective (2015/2118(INI)), 
26 April 2016, p. 8. 
143 Council of Europe, Ready for future challenges - Reinforcing the Council of Europe - Report by the Secretary General for the 
Ministerial Session in Helsinki, 16-17 May 2019, CM-Public SG (2019) 1 01/04/2019, p. 29; Directorate General for External 
Policies of the Union, Study on Contemporary forms of slavery, (December 2018), p.6. 
144 Nicholson (2010), supra n.124, p. 714. 
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redress as they would be ‘unable to identify whether their treatment would engage the 
relevant legal provisions.’146 Ultimately, Nicholson concedes that seeking conceptual 
clarity does not necessarily require an expansive interpretative approach that acts as a 
“catch-all” category, but rather a ‘consensus on what the definition is so that is may be 
interpreted consistently.’ 147 
 
One obstacle to achieving a consensus on definition is the lack of State 
engagement with the existing international instruments that legally define various 
forms of exploitation.148  Such a situation prevails despite obligations on States to 
criminalise human trafficking in domestic law. Stoyanova argues that many states have 
failed to fulfil this obligation since they have perpetuated legal uncertainty by ‘directly 
cop[ying] the international definition of human trafficking and/or the human rights 
definitions of slavery, servitude and forced labour, without further establishing the 
elements of the crimes at domestic level.’149 The UNODC warned in 2009 that a lack 
of engagement with substantive clarification in law leads to a failure to prioritise and 
ineffective implementation of actions and measures to combat exploitation.150 
 
For some scholars and practitioners, the legal uncertainty caused by a lack of 
legal definition and legal certainty of exploitation is not of crucial importance. Instead, 
the value of the law lies in the need to have, as Plant suggests, ‘strong laws against 
coercive exploitation, vigorously enforced, covering all human beings including 
nationals and migrant workers.’151 This thesis refutes such a position on three counts. 
First, the impact of ambiguous legal definitions means that there can be, as Plant 
himself indicates, difficulties in ‘persuading a jury that these subtle forms of coercion 
and deception can make up the criminal offences of forced labour or labour 
trafficking.’152 Second, as will be seen in the following chapters, the distinction in law 
between trafficking for the purposes of labour exploitation and other standalone forms 
of labour exploitation such as forced labour, is important to make – especially as labour 
exploitation can occur in the absence of human trafficking. Furthermore, dismissing the 
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importance of legally distinguishing between all forms of exploitation fails to take into 
account the possibility that some forms of exploitation may, at one time or another, be 
marginalised due to increased political focus, attention and engagement with another 
form of exploitation. Finally, this thesis posits that different forms of exploitation 
require different responses; therefore a “one size fits all” approach will not work .  
 
The lack of legal certainty is problematic when adjudicating on the issue in 
court.153 Therefore, a narrow approach has emerged that may be favoured by juries, 
judges and prosecutors as, this way, legal certainty may be best achieved by ensuring 
consistency in application of the law. In juxtaposition to this, and as we will discuss in 
Section 3 of Chapter 4, an alternative broader expansionist approach has been adopted 
by those who are not as bound by legal principles such as legal certainty e.g. scholars, 
activists and campaigners. A more comprehensive discussion of expansionist discourse 
will follow, however for now, in agreement with Pope, this thesis contends that, ‘legal 
certainty is required, as a result of the complexity of such an issue, which impacts upon 
the whole process and actors involved at all stages.’154 This position has been reinforced 
by David who advocates that ‘definitions—and differences between terminology—are 
the foundation of a justice system that serves all: the community and, those most 
affected, victims of the crime.’155 With this in mind, the following section will begin to 
examine the judicial handling and application of such an undefined and broad legal 
concept in human trafficking jurisprudence.  
 
3. Judicial interpretation of the legal parameters of labour exploitation in human 
trafficking  
 
So far, the present chapter has presented the handling of human trafficking in 
international and regional law (Section 1) and the implications of a categorical rather 
than definitive approach to exploitation (Section 2). In this section and in subsequent 
chapters, the role of the judiciary as a conduit for legal clarity of the legal parameters 
of labour exploitation is examined.  
	
153 Pope, J., ‘A free labor approach to human trafficking’, (2010) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 158, 1849- 1875, p. 
1855-1856. 
154 Pope (2010), supra n.153, p. 1855. 




The judicial interpretation of laws is of crucial importance to the understanding 
and further elaboration of undefined concepts, such as exploitation. Whilst this thesis 
recognises that increased attention to exploitation will facilitate a common 
understanding and harmonisation,156 we reinforce the claim that increased attention to 
the topic will only be effective if it is accompanied by legal clarification that enables 
the identification of labour exploitation in practice.157  
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law will be prevalent in 
the subsequent judicial analysis. The rationale for adopting a predominantly Euro-
centric judicial lens is twofold: first, apart from one case in the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights that we will discuss in Chapter 2,158 no other supranational bodies - 
including African Court of Justice and Human Rights159 and UN Treaty bodies - have 
adjudicated upon State responsibility for the prohibition of human trafficking; 
secondly, the case studies in Part III of this thesis will focus on two European States 
that are bound by the European Convention on Human Rights. It must be noted that the 
specific focus on the Council of Europe instruments is also due to the fact that there has 
been no case law before the Court of Justice of the European Union on the interpretation 
of Directive 2011/36/EU. 
 
In recent years, the ECtHR has increasingly engaged with Article 4 that 
prohibits (but does not define) slavery, servitude, forced and compulsory labour: 
 
1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. 
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. 
3. For the purpose of this Article the term “forced or compulsory labour” shall not 
include: 
(a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according 
to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional release from 
such detention; 
	
156 Gallagher (2008), supra n.55; Edwards (2007-2008),, supra n.9, p. 14. 
157 Rijken (2013) supra n.56, p. 14; J Balch (2013), supra n.342, p. 29; FRA (2015), supra n.45, p. 15, p.39, p. 42. 
158 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Hacienda Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil (20 October 2016).  
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(b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in 
countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military 
service; 
(c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-
being of the community; 
(d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations. 
 
As can be ascertained from the text of the provision itself, there is no mention 
of human trafficking. Thus, of particular interest to the present thesis, is the judicial 
application of the “living instrument doctrine.” In 2010, in the judgment of Rantsev v 
Cyprus and Russia the ECtHR held that ‘[human] trafficking itself, within the meaning 
of Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol and Article 4(a) of the Anti-Trafficking 
Convention, falls within the scope of Article 4 of the Convention.’160 Whilst the case 
law is embryonic in nature, this thesis follows Milano’s statement that the ECtHR’s 
Article 4 jurisprudence ‘provides unique guidance not only to States—members but 
also non-members of the Council of Europe—on how international law standards are 
being interpreted, and will inevitably have an impact on the future case law of other 
international bodies.’ 161 
 
The ECtHR adopts a two-pronged approach to adjudicating Article 4: i) what is 
materially prohibited under the provision and ii) which positive obligations are Council 
of Europe member States’ under in relation to the prohibited practices?162 In this thesis, 
the principal object of enquiry will be the former. We will assess the extent to which, 
if at all, jurisprudence further clarifies the material scope of the “purpose” of the human 
trafficking crime (present chapter). The remainder of the analysis in Part I will 
determine the degree to which a judicial understanding of exploitation beyond the 
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context of human trafficking exists, namely the listed prohibited practices in Article 4: 
slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour (Chapters 2 & 3).  
 
For now, the remainder of this section analyses - in the context of Article 4 - the 
ECtHR’s assessment of human trafficking (Rantsev v Cyprus & Russia [2010]). What 
emerges is the Court’s limited assessment of exploitation and subsequent contribution 
to the conflation of the concept. Indeed, in respect of subsequent cases referring to 
Article 4 and human trafficking, the Court has provided limited clarification of 
exploitation in two cases (M & Others v Italy & Bulgaria [2012], Chowdhury v Greece 
[2017]).  
 
The case of Rantsev v Cyprus & Russia [2010]163 does not provide clarification 
of the forms of exploitation in human trafficking. Instead the ECtHR focused upon the 
examination of ‘the extent to which trafficking itself may be considered to run counter 
to the spirit and purpose of Article 4 of the Convention such as to fall within the scope 
of the guarantees offered by that Article without the need to assess which of the three 
types of proscribed conduct are engaged by the particular treatment in the case in 
question.’164 The rationale for this was threefold:  
i) the Convention’s special feature as a living instrument which must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions;165  
ii) in order to ensure that the object and purpose of the Convention as an 
instrument for the protection of individual human beings, requires that its 
provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical 
and effective and; 166 
iii) the increasing recognition at international level of the prevalence of 
trafficking and the need for measures to combat it, as evidenced by the 
adoption of the Palermo Protocol in 2000 and the Council of Europe Anti-
Trafficking Convention in 2005. 167 
By failing to consider the legal distinctions between various types of 
	
163 Rantsev [2010], supra n.160.  
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exploitation, be it forced or compulsory labour, servitude or slavery, the Court 
immediately fell into the legal quagmire that has been left by the lack of definition of 
exploitation; conflating the process of human trafficking with slavery as highlighted in 
Section 2.1. At no point did the Court elaborate upon the exact form of exploitation that 
had been intended or in fact occurred, (in accordance with Article 3(3) of the Palermo 
Protocol) but instead, simply assimilated human trafficking with slavery:  
 
The Court considers that trafficking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of 
exploitation, is based on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership. 
It treats human beings as commodities to be bought and sold and put to forced labour, 
often for little or no payment, usually in the sex industry but also elsewhere (see 
paragraphs 101 and 161 above). It implies close surveillance of the activities of 
victims, whose movements are often circumscribed (see paragraphs 85 and 101 above). 
It involves the use of violence and threats against victims, who live and work under 
poor conditions [emphasis added].168 
 
Furthermore, the Court concluded that:  
 
In view of its obligation to interpret the Convention in light of present-day conditions, 
the Court considers it unnecessary to identify whether the treatment about which the 
applicant complains constitutes “slavery”, “servitude” or “forced and compulsory 
labour”. Instead, the Court concludes that trafficking itself, within the meaning of 
Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol and Article 4(a) of the Anti-Trafficking 
Convention, falls within the scope of Article 4 of the Convention [emphasis added].169 
 
Significantly, the position of the Court has been reiterated in subsequent cases. 
In M & Others v Italy & Bulgaria [2012], the Court affirmed the Rantsev assimilation 
of human trafficking with slavery.170 More recently, in SM v Croatia [2018], the Court 
followed Rantsev, stating that it is unnecessary to examine the scope and meaning of 
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On the one hand, as put forward by McGeehan, such an approach may be 
viewed as a rejection of the normative hierarchy implied by the text of the European 
Convention, which is predicated on the existence of three distinct practices and, when 
strictly applied, affords greater normative strength to the prohibitions on slavery and 
servitude, than to the prohibition on forced labour.172 On the other hand, as Allain 
emphasises, the approach by the Court is too simplistic, as it fails to take into account 
the three constituent elements that, when all present, constitute the crime of trafficking. 
Notably, the requirement ‘to recruit, transport, transfer, harbour or receive persons’ that 
must be linked to the “means” of ‘threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability 
or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over another person.’ Furthermore, by making reference to previous 
jurisprudence that solely dealt with slavery, the Court’s assimilation of the crime of 
human trafficking with slavery means that the remaining “purpose” elements are 
excluded from the scope of Article 4, namely, the prostitution of others or other forms 
of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, practices similar to slavery, servitude 
or the removal of organs.173 
 
The Rantsev judgment highlights the ECtHR’s unwillingness to consider the 
normative value of the three distinct concepts that are prohibited under Article 4: a 
position that has received criticism from legal scholars such as Keane who perceive the 
main legal issue to be that of the conditions of the artiste visa regime and the 
accountability of the State in facilitating an immigration regime that led to the abuses 
endured by Ms Rantseva which ultimately led to her death. 174  In this regard, as 
Stoyanova writes, a focus upon the actual abuses prohibited under Article 4 would have 
been a preferred alternative, in order to determine a classification between the three 
categories: the slavery, servitude or forced labour. 175 An indication of the practice to 
which the victim had been subjected might have provided clearer guidance on the 
precise legal nature of trafficking from the perspective of the rights of the victims. Legal 
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scholars, including Milano, Piotrowicz, and van der Wilt, believe that the ECtHR’s 
failure to stipulate exactly how human trafficking is a violation of Article 4 is a 
weakness and a sign of intellectual incoherence. Furthermore, to argue that human 
trafficking violates Article 4 without the need to explain exactly how, on the one hand 
shows flexibility, but on the other does not promote legal certainty.176  
 
Alternatively, the Court could have adopted a different approach that applied 
the factual circumstances to ‘the definition of slavery which requires exercise of 
“powers attaching to the right of ownership”, in relation to the particular facts’ of the 
case.’177 Such an alternative approach, proposes Stoyanova, would have resulted in a 
more progressive interpretation, that shifts the focus onto the regulatory framework of 
the visa regimes, such as the artiste visa, and requiring a more robust approach in order 
to address the vulnerability of migrant workers to certain abuses that led to the 
circumstances of the Ranstev case; not just in terms of sexual exploitation but also for 
other forms of exploitation experienced by migrant workers. A shift away from human 
trafficking would permit the space for the focus on the conditions of artistes and how 
the State-imposed regulations create susceptibilities to abuses. The focus would not be 
on the migration aspect and on whether women are engaged in prostitution; but on how 
to modify those regulations so that abuses by private parties are prevented.178 This 
thesis supports this suggestion as such an approach would enlarge the scope of 
protection to those who are subjected to the forms of abuse proscribed in Article 4, and 
not just those who are victims of sexual exploitation. 
 
Ultimately, the analysis of the Rantsev judgment raises a number of issues that 
are of critical value to this discussion of conflation and confusion in terminology, as 
well as with regards to the marginalisation of labour exploitation and the dominance of 
efforts to combat human trafficking, as will be seen in Chapter 4. First, the approach 
taken in Rantsev was so restricted to trafficking in human beings, that any expansion 
of Article 4’s remit to include ‘exploitation’ would have been limited to ‘exploitation 
which is linked with recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
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persons, by means of coercion or deception.’ 179 Such a reading can be undesirable 
because it leads to a ‘privileging of “exploitation” as a purpose element of human 
trafficking over any type of “exploitation”.’180   Second, and of vital significance to the 
discussion around the correct application of terminology, is the fact that the Court 
‘referred to Rantseva as a victim of trafficking or exploitation.’181 Such a formulation 
requires further examination, in light of the human trafficking definition: ‘was she a 
victim of exploitation within the context of trafficking, which requires linking the 
exploitation with certain ‘means’ and certain “actions”? Alternatively, was she simply 
a victim of exploitation, which demands the question whether the material scope of 
Article 4 is enlarged to such an extent as to cover any “exploitation”?’182  Unfortunately, 
the Court, by virtue of its decision that it was unnecessary to identify whether the 
treatment constitutes “slavery”, “servitude” or “forced and compulsory labour”, did not 
offer further insight into these questions.  
 
The Rantsev judgment is the upshot of a ‘Court [that] is not regularly called 
upon to consider the application of Article 4,’ 183  therefore whilst the decision is 
significant it is also a source of disappointment for those seeking legal clarity.184 
Consequently, since the affirmation in Rantsev that human trafficking falls within the 
material scope of Article 4, there have been two subsequent cases of human trafficking 
for labour exploitation whereby the Court directly addressed the material scope and 
interpretation of the three prohibited practices, forced compulsory labour, servitude or 
slavery.185 A more detailed analysis of the forms of exploitation discussed here are 
further examined in subsequent chapters; for now, a preliminary explanation of the 
cases is outlined.  
 
In M & Others v Italy & Bulgaria [2012], the court held that there was 
insufficient evidence for the events complained of to constitute human trafficking. As 
to whether or not the applicants were held in slavery or forced or compulsory labour, 
	
179 Stoyanova (2012) supra n.121, p. 172. On continued narrow approach adopted by the Court after LE v Greece [2016] Milano 
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181 Rantsev [2010], supra n.160, para. 296.  
182 Stoyanova (2012) supra n.121194, p. 173. 
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185 There have been other cases adjudicated under Article 4, but the Court examined compliance with positive obligations in lieu 
of a further elaboration of the material scope of the prohibited practices in LE v Greece (2016) and J & Others v Austria (2017), 
see Milano (2017), supra n.161, 701–727, 
	 63	
the court referred to the marriage being in accordance with Roma traditions186 and the 
exchange of money in the context of the alleged marriage, was not enough to conclude 
that there had been transfer of ownership.187 Equally, the Court held that the applicants 
had not been required to perform forced or compulsory labour because they had been 
employed to do housework, in the absence of coercion, force or menace of penalty.188 
 
In Chowdhury v Greece [2017], the Court held that the applicants had been 
victims of human trafficking for the purpose of forced or compulsory labour. When 
discussing the parameters of forced or compulsory labour and the restrictive domestic 
assimilation of human trafficking with servitude, the Court emphasised the distinction 
between servitude and forced or compulsory labour.189 The Court stated that the key 
distinction between the two forms of labour exploitation is characterised by the victims’ 
feeling that their condition was permanent and that the situation was unlikely to 
change.190 In Chowdhury, the Court held that the applicants’ status as undocumented 
seasonal workers would have emphasised such a feeling of lack of an alternative. 
Crucially, the Court emphasised that restriction of movement is not sina que non for 
identifying forced or compulsory labour. Unlike the domestic courts, the Court did not 
consider the freedom of movement of the workers during leisure time sufficient enough 
to rescind the feeling that they had a choice to leave the exploitative situation. Indeed, 
the Court stressed that the precarious nature of their position – without a residence or 
work permit – and the non-payment of wages owed would have meant that they would 
have been left destitute had they decided to leave. Such precarity left them with no 
alternative but to continue working in such conditions.191 
 
Ultimately, despite these two further cases, the ECtHR has still to determine 
whether or not Article 4 covers lesser forms of abuses than the potentially high 
standards established by the concepts of slavery, servitude and forced labour. Indeed, 
the Chowdury case begins this judicial dialogue, but still within the realms of forced 
labour. Should the Court adopt such a progressive interpretation of Article 4 of the 
ECHR then, as Stoyanova correctly asserts, this could lead to the interpretation of 
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Article 4’s material scope requiring a certain minimum level of severity, thus 
establishing a threshold of seriousness for exploitation. 192  However, as Shamir 
highlights, the role of the court would not end there. The Court would be subsequently 
required to provide further input in order to determine the exact parameters of such a 
threshold.193 As we have demonstrated, the limited amount of jurisprudence thus far, 
and lack of engagement with such a reading of Article 4, suggests that such judicial 
developments are still far off.  
4. Concluding remarks  
 
Following the international definition of human trafficking and the expansion of its 
scope to include labour exploitation, there has been an increased recognition of this 
form of trafficking at the supranational level (Section 1). However, there is still a lack 
of clarity regarding the scope of the exploitation concept as a result of a categorical, 
non-exhaustive, approach to the purpose element (Section 2). As a result, the lack of a 
definition of exploitation in human trafficking has led to a number of issues, namely a 
conflation and confusion between the forms of exploitation, a fragmented and 
inconsistent domestic implementation and a lack of legal certainty. This thesis claims 
that such problems can be overcome by developing a legal conceptualisation of labour 
exploitation that correctly identifies the common attributes of exploitation. 
Furthermore, we believe that a practical legal understanding will not negatively impact 
existing policy measures that are designed to tackle this problem but rather enhance 
their effectiveness. 
 
Despite the problems raised in this chapter, there has been a shift towards 
greater recognition of exploitation. However, there is a lack of guidance and assistance 
from international and regional bodies (UN Treaty bodies and ECtHR) to ensure 
domestic application provides for legal certainty. Furthermore, the overview of the 
European Court of Human Rights Article 4 case law shows that the judicial engagement 
with human trafficking has not been very useful to date due to an aversion to providing 
clarification of the material scope of the provisions, instead preferring to address the 
positive obligations on States in relation to the prohibited practices (Section 3).  
	
192 Stoyanova (2012) supra n.121, p. 185. 
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The critical analysis of the transnational human trafficking definition and its 
application both formally and substantively does not seek to dismiss the achievements 
of measures aimed at countering human trafficking. Quite the opposite. Indeed, the 
developments in anti-trafficking law and policy are to be regarded, as Allain suggests 
as ‘a blueprint of the activities to be dealt with so as to suppress exploitation.’194 This 
thesis suggests that efforts that seek to clarify the legal meaning of exploitation will 
strengthen the application of the prohibition of human trafficking.  
  
	






CHAPTER 2 – State-of-the-art legal understanding of slavery, 









0. Introduction and structure of the chapter 
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the established legal definitions of human trafficking list a 
number of forms of exploitation that had already been defined as standalone forms of 
exploitation in separate international and regional instruments, prior to the 
promulgation of the Palermo Protocol. In the first instance, we consider three of these 
standalone forms of exploitation: slavery (Section 1), practices similar to slavery and 
servitude (Section 2). Secondly, we analyse the international and regional jurisprudence 
that applies the international definition of these forms of exploitation (Sections 3 & 4). 
As in Chapter 1, the predominant focus is on the jurisprudence related to Article 4 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which as Keane writes was a priori ‘a long 
dormant provision’ 195  but has increasingly been the focus of academic and legal 
commentary and judicial discourse ‘in light of the abuses to which migrants in host 
European countries are being subjected.’196 Unlike Chapter 1, however, the discussion 
of the judicial interpretation of international and regional definitions of slavery and 
servitude also extends to other judicial bodies, including the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the High Court of Australia, the ECOWAS 
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Community Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The 
slavery case law analysis reveals a fluctuation between an expansive and narrow 
interpretation of the slavery definition that seeks to ensure that the “classical” definition 
of slavery is applicable in a contemporary setting with a shift away from ownership to 
an understanding premised upon the exercise of control (Section 3). The jurisprudence 
relating to servitude and practices similar to slavery has seen an engagement with a 
criterion based interpretation of the former non-legal concept rather than the categorical 
list of ‘practices similar to slavery’ that are enumerated in law (Section 4). 
 
Overall, we demonstrate in this chapter the extent to which the discourse 
surrounding the legal understanding of slavery, practices similar to slavery and 
servitude can assist in conceptualising exploitation in law. We acknowledge that the 
prohibition of slavery recognises the extreme nature of this form of exploitation that 
must not be diluted, out of respect for and in recognition of the abhorrence of the 
historical transatlantic slave trade and societal acceptance of slavery. Without 
diminishing the historical importance of the prohibition of slavery, further clarification 
of its material scope is required in the context of a modern setting so as to ensure that 
individuals can seek access to justice. Whilst the international law definition appears to 
have endured the test of time, subsequent supranational legal reform and jurisprudence 
reflects the legal community’s recognition that the modern understanding of slavery 
must move beyond the limitations of a master-property relationship.  
 
1. Slavery in international and regional law  
 
The abolition of the Transatlantic slave trade and the abolition of slavery must be 
distinguished. Whilst the former was finally legislated in 1807 in Great Britain with the 
Slave Trade Act and in the United States with the Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves, 
the practice of holding another in a position of slavery continued with an incremental 
approach to its abolition across the British Empire (1833) in the US (1865) and across 
Europe (early 20th century). 197 An international approach to the suppression of both the 
slave trade and slavery came to fruition with the entry into force of the League of 
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Nations International Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, 1926. 
Therein, Article 1(1) defines slavery as:  
 
The status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership are exercised.198  
 
The international definition has, according to Allain, been widely accepted,199 
and is recognised as having the status of customary international law and jus cogens.200 
Very much like other fundamental rights such as the right to life and freedom from 
torture, States must not only refrain from infringing freedom from slavery (a negative 
right), they must also take measures to prevent its violation (a positive right). For 
example, Article 2 of the 1926 Slavery Convention requires:  
 
The High Contracting Parties undertake, each in respect of the territories placed under 
its sovereignty, jurisdiction, protection, suzerainty or tutelage, so far as they have not 
already taken the necessary steps: 
(a) To prevent and suppress the slave trade; 
(b) To bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of 
slavery in all its forms.201 
 
Furthermore, Article 5 of the same convention obliges State parties to take all 
necessary measures to prevent compulsory or forced labour from developing into 
conditions analogous to slavery.202  
 
Whilst the absolute prohibition of slavery and the slave trade was overshadowed 
in the Convention by wording such as “progressive” and “suppress,” the position of the 
international community in supporting an absolute prohibition was made explicit in 
Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 1948, which emphatically states that: 
 
	
198 Article 1(1), International Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253. 
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201 Article 2, International Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253. 
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No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited 
in all their forms.203  
 
Whilst the Declaration is non-binding, it set the tone for subsequent binding 
iterations of the prohibition in international and regional human rights treaties wherein 
the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of ‘slavery in all its forms’ has been 
reinforced: 
 
- Article 4 (1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1950): ‘No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.’ 
- Article 8 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966): ‘No 
one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave trade in all their forms shall be 
prohibited.  
- Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981): ‘Every 
individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being 
and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of 
man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment 
and treatment shall be prohibited.’ 
- Article 6 (1) of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969): ‘No one shall be 
subject to slavery or to involuntary servitude, which are prohibited in all their forms, 
as are the slave trade and traffic in women.’ 
- Article 5 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000): ‘No 
one shall be held in slavery or servitude.’ 
 
The eradication of slavery is one of only two human rights identified by the 
International Court of Justice as carryin obligations erga omnes;204 that is, an obligation 
owed by States to the international community as a whole.205 More recently, Article 
7(1)(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), which entered 
into force in 2002, proscribes enslavement as a crime against humanity when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack. 206 Article 7(2)(c) defines enslavement in the 
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same way as slavery in the 1926 Convention as ‘the exercise of any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such 
power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.’207 The 
Statute further proscribes sexual slavery as a crime against humanity in Article 7(1)(g) 
and a war crime in Article 8(2)(b)(xxii). 
 
Whilst these subsequent international and regional instruments affirmed the 
absolute nature of the prohibition of slavery, no further insight is offered as to the 
meaning of the definition of slavery. Thus, whilst the 1926 Convention remains the 
point of reference, 208  it unfortunately perpetuates some confusion as to the exact 
meaning of slavery, as the concept of “powers attached to the right of ownership” is not 
defined. The Convention’s travaux préparatoires provide an indication as to the 
characteristics of the various powers that are deemed to attach to the right of ownership:  
 
1) The individual of servile status may be made the object of a purchase; 
2) The master may use the individual of servile status, and in particular, his capacity 
to work, in an absolute manner, without any restriction other than that which might 
be expressly provided by law; 
3) The products of labour of the individual of servile status become the property of 
the master without any compensation commensurate to the value of the labour; 
4) The ownership of the individual of servile status can be transferred to another 
person; 
5) The servile status is permanent, that is to say, it cannot be terminated by the will 
of the individual subject to it;  
6) The servile status is ipso facto to descendants of the individual having such 
status.209 
 
The intended understanding of the definition of slavery was to be expansive and 
comprehensive. Indeed, the drafters of the 1926 convention displayed considerable 
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ambition in attempting to outline a broad understanding of ‘slavery in all its forms’ but 
unfortunately, had a poor grasp of the exact nature of the practices they sought to 
combat. Consequently, the construction of the definition is paradoxical, as highlighted 
by scholars including McGeehan and Vijeyarasa & Villarino. On the one hand, its 
application to ‘slavery in all its forms’ led to various interpretations and a wide range 
of practices subsumed as slavery.210 On the other hand, following the inclusion of the 
phrase “powers attached to the right of ownership” concerns have been raised that 
certain exploitative conditions could in fact be excluded where there was no evidence 
of a master-property relationship.211   
 
The concerns raised in more contemporary scholarship are not new, as can been 
seen by the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Slavery in 1949, 
whose task was to address concerns as to the satisfactory nature of the 1926 legal 
definition of slavery. The Committee who tabled two proposals to draft: i) either a new 
convention broader in scope or; ii) a supplementary instrument to the existing 
convention.212 The second proposition was approved with a view to affirming ‘the 
slavery convention of 1926 as a whole and to be more precise in defining the exact 
forms of servitude dealt with.’213 At the time, such a position was consistent with the 
inclusion of servitude as a prohibited practice in Article 4 of the newly promulgated 
UDHR. Both developments acknowledged the fact that the definition of slavery does 
not adequately capture all forms of exploitation, in particular those that do not meet the 
legal threshold of the “exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership.” The 
extent to which subsequent legal instruments achieved this objective is discussed in the 
next section.  
 
2. Practices similar to slavery and servitude in international and regional law  
 
The supplementary convention recommended by the aforementioned Ad Hoc 
Committee of Experts on Slavery sought to cover the full range of practices related to 
slavery that were not covered by the 1926 Convention. Article 1 of the Supplementary 
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Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery, 1956 did not amend the legal definition of slavery as it had been 
accepted as an ‘accurate and adequate definition of the term.’214 Instead, the provision 
updated the law by extending, in Article 1, the applicability of the convention to four 
additional ‘institutions or practices similar to slavery’ (hereinafter ‘practices similar to 
slavery’):  
 
Each of the States Parties to this Convention shall take all practicable and necessary 
legislative and other measures to bring about progressively and as soon as possible 
the complete abolition or abandonment of the following institutions and practices, 
where they still exist and whether or not they are covered by the definition of slavery 
contained in article 1 of the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 
1926: 
(a) Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition arising from a pledge by a 
debtor of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as security for 
a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the 
liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively 
limited and defined; 
(b) Serfdom, that is to say, the condition or status of a tenant who is by law, custom or 
agreement bound to live and labour on land belonging to another person and to render 
some determinate service to such other person, whether for reward or not, and is not 
free to change his status; 
(c) Any institution or practice whereby: 
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment 
of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any other 
person or group; or 
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer her to 
another person for value received or otherwise; or 
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another person; 
(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 
years, is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another 
person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young 
person or of his labour. 215 
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Article 1 is the central feature of the Supplementary Convention providing for 
an exhaustive, categorical list of forms of exploitation that constitute ‘practices similar 
to slavery’: namely, debt bondage, serfdom, forced marriage and child exploitation. 
Importantly, despite the prohibition of servitude in the aforementioned Article 4 of the 
UDHR,216 the drafters of the Supplementary Convention replaced servitude by the legal 
term ‘institutions or practices similar to slavery.’ Consequently, servitude remains 
undefined in international law.217 The main justification for this omission was that 
servitude was to be considered as a form of forced labour rather than slavery, ‘which 
would more appropriately be dealt with as such by the International Labour 
Organisation, or kinds of civic obligations which are generally accepted and in no way 
resemble slavery in their effects.’ 218  
 
Such a distinction was not made in the drafting process of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), wherein Article 8 of the ICCPR 
introduced a legally binding absolute prohibition of servitude, with no reference to 
‘practices similar to slavery.’ 219  During the drafting process, it was agreed that 
“slavery” and “servitude” were two different concepts and should be dealt with in two 
separate paragraphs. Servitude was perceived as ‘a more general idea covering all 
possible forms of man's domination of man’ whereas slavery was considered to 
constitute ‘the worst form of bondage […] which tended to reduce the dignity of 
man.’220 Ultimately, the prohibition of servitude, involuntary or otherwise, sought to 
secure the impossibility for any person to contract himself into bondage. 221 
  
Whilst the side-lining of servitude in law could have created fragmentation in 
public international law and international human rights law, Allain highlights that 
subsequent legal instruments appear to have overcome the situation by simply referring 
to both ‘practices similar to slavery’ and ‘servitude.’222 For example, both international 
and regional definitions of human trafficking refer to both practices similar to slavery 
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and servitude. However, since the term servitude remains undefined different 
interpretations have emerged in practice. On the one hand, servitude is considered to 
be synonymous with ‘practices similar to slavery’ and by virtue of the exhausted 
categorisation of ‘practices similar to slavery’ in the 1956 convention. Thus, for Allain, 
this requires the normative content of servitude in international law to be narrowly 
construed in its application.223 On the other hand, Gallagher claims that servitude is 
interpreted as broader than slavery which is restricted to the legal ownership of another 
person, referring to ‘all conceivable forms of domination and degradation of human 
beings by human beings’224 and to ‘less far- reaching forms of restraint and refers, for 
instance, to the total of the labour conditions and/or the obligations to work or to render 
services from which the person in question cannot escape and which he cannot 
change.’225 This hierarchical approach to slavery, servitude and practices similar to 
slavery has been affirmed in jurisprudence, as will be discussed below (Section 3). 
 
The categorical approach to distinguishing between slavery, servitude and the 
practices that amount to slavery has been criticised as it has focused upon existing 
practices rather than identifying the common attributes of the different manifestations 
of slavery. Much of the subsequent confusion concerning what is and what is not 
slavery, according to Bales & Robbins, springs from this separation of the practical and 
the conceptual. 226 This point is further reiterated by McGeehan who emphasises that:   
 
The collective failure to recognise slavery’s ability to manifest in forms other than 
chattel slavery has undermined attempts to abolish it by legal means, and has created 
confusion at the highest level in the legal discourse.227 
 
Allain proposes that the extent to which this is problematic in practice may be 
mitigated by the possibility of a duality of the characterisation of a situation. For 
instance, a particular factual situation may constitute, on the one hand, ‘servitude, if it 
meets the definitional threshold set out in international law e.g. debt bondage.’ 
Concurrently, the same factual situation may also constitute slavery, ‘if beyond meeting 
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the definitional threshold of a specific servitude; it also manifests the exercise of powers 
attaching to a right of ownership.’ 228  Allain’s promulgation of the duality of 
circumstances will be further discussed in subsequent chapters (see Chapter 3). 
 
The continued reference to the 1926 Convention definition reinforces the 
necessity of a situation of slavery to be characterised by the “exercise of powers 
attached to the rights of ownership.” Consequently, the 1956 Supplementary 
Convention is deemed to apply to situations where such powers are not present.229 As 
such, Allain concludes that practices similar to slavery and servitude should be 
understood as human exploitation falling short of slavery. 230 However, despite the 
recognition that the presence of the “exercise of powers attaching to the right of 
ownership” constitutes slavery and the lack of said powers points to a lesser form of 
exploitation i.e. servitude, the traditional definition of slavery is contradictio in 
terminis, as it is universally recognised that one person cannot have a legal right of 
ownership over another person.231 Therefore, with this in mind, it is important to turn 
to the most recent jurisprudential engagement to determine the extent to which the legal 
definition of slavery, practices similar to slavery and servitude have been interpreted in 
a contemporary setting.  
 
3. Judicial interpretation of the legal parameters of slavery: moving towards a 
contemporary understanding   
	
Unlike the human trafficking case law analysis in Chapter 1, this chapter does not only 
consider the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, but also the engagement 
of other relevant international, regional and national judicial bodies with the concepts 
discussed above: including, inter alia the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Australian High Court, the ECOWAS Community Court of 
Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The inclusion of this analysis 
will demonstrate that the conceptualisation of slavery, practices similar to slavery and 
servitude by these judicial bodies is radically different from the approach taken by the 
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European Court of Human Rights.232 The slavery case law analysis reveals a fluctuation 
between an expansive and narrow interpretation of the slavery definition wherein the 
judicial understanding grapples with a “classical” definition of slavery and its  
applicablilty to a contemporary setting.   
 
Despite, the prohibition of slavery in international law since 1926, the concept 
of slavery has been subject to very limited judicial interpretation. One of the occasions 
in which there was judicial engagement with the concept was in 2002, under the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
in Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac & Zoran Vukovic [2002] 
immediately following the entry into force of the Rome Statute. The ICTY attempted 
to determine what van der Wilt calls ‘the proper limits of the crime of enslavement’233 
and in doing so took an interpretive approach that focused upon “factors” that would 
provide assistance in determining whether or not a particular situation amounts to 
enslavement. Following the ICTY’s broad interpretation of contemporary forms of 
slavery in Kunarac, the first subsequent critical engagement of the European Court of 
Human Rights with the parameters of slavery under Article 4 saw the Court offer a 
contradictory interpretation of the meaning of “powers attaching to the right of 
ownership”, in Siliadin v France [2005].  
 
The position of the European Court was followed by the ECOWAS Community 
Court of Justice in Hadijatou Mani v. Republic of Niger [2008], which was 
characterised by enslavement amounting to “chattel slavery” by virtue of the applicant 
being born into an established slave class.234 In the same year, the Australian High 
Court sought to further clarify the exact parameters of slavery according to the 1926 




Bearing in mind 
the gravity of the non-derogable prohibition of slavery as a grave international crime, 
the Australian High Court sought to ensure that the definition is not interpreted too 
broadly so as to capture other exploitative practices that fall short of slavery, per se. 236  
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More recently, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Hacienda Brasil 
Verde Workers v Brazil [2016] delivered a judgment on the prohibition of slave labour 
under Article 6 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court held that 
slavery, in a contemporary setting, must be understood to refer to both the de jure and 
de facto situation or condition of the victim as well as the exercise of powers attaching 
to the right of ownership.237   
 
Three points of interest have emerged from the handling of slavery in the 
abovementioned cases. The first refers to the placing and interpretation of slavery in a 
contemporary setting and the extent to which the concept is to be understood in an 
expansive manner, beyond the traditional understanding of chattel slavery, that is 
characterised by the reduction of an individual to an object (Section 3.1). Secondly, the 
courts have however acknowledged that the property paradigm of slavery is 
contradictio in terminis in light of the legal impossibility of “right of ownership” 
(Section 3.2). Therefore, the third point, following on from the first two, refers to the 
need to clarify the material scope of “any or all of the powers” of ownership that can 
enable a contemporary interpretation of slavery that is premised upon control (Section 
3.3). 
 
3.1 Slavery in a contemporary setting: moving beyond chattel slavery? 
 
Despite the Rome Statute’s reference to the 1926 Convention definition, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac & Zoran 
Vukovic [2002] held that slavery is no longer limited to the notion of “chattel slavery”:  
 
The Appeals Chamber accepts the chief thesis of the Trial Chamber that the traditional 
concept of slavery, as defined in the 1926 Slavery Convention and often referred to as 
“chattel slavery”, has evolved to encompass various contemporary forms of slavery 
which are also based on the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right 
of ownership. In the case of these various contemporary forms of slavery, the victim is 
not subject to the exercise of the more extreme rights of ownership associated with 
“chattel slavery”, but in all cases, as a result of the exercise of any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership, there is some destruction of the juridical 
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personality; the destruction is greater in the case of “chattel slavery” but the difference 
is one of degree. The Appeals Chamber considers that, at the time relevant to the 
alleged crimes, these contemporary forms of slavery formed part of enslavement as a 
crime against humanity under customary international law.238 
 
In stark contrast, the European Court later ruled, in Siliadin v France [2005], 
that a traditional definition of slavery should be adopted under Article 4; making 
explicit reference to the 1926 slavery convention and the exercise of powers attaching 
to a right of ownership. The European Court’s restrictive interpretation drew on the 
understanding of the different prohibited forms of exploitation in Article 4 as distinct 
concepts that descend in gravity, with slavery being the most severe, followed by 
servitude and forced or compulsory labour: 
 
The Court notes at the outset that, according to the 1927 Slavery Convention, “slavery 
is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership are exercised”. It notes that this definition corresponds to the 
“classic” meaning of slavery as it was practised for centuries. 239 
 
The key distinction made in Siliadin [2005] was the emphasis placed on the 
“classic” meaning of slavery leading to an overly restrictive interpretation. To this end, 
such an interpretation requires that for a person to be held in slavery “in the proper 
sense” then an individual must ‘exercise a genuine legal right of ownership over her, 
thus reducing her to the status of an “object”.’
 240 The ECOWAS Community Court of 
Justice in Hadijatou Mani v. Republic of Niger [2008] followed the European Court’s 
position, ruling that the moral element of the slave condition was demonstrated by the 
intention to exercise property rights over the applicant. 241  
 
The approach of the High Court of Australia in R v Tang [2008], in this regard, 
is similar to that of Siliadin, to the extent that the court restricted the interpretation of 
slavery so as to not to render slavery “virtually meaningless” by adopting an expansive 
	
238 ICTY, Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac & Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23& IT-96-23/1-A (12 June 2002), 
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239  Siliadin [2005], supra n.129, para 122. See also reference in para 123 of Siliadin to Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium, 
Commission's report of July 9, 1980, Series B no. 44, p.30, paras 78-80 as discussed by Keane (2013), supra n. 174, p. 183. 
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meaning. Whilst the Australian High Court confirmed that the ‘harsh and exploitative 
conditions do not themselves amount to slavery,’ the offence is distinguishable in law 
on the basis of whether a right of ownership is being exercised. Thus reinforcing the 
hierarchical assertion of the European Court. However, as Allain suggests, the 
judgment does demonstrate that whilst chattel slavery ‘falls within the definition [...] it 
would be inconsistent to read the definition as limited to that form of slavery’.242 
Similarly, the first engagement with the notion of slavery by the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in Hacienda Brasil Verde Workers v Brazil [2016] saw recognition 
of the contemporary nature of slavery but also the need for the factual circumstances to 
amount to the “exercise of powers attached to the rights of ownership.” Taking into 
account the impossibility of legal ownership, we will now consider the extent to which 
the exercise of powers of ownership is a stumbling block in the next section.  
 
3.2 Slavery’s stumbling block: the impossibility of a legal right of ownership  
 
In Siliadin, the Court’s focus on legal ownership restricted the reading of Article 1 of 
the Slavery Convention to a narrow interpretation equating slavery to chattel slavery.243 
Furthermore, the Siliadin judgment’s adherence to the traditional definition of slavery 
suggests that ‘if it is not legally possible to keep a “slave”, because one cannot own 
another person, then no one can ever be enslaved.’ 244  The Court’s restrictive 
interpretation is problematic for two reasons that are of particular relevance to the 
current thesis: first, as noted by Cullen, ‘such a strict definition of slavery may lead to 
difficulties where the facts are less clear and a dispute over the scope of slavery may 
arise’245 and second, Nicholson argues that if the interpretation of slavery is premised 
solely on evidence of ‘legal’ ownership, genuine victims of slavery may well fall into 
the descriptors of forms of servitude, rather than within the meaning of slavery under 
the 1926 Convention.’246 As such, Piotrowicz concludes, the decision is disappointing 
for its reasoning on slavery.247  
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The institution of marriage as the exercise of rights of ownership has received 
different judicial interpretations. In Hadijatou Mani v. Republic of Niger [2008] the 
continuation of the condition of enslavement (ergo the exercise of the rights of 
ownership) was linked to the institution of marriage despite the applicant being issued 
with a ‘certificat d’affranchissement (d’esclave)’.248 However, in M and Others v Italy 
and Bulgaria [2012], the European Court dismissed the case on the basis of insufficient 
evidence of slavery. 249 The Court held that the exchange of money as a dowry for 
marriage did not represent the monetary price of a transfer of ownership. Instead, the 
Court drew upon the cultural tradition of the bride’s family receiving monetary 
contributions, and stressed the prevalence of such a tradition, to the extent that it was 
deemed as an acceptable social practice rather than constituting an indicator of 
exploitation. Similarly, the role of the applicant in the household also fell within the 
expectations of a member of a household and did not amount to servitude or forced or 
compulsory labour.250 
 
The prevailing judicial understanding and interpretation of Article 1 of the 1926 
Convention, as demonstrated by the courts in Kunarac and Tang, is the impossibility 
to exercise a genuine legal right of ownership:  
 
The Appeals Chamber will however observe that the law does not know of a “right of 
ownership over a person”. Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention speaks more 
guardedly “of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership are exercised.” That language is to be preferred.251  
 
Tang made a distinction between “status” or “condition” which, as Tully 
reiterates, amounts to either de jure slavery, where the status of a person as a slave is 
created by or recognised in law, or de facto slavery, where the factual condition of 
slavery does not have any legal recognition. 252 As the 1926 convention sought to 
operationalise a definition of slavery where the status of slavery in law was 
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impossible,253 scholars including Allain and Keane claim that these judgments have 
affirmed that de facto slavery is included in the definition,254 providing legal clarity by 
acknowledging that despite the impossibility of de jure slavery, de facto slavery can be 
dealt with under the prohibition of slavery. Similarly, the Inter-American Court in 
Brasil Verde, recognised the need to ensure that the prohibition of slavery is applicable 
in a contemporary setting by acknowledging that a contemporary definition of slavery 
includes both the de jure or de facto situation or condition of the victim.255 
 
In short, the judicial analysis has confirmed that whilst a situation of slavery 
must present with the exercise of powers attached to the rights of ownership. 256 
Similarly, the shift away from de jure slavery to an understanding premised upon de 
facto slavery not only emphasises the impossibility of legal right of ownership (de jure) 
but also means that any contemporary understanding of slavery hinges upon the 
clarification of the material scope of “any or all of the powers” of ownership (de facto).  
 
3.3 A contemporary interpretation: any or all of the powers of ownership as 
control 
 
As demonstrated in the previous sections, all cases explicitly state that the key 
distinction between slavery and other forms of servitude is that a situation of slavery 
must present with the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership. 257 
However, in Kunarac, the ICTY held that the destruction of juridical personality alone 
does not amount to slavery, but instead any destruction of the victim’s juridical 
personality must be ‘the result of the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership’ [emphasis added].258 Such a position leads to a disjuncture as 
to how the Courts clarify their position in terms of the contemporary operationalisation 
of this element.  
 
	
253 Tully (2010),supra n.138, p. 408. 
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The case law analysis has shown that it is not necessary for “all” of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership to be exercised with a preference for “any” of them 
to be present.259 In order to determine whether or not any of these powers had been 
exercised and/or are present amounted to a situation of enslavement, a number of 
indicators were outlined by the ICTY Trial Chamber and affirmed by the Appeals 
Chamber. These indicators were considered to facilitate the assessment of the factual 
circumstances to determine whether a person was being held in slavery due to ‘the 
control of someone’s movement, control of physical environment, psychological 
control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, forced, threat or force of coercion, 
duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of 
sexuality, forced labour.’260 The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice employed 
these factors to assess whether or not the factual circumstances amounted to 
enslavement.261 The Appeal Chamber affirmed that these inidicia are non-exhaustive 
and must be assessed on a case by case basis:  
 
 […] it is not possible exhaustively to enumerate all of the contemporary forms of 
slavery which are comprehended in the expansion of the original idea; this Judgement 
is limited to the case in hand. 262 
 
The Australian High Court adopted a similar approach in Tang, affirming that 
each case will need to be determined on a case by case basis, taking into account the 
norms prevailing in the temporal and geographical context – suggesting space for an 
evolutionary and ambulatory approach that takes into account contemporary practices. 
To this end, the following powers of ownership were outlined:  
 
[…] the power to make the complainants an object of purchase, the capacity, for the 
duration of the contracts, to use the complainants and their labour in a substantially 
unrestricted manner, the power to control and restrict their movements, and the power 
to use their services without commensurate compensation.263 
 
Whilst both judgments provide an overview of the “powers attached to the right 
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of ownership” the Australian High Court did not go as far as the ICTY in Kunarac. 264 
The ICTY’s introduction of concepts such as ‘oppression of the individual; deception 
and abuse of power creating a situation of vulnerability; and cruel treatment or abuse, 
is more expansive than the Australian High Court's interpretation of powers reflecting 
ownership, with the exception of the power of control and restriction of movement.’265  
 
	 In Kunarac, ‘the tribunal asserted that ownership was an essential element of 
slavery but found that slavery had been established in circumstances which could just 
as easily be described as control rather than ownership.’ 266 The subsequent case of 
Tang sought to ensure that such an interpretation was restricted to ‘powers of the kind 
and degree that would attach to a right of ownership if such a right were legally possible, 
not powers of a kind that are no more than an incident of harsh employment, either 
generally or at a particular time or place.’267 The notion of control has since been 
referenced by a third party intervention in the case of CN & V v France [2012], where 
it was considered to be ‘a crucial element common to all the forms of exploitation of 
human beings covered by Article 4 of the Convention.’268 
 
The notion of control as possession was further galvanised by the judgment in 
the case of Hacienda Brasil Verde Workers v Brazil [2016] where the court held that 
‘ownership’ ought to be understood as ‘possession’ in cases involving slavery which 
amounts to the exercise of control over another. However, the Court stipulated that the 
exercise of control must ‘significantly deprive that person of his or her individual 
liberty.’269 The Inter-American Court also adopted the indicators used in Kunarac to 
further delineate the factual circumstances in the Brasil Verde case as those that amount 
to slavery.270 Interestingly, the operationalisation of these indicators also led to the 
Court recognising the duality of circumstances, stipulating that whilst the factual 
circumstances of the case amounted to forced labour and servitude (debt bondage) they 
also reached the stricter elements of the above-mentioned definition of slavery.271 
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Such indicators are of great assistance to the judiciary who are, for instance, 
required to tackle the distinction between exploitative practices, particularly in 
borderline cases. For instance, legal clarity is imperative when giving legal directions 
to juries who must decide whether the facts of the case amount to slavery or a lesser 
form of exploitation (as we will see in the file study analysis of England & Wales in 
Chapters 9 & 10).272   
 
It is not only the judiciary who have employed the notion of control as the main 
focal point of the contemporary understanding of slavery.273 Indeed, scholars, with a 
view to combatting de facto slavery, rather than de jure slavery, have also identified a 
key element, namely the exercise of powers of control which deprives a person, in a 
significant manner, of their individual liberty or autonomy and, ultimately; is meant to 
allow for exploitation, and is typically maintained through coercion or violence. 274 It 
is contended that the notion of control can be applied to other forms of labour 
exploitation, and not just slavery. Admittedly, the contemporary manifestation of “the 
exercise of the powers attaching to the right of ownership” can be determined by 
employing a property paradigm approach that considers ownership to be anchored in 
the control over a thing; ultimately, it refers to control (physical, psychological or 
otherwise) over a person in such a way as to significantly deprive that person of his or 
her individual liberty.275 The legal understanding of control pivots on possession as the 
sina que non of slavery since you cannot sell a thing or profit from it to the exclusion 
of others unless you possess it. Such possession, in law, ultimately turns on 
demonstrating control. 276  This reasoning has been further refined in the Bellagio-
Harvard Guidelines that provide a contemporary, non-legally binding explanation as to 
the meaning of “rights of ownership”. In essence, “ownership” is now tantamount to 
the degree of control exercised over an individual. The Guidelines state that ‘the 
exercise of “the powers attaching to the right of ownership” should be understood as 
constituting control over a person in such a way as to significantly deprive that person 
of his or her individual liberty, with the intent of exploitation through the use, 
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management, profit, transfer or disposal of that person. Usually this exercise will be 
supported by and obtained through means such as violent force, deception and/or 
coercion.’277 Another manifestation of control includes the conditions of dependency 
in the relationship between the perpetrators and the employees. For example, even 
though persons may not be physically confined to their workplace, their employers may 
still monitor them, retain their passports or identity documents or not provide a legal 
work permit. 278  Such discreet methods of control are difficult to detect and are 
exacerbated by an individual’s isolation, ignorance and unfamiliarity with the country 
of destination’s culture and other obstacles such as language barriers and a lack of 
awareness of employment rights. 
 
4. Judicial interpretation of the legal parameters of practices similar to slavery  
 
When it comes to the practices similar to slavery the judicial analysis reveals an 
engagement with the concept of servitude in place of ‘practices similar to slavery’. The 
European Commission on Human Rights in Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium [1980] 
considered the concept of servitude to amount to a ‘particularly serious form of denial 
of freedom.’279 The Commission outlined three objective criteria, that requires i) the 
obligation to perform certain services for others; ii) the obligation for the 'serf' to live 
on another person's property and iii) the impossibility of altering his condition.280 For 
the purpose of this determination, the Commission was guided by Article 1 of the 1956 
Supplementary Convention.281  
 
From the perspective of the international prohibition of ‘practices similar to 
slavery’, however, the judicial adjudication of servitude is problematic as it fails to refer 
to the four specific servitudes outlined in the 1956 Supplementary Convention, as a 
result, and as emphasised by Allain, fails to ascertain ‘a manageable understanding of 
the term servitude.’282 The Court, in Siliadin v France [2005], held that ‘in the light of 
the case-law on this issue that for Convention purposes “servitude” means an obligation 
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to provide one's services that is imposed by the use of coercion, and is to be linked with 
the concept of “slavery”.’283 Indeed, whilst the Court appears to have reiterated the 
parallels between slavery and servitude, it appears to have failed to distinguish between 
servitude and forced or compulsory labour (that also requires coercion and a menace of 
penalty). 284 With regards to coercion, the Court, in a later case of CN v United Kingdom 
[2012] clarified that forms of coercion, in the context of servitude, can be both direct 
and indirect.285 
 
Whilst reinforcing the objective criteria established in Van Droogenbroeck, the 
Court in CN & V v France [2012] stated that servitude corresponds to a special type of 
forced or compulsory labour or, in other words, an “aggravated” forced or compulsory 
labour. On the one hand, this could be seen to further blur the distinction between the 
concepts prohibited under Article 4. However, the Court did in fact confirm that the 
fundamental distinguishing feature between servitude and forced or compulsory labour 
within the meaning of Article 4 of the Convention lies in the victims’ feeling that their 
condition is permanent and that the situation is unlikely to change.286 Furthermore, the 
Court stated that in order to assess the situation, ‘it is sufficient that this feeling be based 
on the above-mentioned objective criteria [condition is permanent and that the situation 
is unlikely to change] or brought about or kept alive by those responsible for the 
situation.’287 This assessment of the role of the exploiter is also a significant factor in 
the judicial interpretation of the material scope of exploitation that will be seen in 
subsequent chapters (see Chapter 9).  
 
The Court in CN & V v France [2012] then went onto apply such an assessment 
to the two applicants:  
- For one applicant, over a four-year period, the defendants had used her illegal 
administrative situation as one of the reasons to keep her living with them which 
was strengthened by incidents such as fraudulent hospitalisation and lack of 
access to education or training for future work. In addition, she had no days off 
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and possibility for free time which would have enabled her to reach out to those 
who might assist. As a result, in addition to her situation amounting to forced 
or compulsory labour, the Court held that the applicant had been held in 
servitude.288  
- In contrast, the Court assessed the situation of the second applicant not to 
amount to servitude because she was given access to education, including given 
time to do her homework, and was not confined to the house. This resulted in 
her being able to reach out to a school nurse, whom she informed of the 
situation. 289  As with the slavery case law presented in this chapter, the 
assessment is based on factors such as control and restriction of movement.  
 
More recently, the judgment in Hacienda Brasil Verde Workers v Brazil [2016] 
saw the Inter-American Court adopt an alternative position to that of other 
supranational jurisprudence, with an assimilation of the prohibition of slavery to 
practices similar to slavery.290 This is the first time that jurisprudence has sought to 
further clarify, aside from the categorical list in the 1956 Convention, the material scope 
of practices similar to slavery. In Brasil Verde, the Inter-American Court stated that 
practices similar to slavery constitute ‘the exercise of control over a person, through 
physical and psychological coercion, in such a way as to significantly deprive that 
person’s autonomy, with the intent of exploitation against the person’s will.’291 The 
Inter-American Court then went onto state that servitude is a practice similar to slavery, 
which suggests that the two concepts are considered to be the same. However, the 
definitive position of the Court is ultimately not clear, as the Court then went onto 
accept the definition of servitude according to the objective criteria laid out in Van 
Droogenbroeck.292  
 
Therefore, whilst the case law analysis appears to hint at the legal application 
of servitude rather than practices similar to slavery, there is still a need for clarification 
as to the preference between an exhaustive categorical approach or a broader objective 
assessment of the factual circumstances based on the three criteria. 
	
288 C.N. and V. [2012], supra n.208, para. 92. 
289 C.N. and V. [2012], supra n.208, para. 93. 
290 Hacienda Brasil Verde [2016], supra n. 158, para 276. 
291 Hacienda Brasil Verde [2016], supra n. 158, para 276. 
292 Hacienda Brasil Verde [2016], supra n. 158, para 280. 
	 89	
5. Concluding remarks  
 
The global abolition of slavery was initially hailed a success as it had led to a 
stimulation of shared values, a voluntary prohibition of slavery by State parties and the 
gradual elimination of the origins and causes of this conduct.293 However, the success 
of the global slavery prohibition was arguably short-lived, in part due to the lack of 
adequate international implementation and enforcement of the existing international 
legislation and the hibernation of the prohibition of slavery as a tool for repression or 
advocacy against human exploitation. 294  The recent re-engagement with the 
prohibition of slavery, as we have seen in this chapter, further suggests that the slavery 
has ‘survived its abolition and has arguably thrived, despite the gradual recognition of 
its moral unacceptability and its global prohibition.’ 295  
 
Nevertheless, the recent but limited judicial engagement with slavery, servitude 
and practices similar to slavery provide impetus for a better handling and demonstration 
of intolerance of such conduct. The maintenance of a high standard, given the gravity 
of such exploitative conduct (e.g. the jus cogens status of slavery), must also be 
accompanied by conceptual clarity and certainty in law. Such an advancement will be 
fundamental to the application of the protection measures in States and to the ability of 
the law to address the various practices it seeks to prohibit, especially taking into 
account the contemporary context of labour exploitation.296 
  
For now, the state-of-the-art legal understanding of slavery, servitude and 
practices similar to slavery have given significant insight into the clarification of 
exploitation. For instance, the contemporary understanding of slavery recognises that 
the black letter law of the 1926 convention must be interpreted in accordance with the 
contemporary setting, as demonstrated by the shift away from ownership to an 
understanding premised upon the exercise of control.    
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0. Introduction and structure of the chapter  
 
One cross-cutting theme that has been identified in previous chapters and continues in 
the present chapter, follows Gallagher’s assertion that there is a strong political and 
legal importance of upholding a clear distinction between the different concepts of 
exploitation. 297 For instance, the legal framework emphasises the need for a conceptual 
distinction between slavery and forced or compulsory labour, as demonstrated by 
Article 5 of the 1926 Slavery Convention wherein ‘the implication is that forced labour 
is not identical in its invidiousness to slavery; the latter is completely unacceptable, 
while the former is merely undesirable.’298 Further reinforcement of the differences 
between these forms of exploitation is evident from the instrumental and institutional 
division between forced labour and other forms of exploitation. Namely, the ILO holds 
the mandate to eliminate forced or compulsory labour, and the League of Nations, and 
subsequently the United Nations, have dealt with slavery, practices similar to slavery 
and servitude. Notwithstanding, as emphasised in Chapter 1, and despite a clear legal 
framework to the contrary, forced or compulsory labour is very often confused or 
conflated with human trafficking, therefore, it is important to reiterate, as have Lewis 
	
297 Gallagher (2008), supra n. 55. 
298 Bassouini, M.C., ‘Enslavement as an international crime’ (1991) International Journal of Law and Politics 23, 445-517, p. 468. 
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et al, that ‘not all forced labour results from trafficking, and those responsible for 
deceptive border crossings may or may not be directly linked to subsequent 
exploitation.’299 
 
As with slavery, servitude and practices similar to slavery, the legal 
understanding of forced or compulsory labour in a contemporary context has required 
adaptation in order to take account of societal and political shifts such as 
decolonialisation, globalisation, neoliberalism and the deregulation of the labour 
market. 300 Consequently, the shift from forced or compulsory labour as a State practice 
to a form of labour exploitation whereby an estimated 90% of forced labour occurs in 
the “private economy,” 301 is particularly unique to the trajectory of the abolition of 
forced or compulsory labour in law. As a result, the approach taken to recognise such 
political and societal changes, in the context of forced or compulsory labour can be 
contrasted to the forms discussed in previous chapters. In particular, such changes have 
been reflected by amendments to the law on the books, rather than reiterating the 
original text of the law and relying upon subsequent judicial interpretation to consider 
its application in a contemporary setting as is the case with slavery and servitude. Such 
an approach to forced or compulsory labour emphasises that any attempt to delineate 
what is meant by exploitation must be mindful of what Anderson & Rogaly refer to as 
the “multidimensional elements,” that are also of relevance to its understanding, such 
as the political economy and the structural issues that facilitate exploitation as we 
discussed when outlining the problem definition in the Introduction to the thesis. 302  
 
In this chapter we focus upon the development of the meaning of the prohibition 
of forced or compulsory labour in international and regional law (Section 1). The legal 
handling of forced or compulsory labour must be distinguished from the other 
standalone forms of exploitation discussed in Chapter 2. Taking into account historical 
change, the prohibition and definition of forced or compulsory labour in international 
law has been secured under a different institutional regime, namely international labour 
law. The remainder of this chapter will assess the international community’s 
	
299 Lewis, H., Dwyer, P., Hodkinson, S., & Waite, L., (eds) Precarious lives: forced labour, exploitation and asylum, (Bristol: 
Policy Press, 2015), p. 1.  
300 IOM (2003) supra n.103, p. 46. 
301 ILO, Global Estimate of Forced Labour 2012: Results and Methodology, Geneva, 2012; ILO, Profits and Poverty: The 
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engagement with the concept in black-letter law which has not translated into practice 
due to limited powers of enforcement (Section 2), requiring further reinforcement of 
the law on the books (Section 3), and a significant contribution from the international 
and regional human rights legal regime to strengthen the prohibition of forced or 
compulsory labour (Section 4), as well as the further delineation of the concept in 
jurisprudence (Section 5). 
 
1. Forced or compulsory labour in international and regional law 
 
Forced or compulsory labour was first mentioned, but not defined, in Article 5 of the 
Slavery Convention (1926), that outline the circumstances in which States may employ 
such a practice, whilst acknowledging the potential grave consequences of its use. 
 
The High Contracting Parties recognise that recourse to compulsory or forced labour 
may have grave consequences and undertake, each in respect of the territories placed 
under its sovereignty, jurisdiction, protection, suzerainty or tutelage, to take all 
necessary measures to prevent compulsory or forced labour from developing into 
conditions analogous to slavery. 
It is agreed that: 
(1) Subject to the transitional provisions laid down in paragraph (2) below, compulsory 
or forced labour may only be exacted for public purposes. 
(2) In territories in which compulsory or forced labour for other than public purposes 
still survives, the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour progressively and as soon 
as possible to put an end to the practice. So long as such forced or compulsory labour 
exists, this labour shall invariably be of an exceptional character, shall always receive 
adequate remuneration, and shall not involve the removal of the labourers from their 
usual place of residence. 
(3) In all cases, the responsibility for any recourse to compulsory or forced labour 
shall rest with the competent central authorities of the territory concerned. 
 
The inclusion of the term in Article 5 of the 1926 Convention demonstrated ‘a 
definite attempt to deal with forced or compulsory labour in a general international 
agreement.’303 Allain, however, draws attention to the lack of a definition of the concept 
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and the lack of limitations placed on forced or compulsory labour for public purposes 
as being indicative of the attitudes at the time of the Colonial powers wherein the need 
to use forced or compulsory labour was justified for the purpose of public works and 
development. 304 As we will demonstrate below, this historical State perspective is of 
relevance to the current thesis as it reinforces the role of the State (historically and 
currently) in creating exploitation and the impact that this has on determining a 
contemporary understanding of the legal scope of labour exploitation. It will be shown 
that shifts in societal attitudes impact upon the legal and political understanding of a 
particular phenomenon. For instance, the historical evolution of free labour must be 
understood from the perspective of a continuum wherein there is a shift in what is 
understood as practices amounting to exploitation. 
 
The ILO Convention No.29 (Forced Labour, 1930) criminalises the illegal 
exaction of forced or compulsory labour and is the key international instrument 
concerning forced labour. 305  Article 2(1) of the Convention defines forced or 
compulsory labour as:   
 
For the purposes of this Convention the term forced or compulsory labour shall mean 
all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty 
and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.   
 
The forced or compulsory labour definition is purposely broad with explicit 
reference to both work or services and does not enumerate a list of prohibited practices. 
The ILO report that the wide definition of the Convention is applicable to all possible 
forms of forced labour, including slavery and slavery-like practices, debt bondage and 
trafficking in persons, and to all workers in both the public and private sectors.306 In 
contrast to the approaches adopted for slavery, servitude and practices similar to 
slavery, the broad definitional approach towards forced or compulsory labour further 
reinforces its expansive understanding of this form of exploitation and, as a result, can 
lead to the duality of characterisation of a situation of labour exploitation. As such, we 
also follow Allain’s articulation of forced or compulsory labour as ‘a long arc of 
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activities’ wherein a particular situation may amount in law to multiple forms of 
exploitation, as long as the exploitation reaches the legal definition of both forced 
labour and that of the additional form of exploitation e.g. in the case of slavery, the 
exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership. 307   
 
The ILO Convention definition outlines three key elements of the material 
scope of forced or compulsory labour: i) work or service; ii) menace of any penalty; 
and, iii) involuntary offer. First, the definition covers all work or services, with the 
exception of the work and services listed in Article 2(2): 
 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Convention, the term forced or compulsory 
labour shall not include-- 
(a) any work or service exacted in virtue of compulsory military service laws for work 
of a purely military character; 
(b) any work or service which forms part of the normal civic obligations of the citizens 
of a fully self-governing country; 
(c) any work or service exacted from any person as a consequence of a conviction in a 
court of law, provided that the said work or service is carried out under the supervision 
and control of a public authority and that the said person is not hired to or placed at 
the disposal of private individuals, companies or associations; 
(d) any work or service exacted in cases of emergency, that is to say, in the event of 
war or of a calamity or threatened calamity, such as fire, flood, famine, earthquake, 
violent epidemic or epizootic diseases, invasion by animal, insect or vegetable pests, 
and in general any circumstance that would endanger the existence or the well-being 
of the whole or part of the population; 
(e) minor communal services of a kind which, being performed by the members of the 
community in the direct interest of the said community, can therefore be considered as 
normal civic obligations incumbent upon the members of the community, provided that 
the members of the community or their direct representatives shall have the right to be 
consulted in regard to the need for such services. 308  
 
Whilst the exceptions were refined in the ILO Convention No. 105 (Abolition 
of Forced Labour, 1957) under Article 1, the prohibition of forced or compulsory labour 
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in the 1957 Convention is designed to complement and supplement the 1930 
Convention:309    
 
Each Member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this Convention 
undertakes to suppress and not to make use of any form of forced or compulsory 
labour-- 
(a) as a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or 
expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, 
social or economic system; 
(b) as a method of mobilising and using labour for purposes of economic 
development; 
(c) as a means of labour discipline; 
(d) as a punishment for having participated in strikes; 
(e) as a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination.310 
 
As previously mentioned, the substantive differences of the understanding of 
the legitimate imposition of work or services between the 1930 ILO Forced Labour 
Convention and the 1957 ILO Abolition of Forced Labour Convention can be attributed 
to the shift in the political and economic climate at the time of drafting of these 
instruments. Whereas colonialist interests were still in play at the time of drafting the 
first instrument,311 the subsequent 1957 instrument sought to address gaps by explicitly 
prohibiting the use of any form of forced or compulsory labour ‘as a method of 
mobilising and using labour for purposes of economic development.’312 However, as 
Baccini & Koenig-Archibugi remind us, this purpose was not wholly accepted by States 
who wished to prioritise economic development over efforts to abolish forced labour.313 
As such, it is important to take heed of Maul’s assertion that any historical analysis of 
the instruments adopted by the ILO represents ‘a snap shot of a particular moment, 
	
309 ILO, Forced labour, General Survey by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
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Geneva, 15 February 2007, para. 11; ILO, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, Report III (Part 1A) International Labour Conference, 85th Session, Geneva, 1998, para. 105. 
310 Article 1, ILO, C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced 
Labour, 25 June 1957. 
311 Van Der Mussele v. Belgium, 23 November 1983, Application no. 8919/80, para 32.  
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reflecting the majorities and the balances of power at the time of the debate.’314 Again, 
and learning from historical accounts, it is reiterated that any discussion of the 
contemporary context must take into account the political and economic priorities of 
States before determining their engagement with efforts to eradicate labour 
exploitation.315. 
 
Second, the exaction of work or services under the menace of any penalty does 
not only refer to legal penalties, but also to the loss of rights or privileges.316 As 
affirmed by the ILO Supervisory bodies, the penalty does not have to take on the form 
of a penal sanction.317 Therefore, the interpretation of penalty need not be in the strict 
sense to mean punishment attributed by a court of law, but rather as a penalty or 
punishment inflicted by any persons or body. 318 The ILO has identified the following 
forms of menace of penalty: 
• physical violence or restraint, or even death threats addressed to the victim or 
relatives; 
• threats to denounce victims to the police or immigration authorities when their 
employment status is illegal; 
• threats to denounce victims to village elders in the case of girls forced to 
prostitute themselves in distant cities; 
• economic penalties linked to debts; 
• the non-payment of wages; 
• the loss of wages accompanied by threats of dismissal if workers refuse to do 
overtime beyond the scope of their contract or of national law; 
• the retention of identity papers by employers and may use the threat of 
	
314 Maul, D., ‘ILO and Globalisation of Human Rights’ in Hoffmann, S. L., Human rights in the 20th Century, (Cambridge: 
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confiscation of these documents in order to exact forced labour.319  
The loss of rights or privileges was further enumerated by the ILO Supervisory 
Committee to include the loss of certain rights, advantages or privileges such as 
promotion, transfer, access to new employment, the acquisition of certain consumer 
goods, housing or participation in university programmes.320 Such factors are perceived 
as contributing to the individual vulnerability that is conducive to the emergence of 
forced labour situations. 321 
 
The third element of the definition of forced labour states that the worker must 
not have offered him/herself to the work voluntarily. To this end the consent of the 
individual is irrelevant where it has been given under menace of penalty, as it results 
from the use of indirect coercion.322 Similarly, despite the inalienable right of the 
worker to free choice of employment, this must be accompanied by the right to freely 
terminate the employment, where the latter is restricted then this constitutes a menace 
of penalty, and thus the work is deemed involuntary.323 Another example, refers to the 
impossibility to consent to employment where there is a lack of knowledge of the 
working conditions (including place, time, duration, regime and remuneration). Thus, 
when incorrect information as to the working conditions is provided, one cannot infer 
consent.324 A definitional quagmire emerges, however, where as a result of a lack of 
socially and economically attractive options in situations of migration, an individual 
consents to or voluntarily enters into an exploitative labour situation, knowing that the 
conditions are not appropriate but that they are nevertheless going to be better than the 
labour and living standards in their country of origin.325 Where the individual has been 
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The involuntary nature of forced or compulsory labour is however put into 
question by the following conundrum, also put forward by Gallagher: 326 is it possible 
to consent to exploitation? Ultimately, it is very unlikely for such situations to not have 
elements that have exacerbated the background circumstances of an individual leaving 
them with no other alternative but to accept such conditions (even if willingly). For 
instance, scholars have attested to the fact that debt bondage and bonded labour are 
increasingly a feature of forced labour, that is ultimately the outcome of debt-financed 
migration. 327  Further to this, literature also recognises that the tied nature of the 
employment, leaves workers vulnerable to exploitative living and working conditions 
and increases the dependency on employers.328  For this reason, as emphasised by 
Clesse et al, the issue of consent is an overarching and organic element of the situation, 
that must be considered at all stages of the factual circumstances. 329  
 
To assist with the grappling of such complex factual situations, the ILO has 
subsequently determined a number of indicators330 whereby the presence of a single 
indicator in a given situation may, in some cases, imply the existence of forced or 
compulsory labour and, by consequence, the irrelevance of consent: abuse of 
vulnerability, deception, restriction of movement, isolation, physical and sexual 
violence, intimidation and threats, retention of identity documents, withholding of 
wages, debt bondage, abusive working and living conditions, excessive overtime.331 
These indicators are also illustrative of the forms of coercion that are used to maintain 
control over a worker and can foster dependence on the worker. 332  
 
Taking these indicators into account and referring back to the above discussion 
on the need for freedom of choice free from menace of penalty, we can consider the 
work of Andrees & van der Linden who investigated the labour perspective of human 
trafficking. As a result, they adopted a narrower line of questioning when determining 
whether or not one of the indicators had rendered the original consent irrelevant. The 
question posed was: have you been free to change or leave your employment at any 
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given time?333 This thesis considers this line of questioning to be of significance as it 
relates to the discussion of notion of “control” and individuals’ perception of their 
ability to change their circumstances that has emerged from the analysis of the 
parameters of contemporary forms of slavery and servitude in Chapter 2 as key features 
of exploitation and will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.  
 
2. Implementing the prohibition of forced or compulsory labour  
 
The prohibition of forced labour contained in the ILO’s Forced Labour Convention is 
widely ratified, and the elimination of forced labour is one of the 19 strategic outcomes 
set out in the ILO Strategic Policy Framework. 334 Nevertheless, despite its widely 
accepted legal recognition, forced or compulsory labour is considered by some to be a 
flawed legal concept, as it is regarded as a political tool to serve the State’s interests. 
For instance, McGeehan suggested that ‘the purpose of its introduction was the 
facilitation of a form of State-sanctioned slavery in colonial Africa.’ 335 Furthermore, 
in the contemporary context, Skrivankova has clearly demonstrated that the prohibition 
of forced labour through international or general legal norms is very difficult to enforce 
and prosecute unless there is a corresponding criminal offence created in the national 
law.336 This is further reinforced by Stoyanova who reflects upon the low level of 
engagement by ILO Member States to incorporate the criminal offence of forced or 
compulsory labour in their domestic criminal legal framework.337 In addition, where 
the concept of forced or compulsory labour has been applied in domestic law, Muskat-
Gorska demonstrates that there have been diverse understanding of its meaning and its 
indicators, leading to a lack of harmonised approach in national legislation or case 
law.338   
 
Despite these concerns, the ILO has taken further action to abolish forced labour 
by targeting practices that may lead to situations of labour exploitation339  and to 
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regulate working conditions such as working time 340  and payment of wages. 341 
However, ILO Conventions will only become legally binding once they are ratified by 
State parties and enforcement powers are limited. There are three forms of enforcement 
action:  
i) Member States, upon ratification of a Convention, must report to the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(Committee of Experts) who will provide an independent appraisal on the technically 
measures adopted to apply international labour standards.  
ii) Certain Observations of the Committee of Experts are then examined by 
the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, a tripartite committee of 
the International Labour Conference, with discussions and recommendations published 
in its General Report. The Comments and observations of the Committees constitute 
the ILO jurisprudence, and unless contradicted by the International Court of Justice are 
to be considered as valid and generally recognised.  
iii) Finally, a complaints procedure is foreseen by Article 24 ILO Constitution, 
wherein an employers’ or workers’ organisation can submit a representation against 
any government that, in its view, has not properly applied a Convention it has ratified. 
If deemed admissible, the complaint will then be examined by a tripartite committee 
established by the ILO Governing Body, where the complaint is upheld, the Governing 
Body may establish a Commission of Enquiry. Such a mechanism is rarely used, and 
when enforcement action is taken, it can be seen to lack teeth, as can be evidenced by 
the enforcement action on forced labour against Burma in 2000, the first time any action 
was taken and it was served in the form of a proposal that States be invited to take 
‘appropriate measures’, an approach that will be unlikely to have any real impact on 
changing practices in the non-compliant State.342 
 
Admittedly, it is important to bear in mind Baccini & Koenig-Archibugi’s claim 
that such a system of enforcement is implicitly open for critique since the ILO 
framework is based upon the notion of reciprocated cooperation amongst treaty 
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signatories.343 Nevertheless, the often-detailed content of ILO Conventions reduces 
ambiguity about what constitutes compliance and makes it easier to determine whether 
a State has complied or not. States are subject to demanding reporting obligations and 
the supervisory system of the ILO processes information on national labour laws and 
practices that originates not only from governments but also from private organisations, 
notably trade unions. States that are found to be in violation of their obligations are 
named and shamed and exposed to the possibility of sanctions by other States.344 
Furthermore, domestic actors, such as trade unions, civil society and national legislators 
may play a key role in uncovering practices that are not in conformity with the 
ratification process. 345  
 
3. Reinforcing the prohibition of forced or compulsory labour  
 
These political factors and conceptual concerns were taken into account as part of the 
drafting process of the newly adopted ILO Protocol No. 14 (Forced Labour, 2014). In 
particular, and as already touched upon, Ollus notes the need to recognise that ‘the 
definition of forced labour must be reinterpreted in a contemporary social and historical 
context, where forced labour is no longer a state-sponsored (colonial) activity, but 
mainly a form of exploitation by private actors.’346 In this regard, it is recognised that 
the occurrence of exploitation in the private sphere increases due to its locus being ‘a 
secretive place, […] often outside of, or on the fringes of, legal and societal protections 
and recognition.’ 347  The regulatory response to this shift has, to a certain extent, 
manifested in the recognition that States have a positive obligation to prevent forced or 
compulsory labour. In this regard, criminalisation of the practice is only a first step 
leading to an evolution towards much broader positive obligations on States (see below) 
that seek to adapt to the increased involvement of non-State actors as the principle 
perpetrators. 348 
 
Article 1(3) of the ILO Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 
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(P029, hereafter referred to as the Protocol) reaffirmed the ILO Convention definition 
of forced or compulsory labour, but both the promulgation of the Protocol and its 
accompanying Forced Labour (Supplementary Measures) Recommendation, 2014 
(R203 – hereinafter referred to as the Recommendation) demonstrates, as Radeva 
Berket suggests, recognition from the international community that the nature and form 
of forced labour had changed since the 1930 Convention on Forced Labour, and that its 
transnational component requires cross-border collaboration and innovative 
approaches.349  In particular, the Protocol and Recommendation seek to ensure the 
application of the measures therein to include ‘specific action against trafficking in 
persons for the purposes of forced or compulsory labour.’350  
 
Andrees claims that the ILO instruments are merely complementary to the 
Palermo Protocol, as the latter is more specific on forms of coercion, exploitation and 
for instance goes beyond the provision of work or services to include forced 
prostitution.351 However, we draw on the ILO instruments as reinforcement of the 
standalone nature of forced or compulsory labour and for those forms of exploitation 
that are not explicitly listed in the international definition of human trafficking. For 
example, the ILO Conventions recognise other forms of exploitation including, begging 
or other criminal activities, that are not enumerated in the Palermo Protocol but are 
considered as part of the ILO’s understanding of “labour” in the ILO Convention No. 
182 and the ILO supervisory bodies and thus among forms of forced labour. 352  
Furthermore, the final text ensures that the measures therein are applicable to ‘all 
instances of forced labour, whether or not they arose as a result of trafficking’ and that 
‘many of the measures aimed at preventing and eliminating forced labour are applicable 
whatever the source or form of forced labour.’353 
 
Muskat-Gorska praises the approach of the ILO Protocol and Recommendation 
for lifting ‘the labour approach to human trafficking to international level by adding 
labour considerations to the treatment of trafficking persons in so far as they become 
victims of forced or compulsory labour.’ 354 However, this thesis wishes to exercise 
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352 Bakirci (2009), supra n. 64, p. 163. 
353 ILO (2014), supra n.304, p. 5.  
354 Muskat-Gorska (2017), supra n.338, p.460. 
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caution as it is contended that such an approach may still lack the ability to achieve 
policy coherence due to the lack of a robust monitoring mechanism as well as the non-
binding nature of the recommendation where the bulk of the measures lie.   
 
Notwithstanding, this thesis acknowledges the strength of the ILO forced or 
compulsory legal framework to protect against exploitation by ensuring, as described 
by Baccini & Koenig-Archibugi, ‘a level playing field in the global economy’ by 
limiting the temptation for governments and employers to facilitate a race to the bottom 
by lowering labour standards as part of the goal of creating a comparative advantage in 
international trade.355 In addition, the same authors consider that the ILO Conventions 
serve as political and economic mechanisms whereby States may strive to improve 
domestic labour market standards without jeopardising their economic position 
amongst global competitors. Such a situation would result in States becoming more 
willing to commit to ILO standards once their economic competitors have adhered to 
the ILO framework.356 
 
4. Strengthening the prohibition of forced or compulsory labour  
 
The value of the ILO’s approach to the prohibition of forced or compulsory labour can 
be ascertained from the regional prohibition, wherein a number of key binding and non-
binding human rights instruments are of pertinence; namely, Article 4 UDHR, Article 
4 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5 EU Charter on Fundamental 
Rights, and Article 6 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Of particular 
relevance, it must be noted that these human rights instruments do not define forced or 
compulsory labour, instead they refer to the 1926 Slavery Convention and 1930 ILO 
Convention definition of forced or compulsory labour respectively. Whilst this thesis 
recognises, as does McGeehan, that these instruments ‘predate the birth of the 
instruments and mechanisms of human rights law,’ this thesis asserts that it is 
nevertheless important to consider the extent to which the international human rights 
regime has bolstered the prohibition of forced or compulsory labour. 357 
 
	
355 Baccini & Koenig- Archibugi (2014), supra n.343, p. 446. 
356 Baccini & Koenig- Archibugi (2014), supra n.343, p. 448. 
357 McGeehan (2012), supra n. 172, p. 347. 
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The normative framework of international human rights law provides workers, 
and in particular migrant workers, with the ‘legal and political space’ to reinforce labour 
standards and to ‘bring the scope of state responsibility into sharper focus.’ 358  In 
addition to the prohibition on forced or compulsory labour and associated rights such 
as freedom of association and freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment, the 
international human rights law framework, also enshrines core labour standards. For 
example, the UDHR guarantees the right to ‘just and favourable conditions of work’ 
and subsequent human rights treaties such as the ICCPR, ICESCR, and UN Convention 
on Rights of Migrant Workers enshrine general protection to workers, irrespective of 
immigration status, including in relation to remuneration and fair wages, safe and 
healthy working conditions, reasonable working hours and non-discrimination.359 In 
their study of forced labour and migration in the UK, Anderson & Rogaly envisage the 
considerable overlap and convergence between international human rights law and the 
ILO standards as creating a means of enforcement in addition to that which is available 
within the ILO system.360  
 
In particular, whilst the ILOhad already achieved significant steps towards 
securing international agreements and standards on a number of labour related issues, 
including: minimum age regulation, wages, working hours, invalidity insurance, 
unemployment provision; the development of the universal human rights regime was 
an opportunity to further ensure the universal coverage of ILO labour standards as until 
then, they only covered a handful of economically advanced European countries. Thus 
by 1945, the ILO, with the establishment of the international human rights regime, was 
able, according to Maul, to ‘take a working mechanism and bring human rights 
principles into a form binding under international law.’ 361 The binding nature of the 
international labour standards was further entrenched as a result of increased 
membership and an unprecedented acceptance of ILO human rights standards 
evidenced by a record number of ratification of norms. 362  However, in the 1960s, such 
political and moral commitment to human rights was side-lined in favour of economic 
development; for example, the 1962 ILO Supervisory Committee report listed counties 
	
358 Chuang, J., ‘Beyond a snapshot: Preventing human trafficking in the global economy’, (2006) Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 13(1), 137-163, 157.   
359 Anderson & Rogaly (2005), supra n.46, p. 14-15. 
360 Anderson & Rogaly (2005), supra n.46, p. 14-15. 
361 Maul (2011), supra n.314, p. 303. 
362 Maul (2011), supra n.314, p. 315. 
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where compulsory labour service for young people was introduced. Despite 
condemnation for being in contravention with the ILO Forced Labour Conventions, the 
use of forced labour was defended by the new ILO Member States as a necessary means 
to mobilise all available forces to promote development. 363  By the 1990s, the 
promulgation of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work was 
indicative of all Member States’ commitment to the core inventory of human rights 
labour standards. 364 
 
Despite this, the international human rights framework has maintained the 
protection afforded to the individuals from the prohibited forms of labour exploitation. 
For instance, the prohibition of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour in 
Article 8 of the ICCPR, 365 is perceived to be stronger than previous instruments as it 
can be enforced through its reporting mechanism and individual petition system.366  
However, the law in practice does not necessarily make full use of the enforcement 
provisions, for instance there have been very few individual communications under 
Article 8. This missed opportunity can be further emphasised by reference to the 
absence of a General Comment on Article 8 from the Human Rights Committee. 367  
 
The indivisibility of human rights is also important in the context of forced or 
compulsory labour when taking into account not only the civil and political rights 
protection but also the economic, social and cultural rights that are relevant to ensuring 
that individuals are not subjected to the forms of labour exploitation discussed thus far. 
For instance, Article 6 of the 1966 International Covenant of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) which provides ‘the right to work, which includes the right 
of everyone to the opportunity to gain his [or her] living by work which he [or she] 
freely chooses and accepts.’ The provision in the ICESCR is not only enumerating an 
economic right to access the labour market but is also, according to Edwards, an anti-
forced labour provision complementing the civil and political provisions that are 
remunerated in Article 8 of the ICCPR.368  
	
363 Maul (2011), supra n.314, p. 316. 
364 Maul (2011), supra n.314, p. 319. 
365 UN General Assembly (1955), supra n.219, p. 93 
366 Article 40, International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966 entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 9 
367 Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.9, p. 26. 
368 Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.9, p. 27. It is acknowledged that UN CEDAW Committee are in the process of drafting a General 
Comment on Trafficking in Women and Girls as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Furthermore, acknowledging the protection from labour exploitation afforded 
by economic, social and cultural human rights, and borrowing Edwards analytical 
stance, this thesis contends that Article 7 of the ICESCR can also be categorised as an 
anti-labour exploitation provision: 
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular: 
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: 
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of 
any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to 
those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; 
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions 
of the present Covenant; 
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions; 
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate 
higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence; 
(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with 
pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays.369  
 
When it comes to the implementation of these provisions, State parties are not 
required to fulfil their obligations in an absolute manner, since these rights can be 
subject to some exceptions and progressive implementation according to available 
resources.370  Nevertheless, it is important to note that these provisions hold great 
significance when it comes to clarifying the meaning of labour exploitation and 
ensuring that the law available is applied in order to disrupt labour exploitation in the 
labour market. Indeed, one significant factor of labour exploitation is that many 
individuals enter voluntarily into a contract of employment but then the working 
conditions are in breach of the ISESCR provisions discussed above. As a result, in some 
instances, the employment relationship could amount to labour exploitation. A State 
must ensure that the national framework is suitably developed to protect against these 
	
369 Article 7, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, UNTS, vol. 993, p. 3.  
370 For discussion on limitations in Article 2 ICESCR regarding progressive implementation, absolute prohibition of discrimination 
and application to non-nationals in developing countries see Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.9, p. 28. 
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abuses, including judicial mechanisms and labour market regulation.371  
 
The international and regional human rights legal framework demonstrates that 
the prohibition of forced labour is first and foremost a violation of basic human rights 
principles, and its criminalisation is a step towards its eradication. In addition, the 
prohibition refers to all persons, irrespective of their migration status, as it constitutes 
an extreme form of abuse and exploitation. Such disregard and lack of respect for 
individuals is not only harmful to workers, but also, as highlighted by Lewis et al, ‘in 
turn, generates downward pressure on wages and conditions through what is known as 
the race to the bottom.’ 372  
 
The next section will consider how and to what extent the parameters of this 
form of exploitation have been further delineated in a judicial context, in light of the 
contemporary setting and the shift from state-sponsored activity to one enacted in the 
private labour market economy, an issue that has been extensively addressed in 
literature.373 Piotrowicz particularly emphasises the perspective of the ‘the traditional 
vertical application of human rights law between state power and the individual,’ 374 as 
with other human right violations that are committed by non-state actors, he emphasises 
that the role of human rights law must adapt to ensure that States undertake appropriate 
protection measures in order to respect and fulfil their obligations.375 Cullen supports 
this perspective, since such an approach will require more than the mere prohibition of 
the practices outlined in the treaties,376 is also obliges States to legally discourage and 
prevent enslavement, forced labour and servitude perpetrated by non-state actors, as 
well as to protect those at immediate risk. 377  Whilst it is acknowledged that the 
considerations regarding positive obligations, as illustrated by these latter points, is of 
crucial importance when it comes to making the law practical and effective, rather than 
theoretical and illusory; the focus in the present thesis will be upon the substantive 
	
371 Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.9, p. 28. Also supported by Chuang who calls for focus on socio-economic approach. Chuang 
(2006), supra n.358, p. 157.   
372 Lewis et al (2015), supra n. 299, p. 3. 
373 See on the shift of forced labour from state sanctioned to private economy activity in Allain (2013), supra n.1,  p.106 Ollus 
(2015), supra n.1, p. 229. ILO, Global Estimate of Forced Labour 2012: Results and Methodology, Geneva, 2012; Hadijatou Mani 
[2008] supra n.67, para 77 for Piotrowicz this case is important for what it tells us about state responsibility under human rights 
law for what are, essentially, private acts: Piotrowicz (2012), supra n.58, p. 191. 
374 Piotrowicz, R., ‘The legal nature of trafficking in human beings’, (2010) Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 4, 175 – 203, 
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articulation of the prohibited practices as opposed to the scope and nature of the positive 
obligations on States.378  As will be demonstrated by the presentation of the most 
pertinent cases of  regional human rights law, seeking to minimise the diversity of 
understandings as to what is to be prohibited in national settings, is still a topic for 
further consideration.  
5. Judicial interpretation of the legal parameters of forced or compulsory labour  
 
The jurisprudence engaging with the concept of forced or compulsory labour has 
reinforced the definition elaborated in ILO Convention 29 providing further clarity of 
the meaning of the three main definitional elements we outlined in Section 1. However, 
ILO research on the judicial adjudication of forced or compulsory labour in courts 
reveals that, in some instances, the courts have used their judicial freedom to develop 
their own tests for determining the involuntary nature of labour. 379 The discussion of 
the judicial interpretation of the legal parameters of forced or compulsory labour will 
therefore consider the case-law that provides assistance on the legal understanding of 
when the provision of work or services becomes forced labour, but with particular 
emphasis on two of the three constituent elements: i) menace of penalty; and ii) 
involuntariness. The analysis of the case-law will highlight the necessity of the 
existence of both a menace of penalty and involuntariness for the provision of work or 
services to be forced; yet there is, in practice, a relationship of reciprocity between the 
two elements. Quite simply, this thesis contends that the impact of a menace of penalty 
(often achieved by means of indirect coercion) leaves an individual with no choice but 
to submit to the provision of forced labour.   
 
5.1 Menace of penalty: a threat exacerbated by a position of vulnerability  
  
The menace of penalty element has been likened to both direct and indirect forms of 
coercion, as we discussed in Section 1.380 However, where factual circumstances do not 
present clear indicators of direct coercion, it is sometimes difficult for courts to grapple 
	
378 For an excellent and comprehensive overview of the positive obligations on states to ensure the effective prohibition of forced 
or compulsory labour, servitude, slavery and practices similar to slavery see Stoyanova (2017) supra n. 162. 
379 ILO (2009), supra n.67, p. 5.   
380 See Inter-American Court case Ituango Massacres v Columbia [2006], in Allain (2013), supra n.1, p. 220. The menace of 
penalty in the most extreme form = the direct and implicit threat of physical violence or death addressed at the victim or next of 
kin. The real and actual presence of a threat, which can assume different forms and degrees, of which the most extreme are those 
that imply coercion, physical violence, isolation or confinement or the threat to kill him or the next of kin. 
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with indirect forms of coercion.381 To this end, Siliadin [2005], provided further clarity 
of the exact parameters of the meaning “menace of any penalty.”382 The reasoning of 
the Court was particularly useful for migrant workers who may find themselves in a 
situation whereby they are reliant upon their employer to secure their migration status. 
Following on from the ILO Committee of Expert’s submission that menace of any 
penalty does not require penal sanctions but can also include loss of rights or privileges, 
the Court acknowledged that the threat of police arrest could be deemed to constitute 
an equivalent threatened penalty.383 The Court identified a number of factors of the 
applicant’s situation that led to extreme vulnerability, amounting to a menace of 
penalty.384 In particular, the fact that the applicant was a minor, irregularly resident and 
dependent upon her employer’s for regularising her migration status, did not amount to 
a threat of a ‘penalty’ but was, in fact, an equivalent situation in terms of the perceived 
seriousness of the threat.385 
 
5.2 Involuntariness: a disproportionate burden or a lack of alternative? 
 
The case law affirms Gallagher’s assertion that the concept of voluntariness is central 
to the definition of forced labour.386 Nevertheless, the case-law analysis reveals that the 
method for determining involuntariness has been given different emphasis in different 
judicial contexts. The ECtHR in Van der Mussele v Belgium [1983] stated that, for a 
violation of Article 4, a mere lack of willingness alone is not sufficient to amount to 
involuntariness. Instead, the service required must have ‘imposed a burden which was 
so excessive or disproportionate to the advantages attached to the future exercise of that 
profession’ that it ‘could not be treated as having been voluntarily accepted 
beforehand.’387 Alternatively, instead of identifying involuntariness as amounting to a 
disproportionate burden, the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Krnojelac [2002] emphasised that 
involuntariness is to be determined on a case by case basis taking into account the lack 
of alternative the individual faces given the circumstances:  
	
381 ILO (2009), supra n.67, p. 5.   
382 Piotrowicz (2012), supra n.58,p. 190. 
383 ILO (2007) supra n.309, para 37; Siliadin [2005], supra n.129, para. 118; Mantouvalou V., ‘Employment and Discrimination: 
treatment of unpaid household servant, Case Comment: Siliadin v. France’, (2005) European Human Rights Law Review 6, 660-
664, p. 664. 
384 ILO (2009), supra n.67, p.30.  
385 Siliadin [2005], supra n.129, para. 118.  
386 Gallagher (2008), supra n. 55. 
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[Involuntariness is a] factual question which has to be considered in light of all the 
relevant circumstances on a case by case basis… What must be established is that the 
relevant persons had no real choice as to whether they would work [emphasis 
added].388 
 
Both of these cases offer insight into the extent to which the provision of work 
or services was involuntarily and thus amounted to forced labour can be identified. The 
more recent cases of Chowdury [2016] and Brasil Verde [2016] are further indicative 
of the contemporary understanding of forced or compulsory labour, particularly in 
relation to workers who are extremely dependent upon their employers due to, inter 
alia, irregular migration status, geographical isolation, and/or economic compulsion.  
 
The ICTY’s assessment of the “inability to change circumstances” as being 
closer to servitude, was also reinforced by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
in the Brasil Verde case, where the Court highlighted the fact that because the workers’ 
movements are controlled and their freedom of movement denied, the legal concept of 
forced labour, is closely related to other abusive practices including human trafficking, 
slavery and slavery-like practices, debt bondage or bonded labour, and labour 
exploitation. 389 The ECtHR however, in Chowdury stated that restriction of movement 
is not a condition sina que non for classifying forced labour.390 Such a position was in 
stark opposition to the domestic authorities who had held that the workers did not have 
their freedom of movement sufficiently restricted to amount to forced labour as in their 
free time, the workers were able to move around the region, go shopping and play 
cricket, meant that they were not forced to work against their will and could have left 
the situation at any moment. 
 
In Chowdury, the Court referred to the proportionality test in Van der Mussele, 
clarifying that it is necessary for any assessment of proportionality to refer to all 
circumstances on a case-by-case basis. 391  In particular, the workers’ vulnerability 
	
388 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25 (15 March 2002), para 359.  
389 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2015) Human rights of migrants, refugees, stateless persons, victims of human 
trafficking and internally displaced persons: Norms and standards of the Inter American Human Rights System, para 277, 
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390 Chowdury [2017], supra n.100, para 123. 
391 Van Der Mussele [1983], supra n.311, para. 96. 
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arising from their undocumented status led to the Court reasoning that prior consent to 
the working conditions was irrelevant due to the employer’s abuse of the position of 
vulnerability, which was exacerbated by their lack of financial means and the risk of 
detention or deportation should they contact the authorities.392 Thus, the jurisprudence 
reveals that the assessment of involuntariness must not only be made on an objective 
basis but also according to the individual’s personal conviction. 393 Such an objective 
standard, as Rijken also notes, aligns the concept of consent in the context of forced or 
compulsory labour with that of human trafficking, that is, any consent is irrelevant 
where a means is used, which will be the starting point of the next section that considers 
it’s reciprocity with the menace of penalty.394  
 
5.3 The reciprocity of menace of penalty and involuntariness  
 
The concept of voluntariness is central to the definition of forced labour, 395  but 
nevertheless overlaps with the menace of penalty element.396 The case-law analysis has 
demonstrated that it is necessary for the existence of both a menace of penalty and 
involuntariness for the provision of work or services to be considered forced labour. 
Therefore, it is contended that there is a relationship of reciprocity between the two 
elements: namely, the impact of a menace of penalty (often achieved by means of 
indirect coercion) leaves an individual with no choice but to submit to the forced labour. 
The following cases demonstrate the extent to which such reciprocity means that, in 
some instances, the two constituent elements are interconnected.  
 
The factual circumstances in Krnojelac were considered to amount to a menace 
of penalty (threat of punishment in the event of refusing to work) that made it 
impossible for any expression of free consent (impossible for an objection to the work 
to be voiced). In addition, the coercion (menace of penalty) created a ‘climate of fear’ 
rendering the work involuntary.397 Subsequent cases have affirmed that where such a 
	
392 Van Der Mussele [1983], supra n.311, para. 97. 
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396 ILO (2007), supra n 309, paras 38-40. 
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climate of fear prevails, even if the worker has the opportunity to leave, the fear of harm 
would prevent them from leaving. 398 
 
Similarly, whilst the notion of ‘economic compulsion’ in and of itself, has not 
been accepted by the ILO Committee of Experts as constituting forced or compulsory 
labour, where such compulsion is attributed to an employer who is perpetuating the 
economic constraints on an individual(s), leaving them with no alternative, then this 
would be sufficient to amount to forced labour. In Chowdury, the domestic authorities 
initially held that the promised wages below the minimum wage, did not amount to 
deception or abuse of workers’ vulnerability because of the systemic underpayment of 
the minimum wage in the sector. 399 A written submission by the International Trade 
Union Confederation also considered whether or not persistent and deliberate 
withholding of wages was sufficient for menace of penalty and met the threshold of the 
Article 4. The Court, in contrast to the domestic authorities, held that the menace of 
penalty emanated from the inability of the individuals to seek employment elsewhere 
and as such there was no possibility to leave the situation without falling into severe 
precarity. In particular, the Court took note of the fact that the workers felt obliged to 
continue to work, knowing that if they stopped working they would not receive the 
wages owed to them, in the context that they had no other means of subsistence.400  
 
Such economic compulsion had been previously considered by the Supreme 
Court in India in 1982, in which it held that: 
 
Any factor that deprives a person of a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt 
one particular course of action may properly be regarded as ‘force… He would be in 
no position to bargain with the employer; he would have to accept what is offered to 
him. In doing so he would be acting not as a free agent with a choice between 
alternatives but under the compulsion of economic circumstances, and the labour of 
service provided by him would be clearly ‘forced labour’.401  
 
	
398 ILO (2009), supra n.67, p. 26. See also discussion on climate of fear in European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
Protecting migrant workers from exploitation in the EU: workers’ perspectives (June 2019), p.87. 
399 Chowdury [2017], supra n.100, para 24. Disscussed in Muskat-Gorska (2017), supra n.338, p.462. 
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The Indian Supreme Court considered such compulsion to emanate from the 
lack of alternative but to accept remuneration for less than the minimum wage. As has 
been mentioned above, the position of the Supreme Court that any work for less than 
the minimum wage constitutes forced or compulsory labour was not taken up by the 
ILO Committee of Experts as the commission of forced or compulsory labour requires 
the identification of all constituent elements. 402  The assessment of the factual 
circumstances in Chowdury led to such an interpretation. Namely, that the situation, 
amounted to menace of penalty and involuntary situations. The employer’s actions 
meant that only continuing to work without payment gave them hope of receiving their 
back pay, whereas taking the choice to quit their workplace would not only abandon 
any recuperation of back pay but would also amount to facing destitution, detention, 
and/or deportation. The workers were subjected to a climate of fear that was evidenced 
by the impunity of farmers and daily presence of guards etc. threats of violence as 
punishment for insubordinate workers.403 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
 
Forced or compulsory labour is a standalone form of labour exploitation that has been 
adapted to the contemporary context not just through judicial adjudication but through 
the adoption of new contemporary legal instruments. The approach to ensuring that the 
prohibition of forced or compulsory labour is well implemented is largely in recognition 
of the contextual shift wherein exploitation now predominantly occurs in the private 
economy and is no longer a State sponsored activity. The subsequent indicators and 
additional legal instruments offer insight into how exploitation should be understood, 
with a particular focus on the forms of coercion and the irrelevance of consent.  
 
The judicial engagement with forced or compulsory labour – albeit limited - has 
provided critical insight into the key features of exploitation that are in some situations 
reciprocal (see for example Section 5.3) and ultimately reinforce the exercise of control 
that fosters a lack of viable alternatives – all features that have been identified in relation 
to the other forms of exploitation, namely, slavery, slavery like practices and servitude.  
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0. Introduction and structure of the chapter  
 
The state-of-the-art of labour exploitation in international and regional law illustrates 
the international community’s engagement with the prohibition of the most egregious 
forms of exploitation and affirms Allain’s assertion that ‘labour exploitation is hardly 
a novel phenomenon.’404 We consider, nevertheless, that conceptual difficulties that are 
detrimental to legal certainty exist illustrating that legal clarification of exploitation in 
both law and policy remains a necessary task. As such, the first part of this Chapter 
distills the key elements of exploitation that have emerged from the legal analysis and 
will begin to identify those cross-cutting elements that exist regardless of the form of 
exploitation (Section 1).  
 
Once we have taken stock of the state-of-the-art understanding of labour 
exploitation in law - and bearing in mind the overall goal of clarifying the legal 
understanding of exploitation - we will also take into account the legal developments 
both on the books and in practice as well as the academic scholarly debate. From this 
analysis we will discuss the key obstacles that continue to hinder the legal clarification 
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of exploitation. Thus, providing a response to the following subsidiary research 
question: What are the obstacles to the legal clarification of labour exploitation? 
 
Previous chapters reveal that the historical legal development of labour 
exploitation has been stunted by competing geopolitical interests where state policies 
have held sway, as can be shown by the omission of servitude from the supplementary 
slavery convention and the State-sanctioning of forced or compulsory labour under 
certain conditions. 405 We have identified three main obstacles to a legal clarification of 
labour exploitation in law that have emerged from the analysis of the legal framework 
and literature review. We argue that the existence of these moral, legal and political 
obstacles continues to exacerbate contemporary efforts to tackle exploitative working 
practices, thus further emphasising that exploitation still needs to be addressed in both 
academia but also in practice.  
 
The first obstacle is the focus on the prohibition of human trafficking in criminal 
law (Section 2). This is a legal obstacle that has seen the international community’s 
efforts be dominated by an emphasis on anti-trafficking initiatives that strongly 
advocate a criminal justice approach, whereby criminalisation and prosecution are 
prioritised.   
 
The second obstacle is the neo-abolitionist influence on law and policy 
developments (Section 3). This is a moral obstacle that has not only strongly influenced 
the anti-trafficking legal regime, particularly with an emphasis on the criminalisation 
of human trafficking for sexual exploitation but is also present in more recent 
discussions on modern slavery.  
 
The third obstacle is the marginalisation of labour exploitation through political 
inertia and a tolerance of exploitation (Section 4). This is a political obstacle that 
explores the side-lining of labour exploitation in law and policy and the impact that this 
has on a tolerance of exploitative labour practices. 
 
	
405 On servitude see Allain (2008), supra n.209, p. 229.On forced or compulsory labour see Lee, M., ‘Introduction: Understanding 
human trafficking,’ in Lee, M. (ed.) Human Trafficking, (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2007). 
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The more detailed discussion of these obstacles illustrates that it is not possible 
to place them in a hierarchy of importance or, indeed, of causation. In fact, these 
obstacles are very much interrelated and the continuance of one can be fostered by 
another. As a result, the solution to these obstacles must be comprehensive. Law alone 
is not the answer. Thus, whilst this thesis suggests that a legal conceptualisation of 
labour exploitation can go some way towards overcoming some of the obstacles, it must 
not work in isolation, if it is to be effectively applied.  
 
1. The elements of exploitation emerging from the state-of-the-art legal analysis  
 
The purpose of this section is to present the four cross-cutting elements of exploitation 
that have been identified from the state-of-the-art legal analysis of the existing 
prohibited forms of labour exploitation: abuse of a position of vulnerability; exercise 
of control; difficulty to change circumstances and irrelevance of consent.  
 
 
Table 1: The building blocks of exploitation: the legal elements of exploitation emerging from the 
state-of-the-art analysis 
 
 A position of vulnerability is a crucial starting point from which the relationship 
between two parties may become exploitative. However, a position of vulnerability is 
not enough, it must be abused. This standpoint emerges from the means element of the 
trafficking definition which includes an abuse of position of vulnerability (Section 
2.1, Chapter 1). A position of vulnerability, although not explicitly referred to in the 
definition of the other forms of exploitation does emerge as part of the judicial 
reasoning in the context of the menace of penalty in forced or compulsory labour. For 
instance, in Siliadin, the menace of penalty element was identified due to the large 
number of factors of the applicant’s situation that amounted to extreme vulnerability 
(Section 5.1, Chapter 3). Indeed, the means by which the menace of penalty arises is 
very similar to that of the abuse of position of vulnerability, namely, the use of direct 
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and indirect forms of coercion (Section 1, Chapter 3).  
 
The means by which an abuse of position of vulnerability or indeed a menace 
of penalty is achieved is the focus of the second element that has emerged from the 
legal analysis: the exercise of control. The notion of control predominantly emerges 
from the jurisprudence of slavery with the ICTY appeal chamber in Kunarac including 
control in the list of indicators of powers attaching to the right of ownership. This was 
affirmed in Tang and Brasil Verde where the courts referred to the power to control and 
restrict movement (see Section 3.3., Chapter 2). The interpretation of ownership as 
control has also been the emphasis in academic scholarship that seeks to better 
understand the de facto condition of slavery by way of a property paradigm that 
emphasises the notion of control through possession. The jurisprudence of the European 
Court then further extended the understanding of control in CN & V v France to all 
forms of exploitation prohibited under Article 4 ECHR. More recently, in the context 
of forced or compulsory labour, the European Court in Chowdhury revealed that the 
exercise of control can amount to dependency and as such does not require a complete 
deprivation of liberty. Overall, the judicial engagement with the notion of control is 
indicative of a contemporary judicial understanding of labour exploitation. 
 
 Whilst the exercise of control is an extra-judicial feature of the legal analysis, it 
does closely interact with the third element of exploitation that has emerged in all forms 
of exploitation discussed thus far: a difficulty to change circumstances. The legal 
articulation of this element can be discerned from the travaux préparatoires of the 
Palermo Protocol which provided guidance as to the meaning of the abuse of position 
of vulnerability, wherein the concept was considered to refer to a situation that leads to 
no real or acceptable alternative (Section 2.2, Chapter 1). Similarly, the difficulty to 
change circumstances is explicitly included in the judicial understanding of servitude 
in Van Droogenbroeck where one of the conditions requires that there is an 
impossibility to alter their condition (Section 4, Chapter 2). The difficulty to change 
circumstances is also present when in forced or compulsory labour the menace of 
penalty has left the individual with no choice but to submit to the involuntary provision 
of work or services (Section 5, Chapter 3).  
 
All of the manifestations of the third element that have emerged from the legal 
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analysis, although articulated in slightly different ways, all lead to the final element: 
the irrelevance of consent. Ultimately, the extent to which someone is able to reject 
an offer and/or is free to leave the exploitative circumstances depends upon the extent 
to which they are able to exercise agency (Section 2.2, Chapter 1). By virtue of the 
cumulative effect of the three above elements, the principle of irrelevance of consent is 
either explicitly or implicitly included in all forms of exploitation discussed thus far. In 
the human trafficking definition, irrelevance of consent is explicit, whereas in the other 
forms of exploitation there is an emphasis on the involuntariness that is confounded by 
the use of the means such as coercion or deception (Section 1, Chapter 3). The 
assessment of the irrelevance of consent is difficult since the complexity of exploitative 
working conditions, in some instances, makes it difficult to determine where an 
individual as willingly consented or is in fact in an involuntary position (Section 2.2, 
Chapter 1). Here, the assessment in practice of the irrelevance of consent is facilitated 
by indicators (see Section 1, Chapter 3 for discussion of ILO Indicators) or through a 
test of proportionality, that requires a disproportionate burden (see Van der Mussele v 
Belgium in Section 5.2, Chapter 3). Here again, the irrelevance of consent is closely 
interconnected with other elements discussed above. For instance, another judicial 
interpretation required that the determination of involuntariness must take account of 
the extent to which an individual had no real choice (see Prosecutor v. Krnojelac in 
Section 5.2, Chapter 3). 
 
Thus far, the presentation of the elements of labour exploitation that can assist 
in determining the material scope of the concept have clearly indicated that they are 
reciprocal and intertwined, thus adhering to an understanding of exploitation as a 
process. The crucial point of interest here when it comes to the overall objective of this 
thesis is that whilst there are commonalities between the different forms of exploitation, 
there has not yet to date been an attempt, either in practice or in scholarship, to define 
the concept of exploitation (see the discussion in Chapter 1 on the impact of a lack of 
definition of exploitation on human trafficking law). However, the presentation of the 
legal elements of exploitation that have emerged from the analysis thus far suggests 
that it is possible to clarify the concept of exploitation in law. In the next section, taking 
into account the entirety of the legal analysis thus far, we will outline some of the key 
obstacles to such legal clarification. 
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2. The focus on criminal law responses for human trafficking: a legal obstacle  
 
Despite the legacy of the prohibition of slavery, servitude and practices similar 
to slavery, the judicial adherence to a very traditional understanding of these forms of 
exploitation can be attributed to the international legal regime’s advancement of a 
global movement against human trafficking. The Palermo Protocol is hailed as a 
leading global anti-trafficking standard that for Gallagher demonstrates ‘an increased 
acceptance on the part of States that severe exploitation, even that which takes place 
within the private sphere, is indeed a matter for public concern and international 
regulation.’406 To this end, it can be said to have had a chilling effect on further efforts 
to tackle exploitation without trafficking. Indeed, anti-trafficking academic and policy 
discourse has flourished on an unprecedented scale since the 2000 Palermo Protocol.407 
We consider that one limitation of the emphasis on human trafficking by the 
international community has led to governments defining exploitative situations as 
either human trafficking or not. The result of which has limited attempts to enhance the 
legal understanding of labour exploitation by further engaging with established 
concepts of forced labour and slavery. For example, Skrivankova emphasises the focus 
on the centrality of exploitation in certain legal frameworks. 408  The “actual 
exploitation” is a status or condition, which is intrinsically linked to the process of 
human trafficking but is ultimately the end result. There are many paths by which a 
person arrives in a situation of exploitation.409 Therefore, it is important that responses 
are designed to react to the “actual exploitation” rather than the journey, especially as 
it is not only those in an irregular position who are at risk,	410  but also those regular 
workers in the formal economy who may nevertheless be ‘subject to extensive rights 
violations, including confinement, passport confiscation, non-payment of wages, and 
physical violence or its threat.’411 Importantly, it can be further argued that voluntarily 
assumed migratory journeys or voluntarily assumed recruitment that result in forced or 
exploitative labour conditions could in fact satisfy the definition of the Palermo 
	
406 Gallagher (2009), supra n. 140, pp. 824-825. 
407 Despite the issue coming to the attention of the international community at the end of the 1990s, see Holmes, L., (ed) Trafficking 
and human rights – European and Asia-Pacific Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 2010), p. 5. 
408 Skrivankova (2010), supra n. 50, p.12.. 
409 Allain & Bales (2012) supra n.254, p. 2; Rijken (2013), supra n.56, p. 13. 
410 For discussion on legal distinction between smuggling and human trafficking, and those who willingly embark upon a journey 
in search of better job opportunities see Goodey, J., ‘Human Trafficking: Sketchy Data and policy responses’ (2008) Criminology 
and Criminal Justice 8, 421-442, p. 423. 
411 O’Connell Davidson (2010), supra n.58, p. 249. 
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definition where deceit, fraud or abuse of power or vulnerability is involved.412 Our 
analysis of the case law reveals that such circumstances are in fact faced by the judiciary 
where they are to apply a domestic criminal prohibition of human trafficking that does 
not include the means as a constituent element (discussed in Chapters 8 & 9). With this 
in mind, any subsequent analysis of future interventions should, therefore, focus on the 
outcome, namely the working conditions, that may or may not amount to human 
trafficking, forced labour or slavery, but does amount to labour exploitation.413  
 
The ramifications of the global focus on human trafficking as an international 
crime, stemming from the Palermo Protocol’s global definition and the creation of 
remedies through the criminal law have not gone unnoticed. Its focus on human 
trafficking has promoted a partial perspective that does not address all manifestations 
of exploitation.414 The legal impact is that ‘the trafficking definition thus amounts to a 
significant retreat from the already agreed upon prohibition of slavery [and] the 
emphasis on the criminalisation of human trafficking […] has rendered the existing 
framework insufficient to address exploitation.’415 Admittedly, one exception is the 
2014 ILO Protocol that, as we have seen in the chapter on forced or compulsory labour 
sought to further strengthen its prohibition in international law. However, the ILO’s 
adoption of a broad definition of forced labour as an inclusive definition has not gone 
unnoticed, with Jägers & Rijken critiquing the ILO approach as failing to recognise that 
not all forms of human trafficking qualify as a form of forced labour.416 
 
The inclusion of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour in the 
human trafficking definition did not supplement the understanding of labour 
exploitation. As we saw in Chapter 1, the drafting of the Protocol did not place 
significant emphasis on the meaning of labour exploitation. Subsequently, literature 
further emphasises that in fact the focus on the exploitation element of trafficking is 
very limited. As Ollus writes, the trafficking definition ‘does not equate ‘exploitation’ 
[...] with trafficking, but is concerned only with prohibiting forms of dealing which 
	
412 Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.9, p. 38. 
413 For more examples of proposal to focus on the situation of exploitation i.e. the forced labour element rather than the movement 
element see Anti-Slavery International, Trafficking for forced labour in Europe: Report on a study in the UK, Ireland the Czech 
Republic and Portugal, (November 2006), p. 7. 
414 Hathaway (2008) supra n. 205, pp. 4-5. 
415 Baer, K., ‘The Trafficking Protocol and the Anti-Trafficking Framework: Insufficient to address exploitation’, (2015) Anti-
Trafficking Review, 4, 167, p. 167. 
416 Jägers, N., & Rijkens, C., ‘Prevention of human trafficking for labour exploitation: the role of corporations’ (2014) Northwestern 
Journal of International Human Rights 12(1), 47-73, p. 49. 
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facilitate or lead to exploitation.’ 417 Consequently, Wijers draws attention to the fact 
that there is no obligation flowing from the Palermo Protocol to do anything about the 
condition of being exploited, much less to provide a remedy to exploited persons.418 
This is also reinforced by O’Connell-Davidson who writes: 
 
In practice, the restriction of a person’s choices and freedom of movement 
through violence, or its threat, is taken as the real and unique evil of 
‘trafficking’. Exploitation, which is so hard to define, is left to one side.419  
 
As such, Stoyanova recalls that the commonality of the trafficking situation – 
regardless of purpose or causes – is the method of transportation, clandestine 
movement, and the form of coercion or deception employed.420 Such a position stands 
in sharp contrast to the traditional legal understanding of the duty to end slavery, which, 
as Hathaway reminds us requires an end to the condition of slavery as such (and not 
just to the forms of dealing that lead to it). 421 
 
The Palermo Protocol definition entrenches this position by the fact that the 
existence of an aim to exploit is sufficient to qualify as a case of human trafficking 
without the need of the actual exploitation taking place. The result being that the focus 
of the constituent elements is on forced recruitment.422 Whilst, the forms of labour 
exploitation explicitly included in the human trafficking definition, are the outcomes of 
the process of human trafficking; the non-exhaustive categorisation of forms of labour 
exploitation in the Palermo Protocol raises further questions. Namely, as summised by 
Jägers & Rijken: when does decent work evolve into a form of forced labour and under 
what conditions can this be considered to fall in the scope of human trafficking?423 The 
ILO guidance on the interpretation and application of the forced labour definition,424 
can assist to a certain extent, however, such guidance does not apply to labour 
exploitation in context of human trafficking, which as previously stated can amount to 
	
417 Ollus (2015), supra n.1, p. 237. 
418 Wijers (2015), supra n.12, footnote 34. 
419 O’Connell Davidson (2010), supra n.58, p. 252-253. 
420 Stoyanova (2014) supra n. 108, p. 422.  
421 Hathaway (2008) supra n.205, pp. 10-11. 
422 Rijken (2013), supra n.56, p. 13. 
423 Jägers & Rijken (2014), supra n.416, p. 50; Rijken (2013), supra n.56, p. 10, footnote 9. 
424 For discussion on ILO 2005 and ILO 2012 Global estimate see Jägers & Rijken (2014), supra n.416, p. 49. 
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more or less than forced or compulsory labour.425 Such a gap brings us full circle and 
reinforces the problem posed by the lack of ‘clarity on the distinction between bad 
labour conditions [and] exploitation.’426 
 
In order to address this lacuna, Edwards argues that labour exploitation requires 
different responses that the Palermo Protocol’s definition cannot provide.427 The focus 
on the actions and the means rather than the exploitation, influences how governments 
and policy makers conceive of human trafficking as a criminal justice issue, migration 
issue and labour issue; which will consequently impact upon the status of the victims 
(irregular migrants, victim of crime, a human rights victim or (migrant) worker) and 
the level of protection they should receive. 428 In this regard, Shamir laments the non-
elaboration of the scope of exploitation as it has led to the lack of consideration of the 
‘structural labour market components that enable trafficking,’ both in implementation 
and during the negotiations of the Palermo Protocol due to the absence of representation 
of a labour approach to trafficking.429 Indeed, as can be ascertained from the previous 
chapters, States have mainly focused upon the criminalisation of human trafficking, 
resulting in a failure to criminalise the standalone forms of exploitation. Ultimately, 
abuses where there are no elements of recruitment, transportation, transfer etc. by 
means of deception or coercion, remain unchallenged.430 
 
Another concern of the focus on criminalisation of human trafficking is the 
focus on the exploiter. In their study of forced labour in Europe, Balch highlights the 
emphasis on prosecution by way of capturing the crime through the action and the 
means element side-lines the victim focus, due to the decreased prevalence afforded to 
the exploitation suffered. 431 Instead, as Haynes explains, the victim’s role is very much 
focused upon securing a successful prosecution: 
 
For a victim of human trafficking to be recognised at all as such, there were now 
conditions: she has to regard herself as a victim, she has to prove that she is one, and 
	
425 For analysis of the article 4 jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the missed opportunity to deal with an explanation of labour 
exploitation, rather than addressing human trafficking see Stoyanova (2012), supra n.121, p. 281  
426 Jägers & Rijken (2014), supra n.416, p. 50. 
427 Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.9, p. 15 & p. 46. 
428 Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.9, p. 52. 
429 Shamir (2012), supra n.193, p. 91. 
430 Stoyanova (2014), supra n. 108, p. 407. 
431 Balch (2013), supra n.342, p. 58-59. 
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most importantly, she has to take on the role of assisting with the prosecution of her 
trafficker. If she does not, she is not considered a victim of human trafficking as a 
matter of law. At the point at which she makes a claim that she is a victim, the abuse 
she suffered is no longer seen as a human rights issue-focused on the exploitation and 
the loss of human dignity-but rather as evidence of a crime, which can be used in 
support of securing a prosecution of her traffickers.432 
 
The criminal justice approach undoubtedly emanates from the positioning of the 
international prohibition of human trafficking in the context of transnational criminal 
law. Subsequent international and regional policy instruments have reinforced the 
victim centered approach, however, the emphasis remains very much on the 
prosecution of the perpetrator, which not only has significant implications on the victim 
but also requires proactive implementation of criminal law prohibitions by States in 
order to ensure that they do not remain merely symbolic (as has been discussed in 
Section 2.2, Chapter 1 regarding the failure of the criminal justice approach due to a 
stereotypical understanding of exploitation).433  
 
Furthermore, Stoyanova and Borg Jansson have both criticised the focus on 
criminalisation of human trafficking, as by the very nature of the abuse already being 
committed, it fails to prevent such abuse and, as a result, is not necessarily the best tool 
of deterrence.434 Additionally, research conducted by Anti-Slavery International found 
that criminalisation has perpetuated a number of issues that impact upon the 
clarification of labour exploitation including an emphasis on human trafficking for 
sexual exploitation and in the case of labour exploitation a focus on the irregular 
migration status and subsequent illegal employment. 435  Overall, as argued by 
Mantouvalou, the dominance of a criminal justice approach has increased the risk of 
labour exploitation as it is ‘a powerful rhetoric device but with limited normative 
scope.’436 
	
432 See example of TWT in US in Haynes (2009), supra n.97, p. 42.  
433 For discsussion on obligations on state to adopt national criminal laws to prohibit human trafficking see Eriksson, M., ‘The 
prevention of human trafficking – Regulating domestic criminal legislation through the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(2013) Nordic Journal of international Law, 82, 339-368, p. 340; Stoyanova (2014) supra n. 108, p. 412. On criminal law reflecting 
a moral standard, Kangaspunta, K., ‘Was trafficking in persons really criminalised?’, (2015) Anti-trafficking Review, issue 4, 80-
97. 
434 Stoyanova (2014) supra n. 108, p. 414; Borg Jansson (2015), supra n.94, p.111. 
435 Anti-Slavery International (2006), supra n.413, p. 3. See also Guild, E., & Minderhoud, P., (eds) Immigration and Criminal Law 
in the European Union The Legal Measures and Social Consequences of Criminal Law in Member States on Trafficking and 
Smuggling in Human Beings (Brill, 2006). 
436  Mantouvalou V., ‘Legal construction of structures of exploitation’ in Collins, H., Lester, G., & Mantouvalou V., (eds) 
Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law, (Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 188. 
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Therefore, whilst we acknowledge that trafficking for labour exploitation has 
received increased attention in recent years,437 the dominance of human trafficking and 
the criminal justice approach acts as a barrier to securing effective counter measures to 
labour exploitation as the lack of definitional clarity impedes the possibility of moving 
beyond the criminal justice approach towards, as Dottridge writes a ‘multi-pronged 
strategy against extreme forms of exploitation.’438 The neo-abolitionist movement has 
been mentioned in previous chapters as having influence on how contemporary 
approaches to combatting human trafficking and exploitation are framed. For instance, 
as we have seen in previous chapters with regards to the space given to labour 
exploitation in drafting the protocol (Section 1, Chapter 1). In the next section, we 
consider that ‘the neo-abolitionist effect’ sheds further light on the current status of 
labour exploitation in law, including the fact that it has been side-lined by an emphasis 
on the criminalisation of human trafficking. 
 
3. The neo-abolitionist influences on law and policy developments: a moral 
obstacle   
 
Based upon our analysis of  labour exploitation in international and regional law in 
Chapters 1-3, we are able to identify two factors that are the progeny of the neo-
abolitionist movement and by consequence impact upon the possibility of legally 
clarifying exploitation in law. The first factor is the influence on the criminalisation of 
human trafficking for sexual exploitation and the second is the emergence of an 
expansionist discourse that coins all contemporary forms of labour exploitation as 
modern slavery.  
 
First, we turn to the criminalisation of human trafficking for sexual exploitation. 
Despite the Palermo Protocol definition expanding the scope of exploitation to include 
specific types of labour exploitation, we assert that the dominance of human trafficking 
and the criminal justice approach (the legal obstacle) has been further entrenched by a 
‘one-dimensional’ focus on sexual exploitation.439 In literature, many scholars refer to 
	
437 ILO Tripartite Meeting of Experts (2013), supra n. 126, p. 3. 
438 Rijken (2011), supra n.49, p.352. Gallagher (2017), supra n.76, p. 103; For discussion on need for definitional clarity for 
prosecution and investigation, and multi-pronged strategy against extreme forms of exploitation e,g, social protection, see Dottridge 
(2017), supra n. 273, pp. 59-60.  
439 Aronowitz (2013), supra n.92, p.36; Kotiswaran (2015) supra n.12, p.15-17.  
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trafficking for labour exploitation receiving less attention than human trafficking for 
sexual exploitation both at the drafting stages of the Palermo Protocol and indeed 
afterwards with regards to its implementation. 440 On this point we concur.  
 
Both Chuang and Wijers reflect upon the impact of the neo-abolitionist lobby 
active in the field. This lobby was a dominant voice at the time of drafting the Palermo 
Protocol.441 Chuang sees two outcomes of this lobbying efforts. First of all, instead of 
fostering international cooperation to combat human trafficking, the focus on sexual 
exploitation coupled with the confusion of legal standards resulting from a conflation 
of human trafficking with slavery ‘perpetuate[d] inconsistency and confusion regarding 
the legal definitions of trafficking’442 as we have shown in Chapter 1 (Section 2). 
Indeed, the distinction between sexual exploitation and labour exploitation may also 
lead to a narrow understanding of sexual exploitation, which, according to Wijers, 
neglects to take into account the fact that those who are subjected to sexual exploitation 
in the sex industry are not recognised as possible victims of forced labour.443  We agree 
with Chuang who states that ‘neo abolitionist legal reforms and the reductive narrative 
have promoted criminal justice responses that target prostitution and leave 
unquestioned the exploitative labour practices and migrant abuse that characterise the 
majority of trafficking cases.’ 444   
 
As a second outcome of the neo-abolitionist focus on sexual exploitation, 
Chuang highlights the construction of ‘trafficking as a moral or social problem driven 
by social deviance or entrenched male patriarchy.’445  The result of this moralistic 
perspective has meant that there has been no consideration of how to manage the 
consequences of ‘deep economic disparities between wealthy and poor communities 
and nations and by inadequate labour and migration frameworks’ that drive such a 
	
440 Goodey (2008), supra n.410, p. 435; Wijers (2015), supra n.12; Jahnsen, S. O. & Skilbrei, M. L., ‘From Palermo to the Streets 
of Oslo: Pros and Cons of the Trafficking Framework’, (2015) Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 4, 156–160; Chuang (2006), supra 
n.358, p. 140; Chuang (2010), supra n.24, p. 1656; Weitzer (2015) supra n.48, p. 228; Shamir (2012), supra n.193, p. 78; Lee 
(2007), supra n.405, p. 4-5; Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.9, p. 38. 
441 Chuang (2010), supra n.24, p. 1672; Wijers (2015), supra n.12. 
442 Chuang (2010), supra n.24, p. 1706. 
443 Wijers (2015), supra n.12. 
444  Chuang (2010), supra n.24, p. 1659; Kotiswaran, P., From Sex Panic to Extreme Exploitation: Revisiting the Law and 
Governance of Human Trafficking in Kotiswaran, P., (ed) Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and 
Modern Slavery, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p.36; see also Jahnsen & Skilbrei (2015), supra n.435, pp.157-
158; Gallagher, A., ‘Editorial: The Problems and Prospects of Trafficking Prosecutions: Ending impunity and securing justice’, 
(2016) Anti-trafficking Review Issue 6, 1-5. 
445 Chuang (2010), supra n.24, p. 1683. 
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complex phenomenon. 446 An outcome of the emphasis on the ‘moral’ nature of sexual 
exploitation means that the drive to better understand and generate awareness of labour 
exploitation is belated and has resulted in perpetuation of stereotypical understandings 
of human trafficking as seen in our first chapter on human trafficking as a consequence 
of the lack of a definition of exploitation (Section 2, Chapter 1).447  
 
The focus on sexual exploitation is not the only contribution of the neo-
abolitionist movement. A second contribution is the emergence of an expansionist 
discourse that coins all contemporary forms of labour exploitation as “modern slavery”. 
For Allain & Bales, the legal development of slavery that we saw in Chapter 2 can be 
attributed to the neo-abolitionist movement that has, according to them, driven the 
‘renaissance of slavery.’ 448  Indeed, it is undeniable that, as stated by Bassouini 
‘slavery, slave-related practices, and forced labour are well-established violations of 
international law and constitute international crimes.’449 However, we suggest that the 
influence of the neo-abolitionist movement is contrary to the restrictive legal 
interpretation of contemporary forms of labour exploitation. Neo-abolitionist 
proponents have a tendency to adopt an expansive and all-encompassing understanding 
of slavery under the guise of the non-legal term “modern slavery” 450 which, as Allain 
highlights, culminates in an ‘ever growing list of practices finding shelter under its 
umbrella.’451  
 
Advocates of expansionism, most prominently Bales, argue in 2001 that an 
expansionist socio-legal understanding of the concept is deemed necessary in order to 
secure the dynamic nature of the definition, so as to be able ‘to capture new forms of 
slavery within its aegis.’ 452  Furthermore, Datta & Bales consider an expansionist 
approach to be an opportunity to take into account the shift in social, economic and 
historical contexts and to overcome the discrepancies and confusion caused by the legal 
definition which act as a barrier to developing appropriate policy measures that could 
	
446 Chuang (2010), supra n.24, p. 1683. 
447 For instance, research has shown that ‘the share of employers who would report an instance of trafficking into domestic work 
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p. 36; see also, Chuang (2010), supra n.24, p. 1698. 
448 Allain & Bales (2012) supra n.254, p. 1.  
449 Bassouini (1991) supra n.298, p. 456-457. 
450 Gallagher (2009), supra n.140, p. 800. Bales & Robbins (2001), supra n. 226, pp. 21–23; Quirk, J., ‘The Anti-Slavery Project: 
Linking the Historical and Contemporary,’(2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly, 565, p. 568 . 
451 Allain (2008), supra n.209, xvii. 
452 Bales & Robbins (2001), supra n. 226, p. 42. See also discussion on the impact of expansionist discourse on contemporary 
understanding of slavery in: Quirk (2006), supra n.450, p. 578. 
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confront such practices. 453 
 
We understand that a narrow definition of slavery that does not take into account 
the wider sociological context of modern forms of slavery is undesirable. However, 
caution must be exercised to ensure that the interpretation of the international legal 
instruments is consistent with their objectives. For instance, Gallagher and Nicholson 
both refer to the travaux préparatoires to the 1926 Convention that clearly demonstrate 
that it was not intended to encompass all forms of exploitation.454 That said, we do 
concede that, the previous chapters have shown the difficulties encountered by judicial 
bodies that have had the task of further defining the exact parameters of the practices 
prohibited by treaty; to the extent that despite its global prohibition, it has been 
suggested that slavery has been marginalised in law permitting its continuation, as 
McGeehan argues, ‘in a more acceptable form.’455 Indeed, the case law demonstrates 
that slavery is in fact a form of labour exploitation that has been ‘imperfectly 
understood’456 with the judicial reinforcement of a restrictive understanding of slavery 
that is still predicated upon the drafters’ reference to a ‘destruction of juridical 
personality’. 457 Despite hints at a more expansive understanding shifting away from 
the notion of “chattel slavery”, premised upon a property paradigm,458 we have seen in 
previous chapters that the European Court is, as noted by Milano, in favour of a ‘older 
and narrower criminal justice approach to slavery, servitude and forced labour, as 
reflected in, for example, in the 1926 and 1956 slavery treaties.’459 
 
Thus, we consider that the sociologically grounded expansionist understanding 
of slavery leaves us with a dilemma, as acknowledged by Bales (a sociologist who 
favours expansionism) & Allain (a legal scholar who adopts a restrictive approach). On 
the one hand, as Bales advocates, it provides us with the nearest approximation to the 
lived experience of a slave today and it serves well as a methodological tool supporting 
predictive validity in the social scientific study of slavery. On the other hand, as Allain 
	
453 Datta, M., & Bales, K., ‘Slavery in Europe: Part 2, Testing a Predictive Model (2014) Human Rights Quarterly 36 (2), 277-295, 
p. 279-280; Bales & Robbins (2001), supra n. 226, p. 18. 
454 Nicholson (2010), supra n.124, p. 714. Gallagher (2009), supra n.140, pp. 800-801. 
455 McGeehan (2012), supra n. 172, p. 437. 
456 Balch (2013), supra n.342, p. 39. 
457 UN General Assembly, supra n. 219, p. 91 
458 For discussion of property paradigm and distinction between de jure and de facto ownership see Allain (2013), supra n.1, p.142; 
Allain & Bales (2012) supra n.254, p. 3. 
459 For more details on court’s assessment of the principles of responsibility in LE v Greece [2016] see Milano (2017), supra n.161,  
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notes, it is not legally binding, thus the failure to engage with the legal definition has 
made it redundant as an anti-slavery tool within the rule of law. 460 
 
Taking the latter point into account, we believe that the need for accuracy when 
discussing the legal parameters of the forms of exploitation is of paramount importance, 
especially when such language can render terms ‘virtually meaningless’ leading to 
misguided efforts to adjudicate in law ultimately facilitating conceptual confusion and 
conflation. 461 The use of expansive language can also be problematic when it creates a 
situation in which exploitative or abusive behaviour fails to reach the legal threshold of 
the legally prohibited forms of exploitation. 462 Such an approach may enable a State to 
avoid responsibility by way of creative interpretation. For example, Nicholson suggests 
that a creative interpretation may leave the victim with little avenue for redress which, 
as David reminds us, is contrary to the tenets of criminal justice system that seeks to 
serve all.463 Indeed, conflation can lead to dilution of the legal understanding of the 
prohibited practices, Chuang suggests that it can also inadvertently raise the legal 
threshold of human trafficking ‘by creating expectations of more extreme harms than 
required in law’, which is purposefully defined in such a way as to encompass a wide 
range of practices. 464 Chuang reinforces the position of Allain and Gallagher by making 
reference to the impact of any inconsistent interpretations of the human trafficking 
definition on international efforts to bring to justice those criminally responsible for 
violating the prohibition but also lead to a violation of the right of accused persons to 
be ‘informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge 
[against them].’465 Furthermore, we consider that it is also important to ensure that the 
legal developments thus far are given sufficient recognition. For example, the unilateral 
adoption and strict legal application of the 1926 slavery definition as a jus cogens norm 
emphasises the weight afforded to such an egregious form of exploitation. 
 
	
460 Allain & Bales (2012) supra n.254, p. 6.  
461 Miers, S., Slavery in the Twentieth Century: The Evolution of a Global Problem, (Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira. 2003), p.453; 
Allain (2008), supra n.209; Allain, J., ‘Book Review, Kevin Bales, Understanding global slavery: a Reader’, (2008) International 
Journal of Refugee Law 20 (1), 228-232; Gallagher (2009), supra n.140, pp. 799-848; Chuang (2014), supra n. 131; Chuang (2010), 
supra n.24, p. 1708; Nicholson (2010), supra n.124,  p. 705; van der Wilt (2014), supra n.3, p. 297 Vijeyarasa & Villarino (2012), 
supra n.58,  p. 36. 
462 Nicholson (2010), supra n.124, p. 713. 
463 Nicholson (2010), supra n.124, p. 714; David (2015), supra n. 155, p. 151. 
464 Chuang (2010), supra n.24, p. 1709. 
465 Gallagher (2009), supra n.140, p. 799; Allain, J., ‘The Definition of “Slavery” in General International Law and the Crime of 




Whilst we take heed of the cautionary tone of scholars such as Allain, Chuang 
and Gallagher, we suggest that it is unwise to entirely dismiss the contribution of the 
expansionist discourse on the overall increasing uptake and recognition of labour 
exploitation. For instance, the international community is shining a spotlight and giving 
political attention to “modern slavery” in the UN Sustainable Development Goals and 
the ILO Global Estimates.466 Therefore, whilst it is vital for academic scholarship to 
continue to critique and assess the impact of such expansionist discourse, it is important 
to find a meeting point; whereby the sociological approach becomes compatible with 
the legal reading.467 The complexities of fully understanding the exact legal parameters 
of the prohibited forms of labour exploitation discussed in the first three chapters  
affirms that any articulation of the term “modern slavery” must be mindful of the 
difficulties in conceptualising the legal and social understanding of labour 
exploitation.468  
 
Ultimately, a common reading and understanding of the different forms of 
labour exploitation is of vital importance to ensuring jurisprudential consistency so as 
to avoid ‘high level confusion’469 and to provide guidance to domestic courts who have 
prohibited forms of labour exploitation in law, but due to an enforcement deficit have 
yet to further define or prosecute such criminal activities.470 With this in mind, we once 
again stress, as does Allain, that clarification in law is the first step to overcoming 
conceptual ambiguity. 471  Achieving such clarity in law requires political will and 
momentum towards engendering a zero-tolerance approach to all forms of exploitation. 
However, the third obstacle reveals that political inertia has in fact contributed to a 







466 See UN Sustainable Development Goals and ILO Global modern slavery estimate 2017. 
467 Allain & Bales (2012) supra n.254, p. 6-7.  
468 Siliadin [2005], supra n.129; Rantsev [2010], supra n.160; C.N. and V. [2012], supra n.208; CN [2013], supra n. 285; Stoyanova 
(2012), supra n.121, pp. 163-194.  
469 See for instance the differing position of ICTY in Kunarac and ECtHR in Siliadin and the outlining of the positions by 
McGeehan: Gallagher v Hathaway, Allain v Bales. McGeehan (2012), supra n. 172, p. 442. 
470 Allain (2013), supra n.1, p.142. 
471 Allain (2013), supra n.1, p.142; Allain (2009), supra n.138, p. 252.  
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4. The marginalisation of labour exploitation: a political obstacle 
	
Borrowing from McGeehan’s doctoral work regarding the marginalisation of slavery 
in international law, we contend that the neo-abolitionist influence on the 
criminalisation of human trafficking for sexual exploitation and the proliferation of 
“modern slavery” has, in fact, compounded the marginalisation of labour exploitation. 
In this section we claim that the difficulty in clearly distinguishing between the different 
forms of severe labour exploitation has been further hampered by political inertia in 
tackling labour exploitation and the implicit tolerance of exploitation that emerges from 
structural issues that facilitate the continuation of exploitation. 472   
 
First, we turn to the lack of political engagement with tackling labour 
exploitation.  
 
Policy measures addressing all forms of labour exploitation, including human 
trafficking, remain under-developed.473  For example, despite the expansion of the 
international prohibition of human trafficking to include labour exploitation, it is a form 
of exploitation that has been excluded from key domestic policy documents aimed at 
combatting trafficking. 474 Furthermore, drawing on our examination of the dominance 
of human trafficking in obstacle one and the focus on tackling sexual exploitation in 
obstacle two, it is important to recognise that anti-trafficking provisions are selectively 
implemented. For Baer, this makes the anti-trafficking framework insufficient to 
address exploitation as it detracts attention and resources from less clear-cut or 
politically divisive cases of exploitation and abuse. 475  
 
We would pursue this line of reasoning and also emphasise Pope’s assertion 
that the lack of detailed information on the application of human trafficking for labour 
exploitation also has implications on the amount of attention attributed to instances of 
labour exploitation with no human trafficking element at play. 476  The impact of 
	
472 Andrees & van der Linden (2005), supra n.51, p. 69. 
473 Borg Jansson (2015), supra n.94, p. 97. 
474 Until 2008, Spain did not include labour exploitation in national action plan to combat human trafficking, see Waisman, V., 
‘Human trafficking: state obligations to protect victims’ rights, the current framework and a new due diligence standard’ (2010) 
Hastings international and comparative law review 33 (2), 385, at 396.  For example, the existing Norwegian anti-trafficking 
framework is ‘explicitly designed to address victimisation through sexual exploitation rather than through different forms of 
labour.’ In Jahnsen & Skilbrei (2015), supra n.440, pp. 156-160. 
475 Baer (2015) supra n.415, p.167. 
476 Pope (2010), supra n.153, p. 1854. 
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marginalising labour exploitation has also been raised by Balch’s research into forced 
labour, where it was found that less emphasis is placed on exploitative working 
practices involving deception or coercion.477 Worryingly, such a situation can facilitate 
a sense of impunity, where acceptance and tolerance of poor working conditions, non-
payment of wages and low labour standards become tolerated as the norm.478  
 
As we begin to see the implications of a lack of political will, we turn to another 
issue that will impact upon the framing of exploitation in law: the tolerance of 
exploitation. 
 
The tolerance of exploitation can be explained as a chicken and egg scenario. 
On one hand, the lack of prioritisation in relation to policy, resources and political will 
can lead to tolerance of exploitation. On the other hand, a tolerance of exploitation can 
be attributed to the lack of prioritisation. Taking the latter as a starting point, many 
scholars – including Mantouvalou and Lewis et al – stress that exploitation is not only 
facilitated by, but is a direct consequence of, structural inequalities that perpetuate the 
type of vulnerability that increases the risk of falling victim to exploitation.479 Such 
systemic issues are to be found in the regulatory responses to migration, labour and 
criminal justice. For example, certain legally sanctioned migration measures in 
destination countries in fact create or compound the risk of exploitation, such as tied 
visa regimes that prohibit migrant workers from changing jobs without that employer’s 
permission and often exclude workers from the protection of national labour laws and 
joining trade unions.480  
 
The tolerance of exploitation by State actors has a ripple effect on the legal approach 
to tackling exploitation. For example, as we have seen in the first three chapters, 
international law places obligations on States to domestically criminalise labour 
exploitation. However, case-law analysis shows that States, in fact, often fail to 
implement existing legal frameworks. Therefore, it is unsurprising, that where even the 
most serious forms of exploitation remain unimplemented, that there is a significant 
	
477 Balch (2013), supra n.342, p. 7. 
478 Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.9, p. 43. Balch (2013), supra n.342, p. 34. 
479 Mantouvalou (2018), supra n.436, p. 197; Lewis et al (2015), supra n. 299. 
480 See for example, discussion on migration policy and impact on exploitation in Gallagher (2015), supra n, 328, p. 62. See example 
of tied visa regime for domestic workers in Weatherburn & Muraskiewicz (2016), supra n.86.  
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lack of political consideration and regulation of types of exploitation that do not even 
meet the high legal threshold of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour, 
but nevertheless are indicative of labour exploitation.481 Pope has critiqued such lack 
of investment in tackling such marginal forms of exploitation (premised upon the less 
egregious consequences, such as failure to pay wages or violations of health and safety 
regulations), and argues that it is due to the fact that any engagement is ‘not vital to the 
power or prosperity of any important economic or political elite.’482 Bearing in mind 
the consequences of political inertia and tolerance of exploitation that hamper any 
attempt at seeking legal clarification, two key points emerge. 
 
First, findings from the IOM and EU Fundamental Rights Agency reveal that 
one consequence is the aggravation of non-engagement from the general public which, 
considering the complexity of the phenomenon, may have a sentiment that ‘it is beyond 
their control’.483 Chuang laments the moral tolerance for exploitative labour conditions 
and lack of attention on States’ responsibility to promote safe labour conditions as it 
perpetuates the focus on other forms of human trafficking leading to increased 
vulnerability and acceptance of precarity as the norm. 484  
 
Secondly, another consequence of the lack of willingness to address labour 
exploitation is raised by Haynes who discusses the conditionality of legal protection 
which will only be afforded to those who are eligible (e.g. victims of trafficking) once 
they have proven their case and demonstrated their entitlement to such legal protection. 
485 Such a position deliberately adopts the view that any improvement in their socio-
economic position will not be facilitated by the State, unless they can prove on a case-
by-case basis that they have suffered harm.  
 
In order to overcome such marginalisation, the political inertia and tolerance of 
	
481 See for example in the Netherlands, an example of good practice where the conceptual framework [begrippendkader] of labour 
exploitation recognises that there is a categorisation of sitautions that are more than labour law violations but not identified as 
labour exploitation under Article 273f. This has been conceptualisaed as “serious economic crime” whereby there are Serious 
disadvantage / serious violations. A form of social economic crime involving employers conscious and intentional law and 
regulations. This is about workers who are not exploited in the strict sense (in accordance with Article 273f) or of which this is 
considered not provable, but which you can make have underpayment, long working days, fines and (sexual) harassment, and as 
such "being severely disadvantaged". Presentation of Luuk Esser, National Rapporteur's Office: "slightest indication" at FNV 
Labour Exploitation Expert Meeting, 21 November 2017 and Inspectie SZW, Jaarverslag 2016, p.24. 
482 Pope (2010), supra n.153, p. 1854. 
483 IOM (2003), supra n. 103, p. 40. FRA (2015), supra n.45, p.53.  
484 Chuang (2006), supra n.358, p. 154. 
485 Haynes (2009), supra n.97, p. 4.  
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exploitation must be addressed. As Lewis et al propose, it is necessary to take into 
account situations of enforced vulnerability to exploitation by State-sanctioned denial 
of basic rights to employment, housing or welfare. 486  Such a shift in policy will 
minimise the impact of structural factors that make up the complex web of processes 
that render individuals vulnerable to exploitation. Here, such propositions place an 
emphasis on wider policy considerations, that thus far have been sidelined due to the 
‘piecemeal and inconsistent’ response to exploitation that perpetuates a narrow, 
singular criminal justice focused response. As Lewis et al emphasise other labour and 
social security rights, so to does Haynes emphasise the implications for migrants and 
their socio-economic situation, whereby restrictive immigration policy is also a factor 
that, as Gallagher asserts, fails to consider debt-financed migration, neglect the 
obligation to ensure protection of labour and human rights and justify the securitisation 
of borders.487  
 
By going beyond criminal law and emphasising the non-protection of labour 
and social security rights, it becomes inconceivable for future responses to combating 
labour exploitation to be premised solely upon criminal law, or indeed, law. Therefore, 
in order to overcome these obstacles, a legal conceptualisation alone will not suffice. 
Any shift in law and policy that seeks to better understand exploitative labour 
conditions will require a comprehensive response that acknowledges not only legal and 
the political economy but also moral and social economy, as we will discuss in the next 
section and in upcoming chapters that explore the moral wrong of exploitation in theory 
(Chapters 5 & 6).   
 
5. Concluding remarks  
 
We saw in the first chapter that the lack of a definition of exploitation in the human 
trafficking definition is problematic, especially when the international definition is 
increasingly being recognised as a pivotal aspect to the anti-trafficking and modern-
abolitionist movement. As was mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, we aim to 
adopt an approach that focuses upon exploitation whilst simultaneously building upon 
the successes of measures aimed at countering human trafficking. 
	
486 Lewis et al (2015), supra n. 299, p. 2. 
487 Haynes (2009), supra n.97, p. 7. Gallagher (2015), supra n, 328, p. 57. 
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The presentation of the initial abstraction of the legal elements of exploitation 
in this chapter reinforce this assertion. Indeed, the similarity of the elements and how 
they are legally handled shows that there is potential for common ground. However, 
any quest for such legal clarification is hindered by the obstacles that have been 
discussed in this chapter.  
 
These obstacles cannot be placed in a hierarchy of importance or, indeed, of 
causation as they are very much interrelated and the continuance of one can be fostered 
by another. As a result, the solution to these obstacles must be comprehensive. Law 
alone is not the answer. Thus, whilst this thesis suggests that a legal conceptualisation 
of labour exploitation can go some way towards overcoming some of the obstacles, it 
must not work in isolation, if it is to be effectively applied. As Ollus writes, any 
approach which seeks to clarify the legal meaning of (labour) exploitation should ‘see 
trafficking for the purpose of forced labour as both a crime and labour concern and to 
engage both law enforcement as well as labour actors (such as labour inspectors and 
trade unions) in the fight against (labour) trafficking.‘488 Furthermore, a shift to a focus 
on exploitation will lead to a holistic human rights based approach that will be universal 
in application to all those who are vulnerable to exploitation. 489  
 
We will see in subsequent Chapters, that a shift towards exploitation is, on the 
one hand, a viable option, as it ‘gives us a lot of room for systemic change.’ 490 
However, on the other hand, the embryonic stages of this shift reveals the complexity 
of the phenomenon. This requires a bespoke mindful approach that overcomes 
stereotypes and perceptions by taking into account all of the individuals involved 
regardless of gender and migration status.  
 
Indeed, striving for a universal approach is not necessarily the most appropriate 
way of dealing with such a complex phenomenon, and in this regard, we support Piper 
et al’s suggestion that ‘the intention of engaging directly with definitional 
understandings is not to resolve what will be the ultimate universal language and 
	
488 Ollus (2015) supra, n.7, p. 238. 
489 Coghlan & Wylie (2011) supra 103, p, 1522. 
490 Piper, N., Segrave, M., & Napier-Moore, R., ‘Editorial: What’s in a Name? Distinguishing forced labour, trafficking and 
slavery’, (2015) Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 5, 1–9, p. 8. 
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meaning, rather to recognise and articulate both complexity and contradiction. There 
will never be one approach or understanding that is utilised internationally or locally. 
We must find a way to embrace the diversity of interpretations and understandings.’491 
Such ‘diversity’ requires ‘individual strategies operating on multiple levels’492 that 
ensures a context specific approach.  
 
Finally, the proliferation of terms such as “modern slavery” suggests that the 
international community is committed to combatting the phenomenon. However, the 
reality is that the use of the non-legal term “modern slavery” in fact does not assist with 
the real task at hand, that is to determine ‘where, on a continuum and in different 
contexts, “appropriate” exploitation ends and “inappropriate” exploitation begins.’ 493 
The lack of engagement by States to address this situation means that it is both 
politically and legally hanging in the balance. 494  
 
The legal conceptualisation of exploitation will begin to address this 
conundrum. However, in order to achieve this, a further exploration of the theoretical 
understanding of the constituent elements of exploitation will be undertaken in the 
following chapters. The findings of the theoretical analysis in the next Part and the legal 
analysis in this Part will then be used as an analytical tool for discerning the judiairy’s 
understanding of the material scope of exploitation in two national legal orders. 
	
491 Piper, et al (2015), supra n.491, p. 8. 
492 Quirk (2006), supra n. 450, p. 596. 
493 O’Connell Davidson (2010), supra n.58, p. 257. 

































0. Introduction and structure of the chapter  
 
The concept of exploitation remains undefined in law. However, as we have seen in 
Part I, some standalone forms of labour exploitation are defined in law (e.g. slavery, 
servitude and forced or compulsory labour). In this thesis we emphasise the need for 
further exploration of the concept of exploitation and in particular the conditions that 
govern its application in law. In addressing this need, we use Hill’s normative stance 
and primary motivation of his exploration of the legal applicability of exploitation 
theory:  
 
No clearly defined necessary and sufficient conditions govern the application of the 
concept of exploitation. Nor is there an adequate theoretical basis for understanding 
exploitation or its exculpatory function in the law.1  
 
The purpose of our exploration in theory is to seek to resolve this conceptual 
gap in law. We propose an exploration of the tenets of exploitation theory as a way to 
improve our understanding of the material scope of labour exploitation in law and the 
impact of the law on certain groups who are at risk of exploitation. Indeed, in addition 
	
1 Hill, J., ‘Exploitation’, (1994) Cornell Law Review 79, 631, p. 635. 
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to Hill, legal scholars such as Allain and Rijken have already begun this exploration,2 
and we use this literature as the starting point for further development of the analytical 
framework that is applied to the comparative analysis of national criminal case law in 
Part III. 
 
With this chapter we answer the following subsidiary research question: How 
do exploitation theories conceptualise labour exploitation? 
 
Our exploration of exploitation theory in Part II is twofold. In Chapter 5, we 
present a typology of exploitation theories that will then be operationalised as part of 
our identification of the key constituent conditions of exploitation in Chapter 6. These 
conditions, together with the findings from the legal analysis in Part I, will constitute 
the normative basis of an ‘assessment tool’ that, as Sample posits, can be used to 
ascertain whether or not certain situations amount to exploitation. 3 We recognise the 
difficulties of such an endeavour, particularly due to the normative value and differing 
moral standards of exploitation. Indeed, as Wolff notes, any conceptual clarification 
may well not result in a clearly articulated ‘technical definition’ of exploitation. 4 He 
writes: 
 
My argument is that while it is relatively straightforward to identify the elements that 
are relevant to a charge of exploitation, it is very unlikely that there will be any clear 
formula that can be applied in every case, or would be acceptable to people who make 
different moral assumptions about the same case. 5 
 
Yet, we consider that despite these challenges, the identification of the 
conditions of exploitation can go a long way to ensuring a consistent understanding and 
application of the concept of exploitation in law.  
 
Generally, in ordinary parlance, ‘to exploit something is to use or take 
	
2 Allain, J., Slavery in international law of human exploitation and trafficking, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013); Rijken, 
C., ‘Legal Approaches to Combating the Exploitation of Third-Country National Seasonal Workers’, (2015) International Journal 
of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 31(4), 431–451.  
3 Sample, R., Exploitation: What it is and why it’s wrong, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003), p. 2. 
4 Wolff, J., ‘Structures of exploitation’ in Collins, H., Lester, G., & Mantouvalou V., (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Labour 
Law, (Oxford University Press, 2018).p. 187. 
5 Wolff (2018), supra n.4, p. 176. 
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advantage of that thing.’ 6 Exploitation is a concept that can be either morally neutral 
and positive or moralised and negative. We focus upon the exploitation of persons as a 
moralised and negative practice.7 To this end, in this chapter we seek to identify the 
point at which the use of a person becomes illegitimate or wrong. Interestingly, political 
theories of exploitation reveal a contested understanding when establishing the 
threshold of wrongful exploitation 8  and admittedly not all morally reprehensible 
conducts are subject to legal intervention.9 Yet, a determination of the threshold of 
exploitation as a morally wrong concept can be of utility when considering the extent 
to which such conduct should be regulated by law and criminal law in particular.  
 
Exploitation in political theory is an area of scholarship where the discourse is 
well developed with clear divisions between the different approaches explored and 
critiqued. As such, we cannot claim expertise to confront such nuances. Similarly, it is 
not the purpose of the present thesis to outline every theory of exploitation, but rather 
to determine the critical aspects that are of relevance to the object of enquiry of the 
thesis; a conceptualisation of exploitation that seeks to enhance the legal understanding 
of labour exploitation in human trafficking and as a standalone offence.  
 
Whilst we will see that much of the theoretical debate is grounded in Marx, the 
modern understanding of exploitation theory has extended the meaning of the concept 
beyond the extraction of surplus value.10 A shift that this thesis supports. The Marxist 
critique of capitalism has been reconstructed and reconceptualised in order to capture a 
wider understanding of exploitation that is not just limited to ‘relations of economic 
exchange’11 (structural) but also to consideration of issues of fairness and distributive 




6 Holmstrom, N., Exploitation in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, (Blackwell Publishing, 2013); McLean, I., & McMillan, 
A., The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, (3 ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
7 See distinction between exploitation of a thing (s-exploitation) and exploitation of persons (p-exploitation) in Mayer, R., ‘A 
Walzerian Theory of Exploitation’ (2002), Polity 34(3), 337-354, pp. 337-354, p. 339. 
8 Mayer (2002), supra n.7, p. 338-339. 
9 Duff, R.A., Farmer, L., Marshall, S.E., Renzo, M. & Tadros, V. (eds) Criminalisation: the political morality of the criminal law, 
(Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 8-9. 
10 Brewer, J., ‘The Scottish Enlightenment’, in Reeve, S., (ed) Modern Theories of exploitation (Sage Publishing, 1987), p. 12; 
Fleurbaey, M., ‘The facets of exploitation’, (2014) Journal of Theoretical Politics 26(4), 653–676, p. 654-655.  
11 Wolff, J., ‘Marx and Exploitation’, (1999) The Journal of Ethics 1(3), 105–120, p. 105. See also Verma V., ‘Exploitation and 
Justice: Should We Be Interested in a Theory of Exploitation?’, (Jan. 17-23, 1998) Economic and Political Weekly 33(3), 115-121, 
p. 116. 
12 Zwolinski, M., ‘Structural Exploitation’, (2011) Social Philosophy and Policy 29(1), 154-179, p159. 
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Understanding exploitation in terms of unfair or degrading use rather than in terms of 
the forced extraction of surplus labour allows us to apply the idea of exploitation in 
contexts other than the economic relationships on which Marx focused, such as 
relationships between intimates. 13 
 
The findings in this chapter do not adhere to one particular school of thought, 
but instead develop a comprehensive understanding of exploitation. This is exemplified 
by the fact that the analysis goes beyond economic inequality and also considers social 
and educational class and non-class differences, as a function of one’s emotional or 
psychological state. 14  The application of such an understanding is crucial to the 
understanding of exploitation in law, as the root causes or background conditions are 
multiple, including not just economic, but also social, political and psychological 
elements can play a significant role in the circumstances that lead to the actual 
exploitation. In essence, by turning to presentations of exploitation in political theory, 
we seek to determine the normative content of exploitation, as understood in existing 
theories, and begin to determine how such an understanding can assist in the 
conceptualisation of labour exploitation in the legal context of human trafficking. 
 
In this chapter we will first introduce the findings of the exploratory analysis and the 
three models of exploitation that we have developed and presented as a typology of 
exploitation (Section 1). This typology acknowledges both the structural and relational 
constructions of exploitation and, as such, in the second part of this chapter we consider 
how such a typology can be applied to a contemporary understanding of labour 
exploitation (Section 2).  
1. A typology of exploitation theory: structural and relational constructions of 
exploitation 
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, this Part of the thesis ultimately seeks 
to determine the theoretical conditions of both structural and relational exploitation that 
	
13 Zwolinski (2011), supra n.12, p159. 
14 Non-class forms of exploitation are groups identified according to gender, race, nationality, disability, age, sexuality etc and not 
as in the Marxist rhetoric, workers who were considered as class that was exploited. Non-class identity groups considered to be 
oppressed rather than exploited, however since a woman can be both oppressed and exploited, the distinction cannot necessarily 
stand in context of labour exploitation. Supported by Hill (1994), supra n.1, p. 634; Rijken also agrees with this reading of 
exploitation, the impact of the exploitation on the ability to rationally decide, in Rijken (2015), supra n.2. See also Veneziani, R., 
‘Exploitation, inequality and power’ (2013) Journal of Theoretical Politics 25(4) 526–545, p.545.  
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can be applied to a clear and consistent legal understanding. Namely exploitation by 
individuals on other individuals (relational) and the societal structures that foster 
exploitation by failing to minimise the risk of exploitation (structural). Such a task is, 
however, complex due to the starting point being one whereby, as Veneziani highlights, 
‘there is little agreement concerning even the most basic features of exploitative 
relations, and both the definition of exploitation and its normative content are highly 
controversial.’15 Mayer also reflects upon the variety of understandings of exploitation 
that demonstrate that ‘even where there is agreement that a given act of exploitation is 
wrong, there is disagreement about why it is wrong.’16 For instance, many exploitation 
theorists acknowledge other extrapolations of the concept and simply acquiesce to the 
different interpretations by agreeing to disagree. 17  With this challenge in mind, 
following an explorative literature review of exploitation in political theory, we have 
developed a typology of three theoretical models of exploitation:  
 
First is the Redistribution Model, wherein we focus upon the structural 
representation of exploitation fostered by societal structures that impact on individuals 
as a result of unfair distribution of assets and resources.   
 
Second is the Human Dignity Model, wherein we focus upon the relational 
representation of exploitation inflicted by individuals on other individuals wherein the 
result of the exploitation is denoted as degradation that results from a lack of respect 
for the dignity of others who are in a position of a vulnerability or weakness.  
 
Third is the Basic Needs Model wherein the exploitation theories we present refer 
to both structural and relational interactions. This “middle-ground” establishes a basic 
needs threshold from which the fairness of transactions can be assessed. 
 
	
15 Veneziani (2013) supra n.14, p.527. 
16 Mayer, R., ‘What’s Wrong with Exploitation?’, (2007) Journal of Applied Philosophy 24, 137-150, p. 137 
17 The debate is still ongoing amongst political theorists and philosophers, see for example the recent dialogue between Vrousalis 
and Arneson Vrousalis, N., “Exploitation, Vulnerability, and Social Domination” (2013) Philosophy and Public Affairs 41(2), 
131–157, Arneson, R.J., ‘Exploitation, Domination, Competitive Markets, and Unfair Division’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 
(2016), 54 (S1), 9-30; Vrousalis, N., ‘Exploitation as Domination: A Response to Arneson’ (2016) Southern Journal of Philosophy 
54 (4), 527-538. See Wood on Wertheimer’s approach to the use of the term of exploitation as a reference to transactions whose 
terms are unjust or unfair, Wood, A., ‘Unjust exploitation’, (2016) The Southern Journal of Philosophy 54, 92–108, p. 9; See 
Wertheimer on understanding of exploitation that requires harm, that recognises that there can be a benefit to the exploited party, 
that it is possible to consent to exploitation, Wertheimer, A., ‘Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation’, (1996-1997) Denver 
University Law Review 74, 889, p.897. 
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1.1. The Redistribution Model  
 
The first theoretical conception of exploitation is labelled as the Redistribution Model 
wherein the theoretical understanding of exploitation is market-driven adopting an 
impersonal and non-relational stance. The theories encapsulated by the Redistribution 
Model critique the composition of societal structures, namely capitalism as an 
‘institution for labour exchange,’18 and their impact on the commodification of labour, 
such as an unequal exchange that departs from a hypothetical competitive market prices 
in trade.19 From a Marxist perspective, capitalist systems lead to the commodification, 
not just of the products but also of the workers who produce the products. 20 Herein, 
there is an extraction of profit derived from the surplus value of the workers’ labour 
power.  
 
Despite being premised upon a structural construction - that is a technical and 
amoral concept that focuses upon the aforementioned unequal exchange between the 
capitalist owners of the means of production and the workers 21  - some Marxist 
commentators, including van der Veen, have suggested that it is not possible to 
maintain a ‘non-ethical concept of exploitation, while at the same time morally 
condemn[ing] capitalism as an inherently exploitative economic system.’ 22 Contrary to 
this reading, Carver emphasises that the conditions of a capitalist, market driven, 
society does renders exploitation a morally charged phenomenon.23 Indeed, such a 
position is shared by liberal egalitarian political theorists, such as Roemer, who adopt 
a moralised account of exploitation with the crucial object of enquiry being the 
background issues which renders the asset distribution unjust (and as a result 
exploitative) rather than determining the rate of exploitation (or the unequal exchange) 
according to the surplus value.  
 
	
18 Roemer, J. ‘Origins of Exploitation and Class: Value Theory of Pre-Capitalist Economy’, (1982) Econometrica 50(1) 163-192, 
p.164. 
19 Fleurbaey (2014), supra n.10, p. 655. 
20 Carver, T., ‘Marx’s political theory of exploitation’, in Reeve, S., (ed) Modern Theories of exploitation (Sage Publishing, 1987), 
p.69. 
21 Cohen, G.A., ‘The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation’, (Summer, 1979) Philosophy & Public Affairs 8(4), 
338-360, p. 341. 
22 van der Veen, R. J., ‘Can socialism be non-exploitative?’, Reeve, S., (ed) Modern Theories of exploitation (Sage Publishing, 
1987), p.80 
23 Carver (1987), supra n.20, p.81; Veneziani (2013) supra n.14, p.528. 
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A common denominator that emerges in the Redistribution Model is the 
ownership and property relationship of key assets that are the object of value in the 
process of commodification.24  For instance, the Marxist labour theory of value is 
premised upon an individual’s ownership or control of that which creates value. 
Exploitation in this context therefore occurs when there is ‘the wrongful denial to the 
labourer […] to the full capital [or value] of his labour’ without a valid claim. 25 When 
discussing the Marixst theory of value Carver writes:  
 
[…] only workers [can] contribute the labour that transforms materials into goods. 
Ownership or control of the instruments of production, natural resources or the means 
to purchase them does not constitute work [...] If some of the product is possessed, 
used, [or] controlled, by certain persons because they own the means of exploitation, 
there is exploitation.26  
 
Conversely, the emphasis on the consequences of the exploitation by way of 
unequal endowments of assets is contested by liberal egalitarian theorists such as 
Roemer.27 They reject the Marxist understanding of exploitation as the transfer of 
surplus value as, for Roemer, it does not effectively reflect the ‘inequality in the 
ownership of the means of production’ and ‘hence exploitation (the transfer of surplus 
value) is not a proper reflection of underlying property relations.’ 28  Instead, in 
Roemer’s general theory of exploitation, the emphasis is placed on property relations 
between the parties involved with regards to the initial ownership of the means of 
production.29 By focusing on the initial ownership of the means of production rather 
than the ownership of the labour power, Goodin seeks to highlight ‘any discrepancy or 
shift between the creation of a product through labour and the value according to the 
	
24 For more discussion on the labour entitlement theory of property see Reeve, S., Hodgskin, T., & Bray, J., ‘Free exchange and 
equal exchange’, in Reeve, S., (ed.) Modern Theories of exploitation (Sage Publishing, 1987), p. 32. 
25 Reeve et al (1987), supra n.24, p. 41. 
26 Carver (1987), supra n.20, p.69 
27 Roemer’s approach is supported by Fleurbaey (2014), supra n.10, p. 653.  
28 Roemer, J., ‘Exploitation and Labour Theory of Value,’ (1986) Economic & Political Weekly, 21(3) pp. 138-140, p.139; John 
Roemer, Should Marxists be Interested in Exploitation? Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter, 1985), pp. 30-65, p. 
32-33 
29 For more on Roemer’s general theory of exploitation see Roemer, J., ‘Exploitation and Labour Theory of Value,’ (Jan. 18, 1986) 
Economic and Political Weekly 21(3), 138-140, p.281. Roemer, J., ‘Property Relations vs. Surplus Value in Marxian Exploitation’, 
(Autumn, 1982) Philosophy & Public Affairs 11(4), 281-313p. 302-303. 
See a contrario in Godels, G., ‘The Birth and Death of Exploitation Theory: Can the Idea of Exploitation Be Saved from John 
Roemer’s Critique?’ (1998) Nature, Society, and Thought 11(4), 448, p. 448 
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desirability of the commodification does not impact on the identification of economic 
exploitation.’30 
 
In order to distinguish between commodification and exploitation, it is 
important to consider the impact of unequal ownership. The theories encapsulated 
under the Redistribution Model place an emphasis on distributive injustice. Critically, 
whilst much of the exploitation debate is still grounded in the work of Marx, it must be 
recognised that the meaning has been extended beyond the extraction of surplus31 
towards consideration of what Roemer articulates as ‘the distributional consequences 
of an unjust inequality in the distribution of productive assets and resources.’ 32 
Consequently, it is important to recognise that subsequent distributive injustices are 
derived from different sources. 
 
On one hand, the injustice is positioned as an inequality in the ownership of the 
means of production and discusses unfair endowments or assets. The surplus value is 
calculated in accordance with a rate of exploitation that determines the capital paid out 
as wages that should be equal to the value of the worker’s labour power: variable 
capital. Surplus value is the value produced by the worker that is over and above that 
represented by the variable. The ratio of surplus value to variable capital is called the 
rate of exploitation.33  
 
On the other hand, whilst the unequal exchange of the Marxist tradition is 
acknowledged, there is instead a consideration of the unfair advantage that results from 
the exploitative transaction and the moral weight that should be attributed to such an 
outcome. Here, shifting away from Marxist understanding, the fairness of the 
transaction is the focus and does not take into account the background conditions from 
which unfairness may arise. 34 
 
	
30 Goodin, R., ‘Exploiting a situation and exploiting a person’, Reeve, S., (ed.) Modern Theories of exploitation (Sage Publishing, 
1987), p. 166. 
31 Brewer (1987), supra n.10, p. 12. 
32 Roemer, J., ‘Should Marxists be Interested in Exploitation?’, (Winter, 1985) Philosophy & Public Affairs 14(1), 30-65, p. 65 
33 For detailed explanation of the Marxist labour theory of value see Cohen (1979), supra n.21, p. 341. 
34  Mantouvalou V., ‘Legal construction of structures of exploitation’ in Collins, H., Lester, G., & Mantouvalou V., (eds) 
Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law, (Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 193. 
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Finally, the elimination of exploitation is considered in the Redistribution 
Model by using different means of assessing the anti-thesis of exploitation. For 
Marxists, exploitation is an inherent feature of capitalist society and cannot be 
eliminated. However, it is possible to reduce the rate of exploitation by eliminating the 
dominant ownership of the means of production. As Carver explains:  
 
The crucial element of Marxist’s understanding of exploitation within capitalist 
society, is that exploitation is a defining feature. Thus, rather than eliminating the 
phenomenon, the rate of exploitation may be measured. In order to achieve an 
exploitation rate of zero, Marxists believe in the distribution of the means of ownership 
in society permitting the control of the means of production to be shared equally by 
society as a whole. 35  
 
For Marx, the rate of exploitation can be minimised by adopting a socialist 
ownership approach where, ‘class distinctions and privileges will disappear altogether 
with the economical basis from which they originate; and society will be transformed 
into an association of producers.’ 36 Such equal access to the means of production would 
require the redistribution of property entitlements placing the emphasis on equal 
property ownership; replicating a communist societal order. The inevitability of 
exploitation as purported in the Marxist discourse is challenged by liberal egalitarian 
theorists who believe the emphasis on the ownership of means of production will 
remove the necessity to provide labour in a capitalist, subsistence, economy as workers 
are able to relinquish their labour power; therefore the inevitability of exploitation is 
eliminated.37  
 
1.2. The Human Dignity Model  
 
The Human Dignity Model is representative of those exploitation theories that have 
co-opted the notion of human dignity as a normative baseline. Here, the emphasis is 
placed on any action that devalues human dignity as a result of the exploiter’s choice 
	
35 Carver (1987), supra n.20, p.71 & p. 47. 
36 Marx, K., ‘Nationalisation of Land,’ (1952) Labour Monthly 34, 415-17, p. 417 cited in Steiner, H., ‘A Liberal Theory of 
Exploitation’, (1984) Ethics 94 (2), 225-241, p. 241. 
37 See Reiman, J., ‘Exploitation, Force, and the Moral Assessment of Capitalism: Thoughts on Roemer and Cohen’, (Winter, 1987) 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 16(1), 3-41, p. 30. 
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to seek financial gain or personal profit over and above the dignity of the person being 
exploited. These theories relate exploitation to situations that have profited from either 
the vulnerable characteristics or background conditions of the individuals such as 
poverty or economic vulnerability; or the degrading or humiliating circumstances 
surrounding the individual based upon a lack of respect afforded to them, either by 
society as a whole or by certain individuals who are in a relationship of power.  
 
Contrary to the first model, this understanding of exploitation is inherently 
morally based. In some instances, the underlying rationale for the emphasis on human 
dignity is to identify the moral wrong or “badness” of exploitation - an issue that, 
according to Sample, has not been sufficiently addressed by scholars38 - in order to 
reach an understanding of the concept that permits its use as “a tool of moral 
criticism.”39 
 
The Human Dignity Model emphasises the personal, relational aspects of the 
exploited party, by taking into account the background conditions of the individual. 40 
Such background conditions can be premised upon vulnerabilities that have already 
been raised in literature such as dependencies created by existing social conditions 
(Goodin), indebtedness (O’Connell-Davidson), 41  lack of a reasonable alternative 
(Valdman & Liberto), inability to provide for oneself (Goodin),42 psychological or 
cognitive weakness (Hill), 43 a threat of harm (Goodin),44 or as a result of force of 
circumstances beyond the control of the individual (as we will see in Chapter 9). Hill 
argues that the vulnerability is a defect that will impact upon the quality of the 
transaction predominantly by reinforcing the inequality and imbalance of bargaining 
power between the two parties. 45 For Sample, a position of unequal bargaining power 
leads to ‘the person who has the greater power in the relationship [using] is to gain the 
	
38 See Sample’s critique of Feinberg failure to account of the badness of exploitation can be given “in the absence of a complete 
normative moral theory” and opts instead for a description of the conditions under which we are more or less likely to make 
exploitation, Wertheimer’s account is inadequate because it fails to account for the badness of exploitation, and the Marxian 
understanding of exploitation, Sample considers this is to be merely “a technical notion” devoid of any moral content.  Sample 
(2003), supra n.3, p. 2-4, p. 6-7, p. 56 & p. 65. 
39 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 3  
40 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 82. 
41 O’Connell Davidson, J., ‘Troubling freedom: migration, debt, and modern slavery’, (2013) Migration Studies 1(2): 176-195, p. 
195; Goodin, R., Protecting the vulnerable: a reanalysis of our social responsibilities, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1985), p. 191 & p. 192. 
42 Valdman, M., ‘A Theory of Wrongful Exploitation,’ (2009) Philosophers’ imprint 9(6), p. 1; Liberto, H., ‘Exploitation and the 
Vulnerability Clause,’ (2014) Ethic Theory Moral Prac 17, 619–629, pp. 621-622. Goodin (1985), supra n.41, p. 54. 
43 Hill (1994), supra n.1, p. 683-684. 
44 Goodin (1985), supra n.41,, p. 110.  
45 Hill (1994), supra n.1, p. 683-684. 
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advantage in a way that fails to respect the other person in the relationship.’46 Such a 
situation can arise even in circumstances where the agreement or exchange is mutually 
advantageous.  
 
Having regard to the background conditions (including vulnerabilities) that can 
contribute to a defective exchange, there is a need to consider at what point such an 
exchange amounts to exploitation. For Wertheimer, a harmful outcome is the key 
distinguishing feature. Harmful exploitation occurs when A intentionally gains by an 
action or transaction that is harmful to B. Harm occurs where a person’s physical, 
psychological, socio-economic, position is worse off as a result of their interaction with 
another. The harm element leads to a distinction between a transaction where A gains 
over B, and an exploitative transaction where A gains by causing harm to B. Where 
harm is the result of the transaction, then the transaction is unfair and thus amounts to 
exploitation. 47 Goodin frames the antithesis to harmful exploitation as a duty to refrain 
from harm, which emphasises the moral imperative to protect the vulnerable:  
 
1. All persons have a moral duty to protect the vulnerable;  
2. If a person has a duty to protect the vulnerable, then that person has a duty to refrain 
from exploiting the vulnerable;  
3. If a person has a duty to protect the vulnerable, then that person has a duty to create 
and support institutions that prevent others from exploiting the vulnerable; 
4. All persons have a duty to refrain from exploiting the vulnerable;  
5. All persons have a duty to create institutions that protect the vulnerable from 
exploitation. 48 
 
The protection of the vulnerable by way of a duty to refrain from harm is not 
only morally charged but also consequentialist. Where the infliction of harm results 
from a high dependency upon an individual, then Goodin argues that the exchange must 
be framed ‘in such a way as to produce certain sorts of consequences, namely, ones that 
protect the interests of those who are particularly vulnerable to your actions and 
choices.’49 Indeed, Goodin’s understanding emphasises the notion of exploitation as a 
	
46 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 83-84 & p.87-88. 
47 Wertheimer, A., Exploitation, (Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 209. 
48 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 38; see also Goodin (1985), supra n.41, p.109-110. 
49 Goodin (1985), supra n.41, p. 114.  
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process and not just an outcome.50  Already the understanding of exploitation from the 
perspective of vulnerability deviates from the Marxist analysis. Instead it aligns with 
the broader understanding of liberal egalitarian political theorists who conceive of 
exploitation as a process, considering not only the economic discrepancies at the end 
of the process but also the impact of interpersonal features throughout the process, 
including the background conditions of the individuals in question.51 Arguably, the 
Human Dignity Model goes one step further by also recognising the possibility, not just 
for ex ante vulnerabilities, but of the creation of ex post vulnerabilities as a consequence 
of the infliction of harm which could impact upon either their welfare, psychological 
and physical sensitivities and absolute interests: such as food, clothing and shelter. 
 
As we discussed above, Sample also emphasises that an affront to human 
dignity is the normative basis for any understanding of exploitation, proposing a more 
“morally thick” formulation of exploitation as degradation.52 For Sample, the wrongful 
characteristic of an exploitative relationship is degradation: 
 
Relationships can be voluntary, non-coerced, and even mutually beneficial, and yet 
may be subject to the moral criticism that they are exploitative. The badness stems from 
the degradation of one or more of the agents in a transaction for advantage. 
Degradation is, on my view, treating someone or something as having less value that 
that person or thing actually has.  
 
The inherent element of exploitation as degradation is a lack of respect for the 
value of other human beings; for Sample, respect is a way of responding to the value 
of persons.53  
 
Exploitation occurs when the value of persons is not appropriately respected. This can 
happen when their human capabilities are ignored in the course of an interaction or 
relationship of mutual benefit; or when we take advantage of injustice to profit from 
that interaction or relationship; if when we inappropriately commodify something. 
Exploitation can occur at either level of individual transaction, or at the level of 
	
50 Goodin (1987), supra n.30, p. 181. 
51 Goodin (1987), supra n.30, p. 181 
52 For Sample, one crucial element of the understanding of exploitation as degradation is that it not only reflects the ordinary 
meaning of exploitation as it is objectivist and pluralistic, it may also be applied to both impersonal and personal exploitation: 
which thus far has not been the focus of exploitation theorists. Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 2-4, 6-7, 56 & 65. 
53 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 65 
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protracted relationship. When exploitative interactions fail to properly value our 
interactors, degradation has occurred. 54 
 
This approach follows the Kantian view that ‘human beings are “ends in 
themselves” and that respect of the moral law requires that we treat them as such. Every 
person possesses “dignity”, which differentiates us from those things and creatures that 
possess merely “price”.’55 Accordingly, an exploitative interaction with an individual 
demonstrates a lack of respect in the following ways:  
 
1. Failure to respect a person by neglecting what is necessary for that person’s well-
being to flourish;  
2. Failure to respect a person by taking advantage of an injustice done to him;  
3. Failure to respect a person by commodifying or treating as a fungible object of 
market exchange, an aspect of that’s persons being that ought to not be commodified.56 
 
Both Goodin and Sample suggest that non-exploitation can be achieved by 
imposing moral duties and obligations on society and individuals: namely, a duty to 
protect the vulnerable and a duty to respect others. Sample proposes that the application 
of a duty to respect others would ensure that exploitation does not occur. Such a duty 
requires awareness and restraint in order to preserve the value and dignity of others by 
not treating them as a means to an end. The focus on vulnerability here, as with the 
discussion in the legal analysis, shows that vulnerability is a key component of the 
understanding of exploitation. Thus a non-exploitative situation would mean that the 
value of others has been upheld through adequate respect during the course of a 
transaction. 57 Goodin’s duty to protect the vulnerable goes one step further by seeking 
to achieve a state of invulnerability, wherein the need for society to offer special 
protection (by way of a duy to protect the vulnerable) would be removed. 58 Since 
vulnerability is a significant risk factor, seeking to achieve its reduction or elimination 
would reduce the opportunities people have to exploit one another as they will be 
regarded as equals and have more equal bargaining power.59 Non-exploitation could be 
	
54 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 83 
55 Immanual Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. with an introduction by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, 47, 53 cited in Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 62 
56 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 57 
57 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 67, p. 14 & p. 72. 
58 Goodin (1985), supra n.41, p. 190.  
59 Goodin (1985), supra n.41, p. 195.  
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achieved by increasing interdependency and mutuality that amounts to equal 
dependency and despite the continued existence of some kind of “power relation”, any 
dependencies or vulnerabilities would be reciprocal. 60  However, in light of the 
recognition of the socially contrived nature of vulnerabilities and dependencies, that are 
‘created, shaped, or sustained, at least in part, by existing social arrangements,’61 the 
possibility of a situation of complete invulnerability is unlikely, as there will always be 
some natural and unavoidable vulnerabilities.62  
 
Whilst an understanding of non-exploitation through the Human Dignity Model, as 
presented in this section is a morally thick standard to which all should strive, the 
situation is very often so complex that competing interests mean that it is not always 
possible to ensure respect for the person.63 Therefore, it may well be too onerous to 
effectively fulfil such an obligation (either collectively or individually). Nevertheless, 
it is possible to mitigate the impact of our actions (again either collectively or 
individually) by recognising those who are exploitable and by complying with our 
moral obligations and duties to respect others and to protect the vulnerable. However, 
where the complexity of the situation makes non-exploitation difficult, the final 
theoretical model offers a middle ground between redistribution of inequalities on the 
one hand and a recognition of the inherent nature of human dignity on the other hand.  
 
1.3. The Basic Needs Model  
 
The final model of exploitation - the Basic Needs Model – is derived from 
sufficientarian theories by focusing upon the notion of unfairness in order to determine 
a benchmark whereby it is possible to establish the threshold at which a situation is 
deemed exploitative.64 Two relevant explanations have been proffered in literature. The 
	
60 Goodin (1985), supra n.41, p. 196.  
61 Goodin (1985), supra n.41, p. 191.  
62 Goodin (1985), supra n.41, p. 191 & p. 203.  
63 Synder, J., ‘Needs exploitation’, (2008) Ethic Theory Moral Practice 11,389–405p. 393-394. 
64 Sufficientarianism is a theory of distributive justice. Rather than being concerned with inequalities as such or with making the 
situation of the least well off as good as possible, sufficientarian justice aims at making sure that each of us has enough. Gosseries, 
A., ‘Sufficientarianism,’ Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Taylor and Francis: 2011); see also Raz, J., Ethics in the Public 
Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 9. 
For application of sufficientariansim to exploitation theory see Mayer’s Sufficiency standard in Mayer, R., ‘Guestworkers and 
Exploitation’, (2005) The Review of Politics 67(2), 311-334, p. 312.  See also Mayer, R., ‘Sweatshops, Exploitation, and Moral 
Responsibility’, (2007) Journal of Social Philosophy 38, 605-619. Mayer (2007) supra n.16 and Synder’s needs exploitation theory 
in Synder (2008) supra n.63, p. 395. Synder, J., ‘Exploitation and sweatshop labor: Perspectives and issues’, (2010) Business Ethics 
Quarterly 20 (2), 187-213. Synder, J., ‘Exploitation and demeaning choices’, (2013) Politics, Philosophy & Economics 12 (4), 
345-360. 
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first is introduced by Mayer, who premises the benchmark upon a sufficiency standard 
‘that judges transactions from the standpoint of those who have enough. Such agents 
are not exploitable, and if they would accept an offer it cannot be deemed 
exploitative.’65  Mayer asserts that by seeking to ensure that everyone has enough 
establishes a standard of fairness based on sufficiency that is morally acceptable and 
could be considered as a benchmark for identifying exploitation.66 However, taking into 
account the complexity of exploitative exchanges and the possibility for an exchange 
to be mutually advantageous, the threshold of the sufficiency standard can be bolstered 
by a further duty of beneficence that secures a decent minimum of welfare for humans.67 
Synder concurs with such a sufficientarian approach by proposing an emphasis on basic 
needs. 68 Thus, any duty of beneficence would seek to promote and facilitate access to 
basic requirements to achieve a decent minimum wellbeing.   
 
The notion of well-being as a measure is also raised by Goodin, who considers 
that individuals have discretion as to when, where and how their own resources are 
directed towards others. However, when one enters into a relationship with a person 
who has deficits in their well-being the need to secure their welfare is engaged. For 
instance, in an employment relationship, ‘employers are required to cede as much of 
their benefit from the interaction to their employees as is reasonably possible toward 
the end of the employees achieving a decent minimum standard of living.’69 This use 
of the sufficientarian approach is evident in national legal norms when defining decent 
labour practices. Rather than adopting a comprehensive outcome-based conception, a 
minimum threshold of employment conditions is set, expressed as protective labour 
standards e.g. minimum wage. From this minimalistic perspective, exploitation occurs 
in employment relations that fail to meet the protective threshold set by the minimum 
labour standards. 
 
Importantly, both Mayer and Synder do not seek to encourage flourishing, any 
duty of sufficiency is fulfilled when individuals simply have enough. The justification 
for such an approach is premised upon the need to balance the interests of individuals 
	
65 Mayer (Spring, 2005), supra n.64, p. 312; Mayer (Winter 2007), supra n.64; Mayer (2007) supra n.16. 
66 Mayer (2002), supra n.7, p.354; Mayer (Spring, 2005), supra n.64, p. 320. 
67 Similar approach to Goodin and Sample who approach exploitation theory via imposition of a duty to refrain from exploitation: 
i.e. duty to do no harm (see section 4) & duty to respect (see section 4). 
68 Synder (2008) supra n.63, p. 395. 
69 Goodin (1987), supra n.30, p. 396. 
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in securing freedom of choice and freedom to contract with the common good.70 
Importantly, these theories apply to both structural and relational interactions i.e. 
fostered by societal structures and between individuals. A focus on a decent minimum 
threshold may well open the Basic Needs Model up to criticism. More specifically, 
rather than going beyond Marxist theories, the sufficientarian rationale is in fact 
grounded in and dilutes such theories, since they stipulate that even where workers 
receive the necessary commodities and goods, they are still exploited by virtue of the 
surplus value produced from the work effort. Indeed, where a surplus of labour exists, 
workers have produced more than the required labour to acquire sufficient revenue in 
order to purchase the necessary commodities and goods, amounting to an unequal 
exchange and thus exploitation of labour. 71  Whereas, in the Basic Needs Model, 
exploitation only exists where access to a decent minimum well-being has not been 
achieved.  
 
As a result, the parameters of the Basic Needs Model require further 
consideration in recognition of the critique of the application of a sufficientarian 
approach that simply seeks to secure the bare minimum. Indeed, where vulnerability 
and the level of dependence of the exploited party is at the root of the exploitation, 
Sample argues that it is important to go beyond minimum standards. 72 In particular, 
she argues that the decent minimum well-being should ensure ‘conditions of purposeful 
employment, the prerequisites of psychological well-being, and constraints on 
interaction that are necessary for self-respect.’73  
 
The decent minimum well-being is envisaged as access to the basic goods 
necessary to live a distinctly human life.74 However, we identify a limitation to the 
Basic Needs Model. 75 Nussbaum’s and Sen’s seminal work contradicts the suggestion 
that any decent minimum should simply ensure bare subsistence, rather human 
	
70 Raz (1995), supra n.64. See also Dworkin in Davidov, G., ‘Distributive justice in labour law’ in Collins, H., Lester, G., & 
Mantouvalou V., (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law, (Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 148. 
71 Roemer (1982) supra n.18, p.163; Fleurbaey (2014), supra n.10, p. 654-655.  
72 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 75-76. 
73 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 74. 
74 Synder (2008) supra n.63, p. 395. 
75 Dahan et al acknowledge a vast body of critical discussion on the inadequacy of such minimum standards for securing human 
dignity and whether this sufficientrian miminialist approach is morally justified, see. Dahan, Y., Lerner, H., Milma-Sivan, F., 
‘Global labor rights as duties of justice’, in Dahan, Y., Lerner, H., Milma-Sivan, F., (eds) Global Justice and International Labour 
Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 66.  
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flourishing should be encouraged. 76  Sample applies this rationale to the duty of 
beneficence as discussed in the Human Dignity Model, wherein  interaction with people 
‘for the sake of advantage without regard for their ability to turn that interaction - 
including its compensation - into capabilities characteristic of at least a minimal level 
of human flourishing. Bare subsistence is not flourishing.’ 77 In this regard, we consider 
that any attempt at imposing a decent minimum well-being should seek also to ensure 
respect for human dignity. 
 
As with the other theoretical models, the elimination of exploitation under the 
Basic Needs Model considers the fact that exploitative interactions are those in which 
the capabilities of our interactors are ignored in the pursuit of their own advantage.78 
Thus conversely, non-exploitative relationships would be measured by 
acknowledgement of the needs of those with whom we are engaging. 
 
The framing of the Basic Needs Model demonstrates that alone it is perhaps not 
robust enough to address exploitation. However, it certainly has value as it is applicable 
not only to intrapersonal relationships (relational) but also to economically derived 
relationships (structural). Therefore, it may well be an appropriate foundation from 
which to develop a hybrid model of exploitation, that acknowledges to varying degrees 
the normative foundations of each model outlined in the present typology. The 
constituent theoretical conditions of exploitation that are presented in Chapter 6 have 
been very much developed with such a purpose in mind. Before, presenting the 
conditions of exploitation we will briefly discuss the application of the typology in a 
contemporary context. 
2. Applying the typology of exploitation to a contemporary understanding of 
labour exploitation  
 
As alluded to in the final lines of the previous section, we suggest that the application 
of the typology of exploitation to contemporary circumstances of labour exploitation 
requires a hybrid construction that takes into account not only the differences but also 
	
76 Nussbaum, M., Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000); 
Sen, A., Development as Freedom, (New York: Anchor Books, 2000). 
77 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 167. 
78 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 80-81. 
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the similarities of each Model presented and the exploitation theories recounted therein. 
Thus, in the remainder of this chapter we will discuss three overarching points that we 
consider must be taken into account when identifying the conditions of exploitation in 
Chapter 6: the understanding of exploitation must go beyond mere economics (Section 
2.1); the recognition of exploitation as mutually advantageous and consensual (Section 
2.2); and the understanding of labour exploitation as a non-idealistic concept (Section 
2.3).  
 
2.1. Understanding exploitation beyond economics 
	
First of all, we follow Wertheimer and posit that a contemporary understanding of 
labour exploitation must be ‘applicable to the full range of allegedly exploitative 
transactions,’79 not just economic exchanges. Many political theories of exploitation 
focus upon the economic value of labour.  However, the operationalisation of the value 
of labour is contested by exploitation theorists. For Marxists, the value of labour power 
is a homogenous and inalienable commodity in capitalist societies.80 Alternatively, 
Roemer views the value of labour as a moralised concept in recognition of the impact 
of the labour on the individual worker.81 In terms of the latter, labour relations represent 
a unique type of economic exchange as the commodity for sale (labour skills) cannot 
be separated from the subject who is selling said skills (the worker). Consequently, the 
reduction of the commodification of labour is, as Dahan et al suggest, one of the 
principle means by which to guarantee a life in dignity for all workers – a position 
which can be aligned with the Basic Needs Model that seeks to ensure a decent 
minimum of wellbeing (Section 1.3, Chapter 5).82 However, despite the introduction of 
measures by the ILO and key international human rights instruments to ensure that 
minimum labour standards guarantee a life in dignity,83 Dahan et al are sceptical as to 
the extent to which such standards, even if attained, would guarantee a life free from 
poverty and economic vulnerability.84 This position is exacerbated, as Roemer notes, 
	
79 Wertheimer, A., Millum J., & Schaefer, G. O., ‘Why Adopt a Maximin Theory of Exploitation?’, (2010) The American Journal 
of Bioethics 10(6), 38-39, p.39.  
80 Roemer, J., ‘R. P. Wolff's Reinterpretation of Marx's Labor Theory of Value: Comment’, (Winter, 1983) Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 12(1), 70-83, p. 79. 
81 Roemer (Winter, 1983), supra n.80, p. 80. 
82 Dahan et al (2017), supra n.75, p. 63. Zatz, N., ‘Discrimination and labour law’, in Collins, H., Lester, G., & Mantouvalou V., 
(eds) Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law, (Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 156. 
83 ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, 18 June 1998, 1998; ILO Decent Work 
Agenda. Key International human rights instruments: UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR. 
84 Dahan et al (2017), supra n.75, p. 65. 
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by the positioning of the market place as the sole locus of exploitative relationships and 
transactions, rendering exploitation economically market driven and non-relational, 85 
resulting in an understanding of exploitation as an asocial phenomenon. For Yoshihara 
& Veneziani, it is important to ensure that any articulation of labour exploitation 
recognises it as a social phenomenon, acknowledging the possibility of it arising in 
interpersonal settings including non-market exchanges, whereby the situation and the 
characteristics of the individuals themselves are part of the assessment as to whether or 
not exploitation has taken place.86  
 
2.2. Recognising exploitation as mutually advantageous and consensual 
	
A second consideration of any application of the models of exploitation is the 
inevitability of mutual advantageous exploitation. As we described above, mutually 
advantageous exploitation is, according to Wertheimer, a situation wherein ‘A’ gains 
unfairly or excessively by an action or transaction that is beneficial to ‘B’, and can arise 
in unintentional, non-coercive and consensual transactions.87  However, despite the 
benefit to B, the fact that A gains unfairly or excessively is the pivot for its 
characterisation as wrongful exploitation. In such cases, the harm or fairness will be 
determined according to objective criteria. Wertheimer and Zwolinski describe the 
calculation of the social surplus. Despite the fact that each of the parties may well be 
benefiting, the mutually beneficial exchange does not benefit one of them enough88 or 
to assess whether degradation has caused harm to the person, and, if so, whether the 
degradation exceeds the benefits to B, all things considered.89 Finally, Mayer suggests 
that mutually advantageous exploitation could arise from the imbalance of bargaining 
power meaning that individuals have no alternative and, as such, will always be forced 
to choose from a constrained set of options. Notwithstanding this, both parties gain 
from the transaction, but as these gains are disproportionate; the transaction is unfair. 
The lack of an alternative for the exploited party comes about as an insufficiency that 
results in that party or ‘B’ accepting a least-bad position or the lesser of two evils.90 By 
	
85 Roemer (1986), supra n.29, pp. 138-140, p.138.  
86 Yoshihara, N., & Veneziani, R., ‘Exploitation of Labor and Exploitation of Commodities: A “New Interpretation”’ (2013) 
Review of Radical Political Economics 45(4), 517–524, p.518. 
87 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47, p. 208-209; Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 29; Wertheimer (1996-1997), supra n.17, p.898. 
88 Zwolinski, M., ‘Sweatshops, Choice, and Exploitation’, (Oct., 2007) Business Ethics Quarterly 17(4), 689-727, p. 705. 
89 Wertheimer (1996-1997), supra n.17, p.898. Zwolinski (2011), supra n.12, p156. 
90 Mayer (Spring, 2005), supra n.64, p. 320 
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way of example, Mayer refers to sweatshop jobs that do not pay enough, even when 
they pay more than the alternatives. It is the insufficiency of the compensation that 
renders these jobs exploitative. The employer offers more than competitors but less 
than is sufficient.91 
 
2.3. Understanding exploitation as a non-idealistic concept 
	
Finally, we draw attention to the necessity of a realistic legal understanding of labour 
exploitation. This observation has emerged from the theoretical analysis of exploitation 
in literature that recognises that exploitation cannot always adopt a strict idealistic 
perspective. To explain the positioning of a realistic application of labour exploitation, 
the next few passages will examine the application of the tenets of distributive justice 
in the typology of exploitation theories and consider the limits of such a reading. 
 
The representation of exploitation in literature has been closely aligned to 
distributive justice, where labour is recognised as a social practice and labour 
exploitation as a structural social injustice. However, we consider that it is important to 
acknowledge two limitations of any strict adherence to distributive justice. First, 
Collins reminds us that theories of distributive justice are reserved for state institutions. 
However in the context of labour exploitation the principles of distributive justice are 
applied to private employment relationships that are not always formalised.92 Second, 
as Davidov highlights that the distributive justice paradigm is restricted to redistribution 
as a solution to economic inequality and is not applied to other forms of inequality.93 
In this regard, it is important to make note of Young’s work that stressed that economic 
redistribution alone cannot resolve social injustices that arise from structural or 




91 Mayer (Spring, 2005), supra n.64, p. 320 
92 Collins, H., ‘Is the contract of employment illiberal?’ in Collins, H., Lester, G., & Mantouvalou V., (eds) Philosophical 
Foundations of Labour Law, (Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 63-66. On distinction between labour law and labour market, and 
application of Rawls’ difference principle to the latter, see Davidov (2018), supra n.70, p. 151. 
93 Davidov (2018), supra n.70, p. 144. 
94 Young, I. M., ‘Five faces of oppression’, in Seth N. Asumah & Mechthild Nagel (eds) Diversity, Social Justice, and Inclusive 
Excellence: Transdisciplinary and Global Perspectives (State University of New York Press, 2014), p.18; Young, I. M., Justice 
and the politics of difference, (Princeton University Press1990); Wolff (2018), supra n.4, p. 186 
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Similarly, the presentation of exploitation theories has shown that they are 
grounded in norms of equality and fairness. 95 Rawls’ theory of distributive justice 
emphasised the obligations and duties towards ensuring that individuals are assured a 
basic right to minimum guaranteed income standard of living that is based on a position 
of equal status. In particular, emphasis is placed on the centrality of fairness (original 
position behind a veil of ignorance) in ensuring a well-ordered society wherein political 
liberty and equal opportunity to access to social primary goods (income, wealth, self-
respect) are guaranteed. Conversely, Rawls’ difference principle does permit 
inequalities in the distribution of social primary goods in order to ensure that the least 
disadvantaged have equality of opportunity. However, Davidov indicates that the 
redistribution posited by Rawls’ applies to the absolute position rather than the relative 
position of the least advantaged,96 resulting in what Sen referred to as a bottom-up 
approach to redistribution whereby the worst off remain worst off in society.97 Whilst 
Rawls’ mechanism of redistribution has been critiqued more generally, 98  in the context 
of exploitation, any such economic redistribution would remove the worst off from a 
position of exploitation. Thus, whilst they remain the worst off in society, they are no 
longer exploited.  
 
Ultimately, in order to recognise that exploitation has more than an economic 
impact, we posit that any redistribution mechanism that seeks to ensure equal status in 
society should also consider social/relational equality. This reading aligns with our 
above proposition that any conceptualisation of exploitation that is premised upon the 
Basic Needs Model must also draw upon aspects of the Human Dignity Model so as to 
ensure that individuals are not deprived of the means to develop capacities or basic 
capabilities, as emphasised by Sample.99 Indeed, theorists who adhere to the norms of 
	
95 For critical discussion of justice and fairness in labour exploitation see Dahan et al (2017), supra n.75, and Pogge, T., John 
Rawls: His life and theory of justice, (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
96 Davidov (2018), supra n.70, p. 148. 
97 Sen, A., ‘Rauls v Bentham: An axiomatic examination of the pure distribution problem’, in Daniels, N., (ed.) Reading Rawls 
Critical Studies of Rawls’ A theory of justice (Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 284. 
98 See for instance impossibility of an open stable market in perfect competition in Martin, R., Rawls and Rights, (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1985), p.157-159. 
See for instance non-application of different principle to those who are unable or unwilling to work in Martin, R., Rawls and Rights, 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985),  p. 177-178; No emphasis on flourishing, just ensuring that individual have the 
basic minimum needed, Martin, R., Rawls and Rights, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985), p. 177.  
See for instance focus on adjusting inequalities through economic means (monetary transfer schemes) and not through provision 
of welfare services in Michelman, F., ‘Constitutional Welfare rights and A Theory of Justice’, in Daniels, N., (ed.) Reading Rawls 
Critical Studies of Rawls’ A theory of justice (Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 323. 
99 See also Young, I. M., ‘Responsibility and Global justice: a social connection model’, (2006) Social Philosophy and Policy 
foundation 102; Young, I. M., ‘Responsibility and global labor justice’ (2004) 4 The journal of political philosophy 365 and 
Nussbaum, M., Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, (Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2011).  
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the Redistribution Model, such as Cohen and Arneson, also emphasise that equality of 
resources goes beyond income and wealth and should include equal opportunity of 
welfare (Arneson) or access to advantage (Cohen). 100  
3. Concluding remarks 
	
The exploration of exploitation theory demonstrates that the understanding of 
exploitation in political theory is wide-ranging, and the threshold of the wrongfulness 
of exploitation varies. Nevertheless, the analysis has provided insight into how political 
theory can inform a legal conceptualisation of labour exploitation.  
 
Crucially, we have demonstrated in this chapter that any conceptualisation of 
exploitation must go beyond economic relations and ensure that non-market relations 
are also incorporated. As such, the typology of exploitation reflects the need to ensure 
an approach that accounts for both structural and relational forms of exploitation, 
particularly as a number of converging queries have emerged regarding the outcome of 
the interaction for the exploited party – is harm required or can it be mutually 
beneficial? Is the vulnerability of the exploited party taking into account both ex ante 
and ex post the exploitative situation? To what extent can an individual consent to an 
exploitative situation and to what extent does the exploiter (either an individual or an 
institution) need to have foresight of the consequences on the individual’s ability to live 
and work in conditions that are respectful of their human dignity?  
 
Here, the emergence of respect for the dignity of others is of crucial importance 
to an overall understanding of exploitation in law that is equally human rights 
compliant. The normative theoretical understanding of exploitation as being contrary 
to human dignity, begins to converge with the foundational tenet of international human 
rights regime of respect for both rights and dignity as universal values. 
 
Reflecting further on these and other queries, we will operationalise the 
typology by identifying, in the next chapter, the key conditions of exploitation that have 
emerged from the Models of exploitation. We will also begin to draw together the legal 
	
100 Arneson, R.J., ‘Equality and equality of opportunity for welfare’, (1989) Philosophical Studies 56, 77; Cohen, G.A., ‘On the 
currency of Egalitarian Justice’, (1989) Ethics 99, 906. 
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and theoretical analysis in order to identify the synergies between the juridical and 

















0. Introduction and structure of the chapter 
 
On the basis of the findings of Chapter 5, we understand that in exploitation, on the one 
hand, the advantaged party gains as a result of the harm to the exploited party (harmful 
exploitation). On the other hand, exploitation can be mutually advantageous and thus 
beneficial for both parties involved (mutually advantageous exploitation). However in 
the latter, each party’s gain will differ, since A’s gain is the result of the 
instrumentalisation of B.101 Whilst identification of exploitation as harmful is clear cut, 
we believe that there is a need for clarification of the constituent conditions of 
exploitation in order to be able to better identify mutually advantageous exploitation.  
 
With this chapter we answer the following subsidiary research question: What 
are the conditions of exploitation that emerge from theory? 
 
In the absence of a clear definition, we use the findings of Chapter 5 to 
categorise the different stages of the exploitation process and to identify the conditions 
needed to make exploitation possible. These conditions, together with the findings of 
	
101 Mayer (2007) supra n.16, p. 139. 
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the legal analysis from Part 1, will then be operationalised in Part III of the thesis in the 
development of the analytical framework that will form the basis of the domestic case 
law analysis in order to see the extent to which judges apply these basic ingredients 




Table 2: The building blocks of exploitation: the synergies between the theoretical conditions and the 
legal elements in the exploitation process 
 
Background conditions. In the first two sections, we explore the background 
conditions of exploitation, namely the inevitable imbalance of bargaining power that 
emerges from the exploited party being in a position of inequality (Sections 1 & 2). The 
emphasis here predominantly lies on the background circumstances (ex ante) of both 
parties, in particular those of the exploited party. Such circumstances are considered to 
be influential towards the decision making process in engaging in a 
transaction/exchange or agreement and inform the presence of two conditions, namely, 
a position of inequality of the exploited party (Condition I) that creates an imbalance 
of bargaining power (Condition II). The inequality can be either the result of structural 
injustices or personal vulnerabilities of the individual. 
 
Procedural conditions. We then shift our attention to two procedural conditions 
of an exploitative exchange and the deficiencies in the transaction that result from 
further background conditions. Primarily, from the perspective of labour exploitation, 
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the inherent inequality between parties (ex ante) must be further instrumentalised (ex 
post). As such, we identify the principal procedural deficiency as the abuse of the 
unequal exchange that leads to one party taking unfair advantage of the position of 
inequality (Condition III) – Section 3. Secondly, the procedural stage must also take 
into account the extent to which the situation is instrumentalised in an involuntary and 
non-consensual manner (Condition IV) – Section 4.  
 
Substantive conditions. The final stage looks at the substantive (ex post) impact of the 
transaction, agreement or exchange on both parties. Two substantive conditions 
therefore consider the result of taking unfair advantage of an imbalance of bargaining 
power. The outcome for both parties varies and, in some instances, can be paradoxical. 
For instance, the stronger party may not actually benefit as anticipated when entering 
into the unequal exchange and the “disadvantaged party” may in fact benefit (Condition 
V) - Section 5. Nevertheless, the outcome of the process is to the detriment of the 
“disadvantaged party” when, all things considered, it can be objectively assessed as an 
affront to human dignity (Condition VI) – Section 6. 102   
 
The analysis reveals that inequality and unfairness are present at all stages of 
the exploitation process either ex ante or ex post. Inequality is discussed according to 
the pre-existing structural inequality of the background conditions of the parties to the 
exchange that then has an impact on how the exchange is handled (procedural). 
Unfairness is present either in the interaction (procedural) or in the outcome 
(substantive).103 Highlighting the fil rouge of inequality and unfairness helps determine 
the point at which a relationship of power is not only unequal or unfair but also unjust 
and in need of legal intervention in order to prevent a violation of a person’s rights.104   
 
Finally, in a last section, we consider the complex understanding that emerges 
from the exploration of exploitation theories and we query the extent to which different 
degrees of intervention may be required in response. As a result, a caveat to the 
	
102 Affront to human dignity is understood broadly to include: lack of respect, degradation (Sample, Zwolinski) deprivation of 
capabilities of human flourishing (Wolff, Sen) and violation of human and labour rights (Manoutvalou), undeserved loss (Mayer, 
p.139) 
103 Procedural exploitation: the outcome of the exploitative act is unfair because of a defect in the process e.g. coercion, defrauded, 
manipulated; Substantive exploitation: the outcome of the exploitative act is unfair.  
104 Wood (2016), supra n.17, p. 97. See also Steiner (Jan., 1984), supra n.36, pp. 229-234.  
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conditions of exploitation emerges; namely that certain situations are seen as being the 
lesser of two evils leading to a tolerance of exploitation (Section 7). 
1. A position of inequality (Condition I) 
 
The typology of exploitation theories revealed the presence of both ex ante and ex post 
inequalities. In the first instance our attention goes to the ex ante conditions of 
inequality. Political theorists demonstrate that the source of inequalities are often 
derived from a number of unjust background conditions that can arise from both 
structural injustices or personal features: 105  as illustrated by Marx’s unequal 
distribution of assets, Roemer’s unequal initial distribution of the means of production, 
Synder & Mayer’s lack of the means of subsistence and Zwolinski’s lack of an 
alternative.106  
 
The legal analysis also reveals a need for an inherent background feature that 
creates susceptibility to subsequent exploitation, however this is not expressed as a 
position of inequality, but rather as a position of vulnerability. The similarities between 
the two are that, both can be personal or structural and the existence of inequality or 
vulnerability per se, does not amount to exploitation, there needs to be something more. 
In exploitation theories, this is framed as ‘taking unfair advantage’ whereas in law it is 
framed as ‘abuse of a position of vulnerability.’ 
 
Whilst regular employment relations are characterised by inequality and 
subordination, in the context of exploitation, Mantouvalou correctly asserts that such 
inequality leads to a position of great bargaining weakness that can lead to oppressive 
subordination. 107  Importantly, although structural and personal inequalities are a 
fundamental element of an exploitative relationship and are arguably ever present at the 
core of exploitation; their presence alone does not constitute exploitation per se, nor 
	
105 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 82. See distinction made between vulnerability (inherent/personal) and precariousness (structural) 
in Atak, I., Nakache, D., Guild, E., Crepeau, F., “Migrants in vulnerable situations” and the Global compact for safe and orderly 
Regular Migration’, (2018) Queen Mary University of London, School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 273/2018, pp.2-
5. 
106 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 82; Attas, D., ‘The case of guestworkers: exploitation, citizenship and economic rights’, (2000) 
Res Publica 6, 73–92, p. 78; Synder (2013), supra n.64, p. 347-348; Zwolinski (2011), supra n.12, p.154.  
107 Mantouvalou (2018), supra n.34, p. 197. 
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does it infer that a position of inequality will inevitably result in exploitation. A person 
can be in a position of inequality and not be exploited.  
 
The weight afforded to structural inequalities as opposed to personal 
inequalities has been subject to varying interpretations. Indeed, Wertheimer and 
Zwolinski downplay the importance of structural inequalities, as they may well be 
indicative of injustice but not of exploitation.108 Zwolinski writes: 
 
It is precisely in the conditions that lie in the background of the exchange that the real 
injustice of sweatshop labor is to be found […] this doesn't make it exploitative: What 
role, if any, should consideration of background injustices play in the correct 
understanding of exploitation? My answer, in brief, is that it should play fairly little. 
Structural injustice matters, of course, but it does not typically matter for determining 
whether a sweatshop is acting exploitatively, and it does not typically matter in a way 
that grounds any kind of special moral responsibility or fault on the part of sweatshops 
or the MNEs (multinational enterprises) with which they contract.109 
 
Conversely, others, including Wolff and Mantouvalou, argue that structural 
inequalities are to be the principal focus when seeking to clarify the scope of labour 
exploitation.110  Indeed, this thesis recognises that the economic framing of labour 
exploitation does favour a focus on the structural inequalities. However, we contend 
that consideration of the imbalance of power in personal relationships and indeed 
between individuals is also vital, requiring – as Hill argues - contemplation of non-
economical inequalities.111  
 
Regardless of the source of the inequality (either personal or structural), this 
thesis suggests that consideration of the background conditions is necessary when 
assessing the extent to which the inequality of the bargaining position leads to an unfair 
advantage being taken in the procedure.112  
 
	
108 Wertheimer (1996-1997), supra n.17, p.904.  
109 Zwolinski (2011), supra n.12, p155.  
110 Wolff (2018), supra n.4, p. 178, Mantouvalou (2018), supra n.34. 
111 Hill (1994), supra n.1, pp. 634. See also discussion on non-economcial inequalities such as social, educational, caste, emotional 
and maturity in Haynes, D. F., ‘Exploitation Nation: The Thin and Grey Legal Lines between Trafficked Persons and Abused 
Migrant Laborers’, (2009) Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 23(1), 1 -70, p. 10-12. 
112 Culiffe, J., ‘A mutualist theory of exploitation?’, in Reeve, S., (ed) Modern Theories of exploitation (Sage Publishing, 1987), p. 
55. 
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2. An imbalance of bargaining power (Condition II) 
 
A consequence of the position of inequality is an imbalance of bargaining power. The 
weight afforded to the imbalance of bargaining power differs (see Chapter 5). Culiffe 
and Roemer contend that exploitation stems from a structural imbalance of power 
derived from unequal access to the natural means of production.113 Thereby, as Roemer 
writes, the antithesis to exploitation would be an equal initial distribution of the means 
of production.114 Godels adopts a different approach arguing that such a structural 
inequality or injustice does not automatically amount to exploitation, as not all unequal 
positions derived from inequality in ownership of assets inevitably leads to 
exploitation.115 Consequently, we can see that the determination of the imbalance of 
bargaining power using the Redistribution Model is easier to decipher, as the focus is 
on the ex ante inequality in ownership of assets rather than an ex post analysis of 
exploitation accounts.116  
 
We note that the imbalance of bargaining power and the subsequent inequality 
in the forms of exploitation presented by the Human Dignity Model and Basic Needs 
Model could also be addressed ex ante by assuring that there is no abuse of 
vulnerability, non-degradation or respect or fulfilment of subsistence needs required for 
a decent minimum well-being. Again, as with the Redistribution Model, we 
acknowledge the limitations of such anti-thesis to exploitation noting that they cannot 
lead to an absolute situation of equality. 
 
In capitalist labour relations, an imbalance of bargaining power is an inherent 
feature, despite asymmetry in bargaining power between two parties being a clear 
indication of an unequal situation. Consequently, Zatz notes that labour-market 
regulation seeks to restrain the inherent inequality of bargaining power in order to 
vindicate the principle that the labour of a human being is not a commodity.117 Such 
regulation of employment relations is holistic, as shown by labour law provisions that 
	
113 Culiffe (1987), supra n.112, p. 66; Roemer (1985) supra n.32, p. 65. 
114 Roemer (1985) supra n.32, p. 60; Roemer, J., ‘What is Exploitation? Reply to Jeffrey Reiman’, (Winter, 1989) Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 18(1), 90-97, p. 97; Roemer (Autumn, 1982), supra n.29, p. 305. 
115 Godels asserts that unequal burden or retrun are not necessary not sufficient for the occurrence of exploitation in Godels (1998), 
supra n.29, p. 453. See Veneziani (2013) supra n.14, p.528. 
116 Roemer (1985) supra n.32, p. 53. 
117 Zatz (2018), supra n.82, p. 156. 
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not only seek to minimise any possible abuse of an imbalance of bargaining power prior 
to entering into an employment relationship but also during its realisation.118 However, 
in non-market labour relations, non-standard employment relationships (e.g. service 
providers or self-employed), or where there is non-compliance with the regulatory 
framework; then there is a need for mechanisms to determine the point at which the 
inequality in bargaining power becomes exploitative. 119 
 
Undoubtedly, the imbalance of bargaining power is a key element of 
exploitation which is illustrated by Mayer as the stronger party starting with more and 
using that advantage to gain at the expense of the disadvantaged party.120 However, 
whilst the inevitability of the dominance and imbalance of power between the two 
parties can be viewed as a fundamental distributive injustice;121 in order for ex ante 
position of inequality and an unequal exchange to qualify as exploitation there must be 
more.122 Mere structural inequality where parties possess an unequal share of some 
divisible good does not go far enough.123  
 
The legal analysis differs in this respect by placing an emphasis on the exercise 
of control rather than the imbalance of bargaining power. We nevertheless suggest that 
the exercise of control can be closely aligned to this second background condition 
wherein an imbalance of bargaining power is derived from a position of inequality. 
Here, we consider that the ability to exercise of control is made possible by an 
imbalance of bargaining power, however, the judicial understanding goes further by 
placing an emphasis on the means that are used to exert the exercise of control. Thus, 
in order to qualify a situation as exploitation, it is necessary to determine the impact of 
the instrumentalisation of the imbalance of power on other procedural and substantive 
aspects of the exploitation process and, of course, the outcome for both parties. Here 
the legal analysis can be of assistance in operationalising this theoretical condition.  
	
118 Dahan et al (2017), supra n.75, p. 66. 
119 Dahan et al (2017), supra n.75, p. 66. 
120 Mayer (Spring, 2005), supra n.64, p. 331. 
121 See reference to Cohen’s work in Furner, J., ‘Marx with Kant on exploitation’, (2015) Contemporary Political Theory 14(1), 
23–44, see Mayer’s discussion of Walzer in Mayer (2002), supra n.7, p. 337. 
122 See Mayer’s discussion of Walzer’s approach to dominance and the co-option of this discussion as a theory of exploitation in 
Mayer (2002), supra n.7, p.341.  
123 Mayer (2002), supra n.7, p.341.  
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3. Taking unfair advantage of the position of inequality (Condition III) 
 
In the last two sections, we presented the background conditions of exploitation. The 
existence of imbalance in bargaining power may be an inevitable feature of labour 
relations; it does not per se lead to exploitation. However, it does characterise a 
situation that could be taken advantage of when it comes to making an offer. The 
procedural stage is therefore, characterised by an engagement or undertaking between 
the two parties, and the conditions therein are indicative of the process of engaging in 
an exchange, transaction or agreement.  
 
Once the inequality between parties has been identified, merely taking 
advantage of an unequal exchange is not sufficient for exploitation. Whereas, as 
illustrated by Cohen, taking unfair advantage, reaches the threshold for exploitation 
and violates principles of distributive justice. 124  Goodin and Wertheimer also 
emphasise that since the moral wrong of exploitation is rooted in the notion of fairness 
then exploitation arises in an exchange or transaction when “A takes unfair advantage 
of B.” 125 Meyers considers the unfairness to amount to a situation wherein too much is 
being demanded of the individual.126  
 
Theorists have outlined a number of different ways of determining what 
constitutes unfair advantage and a contested understanding emerges when establishing 
the benchmark of fairness and assessing the extent to which a situation is exploitative. 
Indeed, as Wood highlights: fairness and unfairness in transactions is a highly 
contextualised matter, depending on the details of particular social practices, so that 
wholly general principles regarding them would be virtually impossible to formulate.127 
This is evident in the typology of exploitation theories, where the act of taking 
advantage of a person is a key element, but exactly how that occurs varies: including, 
inter alia, by taking unfair advantage (Mayer), by failing to respect the other person 
(Sample) or by deviating from the market norm (Attas & Wertheimer). 128 Thus, the 
	
124 Cohen (2011) supra 100, p.5; Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47. 
125 Goodin (1985), supra n.41, p. 194; Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47, p. 208. 
126 Meyers, C., ‘Wrongful beneficence: exploitation and third world sweatshops’ (2004) J Soc Philos 35, 319–333, p. 324.  
127 Wood (2016), supra n.17, p. 93 
128 van de Leun, ‘(EU) migration policy and labour exploitation’, Rijken, C., (ed.) Combating trafficking in human beings for 
labour exploitation (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011), p. 435. Mayer (2007) supra n.16, p. 138; Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 83-84 & 
p.87-88. Attas (2000) supra n.106, p. 75. In broad economic terms, Attas asserts that the act of taking advantage of a person is not 
required, as the unequal exchange is determined according to objective, market-based parameters that correspond to the neo-
classical understanding of economic value. Namely, the value assigned to different goods and services will be determined by 
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fairness is considered either as ex ante or ex post, where the assessment of fairness is 
determined by either the outcome (ex post) or the background conditions of the parties 
(ex ante). 
 
From the perspective of the Redistribution Model, where B gains an advantage, 
we support Wertheimer’s position that the unfairness is determined according to an 
objective market price that a well-informed and unpressured seller would give to a well-
informed and unpressured buyer in a competitive market. 129 Thus by determining how 
much a transaction has ‘deviated from the market norm’ will demonstrate whether or 
not the transaction amounts to exploitation. Wertheimer acknowledges the background 
structural conditions that could create injustice suggesting that any status quo is for 
society to reinstate. 130  However, the injustice of the background conditions is 
distinguished from the assessment of the fairness of the transaction which remains 
closely connected to the inter-relational exploitation, derived from the imbalance of 
bargaining power between two parties, rather than structural exploitation that has 
arguably created the inequality in the first instance. It must be noted that Synder argues 
that such a test of fairness fails to sufficiently take account of the impact of the 
background conditions that have in fact led to the ‘breakdown in the functioning of the 
market’ resulting in the need to hypothesise the fair-market price in the first place. 
Indeed, this is morally problematic, as the mere fact ‘that an exchange is fair in the eyes 
of the market in no way guarantees that the resulting distribution of benefits will not 
leave one party without a decent minimum of well-being.’131 The anti-thesis proposed 
by Synder is a standard of fairness or justice premised upon ‘a fully fair or fully just 
world’ whereby all unequal background conditions would be eliminated.132 As Synder 
suggests ‘these very high demands will often be impractical, however, in the actual, 
unfair world in which we live.’133 In acknowledgment of the impractically of assessing 
fairness in an unjust world, we advocate Davidov’s “desert-based distribution,”134 
	
consumer demand and producer supply in perfect competition. Therefore, where prices or wages deviate in value, defined in this 
sense as the perfect equilibrium price, then there is an unequal exchange and a prima facie assumption that here is a case of market 
exploitation 
129 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47, p. 220 & p.223; Synder (2008) supra n.63, p. 392. See also discussion of objective standards in 
comparative legal analysis (Chapters 8 & 9). 
130 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47, p. 208 &p. 216; Wertheimer (1996-1997), supra n.17, p.900-901.  
131 Synder (2008) supra n.63, p. 392.  
132 Synder (2008) supra n.63, p. 391-392.  
133 Synder (2008) supra n.63, p. 393. We therefore acknowledge the impracticality of such a standard of fairness, that is also 
reminiscent of critiques of Rawls’ veil of ignorance and original position. 
134 Davidov (2018), supra n.70, p. 143-147. 
	 173	
wherein an assessment of unfairness is premised upon whether or not the parties have 
gained more or less than they deserve.135 
  
Theorists from the Human Dignity Model have acknowledged the importance 
of the background conditions that led to the unequal exchange when determining the 
unfair nature of a particular situation. Consideration of background conditions is 
essential, as very often the socio-economic background of the exploited parties 
contributes significantly to the imbalance of power at the procedural stage, leading to 
inequality of control and power in the labour process that may engender mistreatment, 
oppression and coercion.136 In such cases an unfair advantage will have been taken 
where the individual in a superior position has played for advantage when morally 
bound not to, due to a moral responsibility to protect the weaker party.137 Considering 
the extent to which an exchange is unfair can be assessed by the notion of fair play, 
which takes account of the contextual, subjective and relational value of the situation 
and examines social values in order to ascertain whether or not a particular situation is 
“inappropriate” and thus in non-conformity with said values. 138  
 
We recognise that the notion of fairness is therefore contested across the 
theoretical spectrum, especially since a fair transaction with no defect in the procedure 
does not guarantee that the resulting distribution of benefits will also be fair.139  
4. A defect of consent is nonessential (Condition IV) 
 
As with the legal analysis on the irrelevance of consent, the theoretical analysis of 
exploitation revealed that a defect in consent is non-essential, meaning that consent is 
irrelevant to the determination of the material scope of exploitation. The consent of the 
exploited party comes into play during the procedural stages of an unequal exchange. 
In order to determine whether the exploiter has taken unfair advantage of the imbalance 
	
135 Dahan, Y., Lerner, H., Milma-Sivan, F., ‘Global justice, labor standards and responsibility,’ (2011) Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law 12, 439, p. 445. 
136 Brewer (1987), supra n.10, p. 12. 
137 Goodin (1987), supra n.30, p. 167 
138 For discussion on fair play and assessment of situations where there is wrongful taking advantage in Goodin (1987), supra n.30, 
p. 185-186. 
139 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47, p. 226. This is similar to Roemer’s understanding that there is a possibility of subsequent 
inequality or injustice as a result of differentiation and variation in the distribution of and access to the means of production. 
However, such an occurrence does not automatically amount to exploitation. See Chapter 5. 
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in bargaining power in an unequal exchange, three perspectives of voluntariness and 
consent emerge from the theoretical analysis that we have characterised as: i) non-
consensual unequal exchange – characteristic of harmful exploitation and ii) 
consensual unequal exchange – characteristic of mutually advantageous exploitation. 
Ultimately, iii) quasi-consensual unequal exchange represents the “grey-area” which 
is a specific point of interest for exploitation theorists, such as Wertheimer, wherein 
despite the exercise of the individual’s agency and consent, the unequal exchange 
amounts to exploitation justifying legal and policy intervention.140  
 
The three situations above demonstrate that a defect in consent is not an 
essential condition. Therefore, regardless of the extent to which an individual has 
consented, the ultimate impact on the individual’s agency is, as Wolff highlights: ‘the 
exploiter is to use another’s circumstances to obtain their actual compliance with a 
situation.’ 141 In this regard, when formulating the conditions of exploitation, this thesis 
is particularly interested in the latter two where the individual appears to have 
consented to the exploitative situation. 
 
i) Non-consensual unequal exchange. Harmful exploitation or a forced exchange is 
characterised by a lack of consent, which is often derived from coercion. With the close 
connection between exploitation and coercion in mind, Wolff’s explanation of the 
distinction between the two concepts is as follows:  
 
Exploitation is typically a matter of using another person’s vulnerability to your own 
advantage. Coercion, on the other hand, typically proceeds by first creating another’s 
vulnerability and then exploiting it. It involves the difference, then, between happening 
upon exploitable circumstances and generating them.142  
 
The extent to which these two concepts may overlap is contested by Hill, as 
coercion characteristically involves threats by which the coercer proposes to make her 
victim worse off unless she does as the coercer demands. Hill writes that exploitation, 
in contrast, often involves offers by which the exploiter proposes to make her victim 
	
140 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47, p. ix. 
141 Wolff (1999), supra n.11, p.115. 
142 Wolff (1999), supra n.11, p. 111. 
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better off if she does as the exploiter proposes.143 We will see such examples in the 
findings of the case-file study, wherein victims of exploitation have received offers that 
prima facie will make them better off in Chapter 9. Roemer concedes that the 
understanding of exploitation does not conceive of dominance or force as prerequisite 
components of exploitation.144 However, this position has been critiqued by Veneziani 
and Mayer for failing to take into account characteristics of the interaction between A 
and B such as asymmetric relations of power,145  that, as a result, could lead to a 
exploitative transaction involving both an offer or a threat,146 depending on whether or 
not force or coercion are employed. This thesis supports this critique, since the 
complexity of the phenomenon means that it cannot only be restricted to situations 
where an offer has been made.  
 
ii) Consensual unequal exchange. Wertheimer claims that a defect in consent is not a 
necessary condition of exploitation, suggesting that wrongful exploitation is possible 
even in circumstances where an individual has consented, a similar line of reasoning 
was adopted by the ECtHR in Chowdury. 147 Sample also concurs that a coercive 
relationship or exchange is not a prerequisite for exploitation, voluntary relationships 
are also candidates for the judgement of exploitation.148 Nevertheless, Wertheimer 
further develops the understanding of consensual unequal exchange, arguing that it 
requires a different level of assessment as the moral and legal relationship between the 
parties to an agreement has been transformed.149 For instance, it may be that despite the 
consensual nature of the agreement, the unequal exchange objectively involves some 
form of degradation and suffering as well as unfairness, that it is necessary to consider 
the “mutually advantageous” unequal exchange to amount to wrongful exploitation.150   
 
iii) Quasi-consensual unequal exchange. Attas’ work argues that, in harmful 
exploitation ‘there must be some minimal force or deception involved, in the sense that 
	
143 Hill (1994), supra n.1. 
144 Roemer (1985) supra n.32, p. 44; Roemer (Winter, 1989), supra n.114, p. 96-97; Reiman (Winter, 1987), supra n.37, p.28. 
145 Veneziani (2013) supra n.14, p.527. 
146 Mayer (Spring, 2005), supra n.64, p. 319. 
147 A defect in consent manifests in two main ways: first a defect in B’s objective situation such as fraud, undue influence, duress, 
coercion, force; and secondly a defect in B’s capacity as a decision maker within B’s objective situations such as false 
consciousness, inequality of bargaining power and hard circumstances. For Wertheimer the latter examples do not in themselves 
constitute a defect on consent, rather they are circumstances that compromise the autonomy of the individual. Wertheimer (1996), 
supra n.47, pp. 247-270. See discussion on rational choice in Hill (1994), supra n.1.  
148 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 29 
149 Wertheimer (1996-1997), supra n.17, p.890.  
150 Wolff (1999), supra n.11, p. 111. 
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the exploited person is unsatisfied by this inequality in values exchanged, and would 
choose not to exchange at these terms if he or she were aware of this and the choice in 
question were available.’151 In this context, he suggests that it is sufficient for force to 
be equivalent to an individual having ‘the range of acceptable or reasonable options 
restricted in such a way that it leaves [the individual] with no real choice’ as they find 
that they are unable to change their circumstances due to a lack of alternative options.152 
We build upon Attas’ elaboration of consent by suggesting that such an argument can 
be interpreted as compulsion, manifesting as a consensual agreement, but ultimately 
leading to an interpretation of the unequal exchange as quasi-consensual. We have seen 
the effect of quasi-consensual unequal exchanges in the first part of the thesis and this 
is also an issue that arises in the findings of the file study. 
 
A brief overview of the Marxist distinction between unfree and free workers 
will shed some light on the interconnectedness between compulsion and consent. Two 
forms of compulsion are identified: legal and economic. Legal compulsion may be 
applied directly by the State in the form of a corvée, or indirectly, by means of lump-
sum taxes on productive abilities. In both cases, the political authority has a legal title 
to the agent’s productive ability. Economic compulsion is a less straightforward notion. 
It assumes that the agent is legally free to dispose of their time and abilities but 
possesses insufficient sources of non-labour income to be able to subsist without 
working.153  Therefore, the inability for workers to exercise meaningful bargaining 
power over their labour conditions due to their socio-economic status and/or their 
political status can be viewed as forced exchange, but it may well be that the situation 
is consensual, hence the articulation of a quasi consensual unequal exchange. 154 
Economic compulsion has also been articulated by Synder as the “demeaning choice” 
of an individual where the voluntariness of an individual is put into question when the 
exploitative interactions are degrading towards individuals, as it does not offer 
sufficient progress towards a decent minimum of human functioning. 155  The 
compulsion to ‘accept an offer that improves the exploitee’s human functioning 
	
151 Attas (2000) supra n.106, p. 75 
152 Attas (2000) supra n.106, p. 75 
153 Carver (1987), supra n.20, p.85. 
154 For practical application of the quasi-consensual unequal exchange literature has explored the plight of guestworkers is an 
example that is in literature to demonstrate the unequal exchange, that could be tantamount to exploitation, as a result of less 
bargaining power derived from legal status see Garcia, R., ‘Labor as Property: Guestworkers, International Trade, and the 
Democracy Deficit’, (2006) The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 10, 27-65; Attas (2000) supra n.106; Mayer (Spring, 2005), 
supra n.64; Walzer, M., Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 59.  
155 Synder (2013), supra n.64, p. 347. See also Sample and degradation.  
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insufficiently’ also impacts on their ability to protest against their mistreatment and 
structural change toward more just conditions. 156  The individual’s “surface 
endorsement” of a demeaning choice is contended to be problematic as it not only 
demonstrates an ‘acquiescence to a degraded state of life’ but it also ‘leaves the 
exploited party without some of these necessary goods, but also because it removes the 
excuse of force or coercion present in other degraded interactions.’157  
 
Ultimately, the lack of alternatives experienced by many who enter into a 
mutually advantageous exploitative transaction impacts upon the extent to which 
interventions are made to remedy the morally wrong exploitation, in recognition of the 
fact that the exploited party is nevertheless gaining from the situation. Nevertheless, the 
“coercion of economic necessity” arising from poverty necessarily limits the choices 
available, resulting in decision-making based upon the least-worse option.158 It is for 
this reason, that we propose the application of a variation of Wertheimer’s objective 
market price (see Section 3 & Section 5) to contemporary labour exploitation. It is 
common for exploited foreign workers to exercise their agency and consent to working 
conditions that are not in compliance with the labour standards of the country where 
the exploitation takes place. As a result, individual workers do not always recognise 
that their situation amounts to exploitation as the conditions are better than that of their 
country of origin, as we will see in later chapters (Chapters 9 & 11).  
 
The application of Wertheimer’s objective market test emphasises the 
importance of the legal and policy framework of the standards of the country of 
destination (equivalent to the well informed or unpressured buyer) as the benchmark 
for assessing exploitation and not those of the country of origin.159 Inevitably, the 
application of objective tests must be cognisant of a possible conflict between the 
autonomy of the worker to make choices provided by the flexibility of the market and 
the protection of worker’s rights, requiring a balancing exercise that does not 
undermine the autonomy of worker. We will discuss later on in more detail the 
challenge of balancing the protection of rights of migrant workers in a market economy 
	
156 Synder (2013), supra n.64, p. 347 & p. 350. 
157 Synder (2013), supra n.64, p. 353. 
158 Zwolinski (Oct, 2007), supra n.88, p. 692. 
159 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Severe labour exploitation: workers moving within or into the European 
Union States’ obligations and victims’ rights, June 2015p.12. 
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with the need to ensure that a paternalistic interventionist approach does not impede the 
autonomy of the worker (see Section 7 tolerance of exploitation).160 For now, we will 
move to the substantive conditions that will be of use when determining whether or not 
the procedural conditions such as taking unfair advantage and consent do in fact amount 
to a defect on the structural or relational interaction. 
5. The outcome of an exploitative exchange as (mutually) beneficial (Condition 
V) 
 
For the stronger party, the intended outcome of an unequal exchange is the accrual of a 
benefit. The purpose of obtaining a benefit is an essential condition of exploitation. 
However, the extent to which the purpose is achieved is non-essential. For instance, it 
is not necessary for the envisaged benefit or gain to have materialised, and in such 
circumstances, does not preclude the possibility of identifying the situation as 
exploitative. Similarly, where a benefit has materialised, it does not have to be 
disproportionate or excessive.  
 
Where a benefit as been accrued, Wertheimer’s calculation of the “hypothetical 
fair market price” can once again be applied in order to calculate the substantive 
fairness.161 The calculation will not only be based upon the outcome but also the 
conditions under which the transaction took place, according to the “zone of 
agreement,” the outer boundaries of which are:  
 
A’s actual reservation price (the minimum price the party would be willing to accept 
and depends upon the knowledge of the market price etc.) and A’s morally justified 
reservation price (the highest amount that they will ask). It is important to note that the 
morally justified reservation price is a baseline and not a ceiling, therefore how much 
more than the baseline one may take without exploiting the other party depends on the 
scope of the bargaining zone or zone of agreement.162  
 
We agree with Valdman that the benefits must equate to the same benefits that 
would have been received had the transaction been concluded with someone in a 
	
160 Van de Leun (2011), supra n.128, p.437-438. 
161 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47, p. 232. 
162 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47, p. 214 
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position of equality and as a result is considered to be rational, informed, and could 
reasonably refuse the offer. 163 
 
It is also important to note, once again, that it is also possible for the exploited 
party to have gained from the unequal exchange (see mutually advantageous 
exploitation) and, therefore, it is not essential for an exploited party to be worse-off. 
Therefore, we make a distinction between a mutually advantageous unequal exchange 
and mutually advantageous exploitation as, in the case of the latter, the benefit is 
accompanied by a detriment, to which we will now turn. 
6. A detriment as the key distinction between unequal exchange and exploitation 
(Condition VI) 
 
Whilst harm is one possible outcome of an exploitative transaction, it is not essential. 
Such an approach is recognised by many theorists and recognises the subtle outcomes 
of exploitation, as Wolff writes:  
 
To be an exploiter is to use another’s circumstances to obtain their actual compliance 
with a situation without having sufficient regard to whether that situation violates 
fairness, flourishing, or suffering norms. To be exploited is to be treated in this way, 
whether or not actual harm is suffered. [Emphasis added] 164   
 
The above citation is not only illustrative of the non-essential requirement of 
harm, but it also reiterates the discussion regarding the agency of the individual and 
highlights the variety of ways in which the outcome can be to the detriment of the 
exploited party due to the exploiter failing to adhere to their ‘moral obligation not to 
extract excessive benefits from people who cannot, or cannot reasonably, refuse our 
offers.’ 165  The latter point here converges with the legal analysis that places an 
emphasis on the lack of alternative choices leading to a difficulty to change their 
circumstances (see Section 1, Chapter 4). Whilst the difficulty to change their 
circumstances is derived from an imbalance of bargaining power and voluntariness (see 
	
163 Valdman (2009), supra n.42, p. 12-13. 
164 Wolff (1999), supra n.11, p.115.  
165 Valdman (2009), supra n.42, p. 3 
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consent above), there is also a detriment: namely the continuation of the exploitation 
due to an impossibility to change their status (as illustrated by the Chowdury case in 
Part I). As mentioned before, a position of vulnerability or inequality must be assessed 
in order to determine the impact of the exploitation (the detriment). Overall, the 
exploitation theories we have discussed greatly differ with regard to the types of 
advantages or inequalities deemed unexploitable, leading to a distinction between those 
theorists that use fairness as a measure of exploitation on the one hand and the impact 
on the individual’s dignity on the other hand. 
 
First of all, regardless of the detriment encountered, some theorists, such as 
Wertheimer, assess the outcome of the situation by attributing it to the notion of 
fairness. However, unlike the emphasis on transactional specific fairness as a 
procedural element of exploitation, the understanding of fairness relates to substantive 
fairness. Here, Wertheimer draws upon the Marxist contribution principle that 
considers “fair” the distribution of any surplus value produced. Exactly how the 
distribution should occur in order to be fair is not easily calculated; as such a 
distribution should reflect the parties’ contributions to the social surplus: the principle 
of contribution. However, the ‘difficulties in the way of measuring an individual’s 
contribution in an interdependent system do not show that the concept of an individuals’ 
contribution is incoherent. They do suggest that the principle of contribution is unlikely 
to provide a stable basis for fair transactions upon which parties could reasonably 
concur.’ 166 In the legal understanding of labour exploitation, the notion of decent work 
and the conditions attached to decent work are considered as a baseline for fairness and 
could be considered also as criterion for the implementation of the contribution 
principle. Where these conditions are not met, then they are indicative of both 
procedural and substantive unfairness, as it can be that both the conditions are 
misrepresented in the transaction, resulting in the actual working conditions being in 
non-conformity with the minimum standards. 
 
For other theorists, such as Wood, Mayer and Sample, any moral assessment 
premised upon fairness is limited for determining the outcome of the unequal exchange 
on the exploited party. 167  As a result, rather than seeking to identify a tangible 
	
166 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47, p. 229 
167 Mayer (2002), supra n.7, p. 339-340.  
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disadvantage, fairness has been set aside leading to a shift away from a distributive-
justice approach that is advocated by those who consider the threshold of exploitation 
to be premised upon the material outcome, identified as either unfair advantage or 
undeserved loss. Instead, the focus is on the impact on the individual’s dignity. For 
instance, Wood argues that exploitation is humiliating and degrading but not 
necessarily unfair. Here, exploitation is understood as a beneficial ‘playing on some 
weakness or vulnerability.’168 Similarly, whilst Sample accepts that exploitation is an 
action that is taken for the sake of further advantage, the focus is on the use of another 
person to advance one’s ends.169 Rather than unfairness being the moral element of 
exploitation, Sample suggests that the principal feature for determining the wrong of 
exploitation lies in the inherent lack of respect for others (degradation) and in particular 
the disrespectful use of their genuine need (vulnerability) that is used for the sake of 
advantage. 170 We will consider this further in the file study where Belgian domestic 
law has placed significant emphasis on certain working conditions as an affront to 
human dignity as the key point of departure for assessing the detriment in labour 
exploitation (see Chapters 8 & Chapter 9).  
 
Importantly, the presence of a detriment to the exploited party is a crucial 
condition, that requires an assessment on an objective basis. Its presence is therefore 
essential whereas, by contrast, as we highlighted in the previous section, the fulfilment 
of the first substantive condition (a benefit) is not essential to classifying a situation as 
exploitation. The purpose of engaging in the unequal exchange is the envisaged benefit. 
However, it is not essential for the benefit to materialise and, indeed, it is possible for 
the benefit to be mutual.  
 
We have discussed the latter point of mutually advantageous exploitation in both 
the context of procedural conditions – in relation to consent - as well as in the discussion 
regarding the substantive outcome being beneficial to both parties. It is on this point 
that we now turn to a caveat that we must acknowledge: the tolerance of exploitation. 
Regardless of the articulation of the conditions of exploitation, is it possible that in 
	
168 Wood, A., ‘What is exploitation?’ (1995) Social Philosophy and Policy 12(2), 136–158pp. 146, 151– 154 & see reference to 
Wood in Furner (2015) supra n.121. 
169 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 14-15. 
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certain circumstances and, in light of the possible benefits to the weaker party, there are 
some instances in which exploitation should be tolerated?  
7. A caveat to the conditions of exploitation: tolerating exploitation as a lesser 
evil?  
 
If the unfairness is modest, and the transaction produces significantly better 
consequences for the disadvantaged party than the likely alternative, we ought to 
tolerate the exploitation as a lesser evil. Prohibiting the exchange will do more harm 
than good, especially for the one who is vulnerable. Sometimes exploitation is the 
lesser evil [emphasis added].171 
 
Robert Mayer’s citation summises a key caveat to any attempt of articulating the key 
conditions of exploitation: the tolerance of exploitation. In particular, when referring to 
situations of mutually advantageous exploitation, individuals are free to enter such 
relationships where the result may well be unfair but ultimately the transaction produces 
significantly better consequences for the disadvantaged party than the likely alternative. 
It may be that prohibiting the exchange will do more harm than good, especially for the 
one who is vulnerable and as a result, exploitation may occur where in spite of the 
wrongful character, it is morally permissible when all other countervailing 
considerations are taken into account.172 Howver, the tolerance of exploitation is not 
absolute and, as Mayer describes, will only be accepted where: i) the exploitation is 
modest, not severe, and ii) this exploitation significantly enhances the well-being of the 
exploited party compared to the most likely clean-hands alternative. 173 Goodin stresses 
that the tolerance of exploitation does not mean that any objections premised upon 
morality or fairness are completely discarded, instead such objections are overridden.174 
Where the possibility of being exploited is better than the alternative, 175 then it is 




171 Mayer (Spring, 2005), supra n.64, p. 328. 
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173 Mayer (Spring, 2005), supra n.64, p. 327-329. 
174 Goodin (1987), supra n.30, p. 173. 
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Globalisation, as highlighted by Sample, has had an impact on such tolerance 
of exploitation. Whilst in and of itself it is not inherently exploitative; some globalising 
processes create exploitation. Thus, there is a balance to be struck between those cases 
that are so morally wrong that they must be prohibited, and those exploitative 
interactions that do not always warrant interference because they improve the situations 
of both parties, and interaction on less exploitative terms may not be forthcoming.177 
Indeed, this understanding of exploitation complicates the moral analysis of 
globalisation. 178  However, it is important to note that even prior to globalisation, 
exploitation was tolerated in pre-capitalist societies. Indeed, Sample highlights the 
societal endorsement of exploitation in relation to the promotion of slavery  which was 
a socially acceptable convention prior to its global prohibition.179 Society’s recognition 
of the legitimacy of exploitative practices renders prohibition, social sanction or 
codification of exploitation and oppression as norms a complex task180 as ‘exploitative 
interactions are systematically favoured and promoted […] as normal.’ 181  
 
Using the conditions listed in this chapter, we identify three situations that can 
determine whether or not law or policy should intervene in a particular situation of 
exploitation according to the moral value of the situation: i) strategic intervention ii) 
non-worseness and iii) non-paternalistic intervention. 
 
First of all, strategic intervention presumes that a mutually advantageous and 
consensual agreement should be permitted even when it is exploitative, precisely 
because the moral force of exploitation is relatively low. 182 Wertheimer explains that 
where strategic intervention occurs, it is often to ensure that the exploitation of B does 
not then lead, ex ante, to the exploitation of a class of B’s. For instance, the prohibition 
of B from accepting a subminimum wage, even though it may be a mutually 
advantageous transaction, seeks to ensure that other members of the class of B’s will 
	
177 See also discussion in the context of irregular migration and those individuals who exercise agency to remain in an irregular 
position in Oudejans, N., ‘The Right not to Have Rights: A New Perspective on Irregular Immigration’ (2019) Political Theory 
1–28. 
178 Sample (2003), supra n.3, p. 132. 
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180 Laycock, H., ‘Exploitation Via Labour Power In Marx’, (1999) The Journal of Ethics 3, 121–131, p. 125.  
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182 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47, p. 296; Mayer (Spring, 2005), supra n.64, p. 328. 
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not be employed for a subminimum wage.183 The strategic argument for the prohibition 
of mutually advantageous exploitation applies only when the prohibition is, in fact, 
beneficial to B, ex ante, as when A would otherwise be able to exploit a monopoly 
position vis-à-vis (a class of) B.184 
 
In the Redistribution Model, exploitation is an inherent feature of capitalist society. 
Therefore, the tolerance of exploitation by way of strategic intervention is characterised 
by prohibition of exploitation through legal regulation, but due to a lack of enforcement 
(non-interference), the practices are nevertheless supported (tolerated) politically, 
legally and in society, as highlighted by Haynes:  
 
We feel that it is "wrong" to exploit people, and so we pass laws to punish the 
wrongdoers and to protect their victims. But we rarely apply the laws, rarely advertise 
their existence to those in need, and sometimes criminalise those who attempt to access 
them. 185  
 
The adherence of societies to the free-market political economy means that the 
tolerance of exploitation is justified precisely because of the presumed improvement to 
their (economic) well-being. The danger is that law and policy wholly apply strategic 
intervention and do not consider the option of perfectionist intervention. Or where a 
perfectionist interventionist position is adopted to tackling exploitation of labour (e.g. 
UK Modern Slavery law and policy) any added value is diminished as the result of 
conflicting policies that adopt strategic intervention (e.g. UK immigration policy) to 
tackling illegal working. Such an approach fails to take into consideration that a non-
exploitative job would be more likely were access to the labour market facilitated by 
regular migration channels. One justification for such a varied response is that there is 
very often a lack of awareness and understanding of the reality of labour exploitation 
that leads to a reinforcement of stereotypical understandings of human trafficking (as 
we have discussed in Section 2.2 of Chapter 1). Where such conflicting policy measures 
	
183 Note that Wertheimer stresses that strategic intervention is not watertight, as it may mean that strategic intervention may 
sometimes work to the detriment of the “worst-off”. This may occur in labour markets e.g. minimum wage example. Consumer 
markets where contractual terms, safe product etc. price out the market those who would prefer harsher contractual terms (and 
lower price) or a substandard product to getting nothing at all, Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47, p. 301.  
184 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47, p. 303. 
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exists, the legal framework must be robust and clear enough to challenge such 
misrepresentations.    
 
Second, non-worseness (or dirty hands) is also applicable to the non-
interference of exploitation in accordance with the Basic Needs Model.186 Here, the 
choice of the exploited party to accept less benefit from the transaction than is deserved 
is, according to Synder, considered to be a rational one given the lack of preferable 
options. The acceptance of exploitation is based on the fact that condemnation of a 
(voluntary) interaction that leaves the exploitee better off than they would have been 
had the so-called exploiter never entered into the interaction at all. The non-worseness 
claim challenges the idea that it can be morally worse for an individual A to make a 
mutually beneficial offer to an individual B, if A is not obligated to make any offer to 
B at all. The non-worseness claim revisits the obligations that are placed on individuals 
to help others in need: the need to discharge a duty of beneficence. The threshold for 
discharging such a duty should be premised on the standard that a transaction, which 
may well confer some benefit, does not benefit one party sufficiently from the 
perspective of what is owed morally to that person. 187  
 
Third, the tolerance of exploitation may also be justifiable on the basis of non-
paternalistic intervention. Here Zwolinski describes non-paternalism as a way of 
showing respect for the autonomy of workers’ freedom to choose their working 
conditions, whilst acknowledging that even a worker loses some of their rights as a 
consequence of the exercise of their autonomy of choice. Any limitation to their 
autonomy must safeguard against an overbearing paternalism. Prior to any interference 
with the worker’s autonomy, an assessment of the context is needed in order to 
determine the extent to which intervention measures are proportionate in accordance 
with the circumstances must be carried out. Notwithstanding this, such tolerance is not 
	
186 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.47. 
187 NB Synder also discusses the distinction between exploitation and neglect, the moral obligation that is placed on individuals to 
help others in need extends beyond the exploitation model. Both are morally reprehensible but equally can be subjected to the non-
worseness claim.  
And Synder discusses the distinction between, i) the person who does nothing to help those around him (the negligent person); ii) 
the person who partially discharges these obligations through mutually beneficial transactions (the exploiter); iii) the person who 
engages in some generally beneficent actions or takes some steps toward discharging a general political responsibility. Here there 
is a sliding scale of “morally worse behavior”, and it is for the non-worseness claim to determine the position the “middle man” 
faces with regards to the moral compass of the situation. See Synder (2013), supra n.64, p. 348-350.  
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absolute and may only be justified in certain circumstances. Ultimately, the burden of 
proof should shift to those who wish to intervene to provide a justification. 188  
 
Finally, the tolerance of exploitation accepts the fluid nature of exploitation, 
recognising that there are lesser, moderate, and severe forms of exploitation. However, 
the impact of this understanding on the conceptualisation of exploitation will be that 
the “grey” area between non-exploitation and exploitation that is even more difficult to 
clarify. Whilst the tolerance of exploitation advocates for the immorality of the 
exploitation to be overlooked (not erased or cancelled) due to the fact that the 
exploitation is the lesser of two evils, this should not detract from attempts to clarify 
the conceptual nature of exploitation.  
8. Concluding remarks 
 
By using the typology of exploitation theories presented in Chapter 5 and reflecting on 
the synergies between the theoretical analysis in this Part and the legal analysis in Part 
I, we have, in this chapter begun to shift towards a conceptual clarification of 
exploitation; as it might relate to labour exploitation. We categorised the process of 
exploitation into three stages: background, procedural, and substantive; and outlined 
the conditions that are required for each stage: imbalance of bargaining power, position 
of inequality, taking unfair advantage, nonessential defective consent, (mutual) benefit 
and detriment. These conditions of exploitation individually do not amount to 
exploitation. However, cumulatively they may be indicative of exploitation.  
 
Thus, we begin to see the interconnected nature of the conditions of 
exploitation. They are not to be considered in isolation but cumulatively. Indeed, an 
imbalance of bargaining power alone does not amount to exploitation, the stronger 
party must act in such a way that the inequality is taken advantage of with a view to 
obtaining a benefit, at the expense of the weaker party, leading to an outcome which 
violates their human dignity. 
 
	
188 Zwolinski discusses the plight of sweatshop workers to choose their profession, based on a need to survive. Zwolinski (Oct., 
2007), supra n.88, p. 692 -696. 
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Finally, we recognise that a conceptualisation of exploitation must also be aware 
of the tolerance of exploitation, that does not seek to discard the moral wrong of 
















PART III – Labour exploitation in the criminal law of Belgium and 








CHAPTER 7 - Composition and contetxualisation of the file study of 








0. Introduction and structure of the chapter  
 
In the first part of this thesis, we demonstrate that the principal objective of the research 
– the understanding of exploitation in law – is, to date, a matter of legal study that has 
evoked conflicting responses. As already announced, the expository review and 
analysis of the state-of-the-art legal understanding of labour exploitation in Part I and 
the exploratory review of exploitation theory in Part II form the basis for the 
development and framing of the research design for the comparative file study in 
Belgium and England & Wales - the object of enquiry in this present part of the thesis.  
 
In Section 1 of this chapter, we outline the analytical framework that provides 
a tool that can discern the understanding and handling of the law in practice in criminal 
cases of labour exploitation in Belgium and England & Wales. We present, in Section 
2, the composition of the file study and in Section 3 we describe aspects of the file study 
in order to inform the comparative analysis in subsequent chapters. In Section 4, we 
will set the scene for the following chapters by discussing the role of the two principal 
actors who are responsible for ensuring a consistent and effective implementation of 
international and regional obligations into the domestic criminal legal framework: the 
legislature and the judiciary.  
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Belgium and England & Wales are both destination countries for victims of 
human trafficking.1 Belgium is also increasingly considered as a transit country.2 In 
addition to the transnational nature of the phenomenon, both countries have identified 
an increase in the number of nationals who are exploited in the labour market.3 In 
Belgium exploitation is taking place in the following sectors: hospitality and 
construction, as well as cleaning services, horticulture and agriculture.4 In England & 
Wales, the economic sectors identified as being at risk of exploitation, include those 
low-paid sectors such as domestic service, care, agriculture, cleaning, hospitality and 
construction.5  
Year Belgium6 England & Wales 
No. of prosecutions7 No. of referrals8 No. of prosecutions9 No. of referrals10 
2010 21 Not available Not available Not available 
2011 52 165 Not available Not available 
2012 32 164 89 393 
2013 46 184 79 820 
2014 49 115 86 1093 
2015 79 124 61 1605 
2016 69 112 62 2034 
2017 143 116 65 2840 
	
1 GRETA, Report concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human 
Beings by Belgium, First evaluation round, Strasbourg, 25 September 2013, GRETA (2013) 14, p. 10. 
2 GRETA, Report concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human 
Beings by Belgium, Second evaluation round, Strasbourg, 16 November 2017, GRETA (2017) 26, p.7.  
3 GRETA (2013), supra n.1, p. 10; GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p.7. 
4 See GRETA (2013), supra n.1, p. 10; GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p.7. 
5 GRETA, Report concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human 
Beings by the United Kingdom, First evaluation round, Strasbourg, 12 September 2012, GRETA (2012) 6, p. 30 and p.83, GRETA, 
Report concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings by the 
United Kingdom, Second evaluation round, Strasbourg, 7 October 2016, GRETA (2016)1, p. 24. 
6 In Belgium, as there are no harmonised data sets, the following statistics are from the Police General National Database (GND) 
and the Social Inspectorate of the Federal Public Service of Social Security for all recorded human trafficking violations. Myria - 
Belgian Federal Migration Centre, Rapport Annuel 2017 En ligne_ (2017).  
7 Evolution of the number of cases referred to the prosecutor’s office, including the federal office: For 2011see Centre fédéral pour 
l’analyse des flux migratoires, la protection des droits fondamentaux des étrangers et la lutte contre la traite des êtres humains, 
Rapport annuel traite et trafic des êtres humains 2011: L’argent qui compte (2011), p.136; For 2012-2016: Myria (2017), supra 
n.6, p. 136; For 2018 see Myria - Belgian Federal Migration Centre, Rapport annuel traite et trafic des êtres humains 2018: 
Mineurs en danger majeur (2018), p. 142. 
8 Human trafficking victims referred to the NRM. For 2011 see Centre fédéral pour l’analyse des flux migratoires, la protection 
des droits fondamentaux des étrangers et la lutte contre la traite des êtres humains (2011), supra n.7, pp128-131; For 2012-2017 
see Myria (2018), supra n.7, p. 137 & p. 139. 
9 For data on number of decisions to prosecute in England & Wales not including human trafficking for sexual exploitation from 
2010-2011 see HM Government, First annual report of the Inter-Departmental Ministerial Group on Human Trafficking (2010-
2011), p. 32; For 2012-2013 see HM Government, Second report of the Inter‑Departmental Ministerial Group on Human 
Trafficking (2012-2013), p.26; For 2014-2016 see HM Government, 2017 UK Annual Report on Modern Slavery (2017), p. 19; 
For 2017 see HM Government, 2018 UK Annual Report on Modern Slavery (2018), p. 19; HL, Short Debate: Immigration: Migrant 
Workers 27 October 2009 Vol 713, Col 1152; HC, Modern Slavery Bill, Second Reading, 8 July 2014, Col 188. 
10 National Referral Mechanism Statistics referring to total number of adults and minors referred to NRM for labor exploitation 
and domestic servitude see National Crime Agency, National referral mechanism statistics end of year summary 2013 (20 January 
2014); National Crime Agency, National referral mechanism statistics end of year summary 2015 (11 February 2016); National 
Crime Agency, National referral mechanism statistics end of year summary 2016 (7 April 2017); National Crime Agency, National 
referral mechanism statistics end of year summary 2017 (26 March 2018); National Crime Agency, National referral mechanism 
statistics end of year summary 2018 (23 March 2019).  
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Table 3: Number of referrals and prosecutions for labour exploitation offences in England & Wales 
and Belgium (2010-2017) 
 
The above table shows that both countries have a marked increase in the number 
of labour exploitation cases in terms of identified victims of trafficking and for them, 
in the case of England & Wales, forced labour, slavery and servitude. Nevertheless, the 
difference in prosecutions of criminal offences related to labour exploitation in the two 
case studies is stark in contrast. 
 
1. Research design  
 
Building on the methodology outlined in the Introduction of the thesis, we will briefly 
present the analytical framework (see Annex 1 for full outline) which will be used for 
the data collection and analysis process (see Sections 2.2 & 2.3). The analytical 
framework for the comparative analysis of the file study has been developed following 
the expository review and analysis of the state-of-the-art legal understanding of labour 
exploitation in Part I and the exploratory review of exploitation theory in Part II.  
 
The structure of the framework is premised upon the conditions of exploitation 
in Chapter 6, where we identified three stages of the exploitation process: background, 
procedural and substantive. The features of exploitation are then further developed in 
accordance with the findings from the analysis of the constituent elements of the 
definitions of labour exploitation in international and regional law as well as the 
features that have emerged from the legal analysis (Chapters 1- 4) and the typology of 
exploitation theory (Chapter 5). Overall, the analytical framework is reflective of the 
wide range of factors used by the judges to assist with their adjudication of cases. 
 
The first section of the analytical framework refers to two background 
conditions. The position of vulnerability and/or inequality (condition I) and 
imbalance of bargaining power (condition II). Here the focus is upon the background 
circumstances of the individual including any vulnerabilities that may place them in a 
weaker position. The factors that could indicate possible risk factors or vulnerabilities 
are developed from those that already exist in law and theory. These are then further 
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assessed in accordance with the status of the relationship between the two parties, 
whether pre-existing or not. These factors can assist with the determination of the 
imbalance of bargaining power between the two parties that arise from a position of 
inequality.  
 
The second section of the analytical framework refers to two procedural 
conditions. Taking unfair advantage (condition III) and consent (condition IV). 
Here the emphasis is on the role of the exploiter and their attitude towards the exploited 
party. In particular, we focus on the means of control over person’s capacity or 
resources. The means are developed from the existing legal frameworks including the 
international human trafficking definition, the ILO forced labour indicators and other 
factors that emerged from the desktop research in Part I. The impact of this control is 
then considered from the perspective of the (in)voluntariness of the exploited party – a 
key feature that we have seen emerge in the legal definitions of exploitation and in the 
literature of exploitation theory. Here a number of different aspects are considered that 
reflect the diversity of the role of consent in an exploitative situation, and in particular 
the factors that could compel an individual to accept exploitative working conditions, 
such as a lack of alternative and lack of resources. Finally, the living and working 
conditions themselves are factual circumstances that are indicative of whether or not 
exploitation has occurred. Here again, we build upon the indicators that have been 
developed alongside the international and regional legal frameworks and case law.  
 
The third section of the analytical framework considers the two final substantive 
conditions, the (mutual) benefit (condition V) and detriment (condition VI). These 
conditions are reflective of the exploration of exploitation theory in literature whereby 
it emerges that both parties can accrue a benefit, even though it does not have to be 
realised and may only be a perceived benefit. For exploitation to have emerged, there 
must be a detriment to the exploited part that can amount to a number of different things, 
including harm, an affront to human dignity, lack of respect, degradation or even lack 




2. Composition of the file study 
 
The adoption of an empirical approach to the law lends itself to a systematic gathering, 
describing and analysis of the criminalisation and judicial application of labour 
exploitation in the two comparative jurisdictions: i) Belgium and ii) England & Wales.  
 
In Belgium, the analysis considers the offence of trafficking for the purpose 
of economic exploitation prohibited under Article 443quinquies Criminal Code and 
modified by the Law of 29 April 2013.  
 
In England & Wales, the analysis focuses upon trafficking people for labour 
exploitation, introduced in Section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of 
Claimants etc) Act 2004 replaced by Section 2 Modern Slavery Act 2015. In addition, 
three standalone offences of holding another person in slavery, holding another 
person in servitude and requiring another person to perform forced or compulsory 
labour, first criminalised under Section 71 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and replaced 
by Section 1 Modern Slavery Act 2015 will be considered.  
 
In the remainder of this section we will provide insight into the sample of the 
file study including the timeframe and sample size (Section 2.1), the process of data 
collection and analysis (Sections 2.2 & 2.3) and the limitations of the file study (Section 
2.4). In particular, whilst the criminal legal framework and its implementation is the 
principal focus, we acknowledge that there are alternative explanations for the 
differences in the approach to labour exploitation e.g. inquisitorial v common law – 
role of the judge etc that do not hinder the comparative approach but in fact offer insight 
into the real-world application of the law.11  
 
2.1. Sample  
 
A contextual approach requires investigation of sources beyond the black-letter law, 
however it is not feasible, based upon practical constraints such as time and resources, 
	
11 Lawless, R.M., Robbennolt, J. K., & Ulen, T. S., (eds) Empirical Methods in Law, 2nd Edition, (Aspen Select Series, 2016), 
p.33. 
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to achieve a state of omniscience. 12  Therefore, by using a purposive sampling 
approach13 - timeframe, types of offence on indictment and, in Belgium, language 
restrictions - the research considers the information recorded by the courts.14 Whilst 
such an approach to the sampling has the benefit of being drawn from real world 
sources; limitations do arise regarding different levels of access to the data sources. For 





Recent law reform in both case studies generates an opportunity to discern the impact 
of the change in practice. However we acknowledge that such changes take time to 
implement  and their effects may be slow to manifest themselves. 15  The sample 
considers criminal cases where the judgment was handed down between January 2010 
and December 2017. Crucially, the selected timeframe is representative, in both 
jurisdictions, of domestic legal reforms to the criminalisation of labour exploitation. In 
Belgium, significant amendments were made to the Criminal Code in the Law of 29 
April 2013, that sought to provide clarification to the meaning and scope of overall 
trafficking offence, but also for trafficking for economic exploitation (see Chapter 8).16 
In England & Wales, two reforms are of significance, first in 2010 with the entry into 
force of standalone offences and again in 2015 with the consolidation of the criminal 
law offences prohibiting labour exploitation (see Chapter 8). 17 
 
The choice of the timeframe provides a state-of-the-art overview of the 




12 Palmer, V. V., ‘From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’, (2005) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 53, 261, p288. 
13 Selected by the researcher as being particularly informative. 
14 Lawless et al (2016), supra n.11, p.56. 
15 Lawless et al (2016), supra n.11, p.35. 
16 Huberts, C., & Minet, J.-F., ‘La loi du 29 avril 2013 visant à modifier l’article 433quinquies du Code pénal en vue de clarifier et 
d’étendre la définition de la traite des êtres humains: analyse et mise en perspective’ (2014) Revue de Droit Pénal de de 
Criminologie, 34, p. 6.  
17 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (Commencement No. 4, Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2010; The Modern 
Slavery Act 2015 (Commencement No. 1, Saving and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2015. 
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2.1.2. Sample size  
 
A total of 72 cases are analysed: 25 in England & Wales and 47 in Belgium (see Annex 
2 for a full list of the cases). As can be seen from Table 1 found in the introduction of 
this Chapter, the sample does not comprise all cases of labour exploitation in the 
timeframe. The identification of the sample was a twofold process. We first undertook 
a mapping exercise to identify criminal cases where the first instance proceedings had 
completed between January 2010 and December 2017; and where at least one of the 
relevant offences was included in the indictment. 18 Following the mapping exercise, 
the final sample was selected according to relevance, accessibility, and linguistic skills 
of the researcher. 
  
In England & Wales, since the cases are not reported and the transcripts of first 
instance cases are not publicly available, we identified in the mapping exercise 29 
criminal cases where at least one of the criminal offences prohibiting labour 
exploitation were included in the indictment. The mapping exercise used LawPages to 
identify the case number of the first instance cases and Westlaw database to identify 
the appellate cases. In order to analyse these cases, we requested research access from 
Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to access all 29 cases. The request for 
research access to all 29 cases was submitted on 3 November 2017 and was granted on 
27 April 2018 for a period of six months (30 April 2018 - 31 October 2018). The 
research access included 23 of the cases identified in the mapping exercise, as six files 
could not be found (UK2, UK10, UK11, UK13, UK18, UK26). Finally, the Ministry of 
Justice also made the researcher aware of two new cases where the trial had concluded 
towards the end of 2017 (UK30, UK31). The case files were accessed at the following 
Crown Courts: Bristol, Cardiff, Croydon, Harrow, Leeds, Luton, Manchester, 
Manchester Minshull Street, Newcastle, Nottingham, Oxford, Portsmouth, Preston, 
Southampton, Southwark, St Albans, and Woolwich.  The content of the court files 
varied, but in most instances they included documents related to the preliminary 
hearing, submission of defence and prosecution counsel skeleton arguments and 
transcripts of interviews with defendants and complainants. A total of 25 cases were 
	
18 A mapping exercise was undertaken for both jurisdictions, in order to ensure that the sample was as representative as possible: 
Mapping of labour exploitation criminal cases in Belgium (2010-2017), February 2018 and Mapping of labour exploitation criminal 
cases in England & Wales (2010-2017), March 2018 (on file with author).  
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analysed, however it is important to note that following access to the UK29 file, it 
emerged that the case related to sexual exploitation and not labour exploitation.  
 
In Belgium, we identified 94 cases in the mapping exercise, however due to 
linguistic restrictions, only cases from the francophone community were retained (47 
in total). The judgments of these 47 cases are publicly available from the website of the 
National Rapporteur.19  
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL 
Belgium 6 3 3 10 7 11 5 2 47 
England & 
Wales 
0 1 4 4 1 4 4 7 25 
Table 4: List of cases analysed in Belgium and England & Wales between 2010-2017 
 
Demographic of victims/civil parties   
In Belgium, the sample consists of 125 civil parties. In 19 cases, at least one of the civil 
parties was a representative organisation such as the Interfederal Migration Centre, the 
specialised human trafficking organisations or a trade union (24).20 A total of 101 
human trafficking victims were included as civil parties in the sample (73 male and 28 
females, including 1 minor). In one case, a specialised centre providing support and 
assistance to victims of human trafficking stood as civil party on behalf of two child 
trafficking victims (BE42). The majority of civil parties are third country nationals (87), 
with 7 EU nationals and of the remainder, the country of origin is unknown (7). It is to 
be noted, that not all victims will request to be a civil party, so the total number of 
victims of human trafficking listed on the indictments is higher (227). The gender and 
nationality of all victims is not available. In England & Wales, the sample consists of a 
large number of victims, with 81 victims in England & Wales (9 females – including 1 
minor and 72 males – including 1 minor). The majority of victims are either British 
nationals (39) or EU nationals (38). Four victims were third country nationals. 
	
19 Myria - Federal Centre for Migration, Jurisprudence, available at: http://www.myria.be/fr/jurisprudence [last accessed 21 June 
2019]; Myria, Federal Centre for Migration, Annual Reports, available at: 
http://www.myria.be/fr/publications/eyJyZXN1bHRfcGFnZSI6ImZyXC9wdWJsaWNhdGlvbnMiLCJjYXRlZ29yeTpncm91bm
RzIjoiMjMxIiwicmVxdWlyZV9hbGwiOiJjYXRlZ29yeSJ9 [last accessed 21 June 2019]. 
20 BE01, BE03, BE07, BE09, BE10, BE15, BE17, BE19, BE20, BE23, BE26, BE29, BE32, BE36, BE42, BE43, BE44, BE45, 
BE47. 
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Nationality of victims/civil 
parties 
Belgium England & Wales  
EU Nationals  
Hungary  9 
Latvia  2 
Poland  1 22 
Portugal 1  1 
Romania 3 2 
Slovakia 2 2 
United Kingdom  39 
Third Country Nationals 
Albania 1  
Algeria 1  
Bangladesh 1  
Brazil 9  
Bulgaria 3  
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
1  
China 15  
Guinea 1  
India 4  
Indonesia 1  
Kenya 1  
Morocco 30  
Nigeria  1 
Pakistan 1 2 
Philippines 4  
Russia 1  
Tazmania  1 
Togo 1  
Tunisia 2  
Turkey 2  
Yugoslavia 1  
Unknown 7  
Table 5: Nationality of victims and civil parties in Belgium and England & Wales  
 
In relation to the background of those who are exploited, the file study offers a 
stark distinction. In England & Wales, the victims are predominantly British and EU 
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Nationals 21  and where third-country nationals are identified as victims, they have 
entered the UK through legal channels and had a regular residence status before and 
during the exploitative circumstances. In contrast, in Belgium, the majority of the 
victims are third country nationals with irregular migration status, which was also an 




Demographic of defendants  
In Belgium, the sample consists of 139 defendants, of which 31 are legal entities and 
108 are private persons (77 male and 31 female). The nationality of the defendants 
varies greatly, with 24 Belgian nationals (one with dual nationality Morocco/Belgium) 
11 EU nationals (one with dual nationality DRC/Netherlands), 64 non-EU nationals 
(one with dual nationality – Morocco/Kenya) and two unknown. In 27 cases, the 
nationality of at least one of the defendants (42) corresponds to the nationality of at 




21 More generally the vast majority of undocumented migrants do not have access to the tribunal system, as bringing themselves 
to the attention of the authorities will lead to deportation.” Anderson, B., & Rogaly, B., Forced Labour and Migration to the UK, 
Compas, Trade union congress: 2005, p. 51. 
22 GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p.26. It is perhaps important to query the absence of trafficking victims who were regularly residing 
third country nationals in the Belgian sample could also be further investigated, especially since the recent FRA research reveals 
that 60% of the third country nationals were regularly staying in their country of work at the time of exploitation, the 
overrepresentation of irregularly staying third country nationals in the file study perhaps needs further exploration. A task that is 
nevertheless beyond the scope of the current research, see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Protecting migrant 
workers from exploitation in the EU: workers’ perspectives (June 2019), p. 26.  
23 BE04, BE05, BE07, BE08, BE09, BE10, BE11, BE14, BE15, BE19, BE20, BE23, BE24, BE26, BE27, BE28, BE29, BE31, 














In England & Wales, the nationality of the defendants (81 in total, 57 male and 
24 female) is also spread between 44 British nationals, 22 EU nationals and 14 third 
country nationals. For one defendant the nationality is unknown. In 20 cases, the 
nationality of the defendant (61) corresponded to the nationality of at least one of the 
victims (53).24  
 
It is important to note that the number of defendants exceeds the number of 
cases, and the analysis is based upon each case rather than each defendant. 
 
Nationality of defendants Belgium England & Wales  
EU Nationals   
Belgium  24 (1 dual nationality Morocco)  
France 1  
Greece 1  
Hungary  4 
Italy 3  
Latvia   
The Netherlands 1 (dual nationality DRC)  
Poland   11 
Portugal 2  
Romania 2 4 
Slovakia 1 3 
United Kingdom 1 44 
Third Country Nationals 
Albania   
Algeria 2  
	













Bangladesh 1  
Brazil 3  
Bulgaria 1  
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
1  
China 20  
Guinea   
India 1  
Indonesia 1  
Kenya   
Liberia 1  
Morocco 10  
Nigeria 1 2 
Pakistan 2 11 
Philippines   
Russia   
Syria 1  
Tazmania  1 
Togo 1  
Tunisia 1  
Turkey 5  
United Arab Emirates 8  
Yugoslavia 2  
Zaire 1  
Unknown 2 1 
Table 6: Nationality of defendants in Belgium and England & Wales 
 
Outcome of proceedings 
In Belgium, the outcome of the criminal trials led to 94 defendants found guilty of 
human trafficking offence and 13 defendants found not guilty. Three defendants were 
subsequently acquitted on appeal. Of the 94 defendants, 93 were given a custodial 
sentence ranging from 9 months to six years, and one defendant was given 200 hours 
of community service. In many instances, the custodial sentences were accompanied 





In England & Wales, the outcome of the criminal trials led to 55 defendants 
found guilty of human trafficking and/or standalone offences and 21 defendants found 
not guilty. Four defendants did not receive a verdict for various reasons including: the 
prosecution was not continued (2), there was no evidence offered (1) or the defendant 
was removed from the indictment (1). Of the 55 defendants found guilty, all were given 
custodial sentences (suspended in two instances) ranging from 11 months to 15.5 years. 
In many instances, the custodial sentences were accompanied by compensation and 
confiscation orders (27), serious crime prevention order/slavery, trafficking prevention 
orders (16) and a restraining order (1).  
 
2.2. Data collection 
 
In order to facilitate the analysis and comparison with other cases in both jurisdictions, 
we developed a pre-prepared coding template for the purpose of data collection (see 
Annex 3). The template draws heavily on the findings of both law and theory from Part 
I and II and is split into four main parts: the first part allows for collecting the procedural 
and factual elements of the case, the second part draws heavily from the analytical 
framework and focuses upon the judicial weight given to the factual circumstances in 
determining the exploitation according to the three stages developed from the typology 
of the exploitation theory: background, procedural and substantive. The third part takes 
into account any reference to existing legal standards (domestic or supranational) that 
is of significance to the judicial reasoning in the case in question. The fourth and final 
part allows for flexibility should any other factors emerge and have an impact on 













The first version of the coding template was developed following the initial 
legal analysis in Part I and the analysis of exploitation in political theory in Part II, it 
was then updated following finalisation of the methodology and the development of the 
analytical framework. The coding template was then further revised and finalised after 
an initial phase of data collection in Belgium. The coding template ensures a 
systematised and standardised collection of the data which assists with the reliability 
and replicability of the coding stage. In addition, in order to minimise margin of error, 
interim steps such as data collection on paper and then insertion into the coding 
template, have been avoided.25  
 
2.3. Data analysis  
 
The file study analysis uses two classic legal methods:  
 
i) Qualitative content analysis of the case law in each domestic legal 
regime  
The first level of content analysis is premised upon the coding template that is derived 
from the analytical framework. The analysis allows for flexibility so that any key words 
that emerge from the data can be embedded. This first level of analysis determines the 
extent to which the law on the books has been successfully implemented in practice, 
and whether or not the judicial adjudication of the legal framework is in line with the 
drafters’ intentions. In addition, the adoption of this approach also documents trends 
and factors in the case law that appear important to case outcomes. These in turn 
contribute to the process of conceptualising the legal understanding of exploitation and 
the conditions of exploitation (see Chapters 9 and 10).  
 
Content analysis has its limitations, for instance, we cannot treat as accurate and 
complete the facts and reasons given in opinions and, it is not possible to predict the 
outcome of future cases, as other factors such as the personality of the judge as an 
individual must be taken into account. Nevertheless, such analysis can tell us how cases 
have developed and been argued, ultimately describing a more accurate landscape of 
how judges decide and explain their decisions. Whilst it is accepted that content analysis 
	
25 Lawless et al (2016), supra n.11, pp.168-170. 
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‘reaches a thinner understanding of the law than that gained through more reflective 
and subjective interpretive methods,’26 it is envisaged that, overall, such an approach 
will ‘increase internal validity by removing elements of researcher bias and improving 
thoroughness and accuracy.’27 
 
ii) Comparative legal analysis of the two domestic legal regimes  
The domestic case law data set forms the basis of the subsequent comparative legal 
analysis, which as highlighted in the introduction of this chapter, entails a qualitative 
comparative analysis of the national legal orders as to the domestic implementation of 
the international prohibition of labour exploitation, both in terms of formal and 
substantive law.28 
In the first phase of comparative analysis we identify the judicial application of 
the ingredients of the offence in light of the law on the books, taking into account not 
only the judicial decisions but also other factors such as the development and drafting 
of the current law and policy, paying special notice to the political and societal 
influences that led to the final version of the law as it stands (see Chapter 8). Such a 
macro-comparison enables the spirit and style of different systems to be compared 
whilst also acknowledging the role of non-legal factors in the functioning of the law.  
The second and third phase of the comparative analysis are closely 
interconnected. We identify, in phase two, the key elements on how exploitation is 
conceptualised by the judiciary, whilst in the final phase we operationalise the 
theoretical model of exploitation as a basis for identifying the key constituent elements 
of labour exploitation in law (see Chapter 9).  
 
2.4. Limitations  
 
A number of limitations are acknowledged. 
 
Whilst the body of research in labour exploitation and in particular, human 
trafficking for labour exploitation is relatively small, we seek to contribute to the 
	
26 Hall, M.A., & Wright, R. F., ‘Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions’, (2008) 96 California Law Review 63, 88, p.87. 
27 Hall et al (2008), supra n.26, p.88. 
28 Siems, M., Comparative Law  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
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understanding of exploitation in law, by ‘shed[ding] light on legal questions in ways 
that lead to changes in legal practices or structures.’ 29 However, we note that empirical 
research alone is not always the best approach. Thus, the archival research we 
conducted in Part III of the thesis, is complemented by the normative analysis of the 
phenomenon in law and theory in Part I and Part II.  
 
The very nature of archival data sources may lead to a biased selection as it is 
inevitable that not all situations will be captured. 30 Indeed, when it comes to judicial 
decisions challenges exist as to the internal validity as it can be difficult to measure and 
control for all the factors that could reasonably influence the results.31 Nevertheless, an 
examination of the judicial proceedings in decided cases and the identification of the 
relationships among them, has external validity as they capture the conditions in the 
real world. Furthermore, the challenges of purposive sampling in the context of archival 
data research can be offset by including processes for triangulation and ensuring that 
additional sources are consulted, including reports that assess and evaluate the 
effectiveness of the law and policy in practice.32  
 
Finally, there is an imbalance of the availability of the information in the two 
jurisdictions. As mentioned, in Belgium the judgments are publicly available consisting 
of the indictment, factual circumstances and sentencing remarks. However, the access 
to the case files in England & Wales, in certain instances, provided information on 
preliminary hearings, defence and prosecution counsel skeleton arguments and 
transcripts of interviews with defendants and complainants. As a result, in certain 
places, the depth of analysis is much more elaborated due to access to these additional 
materials. Notwithstanding, the essence of the purpose of this analysis is available in 
both jurisdictions: to examine and determine the judicial interpretation of labour 





29 Lawless et al (2016), supra n.11, p.17. 
30 Data might be biased: not all possible data were recorded (selective deposit), decisions about the maintenance of the data may 
mean that some data are retained and other data discarded (selective survival) Lawless et al (2016), supra n.11, p.127. 
31 Lawless et al (2016), supra n.11, p.46. 
32  For example, annual reports of national rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms, independent reviews of legislation and 
implementation of policy, GRETA country reports etc.   
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3. Contextualisation of the file study   
 
We will briefly outline in this Section certain contextual elements of the criminal cases 
accessed in the file study that are of importance when it comes to the analysis and 
discussion of exploitation in Chapters 8 and 9. These characteristics include the types 
of exploitation (Section 3.1), the networks and individuals involved as perpetrators 
(Section 3.2), the economic sectors wherein labour exploitation was uncovered (Section 
3.3) and finally, the channels of identification and how such cases came to the attention 
of criminal justice authorities (Section 3.4). 
 
3.1. Type of exploitation 
 
In Belgium, 46 cases refer to economic exploitation, with one case of exploitation of 
begging. In England & Wales, human trafficking is on the indictment in 11 cases.33 Of 
the standalone offences, the most prominent form of exploitation on the indictments is 
forced labour, in 16 cases,34 followed by servitude in 10 cases.35 Slavery is not listed 
on the indictment as a standalone offence, but only as human trafficking for the 
purposes of slavery in two cases.36  
Type of exploitation  Number of cases 
Belgium 
Economic Exploitation 46 
Forced begging 1 
England & Wales 
Human trafficking 11 
Forced or compulsory labour 16 
Servitude 10 
Slavery  0 
Table 7: Type of exploitation on indictment in Belgium and England & Wales 
 
	
33 UK1, UK3, UK7, UK8, UK9, UK24, UK25, UK27, UK28, UK29, UK30. 
34 UK4, UK5, UK6, UK8, UK9, UK12, UK14, UK16, UK17, UK21, UK22, UK23, UK24, UK25, UK30, UK31. Note that UK8, 
UK9 involve sexual exploitation and UK25 forced prostitution. 
35 UK3, UK4, UK6, UK7, UK12, UK14, UK15, UK17, UK20, UK22. 
36 UK1, UK8 – human trafficking for slavery.  
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In England & Wales, three cases involved factual circumstances prior to 2010 
and as a result the indictment only lists human trafficking for exploitation as the 
standalone offences had not yet entered into force.37 Following 6 April 2010, where the 
complainant is an EU national or non-EU national, in six cases the indictment combined 
a count[s] of human trafficking with count[s] of one or more of the standalone 
offences.38 Where the complainant is a UK national, 13 cases listed standalone offences 
only – except for one case (UK29) involving trafficking of a minor. 39 Post 2010, there 
are only two cases where human trafficking is the only labour exploitation offence 
listed on the indictment with no standalone offences. 40 
 
In both jurisdictions, the factual circumstances reveal other forms of 
exploitation that arguably go beyond the scope of labour exploitation as understood by 
the law on the books. For example, in England & Wales, forced criminality outside the 
context of human trafficking is also a prevalent feature of the labour exploitation, in 
particular commercial exploitation in four cases,41 shoplifting in two cases (UK14 & 
UK31) and theft in one case (UK3).42 In both jurisdictions, there is one instance where 
forced prostitution is successfully prosecuted as economic exploitation (BE46) or 
forced labour (UK25) and not human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation. 
So far, at a regional level, only one recent case of S.M. v Croatia [2018] has referred to 
forced prostitution in relation to the Article 4 ECHR prohibited practices, however the 
Court explicitly avoided assigning a form of exploitation by stating that human 
trafficking was accepted as being under the material scope of the provision. 43  In 
addition, in the England & Wales file study, two more cases include sexual offences on 
	
37 UK1 – slavery and servitude, UK3 - servitude, UK9 – forced labour. 
38 UK7, UK24, UK25, UK27, UK28, UK31. 
39 UK4, UK5, UK6, UK12, UK14, UK15, UK16, UK17, UK20, UK21, UK22, UK23, UK30. 
40 In UK8 the legal directions of judge refer to slavery, servitude and subjected to force, threats, or deception designed to enable 
another person to acquire a benefit of any kind in context of forced marriage and sexual exploitation. In UK19 the legal directions 
of judge refer to the provision of services under deception. These are forms of exploitation listed under Section 1 of the Modern 
Slavery Act but not categorized as standalone offences, see further discussion on this issue in Chapter 9. 
41 UK21, UK22, UK27, UK30. 
42 In three cases, where there is a long history of exploitation, the victim has a criminal record and in some instances has served a 
custodial sentence [UK14, UK21, UK23]. In two cases there were parallel ongoing investigations for trading standard offences 
[UK21, UK27] however, due to the identification of the individual as a potential victim of labour exploitation, the prosecutions 
were withdrawn: see more below in Section 3.3. 
43 S.M. v. Croatia 19 July 2018, Application no. 60561/14, para 54. “the Court concludes that trafficking itself as well as 
exploitation of prostitution, within the meaning of Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol, Article 4(a) of the Anti-Trafficking 
Convention, Article 1 of the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of 
Others and the CEDAW (see paragraphs 27, 28, 31 and 33 above), fall within the scope of Article 4 of the Convention and will 
assess the present case under that provision.” The approach of the Court directly follows the judicial reasoning in Rantsev whereby 
the Court held that trafficking falls within the scope of Article 4 of the Convention. However, whilst Rantsev did refer to sexual 
exploitation and forced prostitution of artistes in cabarets, it is not explicitly mentioned by the court in the deliberations of the 
application of Article 4 of the Convention, see Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 7 January 2010, Application No. 25965/04, paras 
272-282. 
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the indictment but in parallel with the offence of human trafficking for labour 
exploitation (rape in context of arranged marriage human trafficking for exploitation 
(UK8); rape in context of domestic servitude (UK9)).  
 
One emerging form of exploitation which is increasingly visible in the British 
caselaw is financial exploitation. Cases that contain an element of financial exploitation 
can be divided in two categories:  
i) cases where working conditions are not exploitative per se but instead, the 
wages are either paid directly to the exploiter or the bank accounts are controlled 
by the exploiter, leading to debt bondage and dependence upon the exploiter for 
subsistence needs (accommodation, food, transport etc.)44 and; 
 ii) cases where fraudulent misrepresentations are made in conjunction with 
another type of exploitation.45  
 
In the first instance, the work consists of legitimate employment, where the 
workers are registered with an employment agency, receive wages and payslips and 
wages are deposited into bank accounts in the name of the workers. Agency work is 
prevalent in this handful of cases, where workers are taken to work in a number of 
sectors such as: distribution warehouses, waste management and recycling centres and 
food packaging factories. The file study reveals an inconsistent handling of such cases, 
whereby the exploitation is either dealt with as an integral part of the exploitation 
offence e.g. forced labour (UK28, UK31) and securing services etc by force, threats or 
deception (UK19) or in parallel to the exploitation offence as a fraud offence (UK24).  
 
The second category of financial exploitation consists of fraudulent 
misrepresentations, such as fraudulent social security claims made in the name of the 
victim (tax credits, unemployment benefit, income support allowance, disability 
allowance etc.). Such behaviour is recognised on the indictment as fraud offences. 
Other examples of fraud include fraudulent mobile phone contracts, insurance policies, 
ownership of vehicles etc. In these cases, the financial and material proceeds from these 
fraudulent misrepresentations are confiscated by the exploiters and the exploited parties 
are often unware of such fraudulent activity being conducted in their name.   
	
44 UK7, UK19, UK24, UK27, UK28, UK31. 
45 UK5, UK9, UK12, UK14, UK17, UK23, UK30. 
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In Belgium, the file study includes fraud offences on the indictment, however, 
these predominantly refer to fraudulent business practices,46 such as non-payment of 
taxes (BE20), money laundering (BE11, BE16) forgery of counterfeit money (BE46), 
abuse of trust (BE16) misrepresentation of status of workers (BE43), engaging in 
fraudulent work (BE24).47 Social security misrepresentations are not prevalent as in 
most cases the illegal administrative situation of the victims means that they are not 
eligible to claim social security benefits and/or open bank accounts.  
 
In England & Wales, the composition of the indictment has developed 
throughout the reference period. This development is twofold. First of all, in early 
cases, the charge sheet and indictment when sent to the Magistrates’ Court did not 
always include labour exploitation criminal offences, instead in three cases these 
offences are added at a later stage as the prosecution progresses.48 For example, in one 
case (UK16), the initial charge sheet upon arrest and when sent to trial included the 
offences of unlawful imprisonment and grievous bodily harm, however, the final 
indictment also included forced or compulsory labour. In contrast, later cases show that 
“modern slavery” offences are included from the moment of arrest suggesting an 
increased awareness amongst law enforcement (UK22). Secondly, and in connection 
with the first development, the number and range of offences listed on the final 
indictment has increased throughout the reference period. For example, in 2010, the 
indictment only listed a handful of offences, and in some cases only the offence of 
human trafficking. From 2015 onwards, the indictments increasingly list not only 
human trafficking and a standalone offence[s] (due to the introduction of new offences 
in 4 April 2010), but also offences against the person, offences against the public order 
(including fraud) and sexual offences. As a result of this development, the complexity 
of the cases has had a procedural impact. For instance, during the pre-trial hearings of 
three cases, counsel made an application for severance of the indictment: ‘A single trial 
would be extremely long and complex, and the factual issues would be difficult for a 
jury to disentangle’ (UK30 Case summary – 13 May 2016).49  
 
	
46 BE16, BE20, BE43 – Fraud offences from the code de société; BE1, BE2, BE5, BE16, BE29, BE32, BE44 – Fraud offences 
from articles 193, 196, 197 et 213 du code penal. 
47 Articles 1, 2, 5 et 8 de la loi du 6 juillet 1976 sur la répression du travail frauduleux à caractère commercial ou artisanal de 
s'être livré à un travail frauduleux ou d'avoir recours aux services d'un travailleur frauduleux.  
48 UK8, UK,9, UK16. 
49 UK23, UK25, UK30.  
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Keane explains that the introduction of the standalone offences sought to bolster 
existing offences where, in the absence of a trafficking element, ‘it allows prosecutors 
to present the full extent of the behaviour, rather than having to rely on general offences 
such as assault, false imprisonment or theft, which may not fully reflect the nature of 
the offending.’50 In practice, however, it seems that since the introduction of standalone 
offences, the indictment includes both standalone offences and the criminal offences 
that were used by the prosecution prior to the introduction of the standalone offences.51 
This suggests, that prosecutors are increasingly employing the full range of offences at 
their disposal, by combining standalone offences, trafficking offence and other relevant 
criminal offences. Does this suggest that the previous preference for the use of human 
trafficking offences,52 over and above standalone offences has been replaced with this 
new all-encompassing approach? In this regard, an interesting area of further study will 
be to analyse the cases that are flagged as being related to modern slavery, but not 
prosecuted as such – for instance national research reveals that in 2015, the Crown 
Prosecution Service management information shows 226 defendants were flagged for 
modern slavery of which 149 (66%) ultimately received convictions (though not 
necessarily for a modern slavery offence).53 
 
In Belgium, the composition of the indictment is reflective of a well-developed 
body of caselaw, as recognised by regional monitoring bodies.54 Overall, the approach 
is similar to that of England & Wales, whereby the indictment includes a variety of 
offences in recognition of the complexity of the factual circumstances (predominantly 
offences against the person and sexual offences). All cases include the offence of 
human trafficking, with one case of exploitation of begging (BE15), one case of 
exploitation of prostitution (BE46) and one case of exploitation of a minor (BE28). The 
majority of cases (42) include social criminal offences on the indictment, which is 
reflective of the anti-trafficking policy that has always placed an emphasis on the need 
	
50 Keane, D., ‘Abolitionist in heart but not in action: slavery, servitude and the status of Article 4 ECHR in Irish law’, (2013) Irish 
Jurist 50, 166-198, p. 176-177. 
51 E.g. false imprisonment, blackmail and assault, as well as employment legislation relating to working hours, minimum wage and 
health and safety at work. Keane (2013), supra n.50, p. 176-177. 
52 Keane (2013), supra n.50, p. 176-177. 
53 HM Government, 2016 Report of the Inter Departmental Ministerial Group on Modern Slavery (2016), p.19; Home Office, A 
Typology of Modern Slavery Offences in the UK Research Report 93, Christine Cooper, Olivia Hesketh, Nicola Ellis, Adam Fair 
(October 2017), p. 3. 
54 GRETA (2017), supra n.2. 
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to include an approach that is based on social law.55 Other offences included offences 
against the person, fraud offences and sexual offences. 
 
Type of offence Belgium England & Wales 
Social criminal offences56 4257  
Offences against the person 458 1359 
Sexual offences 360 361 
Offences against public order  2 
Offences against property  262 
Fraud 1163 764 
Other offences e.g. drug related 165 266 
Table 8: Type of offences on the indictment in addition to labour exploitation offences 
 
3.2. The informal and formal labour market 
 
In both jurisdictions, there is a distinction between the role of businesses according to 
their status: namely, between those operating in the shadow economy67 and legitimate 
businesses. The former are often small businesses with few workers 68  run by 
individuals or small family units (who are listed on the indictment as defendants in the 
	
55 Vermeulen, G., La politique belge en matiere des traite des etres humains: Etat des lieux, évaluation et options futures, 
Fondation Roi Baudouin (2006), p.32. 
56 For discussion on the application of the law on non-payment of wages to all workers including those employed illegally see 
Service Public Féderal Justice, Service de Politique Criminelle (Direction III – Droit pénal de la Direction générale Législation, 
Libertés et Droits fondamentaux – SPF Justice) Governmental report on Combatting Human Trafficking: 2011 - 2012, pp. 32-33. 
57 non-registration at social security, etc in 42 cases, non-payment of wages in 22 cases, the employment of undocumented or 
unauthorised workers in 36 cases, human smuggling in 11 cases (BE1, BE4, BE5, BE7, BE11, BE20, BE26, BE38, BE39, BE42, 
BE46), slum landlord in three cases (BE3, BE32, BE43), no insurance for accidents at work in three cases (BE40, BE41, BE44), 
criminal organisation in three cases (BE16, BE44, BE46). 
58 One death threat (BE7), one case of involuntary wounding (BE40) where there was a possible threat to life due to poor working 
conditions, two cases of degrading treatment (BE32 & BE47). 
59  UK3, UK4, UK7, UK8, UK9, UK12, UK 15, UK 16, UK 17, UK 20, UK21, UK 23, UK 25; including unlawful/false 
imprisonment (UK3, UK8, UK 9, UK 12) and kidnapping (UK21).  
60 one case of rape and assisted rape (BE24), engagement in prostitution (BE24), exploitation in prostitution (BE46). 
61 UK3, UK8, UK9. 
62 UK27, UK30. 
63 fraud in 10 cases (BE1, BE2, BE5, BE16, BE20, BE29, BE32, BE43, BE44, BE46), money laundering (BE11, BE16), forgery 
in one case (BE46). 
64 Fraud to obtain benefit (UK6, UK17, UK23, UK24, UK31) cause false information to be produced/furnished (UK6), blackmail 
(UK23) money laundering (UK27), making false representation (UK30). 
65 Drug related offences (BE46). 
66 Unlawful neglect of a minor and facilitation of entry of non-Eu citizen into EU member state [change of name and included on 
passport as adopted son] (UK15). 
67 This finding corresponds to other research findings, see for instance Berntsen, L., & De Lange, T., ‘Employer sanctions: 
Instrument of labour market regulation, migration control and worker protection?’, in Rijken, C., & De Lange, T., (eds) Towards 
a decent labour market for low waged migrant workers, (Amsterdam University Press, 2018), p. 216; Radeva Berket, M., Labour 
exploitation and trafficking for labour exploitation—trends and challenges for policy-making, ERA Forum (2015) 16, 359–377p. 
367. 
68  For further examples of involvement of small business see Berntsen & De Lange (2018), supra n.67, p. 219; Smit, M., 
‘Trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation. The case of the Netherlands’, (2011) Trends in Organised Crime 14,184–
197, p. 192. 
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case).69 For the latter, where work is conducted in the legitimate labour market, the 
businesses do not facilitate the exploitation and subsequently are either not involved in 
the prosecution at all (England & Wales)70 or are acquitted by the court as they are not 
to be held to bear individual criminal responsibility (in four cases in Belgium).71 In one 
case, in England & Wales, a business owner was successfully prosecuted for his role in 
the exploitation of Hungarian workers. He was found to be complicit in the operation 
as he had knowingly hidden the use of the workers by keeping them off the books that 
were monitored by ethical auditors from his suppliers (UK19). Overall, considering the 
emphasis on the responsibility of businesses to ensure that their supply chains are free 
from exploitation, the choice of business model and the conditions of its 
implementation requires further consideration e.g. fast food franchises and sub-
contracting for cleaning, use of employment agencies for temporary work. In BE6 and 
BE45, the court explicitly paid heed to the sub-contracting business model and the low 
contract values which were integral to the unacceptable low wages offered to workers 
and the deliberate recruitment of irregular workers.  
 
In the cleaning sector of fast food restaurants. These restaurants make two small 
cleaning companies compete for a maintenance contract. The cleaning staff must work 
for free one month before the company obtains the contract. This is one of the reasons 
leading the cleaning company to illegally outsource undocumented third-country 
nationals.72 
 
Whilst we have highlighted the role of networks, the courts recognise that it is 
not necessary for a large criminal network for human trafficking to take place, but can 
also involve individuals working on their own account:73 
	
69 Nb in both jurisdictions individuals are prosecuted, the businesses themselves as legal entities are not held criminally liable. In 
BE, businesses were included on the indictment are acquitted: BE29, BE31, BE44, BE45.  
70 UK24, UK27, UK28, UK31. 
71 BE29, BE31, BE44, BE45. 
For discussion on application of corporate liability and Carestel case see Myria - Belgian Federal Migration Centre, Rapport annuel 
traite et trafic des êtres humains 2015 : Resserrer les maillons (2015), p. 116; Myria - Belgian Federal Migration Centre, Rapport 
Annuel 2016, Traite et traffic des êtres humains: Des mendiants aux mains de trafiquants (2016),p146 & p. 153 GRETA (2013), 
supra n.1, p.53; Radeva Berket (2015), supra n.67, p. 371; GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p. 39. 
72 Centre fédéral pour l’analyse des flux migratoires, la protection des droits fondamentaux des étrangers et la lutte contre la traite 
des êtres humains, Rapport annuel 2013 du Rapporteur independent Traite des êtres humains Belgique (2013), p. 20, citing trend 
identified by the CTIF, Livre blanc sur l’argent noir, 20 ans de lutte contre le blanchiment et le financement du terrorisme, 2013. 
Unofficial translation, original: “dans le secteur du nettoyage des restaurants fast-food. Ces restaurants font jouer la concurrence 
entre deux petites sociétés de nettoyage pour un contrat d’entretien. Le personel doit travailler gratuitement un mois avant que la 
société n’obtienne le contrat. C’est une des raisons qui mène l’entreprise de nettoyage à employer illégalement en sous-traitance 
des ressortissants de pays tiers sans papiers.” 
73 Recognition of this also in the Plan d’action Lutte contre la traite des êtres humains 2015-2019, p.8. See also, Economic human 
trafficking is hidden and operates in "micro-structures" rather than in large rings see Service Public Féderal Justice (2011 – 2012), 
supra n.54, p.40. 
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The offence of trafficking in human beings may be committed by a person acting alone 
and on his own account, that is, without necessarily being part of an organized crime 
ring or being the last link in it.74 
 
Organised crime networks are identified in the sample of both jursdictions; 
however, these are not large scale, multi-national networks (see for example BE cases 
with criminal organisation offences, and UK cases with conspiracy offences).75 Indeed, 
the majority are small networks closely connected by family ties, or close acquaintances 
e.g. brothers (UK24), husband and wife (UK31), (extended) family in eight cases.76 
Such prevalence of small, familial networks, appears to debunk the internationally 
recognised view that human trafficking is an internationally organised crime on a par 
with the international drugs and arms trade, as noted by the Court of Appeal: 
 
We think it probable that victims of these offences will routinely be strangers rather 
than family members. In cases of facilitating illegal entry to the United Kingdom, the 
fact the entrant is a family member and not a stranger may constitute some mitigation 
of the seriousness of the offence. The fact the victim of economic exploitation is a 
stranger is not, we consider, an aggravating feature of the basic offence.77 
 
This is not the case (as is often the case) of a substantial international forced labour 
criminal enterprise with many lieutenants).78 [emphasis added] 
 
However, the limited involvement of large organised criminal networks could 
be a particular feature of labour exploitation whereas there is evidence to suggest that 
other forms of exploitation, such as human trafficking for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation and in particular of children, do occur in a broader context of 
internationally organised crime.  
 
	
74 BE6 - Unofficial translation, original: “l'infraction de traite des êtres humains peut être le fait d'une personne agissant seule et 
pour son propre compte, càd sans qu'elle fasse nécessairement partie d'une filière criminelle organisée ou en soit le dernier 
maillon.” 
75 UK4, UK5, UK9, UK12, UK14, UK17, UK19, UK20, UK23, UK24, UK27, UK30. 
76 UK3, UK4, UK5, UK6 UK12, UK21, UK30, UK31. Research conducted by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency with severely 
exploited workers found that more than half of the persons interviewed had been recruited through personal networks, e.g. through 
friends, acquaintances, family members and, to a lesser extent, former employers, often people with the same ethnic background, 
to find jobs where they ended up being exploited FRA (2019), supra n.22, p.31 & p.33. 
77 R v Attorney General’s Reference Nos. 37, 38 and 65 of 2010 (Shahnawaz Ali Khan, Raza Ali Khan and Perveen Khan) [2010] 
EWCA Crim 2880, para 17. 
78 UK28 defence statement. 
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In most instances, the nationality of the worker matches or is closely connected 
to that of the exploiter.79 Furthermore, in BE10, the court made explicit reference to the 
same nationality of the defendant and victims, leading to abuse of vulnerability, and 
dependence on exploiter.80 Another indicator of the closely connected nature of the 
relationship between the exploiter and the victim is that the recruitment appears to take 
place via established community or family links. 81  In some milieus, there is an 
indication that the network is extensive, see for instance, Irish Traveller and Roma 
networks in the UK and the Chinese community in Belgium.82 In England & Wales, 
the file study highlighted a significant number of cases referring to Irish travellers and 
Roma, 83  this also emerged from a file study of labour inspector cases in the 
Netherlands.84 Similarly, as with the Dutch labour inspector file study, we are not 
suggesting that, in the present file study, there is a targeting of ethnic groups. However, 
the factual circumstances of these cases reveals that this milieu is already known to law 
enforcement due to prior criminality e.g. commercial exploitation, and by virtue of 
ongoing or concurring investigations may assist the detection of labour exploitation 
related offences.85  
 
In both jurisdictions, the role of the network is very much focused upon the 
facilitation of entry into the country and the identification of work. However, a notable 
distinction between the two jurisdictions, is the legal recognition given to this conduct: 
in England & Wales, the facilitation of travel is indicted as human trafficking and not 
smuggling as it very often refers to persons who have the legal right to enter the country 
(EU nationals with freedom of movement or third country nationals with valid visa 
documents), whereas the facilitation of illegal entry into Belgium is recognised on the 
indictment as an alleged violation of the smuggling offence, for instance in one case 
(BE1), the indictment was amended to refer only to third country national civil parties 
and not the Polish civil parties.   
 
	
79 Third country nationals in UK1, UK8, UK9, UK15, UK20; EU nationals in UK3, UK7, UK19, UK24, UK25, UK27, UK28, 
UK31, BE1, BE2, BE32, BE33; Third country nationals same nationality as exploiter BE04, BE05, BE7, BE9, BE11, BE14, BE17, 
BE19, BE23, BE24, BE26, BE28, BE29, BE33, BE35, BE35, BE36, BE39, BE24. 
80 See also reference to nationality of employer matching nationality of worker in Berntsen & De Lange (2018), supra n.67, p. 219. 
81 UK1, UK7, UK8, UK9, UK15, UK16, UK19, UK20, UK24, UK25, UK27, UK28 
82 Smuggling network in BE11; Perpetrator was previously smuggling and human trafficking victim in BE9, two perpetrators had 
links to smuggling network in BE20, Family network extended to Chinese community in BE26. 
83 Roma involvment in UK7, UK19, UK24, UK25, UK27, UK28, UK31; Irish traveler community involvment in UK4, UK5, UK6, 
UK12, UK14, UK17, UK21, UK23, UK29, UK30. 
84 Berntsen & De Lange (2018), supra n.67, p. 220. 
85 But also other concurring investigations, e.g. trading standards, etc.  
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3.3. Sectors of exploitation  
 
A number of economic sectors are prevalent in both jurisdictions: namely, 
construction,86 domestic work and or the provision of care in a private setting (a private 
household with no family relationship;87 a private household arranged via a familial 
link;88 provision of care (BE14 & BE23), domestic work/servitude,89 forced marriage- 
BE28) and small to medium businesses such as bakeries, night shops, printers and 
butchers. 90  Other sectors in Belgium include restaurants, 91  transport (BE44), 
agriculture,92 warehouse (BE41), wholesale garments (BE10), cleaning in fast food 
(BE6, BE45), horse stables.93 One case of forced prostitution (BE46) and one case of 
forced begging (BE15). In England & Wales, with the emergence of financial 
exploitation as we discussed in Section 3.1, workers are employed in low-wage, low-
skilled sectors such as distribution warehouses, food packaging, recycling plants and 
other work placements arranged by employment agencies.94  
 
In England & Wales, there is a disparity between the types of exploitation that 
are found to reach the trial stage compared to the reporting in the media and by agencies 
such as the Gangmasters Labour Abuse Authority,95 of arrests, raids and investigations 
in other sectors such as nail bars, cannabis farms, domestic workers in diplomatic 
households. In the context of domestic servitude, despite significant emphasis on 
domestic workers in diplomatic households, there are disparities in the number of 
referrals of human trafficking for the purpose of domestic servitude in private 
households, which suggests that migrant workers are finding it difficult to report, 
increasing their vulnerability to exploitation.96 However, alternative mechanisms to 
criminal prosecution are being used, with complainants seeking resolution in an 
	
86 BE1, BE2, BE3, BE5, BE7, BE8, BE12, BE19, BE20, BE27, BE29, BE40, BE43; UK4, UK5, UK6, UK14, UK21, UK22, UK30. 
87 UK1, UK3, UK15, UK16. 
88 UK8, UK9, UK20. 
89 BE32, BE35, BE47. 
90 BE13, BE17, BE22, BE25, BE30, BE33, BE38, BE42. 
91 BE4, BE9, BE11, BE24, BE26, BE39. 
92 BE21, BE31, BE37. 
93 BE16, BE18, BE34. 
94 UK19, UK24, UK27, UK28, UK31. 
95 A Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) that implements, monitors and enforces a license scheme for employment agencies, 
labour providers or gangmasters who provides workers to the following economic sectors: agriculture, horticulture, shellfish 
gathering and any associated processing and packaging. More information available at http://www.gla.gov.uk/.  
96 GRETA Noted the disparity between reporting of THB for purpose of domestic servitude in diplomatic household compared to 
private households: between 1 April 2009 and 3 May 2012, there were five diplomatic domestic workers conclusively identified 
as victims of trafficking (out of 15 referrals), compared to 21 private household cases (out of 67 referrals); GRETA(2012), supra 
n.5, p.31 
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employment tribunal for back pay of wages via compensation. 97 However, it is often 
difficult to enforce the ruling of the tribunals, leaving complainants without the 
compensation orders being complied with. 98 The role of Employment Tribunals in 
identification of serious criminal conduct has been brought to the attention of the 
Modern Slavery Unit. 99 
 
Other “at-risk” sectors have been heavily mediatised such as car washes and 
nail bars do not present themselves in the file study sample. However, there are 
challenges in finding evidence of forced labour in nail bars and car washes as these 
businesses are often the front for other illicit business e.g. drug related offences, money 
laundering, immigration crime and other organized crime etc.100 As for nail bars, there 
is a difficulty in pursuing “victimless prosecutions”, making it difficult for prosecuting 
authorities to convince the judiciary to proceed as they consider that there is no case to 
answer. In 2018, a successful prosecution saw three defendants convicted of modern 
slavery offences, two were found guilty of facilitating the trafficking of the victims 
across the country to work in nail bars and one was found guilty of forced labour.101 
Nevertheless, the pursuit of “victimless” prosecutions is beginning to emerge (either 
because there is sufficient evidence without their testimony, or the victims are not 
identified). 102 To this end, the prosecution service can play a role in pursuing victimless 
prosecutions, through providing early investigative advice to law enforcement. 
Prosecutors can advise on possible avenues of enquiry and consider what independent 
evidence is needed to prove the offence without victim testimony.103 
 
3.4. Identification of exploitation victims 
 
It is important to emphasise that in both jurisdictions self-reporting is the predominant 
channels of victim identification. In England & Wales in particular, the increased 
awareness of modern slavery in the media was noticeable with one victim self-reporting 
	
97 See BE35 involving diplomatic personnel. The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, Before the Harm is Done Examining the 
UK’s response to the prevention of trafficking, (September 2018), p. 38. 
98 The Anti Trafficking monitoring group (2018), supra n. 97, p. 38. 
99 Information provided to researcher by representative of Crown Prosecution Service.  
100 Information provided to researcher by representative of Crown Prosecution Service.  
101  Crown Prosecution Service, Gang jailed for human trafficking at nail salon, 2 January 2018, available at: 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/west-midlands/news/gang-jailed-human-trafficking-nail-salon [last accessed 21 June 2019]. 
102 HM Government, Independent Review of the Modern Slavery Act, Fourth interim report: Legal application of the Modern 
Slavery Act (21 March 2019), p. 14.  
103  Information provided to researcher by representative of Crown Prosecution Service.  
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to a victim support organisation following a radio advertisement (UK15). Secondly the 
role of the authorities such as law enforcement and labour inspectorate is very 
prominent. Such enforcement actions taken by authorities are very much premised upon 
risk assessment of the sector and /or intelligence gathering initiatives.104 A promising 
practice also emerged in one case where a business reported their suspicion of 
exploitation (UK28). Although the company was not involved in the use of cheap 
labour, the company’s awareness of exploitation and rogue labour providers led to the 
identification of the victims as being exploited. Other professionals who have identified 
victims of exploitation include health professionals (UK1, BE40), a probation officer 
(UK6) and a trading standards officer (UK21). 
 
Identification channel Belgium England & wales 
Labour inspectorate 5 0 
Police control/raid 6 7 
Self-reported 10 10 
Third party report 2 2105 
Specialised centre/ victim support 
organisations 
5 0 
Other 3106 5 
Data not available 12 0 
Table 9: Channels of identification of potential victims of labour exploitation 
 
4. The role of the legislature and the judiciary in the domestic criminal 
prohibition of labour exploitation 
 
Belgium and England & Wales are both bound by the international and regional 
instruments discussed in Chapters 1 - 4 wherein State parties are legally obliged to 
prohibit labour exploitation.107 As a result, both jurisdictions emphasise compliance 
	
104 Berntsen & De Lange (2018), supra n.67, p. 216; See reference to risk assessment/intelligence led operations in FRA, Protecting 
migrant workers from exploitation in the EU: boosting workplace inspections, September 2018, p. 13; Service Public Féderal 
Justice (2011 – 2012), supra n.54, pp27-28, pp31-32. 
105 Business reported suspected exploitation: UK28- Although the company was not involved in the use of cheap labour, the 
company’s awareness of exploitation and rogue labour providers led to the identification of the victims as being exploited. E.g. 
their wages withheld. Contact with GLA and involvement in Stronger together – posters on site of the risks of exploitation.  
106 BE14, BE23 (anonymous), BE40 (hospital) 
107 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 2000 was ratified by in England & Wales in February 2006 
and in Belgium in August 2004.  
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with international and regional obligations as the principal objective of domestic legal 
reform. Interestingly, however, the specific supranational instruments that triggered 
domestic legal reform differ: with Belgium seeking to transpose EU Directive 
2011/36/EU (BE26)108 and the UK seeking compliance with the Palermo Protocol and 
the European Convention on Human Rights (UK12). 109  
 
Similarly, the extent to which these supranational sources are relied upon when 
determining the scope of the domestic criminal law also differs. For instance, in 
Belgium, the legislature has provided a detailed explanation and definition of the 
national law in the preparatory works of the domestic legislation, which is then further 
developed by the courts (see more in Sections 1- 2 of Chapter 8 and Chapter 9). In 
England & Wales, whilst statute is one of the principal sources of law in the common 
law tradition, there are no statutory definitions of the labour exploitation offences. 
Instead, there is an explicit reference to supranational instruments whereby all those 
involved in the criminal proceedings (police, prosecutors and judges) ‘need to have 
regard to existing case law on Article 4 ECHR and international conventions.’110 For a 
more general interpretation of the statute, the courts may refer to the pre-legislative 
documents to determine the intention of parliament before the statute came into law, 
and how the statute should be used and interpreted.111  
 
	
At the time of writing, both countries have ratified ILO Conventions No. 29, No.105 and No. 182, ILO Protocol and 
Recommendation 2014, Council of Europe Anti-trafficking Convention, Directive 2011/36/EU. However, it is important to note 
that ‘the UK was not initially bound by the EU Directive 2011/36/EU due to the fact that pursuant to the rules agreed in the 2007 
Lisbon Treaty , the UK can keep a number of exemptions (or “opt-outs”) secured since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty , including 
measures in the area of justice and home affairs, while allowing for the possibility to “opt in” on a case by-case basis. In July 2011, 
the UK authorities notified to the European Commission (EC) of their intention to be bound by Directive 2011/36/EU and on 14 
October 2011, the EC issued a decision according to which this Directive will apply in the UK.’ See GRETA (2012), supra n.5 
para 14.  
Only Beglium has transposed, in 2013, the Employers Sanctions Directive, Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying 
third-country nationals, OJ L 168, 30.6.2009, p. 24–32. 
Both countries have adopted the Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 relating to compensation to crime victims; 
Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union of 25 October 2012 establishing 
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings.  
Only Belgium has adopted the Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country 
nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, 
who cooperate with the competent authorities.  
108 Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de l’Intérieur et des Affaires administratives, de M. CLAES, 4 mai 2010 (Doc. parl., 
Sénat, n° 4-1631/1); Rapport fait au nom du Groupe de travail traite des êtres humains, de Mme DÉSIR, 27 mars 2012, (Doc. parl., 
Sénat, n° 5-1073/1). 
109 For more details on the the UK’s lack of domestic leal reform following the adoption of the EU Directive, see Parkes, C., ‘The 
trafficking protocol has advanced the global movement against human exploitation: the case of the United Kingdom’, (2015) 
Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 4, 150-155, p. 150; and Craig, G., Balch, A., Lewis, H., & Waite, L., (eds) Modern slavery 
agenda: Policy, politics and practices in the UK, (Policy Press, 2019), p. 11-12. 
110 See reference to Article 4 ECHR, Convention on Action against Trafficking and Palermo Protocol in Modern Slavery Act 2015 
(c.30) Explanatory Notes.  
111 Bowen, P., ‘Prosecution of cases of human trafficking in a common law system’, in Piotrowicz, R., Rijken, C., & Uhl, B. H., 
(eds) Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking, (Routledge, 2017), p.223. 
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Taking into account the purpose of the legislation, the file study has affirmed 
that substantively the aim of the legal framework is explicitly acknowledged. The case 
analysis reveals that the judges in both jurisdictions not only seek to consider the will 
of parliament but also recognise that the principal purpose of the development of the 
national legislation is the application of regional provisions.112  
 
In England & Wales, the judiciary are explicit in the need to ensure that the 
criminalised behaviour is sufficiently dealt with in accordance with the will of 
parliament (UK17, UK24). Similarly, judges also refer to the legislative’s aim of 
ensuring that labour exploitation that occurs outside the scope of human trafficking is 
also criminalised, as demonstrated by the Court of Appeal’s ruling in R v Connors 
[2013] EWCA Crim 324 (UK5): 
 
The Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 criminalised the exploitation of labour when it 
was connected to trafficking in human beings, but not otherwise. Therefore, it did not 
prevent vulnerable but untrafficked individuals from being subjected to forced or 
compulsory labour. The Gang Masters’ Licensing Act 2004 established a system for 
licensing those who employed workers in specified industries. Nevertheless, this 
legislation, too did not address the entire problem. The end result was that many men 
and women continued to remain vulnerable to exploitation without any 
counterbalancing protection against exploitation. 
Section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 closed this vulnerability gap by 
creating an offence capable of being committed in three different ways. This new 
offence does not require that the victim should have been trafficked and does not 
address or create a new offence relating to immigration crime.113 
 
Similarly, the courts acknowledge the ‘legal novelty’ (UK5) of this area of law 
when it comes to the understanding of the offences.114 In doing so, the courts, in light 
of the lack of domestic precedent, draw heavily upon the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights for the definition of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory 
	
112 Will of parliament referred to in BE14, BE26, BE32, BE35, BE35, BE47. In UK12, the court referenced the intention of 
parliament being to protect vulnerable people from exploitation; Regional provisions: Article 4 ECHR, Palermo Protocol cited in 
AG Ref Nos. 37, 38 and 65 of 2010 [2010] EWCA Crim 2880, para.12. EU Directive cited in BE26. 
113 R v Connors [2013] EWCA Crim 324, paras 5-6 (UK5). 
114 Note that the file study also revealed the jury requesting clarification of the scope of the offences on the indictment as they were 
unfamiliar with them [UK7]. 
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labour and the regional and international law for the definition of human trafficking.115 
In addition, the file study reveals that there is significant reference to domestic 
authority, including appellate and first instance case law, 116  legal texts 117  and 
ministerial guidance,118 which, in turn, draws heavily upon the interpretation of the 
regional provisions.  
 
In stark contrast, Belgian judges do not make any reference to international or 
European law or jurisprudence – except for one brief reference to the ILO Forced 
Labour Indicators to interpret the meaning of “conditions contrary to human dignity.”119 
Overall, the principal sources of legal authority when interpreting the scope of the 
offence comes from the parliamentary travaux préparatoires of the original law, 
subsequent legal reform 120  and academic scholarship. 121  Only on two occasions, 
following the law reform in 2013, did judges refer to the application of the principle of 
human dignity in the domestic law in order to take into account the wide-ranging 
situations that were required to be prohibited in accordance with international and EU 
law:  
 
The legislative used the concept of human dignity in relation to trafficking in human 
beings, as s/he had to meet the requirements of European and international law, which 
included the punishment of a wider variety of situations.122  
 
	
115 Siliadin v. France, 26 July 2005, Application No. 73316/01 in UK1, UK4, UK5, UK6, UK12, UK23; Van Der Mussele v. 
Belgium, 23 November 1983, Application no. 8919/80 in UK12, UK30; Van Droogenbroeck V, Belgium, Report of the Commission 
9 July 1980, Application N° 7906/77 in UK5, UK12; Article 4 ECHR in UK1, UK4, UK6, UK30; Palermo Protocol in UK1, 
UK19; ILO Convention in UK30; COE Convention explanatory notes in UK19; ECHR Forced labour and trafficking factsheet in 
UK1; Delphi Survey indicators for identifying adult victims of labour exploitation in AG Ref Nos. 37, 38 and 65 of 2010 [2010] 
EWCA Crim 2880, para 12. 
116 R v SK [2010] EWCA Crim 1691 in UK4, UK5, UK9, UK12, UK23, UK30; R v Connors [2013] EWCA Crim 324 in UK4, 
UK12, UK14, UK23; R v Connors Bristol First instance in UK4, UK6, UK7; R v Connors Luton first instance judge’s legal 
directions to jury in UK5. 
117 Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell) in UK5, UK9; Clayton and Tomlinson's “The Law of 
Human Rights”, 2nd edition, volume I, paragraphs 9.17 to 9. 20 (on the concepts of “slavery” and “servitude”) and paragraph 9.25 
(on the concept of “forced or compulsory labour”) in UK12, UK30 [application to dismiss]; Leigh, “Trafficking people for sexual 
exploitation – new legislation” Criminal Justice Weekly, 14.9.2012 in UK19. 
118 Ministry of Justice Circular 2010/07 and Explanatory Note in UK5; Home Office guide for social workers in UK30. 
119 In BE47 the court referred to ILO forced labour indicators to assist with the understanding of work contrary to human dignity.  
120 Recognition of the legal reform in 2005 in BE1, BE32 (lower threshold: particularly vulnerable situation to vulnerable situation 
More in line with European legislation -EU Directive and COE convention);BE37, BE41, BE44 (recognition of larger scope of the 
offence in 2013); BE41 (recognition of the increased sentenced that reflects the number of victims following reform introduced by 
Loi du 24 juin 2013).  
121 BE13, BE32, BE35, BE41 refer to and quote from the following academic texts: Clesse, C.-E., ‘La notion de dignité humaine 
et son application pratique en matière de traite économique des êtres humains’, (2013) Revue de Droit Pénal de de Criminologie, 
12, 854 – 877; Kurz, F., ‘Lutte contre le travail forcé, l’exploitation économique et la traite des êtres humains: des concepts légaux 
à l’application judiciaire’, (20008) Chroniques de droit social 317-330. 
122 BE13 - Unofficial translation, original text: “Le législateur a utilisé la notion de dignité humaine en matière de traite des êtres 
humains, car il devait répondre aux exigences du droit européen et du droit international, qui étaient notamment de sanctionner 
une plus grande diversité de situations.” 
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Therefore, regardless of the sources of law (international, regional and 
domestic) and the extent to which they provide legal clarity, there will always be, as 
Radeva Berket states, a role for the judiciary to ‘develop clear jurisprudence on labour 
exploitation allowing for interpretations to be used for future cases.’ 123 However, as 
Smit opines, in light of the lack of assistance from the legal texts, the role of the judge 
in understanding and interpreting domestic legal provisions criminalising labour 
exploitation may be a tall order.124 Consequently, and considering the complexity of 
this area of law, it is necessary for the judiciary (ideally, specialised judges125) to ensure 
consistent application and avoid confusion with other offences.126 In England & Wales, 
whilst it is ultimately for the jury to decide the guilt of the defendant based on evidence 
heard during the trial, the judge’s understanding and interpretation of the domestic and 
regional law and judicial precedent can be discerned from the judge’s directions. Here 
it is the role of the judge to direct the jury by i) outlining the law and the “test” for 
determining the route to verdict,127 and ii) directing them to acquit where insufficient 
evidence has been adduced by the prosecution.128 As noted by the Court of Appeal in 
R v SK [2011] ECWA Crim 1691 (UK1): 
 
It was for the judge in his summing up to spell out to the jury what the relevant concept 
or concepts involved, and to do so in simple and clear language corresponding to the 
[judgment] of the European Court of Human rights.129  
 
In a civil law system, like the Belgian one, the role of the judiciary is to 
determine, with reference to the conditions contrary to human dignity listed in the 
travaux préparatoires, whether or not the factual circumstances of the case amounts to 
exploitation.130 The file study reveals that in order to undertake this assessment, the 
judiciary places significant weight on the consistency and credibility of the civil parties 
	
123 For discussion of Dutch Supreme Court decision in October in 2009 of the so-called “Chinese restaurant case” see Radeva 
Berket (2015), supra n.67, p. 371.  
124 Smit (2011), supra n. 68, p. 186. 
125 See discussion on use of specialised judges in GRETA (2012), supra n.5, p. 35 and Craig, G., ‘The UK’s Modern Slavery 
Legislation: An Early Assessment of Progress’ (2017) Social Inclusion 5(2), 16–27, pp 24-5. 
126 See discussion on consistent application in GRETA (2013), supra n.1, p.57; Bowen (2017), supra n.122, p.223. See discussion 
on confusion with other cases in GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p.40. 
127 In UK4 the judge “was asked to provide a legal definition of servitude and forced labour, and while, making it clear that full 
directions would be given in his summing up, the judge, with the agreement of counsel, provided the jury with a working 
definition.” R v Connors [Luton] [2013] EWCA Crim 368, para 12 (UK4).  
128 R v Connors [Luton] [2013] EWCA Crim 368, para. 3 (UK4).  
129 R v SK [2011] ECWA Crim 1691, para 43 (UK1). 
130 BE35, BE41 and Myria (2016), supra n.71, p.143. 
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testimony as well as witness statements, that can be also corroborated with additional 
investigative elements such as searches of premises, telephone records etc.131   
 
The need for a well-informed judiciary is especially vital as it will have a knock 
on effect on how prosecuting authorities seek to investigate and tackle cases of labour 
exploitation: where there is a guarded reaction from the judiciary, then restraint may 
well be exercised in tackling forms of exploitation where it is not known what a judge 
would qualify as exploitation.132 In the context of England & Wales, the common law 
system, means that ‘case law is adaptable to the changing profile and methodology used 
in trafficking cases, without the necessity for change to statute.’133 Furthermore, such a 
system places significant importance on the understanding of not only judges but also 
prosecuting authorities, as ‘it [is] for the Crown to make plain which of those three 
concepts was relied upon and then for the judge in his summing-up to spell out to the 
jury what the relevant concept or concepts involved, and to do so in simple and clear 
language.’134 Finally, the relationship and sharing of expertise between the courts and 
the prosecutors is of importance in both jurisdictions analysed in this thesis: in Belgium, 
the role of specialised prosecutors in human trafficking investigations has been 
commended,135 with responsibility for directing and following human trafficking cases 
and serve as contact persons for other stakeholders (e.g. judges, police officers, 
reception centres, Foreign Office). 136  According to GRETA, this contributes to ‘a 
consistent criminal policy response to human trafficking and ensures that human 
trafficking cases are investigated proactively.’137 However, there is some concern both 
from GRETA and the Independent National Rapporteur for Belgium that the 2014 
reorganisation of the judiciary and the federal police, which has resulted in a reduction 
of districts (from 27 to 12) and human resources, may lead to a loss of information for 
specialised anti-trafficking units which will need to rely on ‘maintaining good relations 
	
131 Corroboration of witness statements given weight by judiciary in BE7, BE11, BE12, BE14, BE26, BE27, BE36, BE38 (led to 
acquittal by court of appeal due to lack of corroboration), BE39, BE41. Result of searches and other evidence given weight in BE9, 
BE15. 
132 As noted by Smit in the Netherlands. See Smit (2011), supra n. 68, p. 193. In the Netherlands: restraint from prosecutors and 
investigators in tackling exploitation outside the sex industry because of the guarded reaction of the judiciary in trafficking for 
labour exploitation cases. 
133 Bowen (2017), supra n.122, p.223. See for instance the proliferation of county line drug cases in 2017-2018, not mentioned 
during the drafting phase of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, in HM Government (21 March 2019), supra n.102, p.10-11. 
134 Anderson, A., ‘Case Comment: Trafficking people for exploitation: arranging and individual’s entry into United Kingdom with 
intention to exploit’ (2012) Criminal Law Review 1, 63-66, p. 65; R v SK [2011] ECWA Crim 1691, para 43 (UK1). 
135 GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p.40. 
136 GRETA (2013), supra n.1, p.14. 
137 GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p.40. 
	 223	
with the local police, which does not always give priority to the fight against human 
trafficking.’138  
 
Despite the differences in the common and civil law systems in the procedural 
role of judges and the legal sources relied upon to implement the domestic 
implementation of these criminal offences, both jurisdictions acknowledge the need for 
a modern legal interpretation of labour exploitation. As reiterated by the Belgian 
judiciary in BE39: 
 
The facts are serious. They refer to harming another person by using of his/her 
vulnerability. It is intolerable that in the 21st century, individuals make others work 
harshly in exchange of a mere lodging and a pittance. This reflects an absolute lack 
of respect for these people, even if they were staying illegally, especially since there 
was no insurance against accidents at work [emphasis added].139 
 
In England & Wales, the Court of Appeal premises such a position on the need 
to acknowledge the prevalence of labour exploitation amongst groups as ‘economic 
exploitation of non-EEA nationals is a growing and largely undisclosed problem,’140 
and as such the issue should not be dismissed as an archaic notion remote from 
contemporary life in the United Kingdom.141 Similarly, taking into consideration the 
ECHR as a living instrument (UK12) there is a need to interpret the law in line with 
changes in society’s behaviour and tolerance of such behaviour (UK30).  
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
 
The presentation of the composition and contextualisation of the file study reveals the 
complexity of the factual circumstances being handled by the courts in criminal 
cases. The composition and contextualisation of the file study reflect the differing 
	
138 Centre fédéral pour l’analyse des flux migratoires, la protection des droits fondamentaux des étrangers et la lutte contre la traite 
des êtres humains (2013), supra n.72, p. 41; GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p.40. 
139 BE39 - Unofficial translation, original text: “Les faits sont graves. Ils portent ainsi atteinte à la personne d'autrui dont la 
situation de faiblesse dans laquelle celle-ci se trouve, a été exploitée de manière poussée. Il est intolerable qu'au 21ème siècle, des 
individus en fassent travailler durement d'autres contre un simple hébergement et une pitance. Cela traduit un manque absolu de 
respect pour ces personnes, fussent-elles en séjour illégal et ce d'autant plus qu'il n'existait aucune assurance contre les accidents 
du travail.” 
140 AG Ref Nos. 37, 38 and 65 of 2010 [2010] EWCA Crim 2880, paras 12- 13.  
141 R v SK [2011] ECWA Crim 1691, para 41 (UK1). 
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policy approaches to migration in the European Union, as presented by Radeva 
Berket.142  
 
The first, prevalent in Belgium, refers to migration policies that govern the 
entry, residence and employment of third country nationals on EU territory. The 
composition of the file study reflects a large number of third country nationals as civil 
parties wherein the offences on the indictment amount to a combination of social 
criminal offences and criminal offences related to their irregular entry, residence and 
employment.  
 
By contrast, the file study in England & Wales is reflective of the labour 
mobility policies establishing regulations for the movement of workers between EU 
Member States. The legal, financial and social implications of these policies on cross-
border movement vary, which is also reflected in the file study, with England & Wales 
including offences related to fraudulent misrepresentations in social security benefits 
and financial exploitation, that are not prominent in Belgium due to the non-access to 










CHAPTER 8 – The formal and substantive criminalisation of labour 









0. Introduction and structure of the chapter 
 
In Part I we illustrated that a criminal law approach has been the most prominent to 
tackling human trafficking. Consequently, the implementation of effective law 
enforcement and crime prevention measures have not only sought to increase the 
number of prosecutions but also to act as a deterrent. 143 However, despite such an 
emphasis on prosecution, global and regional prosecution rates remain 
disproportionately low. Convictions for trafficking for labour exploitation remain 
difficult to obtain. We contend that one of the main reasons for this is the lack of a 
definition of exploitation in the trafficking protocol and the subsequent conflation of 
terms such as forced labour, slavery and trafficking for labour exploitation, despite their 
very different legal meanings (as demonstrated in Chapters 1-3). Subsequently, as we 
have seen in Chapter 4, in light of the lack of a ‘universally-accepted definition of 
trafficking for labour exploitation’ a fragmented understanding of human trafficking 
exists, with the offence meaning different things in different countries.144 Therefore, 
despite many EU Member States having amended national legislation to ensure the 
transposition of the regional definition, there is still a significant gap in how domestic 
	
143 The Anti Trafficking monitoring group (2018), supra n. 97, p. 34. 
144 Radeva Berket (2015), supra n.67, p. 369-370. 
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legislatures understand labour exploitation both within the confines of the human 
trafficking paradigm and beyond. England & Wales and Belgium, the two domestic 
jurisdictions that are the object of comparative scrutiny, are indicative of such a 
proclamation. In this part of the thesis, we present the comparative analysis of the two 
national legal orders that seeks to determine how labour exploitation is formally and 
substantively criminalised (present Chapter), judicially applied and interpreted 
(Chapters 9 & 10) in national legal orders.  
 
With this chapter we answer the following subsidiary research question: How 
is labour exploitation substantively and formally criminalised in Belgium and England 
& Wales? 
 
We will preliminarily analyse the implementation of labour exploitation 
offences into the domestic criminal law of these two jurisdictions by the legislative and 
the judiciary. The analysis of the criminalisation of labour exploitation is twofold: first, 
the formal criminalisation of labour exploitation by the legislative considers the 
intentions of the law makers which is secondly overseen by the substantive 
criminalisation which considers the judicial adjudication of black-letter law.145 The 
dual focus acknowledges that whilst there is an overall goal of compliance with 
supranational legal obligations to domestically prohibit labour exploitation, there are 
limits to the political process when it comes to determining the legal framework. Thus, 
the role of the courts is vital to ensuring that labour exploitation is handled and assessed 
in a consistent manner.  
 
There are no standalone offences for slavery, servitude and forced labour in 
Belgian law.146 Instead the legislative opted for an approach whereby slavery, servitude 
and forced or compulsory labour are encompassed by the understanding of human 
trafficking as ‘work or living conditions contrary to human dignity’ and the removal of 
the means element.147 The adoption of a broader human trafficking definition sought to 
	
145 Lacey, N., ‘Theorising criminalisation through the modalities approach: A critical appreciation’ (2018) International Journal 
for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 7(3), 122‐127, p.123. ‘formal criminalisation’—the full range of offences, whether 
created by statute or customary/common law, which are valid in a particular legal system at any moment in time—and ‘substantive 
criminalisation’—the patterns of enforcement of those valid norms through the criminal process. 
146 Clesse, Ch.-E., La traite des êtres humains. Législation belge éclairée des législations française, luxembourgeoise et suisse, 
(Bruxelles: Larcier, 2013), p.268. See also BE13, BE41, BE44 where courts reiterated that there is no criminalisation of forced 
labour or economic exploitation as standalone offences and thus, to identify human trafficking, this element alone is not sufficient.  
147 Huberts & Minet (2014), supra n. 16, p.34. 
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overcome difficulties such as the non-recognition of victim status amongst potential 
victims. 148 Thus the analysis of the legal framework in Belgium, will focus upon a 
single provision: human trafficking for the purposes of economic exploitation (Section 
1). Conversely, in England & Wales, the criminalisation of human trafficking saw a 
gradual development, first introduced in 2002 but restricted to the traffic of prostitution 
and then extended in material scope to include other forms of exploitation in accordance 
with the international and regional definition (Section 1). Only in 2009, were the 
standalone offences of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour criminalised 
(Section 2). In this thesis, we employ the following legal terms: human trafficking, 
slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour. However, since 2013, the British 
parliament have opted for the operationalisation of a non-legal term in both law and 
policy matters: “modern slavery.”149 We posit that “modern slavery” is ‘an umbrella 
term that covers the offences of human trafficking, slavery, servitude and forced 
labour.’150 Importantly, this terminology has been criticised as it ‘fails to recognise 
historical and local perspectives that may be linked to the notion and past experiences 
of slavery,’ hence we refrain from employing such terminology. 151  
 
Finally, we seek to place significant emphasis on the role of law (Chapters 1-4), 
lawmakers and the legal professionals who are responsible for implementing and 
interpreting the law (see Section 4, Chapter 7, current Chapter & Chapters 9-10). 
However, it is acknowledged that a wide variety of actors are integral to tackling such 
a complex phenomenon, and indeed, the law alone is not the answer; as the UK Anti-
trafficking Monitoring Group noted, ‘it takes an emergent complex system to fight a 
complex system.’152 Whilst our focus here is on the judiciary in criminal cases, there is 
of course a need for further examination of the role of judges in administrative and 
labour jurisdictions as well as other professionals such as labour inspectors, trade 
unions and civil society actors. Nevertheless, we contend that the insight into the 
criminalisation of the labour exploitation offences (present Chapter) and the judicial 
interpretation of the concept of exploitation (Chapters 9 & 10) is valuable to subsequent 
efforts that seek to conceptualise exploitation in a broader setting.  
	
148 Huberts & Minet (2014), supra n. 16, p.34. 
149 Despite the change in terminology at a UK level, legislation in Scotland and Northern Ireland retains references to human 
trafficking, rather than the term modern slavery. 
150 HM Government (2017), supra n.7, p.4. 
151 The Anti Trafficking monitoring group (2018), supra n. 97, p. 10.  
152 The Anti Trafficking monitoring group (2018), supra n. 97, p. 13.  
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1. Human trafficking for labour exploitation in Belgium and England & Wales: 
the legal framework  
 
Both Belgium and England & Wales have adopted an incremental approach to the 
development of anti-trafficking law and policy.  
 
In Belgium, the Law of 10 August 2005 amending various provisions with a 
view to strengthening action to combat people-smuggling and trafficking in 
human beings and the practices of slum landlords [Loi du 10 août 2005 modifiant 
diverses dispositions en vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite et le trafic des êtres 
humains et contre les pratiques des marchands de sommeil] created a specific and 
exclusive offence of human trafficking defined in Article 433quinquies of the Criminal 
Code: 153  
 
§1. Any form of recruitment, transport, transfer, harbouring, subsequent reception of 
a person, including exchange or transfer of control over that person, in order to:  
1° enable the offences as mentioned in Articles 379, 380 para. 1 and para. 4, and in 
Art. 383bis para. 1 to be committed against that person;  
2° enable the offence as mentioned in Art. 433ter to be committed against that person 
3° employ or enable that person to be employed in circumstances contrary to human 
dignity;  
4° remove or enable the removal of organs or tissues on that person in violation of the 
Law of 13 June 1986 concerning the removal and transplant of organs; 
5° or, to force the person to commit a crime or an offence against his will. 
Except for the case as mentioned under point 5, it is irrelevant whether the person 
referred to in paragraph 1, gave his/her consent to the intended or actual exploitation. 
 
The 2005 Law sought domestic conformity with international and European 
legal obligations by clearly distinguishing between human trafficking and human 
smuggling.154 Furthermore, shifting the offence of human trafficking from immigration 
	
153 Beernaert, M-A., & Le Cocq, P., ‘La loi du 10 août 2005 modifiant diverses dispositions en vue de renforcer la lutte contre la 
traite et le trafic des êtres humains et contre les pratiques des marchands de sommeil’, (2006) Revue de droit pénal et de 
criminologie 86(4), 335-406, p. 365-66; Exposé des motifs du Projet de loi du 14 janvier 2005 modifiant diverses dispositions en 
vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite et le trafic des êtres humains, (Doc. Parl. St. Chambre, 2004-2005, DOC 51 1560/001), p. 
3. 
154 Previously Article 77bis, Law of 15 December 1980 on foreigners had combined the offences of human trafficking, human 
smuggling and slum landlord into one provision: Huberts, C., ‘Les innovations de la loi du 10 août 2005 modifiant diverses 
dispositions en vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite et le trafic des êtres humains et contre les pratiques des marchands de 
sommeil’, (2006) Journal du Droit des Jeunes n°251, 6-22; Minet, J. F., ‘Chronique de Législation Pénale (année 2005)’ (2006) 
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law into the Criminal Code ensured that the criminalisation of trafficking in human 
beings was applicable to all persons, including Belgian nationals, and not just victims 
who are non-Belgian EU citizens or third country nationals.155 Article 433quinquies 
was subsequently amended by the Law of 29 April 2013 amending the Article 
433quinquies of the Criminal Code with a view to clarify and extend the definition 
of trafficking in human beings [Loi du 29 avril 2013 visant à modifier l'article 
433quinquies du Code pénal en vue de clarifier et d'étendre la définition de la traite 
des êtres humain]:  
 
The offence of human trafficking constitutes the recruitment, transport, transfer, 
housing, harbouring, taking control or transferring of the control over a person for the 
purposes of:  
1° the exploitation of prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation; 
2° the exploitation of begging; 
3° carrying out work or providing services in conditions contrary to human dignity; 
4° removal of organs in violation of the law of 13 June 1986 on the removal and 
transplantation of organs, or human tissue in violation of the law of 19 December 2008 
on the acquisition and use of human tissue for the purposes of medical applications in 
humans or scientific research; 
5° or having this person commit a crime or a misdemeanour against his or her will. 
Except for the case as mentioned under point 5, it is irrelevant whether the person 
referred to in paragraph 1, gave his/her consent to the intended or actual exploitation. 
 
The purpose of the reform was twofold: to transpose the EU Directive 36/2011 
and to further clarify and extend the definition of trafficking in human beings.156 
Further legislative reform in 2013, increased the maximum financial penalty of 50,000 
Euros for human trafficking for all forms of exploitation by introducing a requirement 




Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie 3, 240–280, p. 277; Beernaert & Le Cocq (2006), supra n.153, p. 350-51; Travaux 
parlementaires, Projet de loi modifiant diverses dispositions en vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite et le trafic des êtres humains 
et contre les pratiques des marchands de sommeil, rapport fait au nom de la commission de la justice, 2005, no 3-1138/4, p. 3. 
155 Minet (2005), supra n. 154, p278; Beernaert & Le Cocq (2006), supra n.153, p. 365-66; GRETA (2013), supra n.1, p. 11. 
156 Rapport fait au nom du Groupe de travail traite des êtres humains, de Mme DÉSIR, 27 mars 2012, (Doc. parl ., Sénat, n° 5-
1073/1); Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de l’Intérieur et des Affaires administratives, de M. CLAES, 4 mai 2010 (Doc. 
parl., Sénat, n° 4-1631/1); Huberts & Minet (2014), supra n. 16, p. 6; GRETA (2013), supra n.1, p.11. 
157 Introduced by Loi du 24 juin 2013 portant répression de l’exploitation de la mendicité et de la prostitution, de la traite et du 
trafic des êtres humains en fonction du nombre de victimes; GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p.7.  
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Both iterations of the human trafficking offence in Belgium include two of the 
three constituent elements of the regional/international human trafficking definition: 
the act (the material element/ actus reus) and the exploitation (the moral element/ mens 
rea). The means element is included as aggravating factors (Article 433septies). The 
composition of the offence was deliberate with a view to ensuring the effectiveness of 
criminal proceedings and the protection of victims158 by, as GRETA notes, ‘mak[ing] 
it easier to come up with the evidence required to convict the perpetrators of 
trafficking.’159 Furthermore, the framing of the scope of the domestic offence of human 
trafficking is intentionally broader than the international definition, as explained by 
Kurz it ‘is intended to cover not just forced labour and slavery but also situations of 
very low salaries or of obviously unhealthy or dangerous conditions of labour.’160  
 
In England & Wales,161  following ratification of the Palermo Protocol, the 
offence of human trafficking was introduced by Section 145 Nationality, Immigration 
and Asylum Act 2002, however it was limited to the traffic of prostitution.162 The non-
prohibition of trafficking for labour exploitation was deemed to be justified any other 
forms of exploitation dealt with by existing measures; namely, immigration offences 
and other offences concerning fraud, forgery (of documents), false imprisonment, 
sexual offences and offences against the person.163 Soon thereafter, the gap created by 
the non-prohibition of trafficking for labour exploitation was filled with the entry into 
force of Section 4 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 
2004 which established the offence of trafficking people for exploitation.164  
 
	
158 Beernaert & Le Cocq (2006), supra n.153, p. 367.  
159 GRETA (2013), supra n.1, para 52. 
160  Kurz, F., ‘Lutte contre le travail forcé, l’exploitation économique et la traite des êtres humains: des concepts légaux à 
l’application judiciaire’, (2008) Chroniques de droit social 317-330; ILO, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking Casebook of 
Court Decisions: a training manual for judges, prosecutors and legal practitioners, Special Action Programme to Combat Forced 
Labour, Geneva, 2009, p.58. 
161 When discussing England & Wales, the analysis – unless appropriate – does not refer to the legal and policy development in 
the devolved jurisdictions (namely, Scotland and Northern Ireland). The law and policy on anti-trafficking is split between 
devolved administrations and central government: criminal law, education and health policy relevant to victim protection, support 
and assistance are devolved matters and border an immigration control, including the identification of trafficking victims are 
reserved matters. GRETA (2012), supra n.5, p.13. 
162 Amended by s14 Policing and Crime Act 2009 and s109 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.  
163 House of Commons Library, Asylum and Immigration: the 2003 Bill Research Paper 03/88 (11 December 2003), p.84. See 
application of Human Rights Act 1998 for successful Article 4 claims involving trafficking and forced domestic labour where 
appellant was held in “conditions of virtual slavery”, Miss T v SSHD (AS/03637/2004), in which a policy apology for failing to 
investigate is also (para. 75). See also Immigration Appeals Authority decisions: Miss AB v SSHD (CC/64057/2002); Ms Tam Thi 
Dao v SSHD (HX/28801/2003). Cited in Anderson & Rogaly (2005), supra n.21. 
164 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Bill (HC Bill 109), 2003 (as introduced in House of Commons), 27 
November 2003; Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (c.19); Further amended by section 110 The 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (c. 9). 
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(1)A person commits an offence if he arranges or facilitates the arrival in [or entry 
into] the United Kingdom of an individual (the “passenger”) and— 
(a)he intends to exploit the passenger in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, or 
(b)he believes that another person is likely to exploit the passenger in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere. 
(2)A person commits an offence if he arranges or facilitates travel within the United 
Kingdom by an individual (the “passenger”) in respect of whom he believes that an 
offence under subsection (1) may have been committed and— 
(a)he intends to exploit the passenger in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, or 
(b)he believes that another person is likely to exploit the passenger in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere. 
(3)A person commits an offence if he arranges or facilitates the departure from the 
United Kingdom of an individual (the “passenger”) and— 
(a)he intends to exploit the passenger outside the United Kingdom, or 
(b)he believes that another person is likely to exploit the passenger outside the United 
Kingdom. 
(4) For the purposes of this section a person is exploited if (and only if)— 
(a)he is the victim of behaviour that contravenes Article 4 of the Human Rights 
Convention (slavery and forced labour), 
(b)he is encouraged, required or expected to do anything as a result of which he or 
another person would commit an offence under the Human Organ Transplants Act 
1989 (c. 31) or the Human Organ Transplants (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 
1989/2408 (N.I. 21)), 
(c)he is subjected to force, threats or deception designed to induce him— 
(i)to provide services of any kind, 
(ii)to provide another person with benefits of any kind, or 
(iii)to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind, or 
(d)he is requested or induced to undertake any activity, having been chosen as the 
subject of the request or inducement on the grounds that— 
(i)he is mentally or physically ill or disabled, he is young or he has a family relationship 
with a person, and 
(ii)a person without the illness, disability, youth or family relationship would be likely 
to refuse the request or resist the inducement. 
(5)A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable— 
(a)on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, to 
a fine or to both, or 
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(b)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, to 
a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both. 
 
Whilst the expansion of human trafficking to also include labour exploitation 
was a welcome development, the limitation of the occurrence of labour exploitation to 
human trafficking has been critiqued by Balch and others as it failed to prohibit the 
labour exploitation of non-trafficked individuals.165 Furthermore, the legislation was 
placed within the context of immigration law, ‘suggesting that the primary concern is 
with the movement and its facilitation as constituting the kernel of the crime of 
trafficking, rather the forced labour aspects or abusive employment relations.’ 166 
Section 2 Modern Slavery Act 2015 overcame this issue by consolidating all human 
trafficking offences into one criminal law statue:  
 
(1)A person commits an offence if the person arranges or facilitates the travel of 
another person (“V”) with a view to V being exploited. 
(2) It is irrelevant whether V consents to the travel (whether V is an adult or a child). 
(3)A person may in particular arrange or facilitate V’s travel by recruiting V, 
transporting or transferring V, harbouring or receiving V, or transferring or 
exchanging control over V. 
(4)A person arranges or facilitates V’s travel with a view to V being exploited only if— 
(a)the person intends to exploit V (in any part of the world) during or after the travel, 
or 
(b)the person knows or ought to know that another person is likely to exploit V (in any 
part of the world) during or after the travel. 
(5) “Travel” means— 
(a)arriving in, or entering, any country, 
(b)departing from any country, 
(c)travelling within any country. 
(6) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless 
of— 
(a)where the arranging or facilitating takes place, or 
(b)where the travel takes place. 
(7)A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if— 
	
165 Balch, A., Regulation and enforcement to tackle forced labour in the UK: a systematic response?, JRF Programme Paper (2012), 
p. 11; Percival, R., Cases in Brief Forced or compulsory labour: Attorney General’s Reference of 2013 (Connors and Others) 
[2013] EWCA Crim 324; March 26, 2013 (2013) Archbold Review 4, 3, p.3. 
166 Anderson & Rogaly (2005), supra n.21, p. 8.  
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(a)any part of the arranging or facilitating takes place in the United Kingdom, or 
(b)the travel consists of arrival in or entry into, departure from, or travel within, the 
United Kingdom. 
 
In the remainder of this section, we will further consider the aforementioned 
legislative developments in both jurisdictions through examination of the formal and 
substantive criminalisation of each constituent element in turn (Sections 2.1 – 2.3) and 
will provide insight into how the material scope of exploitation has been understood by 
the judiciary (Section 2.4).  
 
1.1. The actus reus: a replica or an evolutionary element? 
 
In Belgium, the material element of the human trafficking offence (i.e. the act) 
predominantly replicates the European definition by listing a number of actions.167   
 
Law of 10 August 2005:  
Any form of recruitment, transport, transfer, harbouring, subsequent reception of a 
person, including exchange or transfer of control over that person 
 
Law of 29 April 2013: 
The recruitment, transport, transfer, housing, harbouring, taking control or 
transferring of the control over a person 
 
The file study reveals that the courts have been required to provide further 
reflection upon the interpretation of recruitment, as there is no legal reference or 
further explanation provided in the travaux préparatoires.168 As a result, the Court of 
Cassation of Brussels in 2014 (BE13), ruled that the understanding of recruitment must 
be in accordance with its ordinary meaning [sens commun]. Moreover, the court held 
that the recruitment of the exploited person may be triggered by the individual 
themselves who solicits the work in the first instance.169 The ruling of the Court of 
Cassation was further developed by the Court of Appeal in Mons in 2016 (BE18). 
	
167 Beernaert & Le Cocq (2006), supra n.153, p. 367.  
168 BE13, BE18, BE24 
169 BE13, applied subsequently in BE16 and BE21, BE24, BE27, BE36. See also Kurz (2008), supra n. 160.  
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Whilst accepting that the term should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning 
and that the individual themselves could have solicited employment in the first instance, 
the court also held that there was no need for a contract or a “lien de subordination” – 
see below. In a high-profile case of the Court of First Instance in Brussels in 2017 
(BE47), the understanding of recruitment was also crucial to the acquittal of the 
defendants of alleged social penal offences but not of the human trafficking offence. 
Here, the court made a distinction between the accommodation and recruitment of the 
domestic workers and held that the recruitment agency employed by the royal family 
were responsible for recruitment and procedures related to the status of the staff and 
their remuneration. 
 
The 2013 law slightly amended the phrasing of the 2005 Act which referred to 
shifting or transferring control [passer ou transferer le contrôle]. The new law states 
that a person may take or transfer control [prendre ou transferer le contrôle]. The new 
terminology sought to shift away from the previous text - as the reference to transfer of 
control restricted the scope to the sale of a person - by making reference to the exertion 
of control over another person for the purposes of exploitation and asserting a more 
expansive meaning that could include other forms of exploitation such as illegal 
adoption of forced marriage.170  
 
The scope of the meaning of exercise of authority [lien de subordination] was 
the focus of the courts in the early cases in the sample in 2010.171 Here the court 
emphasised that the status of workers as active associates [associés actifs] did not 
exonerate the parties from the exploitation, as the designation of ‘active associates was 
purposefully implemented with the intention of avoiding the formal status of workers, 
	
170 Centre fédéral pour l’analyse des flux migratoires, la protection des droits fondamentaux des étrangers et la lutte contre la traite 
des êtres humains, traite des être humain construire des ponts (2013), supra n.72, p. 39; Amendement au projet de loi visant à 
modifier l’article 433quinquies du Code pénal afin de clarifier et d’étendre la définition de la traite des êtres humains à 
l’exploitation sexuelle, Doc.parl., Chambre, Doc 53-2607/002, p. 4.  
171 In BE1 a non-employment relationship was argued on the basis that the defendants tried to contest the recruitment of undeclared 
employment of foreign national by stating that the workers were sub-contracted or active partners. But the judge ruled that no 
evidence existed to demonstrate that this is plausible. All sub-contractors identified could not be contacted as they did not exist 
and did not work on the construction site and the designation of active partners was done with the intention of avoiding the formal 
status of workers, especially taking into account the services accomplished; In BE2, the court cited La loi du 30 avril 1999 relative 
à l'occupation des travailleurs étrangers and the expansive understanding of subordination : "la seule constatation de prestations 
de travail effectuées sous l'autorité d'une autre personne, quel que soit le cadre juridique sous couvert duquel elles sont effectuées, 
rentre dans le champs d 'application de la loi du 30 avril 1999." (Cour du Travail de Bxl, 5 janv.2006, www .juridat.be, 
n°JS61783_1).  
In BE3 the Exercise of control/authority was assessed according to the control of hours worked and daily instructions on the precise 
content of the tasks to be carried out was considered to be in accordance with the subordination that is characteristic of a contract 
of employment. 
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especially taking into account the services accomplished’ 172  and that the lien de 
subordination can be determined as: ‘exercised a real authority over the workers, not 
only controlling workers' hours of work, but also giving them daily instructions on the 
precise content of the tasks to be performed.’173 In one case, the court emphasised that 
the determination of a lien de subordination was sufficient on the basis that there is 
evidence that the individual exercised control over the acts of the individual (BE3).  
 
In England & Wales, as the offence of human trafficking has evolved, so too 
has the constituent action element. However, unlike the international, regional and 
Belgian definitions, the focus of the actus reus of human trafficking is limited to the 
arranging or facilitation of travel of an individual.  
 
Sections 4 (1), (2), (3), Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 
2004  
(1) A person commits an offence if he arranges or facilitates the arrival in [or entry 
into] the United Kingdom of an individual (the “passenger”)  
(2) A person commits an offence if he arranges or facilitates travel within the United 
Kingdom by an individual (the “passenger”) 
(3) A person commits an offence if he arranges or facilitates the departure from the 
United Kingdom of an individual (the “passenger”) 
Sections 2(1), (3), (5), Modern Slavery Act 2015  
(1) A person commits an offence if the person arranges or facilitates the travel of 
another person (“V”) […] 
(3) A person may in particular arrange or facilitate V’s travel by recruiting V, 
transporting or transferring V, harbouring or receiving V, or transferring or 
exchanging control over V […] 
(5) “Travel” means— (a)arriving in, or entering, any country, (b)departing from any 
country, (c)travelling within any country. 
 
	
172  BE1 – Unofficial translation, original text: “les sous-traitants désignés soit n'ont pu être contactés, l'identité s'avérant 
fantaisiste, soit ne sont manifestement pas intervenus sur les chantiers; Quant aux associés, il apparait, compte tenu des prestations 
effectivement accomplies, qu'ils n'avaient cette qualité que de façon formelle, pour éviter l'application du statut réel d'ouvrier.” 
173 BE2 - NB this does not refer to human trafficking, but the illegal employment of foreign workers. Unofficial translation, original 
text: “exerçait sur les ouvriers une réelle autorité, contrôlant non seulement les heures de prestations des ouvriers, mais leur 
donnant également des directives quotidiennes sur le contenu précis des tâches à executer.” 
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Prior to 2015, the geographical scope of the action was limited to travel into 
(arrival/entry), within or out of (departure) the United Kingdom (the UK), until section 
2(5)-(6) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 broadened the action to include “any 
country”.174 The lifting of geographical limitations ensures compliance with regional 
standards, by recognising that any persons may be potential victims of trafficking, 
including internally trafficked persons such as British nationals and foreign nationals 
who are not trafficked until they are within the UK.  
 
In the international and regional definition, travel is only one of the possible 
actions and as such is not a necessary condition.175 However, despite efforts to broaden 
the scope of the action element so that there is consistency with the international and 
regional definition, the action element remains limited. The rationale for such a 
limitation is explained in the explanatory notes of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, where 
it is stated that such wording is sufficient to ‘the definitions of trafficking set out in the 
Convention on Action against Trafficking and the associated Palermo Protocol’176 and 
‘a broad interpretation of what is meant by ‘travel’, including movement over a very 
small space is taken in practice.’177 The limitation continues to add to the confusion in 
judicial proceedings when trying to determine the meaning and scope of “travel” where 
the movement of a victim is difficult to prove.178 Consequently, despite the fact that 
‘human trafficking is the process of bringing a person into exploitation’, the framing of 
human trafficking from the perspective of the process (movement/travel), rather than 
its outcome (exploitation) fails to consider the abuse of a position of vulnerability of 
potential victims of trafficking.179  
 
The file study confirms that the narrow action element of the human trafficking 
offence is reflected in the interpretation of the offence, with the focus solely on the 
facilitation or arranging of travel. The other actions (recruiting, harbouring, 
	
174 See also amendments in The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 amended the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004. 
175 HC, Notices of Amendments given up to and including Friday 31 October 2014 Consideration of Bill Modern Slavery Bill, As 
Amended, 31 October 2014.  
176 Modern Slavery Act 2015 (c.30) Explanatory Notes, Section 2; Modern Slavery Bill (HC Bill 8), 2014-2015 (as introduced in 
the House of Commons), 10 June 2014, Explanatory notes, p.5. 
177 HM Government (21 March 2019), supra n.102, p.12. 
178 GRETA (2012), supra n.5, p.24; HC, Report stage, 4 November 2014, Col 714; See evidence given by Nadine Finch in HC, 
Public Bill Committee Modern Slavery Bill [First Sitting], 21 July 2014, p. 19-20; HC, Public Bill Committee Modern Slavery Bill 
[Fourth and Fifth Sitting], 4 September 2014 p.5. The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, Class Acts? Examining modern slavery 
legislation across the UK, October 2016, p. 6; HM Government (21 March 2019), supra n.102, p. 10-11. 
179 The Anti Trafficking monitoring group (2018), supra n. 97, p. 10.  
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transferring, receiving, and transferring or exchanging control of persons) are excluded 
as acts on their own. Instead, they must be intricately connected to the arrangement or 
facilitation of travel.180 In UK19, the judge noted that since the action was limited to 
the facilitation or arrangement of travel or - in the case of a conspiracy - have 
knowledge of an agreement to arrange or facilitate the travel of a person within the UK 
for the purpose of exploitation, then the mere employment or recruitment of a trafficked 
person is not sufficient for a conspiracy to traffic. 181 
 
1.2. The mens rea: the intention to exploit as the end result   
 
The second element that is present in both jurisdictions is that the action must be taken 
for the purpose of exploitation, constituting the mens rea of the offence.   
 
In Belgium, it is reiterated that the crime of human trafficking, must be 
examined in its entirety, namely through the identification of the two constituent 
elements: the act and purpose of exploitation. However, of particular importance to the 
Belgian context is the mens rea element that demonstrates the criminal intention to 
exploit an individual, as Kurz writes:  
 
It is the presence of this specific intention (to exploit) that makes the behaviour of an 
author punishable under the offence of trafficking in human beings.182  
 
For trafficking to be established, the mens rea must determine that the act was 
followed by one of the forms of exploitation listed in Article 433 of the Criminal Code. 
For the purposes of establishing the existence of a dol special, it is sufficient for the 
individual to have knowledge of the illicit character of the facts to be perpetrated against 
the victim, without it being necessary for them to know precisely the nature of the 
	
180 UK1, UK3, UK4, UK7, UK9, UK19, UK25. 
181 UK19, judge’s directions to jury: “I must direct you that as a matter of law simply employing someone who has been trafficked 
is not enough, even if you know they’ve been trafficked there must be something more.” 
182 Kurz, F., ‘Un trop long dimanche de finançailles ou lorsque le respect de la tradition mène au viol et à la traite des êtres humains,’ 
(2014) Journal du Droit des Jeunes N° 339, 23-29. Unofficial translation, original text: “C’est la présence de cette intention 
spécifique qui rend le comportement de tel auteur punissable du chef de traite des êtres humains.” 
The lack of means in the Belgian definition of human trafficking means that the offence is considered to be broad enough to include 
other forms of exploitation. In the Netherlands, the distinction is made according to the intended purpose of the exploitation. ‘The 
essence of the Dutch anti-trafficking law is ‘(intended) exploitation’, regardless of nationality of the victims or of movement across 
borders. So, no difference is made between trafficked and non-trafficked victims for forced labour: exploiting Dutch citizens in 
labour situations can also be considered trafficking’ In Smit (2011), supra n. 68, p. 186. 
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offence.183 The new trafficking offences provide precision as to the meaning of the 
moral element: for the purpose of exploitation [la finalité de l’exploitation] shifting 
away from the requirement of coercion, as outlined by the means with the hope that the 
investigation and prosecution of human trafficking would be facilitated.184  
 
In contrast, in England & Wales, three standards of mens rea have emerged 
from the legislative development: i) the person intends to exploit (2004 Act and 2015 
Act); ii) the person believes that another person is likely to exploit (2004 Act) and iii) 
the person knew or ought to have known that another person is likely to exploit (2015 
Act). The offence of human trafficking for labour exploitation (in both 2004 and 2015) 
establishes a high threshold by requiring that at the time of the action, intention to 
exploit or belief that another person would exploit was present at the time when the 
alleged victim arrived/entered in, travelled within or departed from the United 
Kingdom.185 The file study affirmed this with the judges’ route to verdict clearly 
requiring the jury to be sure that the defendant, at the time of the action, intended to 
exploit the victim (UK7, UK9). Nevertheless, Balch raises the problematic nature of 
the need for knowledge of exploitation when applying it to operational circumstances. 
The concrete impact being that for many cases involving labour exploitation, ‘there 
have been issues over the difficulty in being able to prove intent to traffic’ leading to 
not-guilty verdicts in cases brought to trial.186  
 
Such difficulties are arguably limited in practice since both legislative 
frameworks do not require actual exploitation to have taken place, it is sufficient to 
merely demonstrate the intent to exploit.187 Whilst the courts have acknowledged this 
distinction (BE41, BE44, UK1), we can discern from the file study that the factual 
circumstances of the cases refer to situations of de facto exploitation. The implication 
of this being that the assessment of mens rea is often premised upon the evaluation of 
actual exploitation. For example, in Belgium, the file study demonstrates that in the 
majority of cases, the judicial examination of the dol special rested upon the 
	
183 Clesse (2013), supra n. 111, p.199. 
184 Huberts (2006), supra n.154, p. 8; The pre-legislative documents acknwoeldge that the draft law is stricter than the Directive as 
it does not require proof of all of the elements for the behavior to be consider criminal, see Exposé des motifs du Projet de loi du 
14 janvier 2005 modifiant diverses dispositions en vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite et le trafic des êtres humains, (Doc. Parl. 
St. Chambre, 2004-2005, DOC 51 1560/001), p. 11.  
185 Anderson (2012), supra n.145, p. 66. 
186 See more discussion on examples of cases that have led to not-guilty verdicts in Balch (2012), supra n.165, p. 33-38.  
187 Huberts (2006), supra n.154, p. 11; Beernaert & Le Cocq (2006), supra n.153, p. 368. 
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interpretation of “conditions contrary to human dignity” (BE13). The same is applicable 
to the British file study, where in all human trafficking cases, the actual exploitation 
had occurred and as a result it is inevitable that judges and juries alike assess the 
evidence of actual exploitation in order to ascertain whether or not an offence has been 
committed, as noted by the Court of Appeal in R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1981 (UK1). 
Interestingly, in that case, the first instance judge ruled that intention to exploit can be 
proven by actual exploitation. However, this position was overruled by the Court of 
Appeal, whereby it was affirmed that human trafficking is an “offence of intention”, 
and as a result it is not a necessary element for the jury’s consideration, as it was for 
the Crown to prove that the appellant had arranged or facilitated the complainant’s entry 
into the United Kingdom intending when [the defendant] did so to exploit [the 
complainant], as noted by the Court of Appeal:  
 
The judge's third question in the written directions he provided to the jury, which 
invited them to consider whether at some stage during the period covered by the 
indictment the appellant had in fact exploited the complainant, was not a question 
which the jury had to answer in the affirmative if it was to convict the appellant.188  
 
Subsequent cases affirmed that the intention to exploit must be proven to exist 
at the time of the action (facilitation or arranging of travel into the UK, within the UK, 
departure from the UK) but that the exploitation does not necessarily have to 
subsequently take place. 189 Again, however, in practice the file study reveals that the 
assessment of the mens rea is heavily influenced by the factual circumstances of actual 
circumstances presented in evidence to the court. 
  
1.3. The means: a non-constituent element   
 
Unlike the regional and international definition of human trafficking, both jurisdictions 
do not envisage the means to be a compulsory constituent element.190 The lack of means 
in both jurisdictions suggests prima facie, that coercion, threats or menace of violence 
are not required to fulfil the action.  
	
188 R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1981, para 38 (UK1).  
189 UK1, UK3, UK5, UK7, UK8, UK9, UK15. 
190 UNODC, Model Law against Trafficking in Persons V.09-81990 (E) (2010), p. 25 
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In England & Wales, the means have not been included as a constituent element 
of the offence of human trafficking since the Sexual Offences Act 2003, where the 
domestic legislation went beyond the Palermo Protocol by not requiring traffickers to 
use coercion, deception or force during recruitment of trafficking victims. Prior to this, 
the offence of trafficking for prostitution was characterised by a person exercising 
‘control over prostitution by another if for purposes of gain he exercises control, 
direction or influence over the prostitute’s movements in a way which shows that he is 
aiding, abetting or compelling the prostitution.’191 Ultimately, the non-inclusion of 
means was justified as part of the need to ensure that children or vulnerable people were 
covered by the offence, as it is impossible to force, coerce or deceive a child or a 
vulnerable person. Nevertheless, the non-inclusion of means in the offence of human 
trafficking has been critiqued by GRETA and efforts were made, to no avail, in 
subsequent legislative drafting to include this element so as to align the definition of 
trafficking with international definition.192  
 
In Belgium, however, the means are considered as aggravating factors in 
Article 433septies of the Criminal Code, that correspond to the means of the regional 
human trafficking offence and the aggravating offences required under Article 24 of 
the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.193  
 
Article 433septies of the Criminal Code, aggravating circumstances: 194   
 
1° when the offence has been committed against a minor;  
2° when it has been committed in abusing the situation of vulnerability in which a 
person is due to its precarious or illegal administrative status, its precarious social 
situation, its age, its pregnancy, a disease, an infirmity or a mental or physical 
deficiency, in such a way that the person does not have another genuine and acceptable 
choice to not submit to the abuse;  
	
191 Section 145(4) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 
192 See example given for justification for non-inclusion of means: HC, Public Bill Committee Modern Slavery Bill [Fourth and 
Fifth Sitting], 4 September 2014, p.15. 
193 See reference to EU Framework Decision in Exposé des motifs du Projet de loi du 14 janvier 2005 modifiant diverses 
dispositions en vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite et le trafic des êtres humains, (Doc. Parl. St. Chambre, 2004-2005, DOC 51 
1560/001), p. 4; GRETA (2013), supra n.1, p.20. 
194 Exposé des motifs du Projet de loi du 14 janvier 2005 modifiant diverses dispositions en vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite 
et le trafic des êtres humains, (Doc. Parl. St. Chambre, 2004-2005, DOC 51 1560/001), p.15 Collège des procureurs généraux, 
Circulaire n° COL 1/2007 du Collège des Procureurs généraux près les Cours d’appel, Traite des êtres humains - Directive 
ministérielle relative à la politique de recherches et poursuites en matière de traite des êtres humains (17 javnier 2007), p. 11.  
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3° when it has been committed using, directly or indirectly, fraudulent means, violence, 
threats or any form of coercion [or by resorting to abduction, abuse of authority or 
deception];  
3°bis when it has been committed with the mean of offering or accepting payments or 
any other advantages to obtain the consent of a person having authority over the 
victim;] 
4° when the life of the victim has been put in danger deliberately or due to serious/gross 
negligence; 
5° when the offence has caused a disease apparently incurable, a [personal work 
incapacity of more than four months], the complete loss of an organ or of the use of an 
organ; or a serious mutilation;  
6° when the concerned activity constitutes a regular activity;  
7° when it constitutes an act of participation to the principal or accessory activity of 
an organisation, and this regardless whether the perpetrator has or has not the quality 
of leader/director. 
 
Such an approach deliberately goes beyond the European and international 
definition of the offence, in order to focus on the effectiveness of criminal proceedings 
and the protection of victims.195 The rationale for lowering the threshold of the offence 
by placing the means as aggravating factors is threefold. First of all, the threshold of 
proof is already relatively high due to the obligation to identify the existence and 
knowledge of the purpose of exploitation.196 Secondly, the means, in particular the 
abuse of a position of vulnerability, are subject to a variety of interpretations and can 
lead to an acquittal as it is very often the case that it has not been possible to provide 
sufficient proof of this constituent element.197 Thirdly and finally, the requirement of a 
means element would mean that where the situation was found to be an affront to human 
dignity i.e. exploitation, it would be contradictory to then reject the premise due to the 
fact that a means had not been used. 198 Thus, the Belgian domestic legal framework 
has shifted the focus away from the abuse of the victim, instead targeting the 
exploitation.199 This is demonstrated by the Belgian courts referring to the “means” as 
	
195 Huberts (2006), supra n.154, p. 10. Adopted by the aforementioned Working Group and supported by the Minister of Justice in 
the legislative debates; GRETA (2013), supra n.1, p.20. 
196 Huberts & Minet (2014), supra n. 16, p.14. 
197 Huberts (2006), supra n.154, p. 10; Exposé des motifs du Projet de loi du 14 janvier 2005 modifiant diverses dispositions en 
vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite et le trafic des êtres humains, (Doc. Parl. St. Chambre, 2004-2005, DOC 51 1560/001), p. 
15. 
198 Huberts (2006), supra n.154, p. 11. 
199 Council of Europe, Action against trafficking in human beings: prevention, protection and prosecution, Proceedings of the 
regional seminar in Oslo on 1-2 November 2006, p. 37, cited in: Human rights without frontiers international, Trafficking in Human 
	 243	
aggravating factors in relation to both the action and purpose elements, in stark contrast 
to the European and international definition of human trafficking where the use of the 
means is connected to the action element only.  
 
In 2016, further amendments to the criminalisation of human trafficking were 
adopted with a view to bringing the domestic law in conformity with regional standards, 
this led to an extension of the list of aggravating factors to include: kidnapping, 
deception, abuse of authority, giving or receiving of payments or benefits to allow for 
a person having control over another person.200 Notwithstanding, GRETA still has 
concerns as to the extent to which the construction of the human trafficking offence 
‘may lead to confusion with other criminal offences, or to possible difficulties regarding 
mutual assistance in the anti-trafficking field with countries which have incorporated 
the means in their own definition of human trafficking and as to the interpretation of 
Article 4(b) of the Convention concerning victim’s consent.’201 However, despite this 
recommendation, the domestic authorities contend that the offence is well-understood 
and appropriately implemented as there is no evidence of any difficulties in the 
application of the definition of human trafficking.202  
 
In practice, the courts frequently consider at least one of the means as an 
aggravating circumstance, particularly the abuse of vulnerability (as will be discussed 
further in Chapter 9).203 However, it is logical to find this aggravating circumstance at 
the top of the list given that the original domestic legislation prior to 2005 and the 
international and regional definitions of human trafficking place a significant emphasis 
on the abuse of situation of vulnerability.204 The file study affirms this, with at least one 
aggravating factor included on the indictment in all cases. The most common 
aggravating factor was an abuse of position of vulnerability (44 cases) with the most 
common form of vulnerability identified by the judges being an illegal administrative 
situation. 205  In 19 cases, the position of vulnerability by virtue of the illegal 
	
Beings in Belgium -2007-2008, 4 MAY 2009, p.2; Service Public Féderal Justice (2011 – 2012), supra n.55,  pp.53. 
200 Loi du 31 mai 2016 complétant la mise en œuvre des obligations européennes en matière d’exploitation sexuelle des enfants, 
de pédopornographie, de traite des êtres humains et d’aide à l’entrée, au transit et au séjour irréguliers, M. B., 8 juin 2016; GRETA 
(2017), supra n.2, p.8; Myria (2016), supra n.71, pp. 72-74. 
201 GRETA (2013), supra n.1, p.20; GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p.37. 
202 GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p.37. Service Public Féderal Justice (2011 – 2012), supra n.54, pp.53-54. 
203 GRETA (2013), supra n.1, p.20; Service Public Féderal Justice (2011 – 2012), supra n.54, pp.47-50.  
204 Service Public Féderal Justice (2011 – 2012), supra n.53, p.49. 
205 For discussion on link between migration and human trafficking see Vermeulen (2006), supra n.55, pp57-58. The recent findings 
from FRA research found that vulnerability linked to residence status is the most important risk factor causing or contributing to 
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administrative status was explicitly included on the indictment. In 17 cases, the obiter 
dicta states that the defendant had abused the position of vulnerability that arose from 
the precarious or illegal administrative and social situation of the victims. Among these 
cases, the court also refers to lack of financial resources, social isolation, and 
dependence upon the defendant. In three cases, the judgment refers to other forms of 
vulnerability including physical disability (BE15), socially precarious situation (BE32) 
and financial precariousness (BE42). In 5 cases, the judgment did not make explicit 
reference to the vulnerability that had been abused. The least common aggravating 
factor was the commission of an offence against a minor (1 case).  
 
 
No aggravating factors  0 
Frequent activity  16 
Abuse of vulnerability  44 
Position of power/authority  25 
Constitutes an act of participation in the principal or subsidiary activity 
of an association, whether or not the offender is a leader 
5 
Against a minor 1 
Making direct or indirect use of fraud, violence, threats 5 
Table 10: The occurrence of aggravating factors in the file study of Belgian criminal cases 
 
In one case (BE17), the court found the defendants guilty of human trafficking, 
as the two constituent elements had been satisfactorily identified, however, the court 
dismissed the aggravating factor. The court held that the defendants did not abuse the 
situation of vulnerability, as i) the victims requested to work for them and ii) the 
defendants were themselves in an administratively and financially precarious situation 
and as such did not abuse the position of vulnerability of the victims. The court held 
that: 
 
It is not sufficiently established that the defendants abused their authority over A.A., 
nor that they abused his precarious administrative and social situation in such a way 
that he had no other real and acceptable choice than to submit to this abuse, all the 
	
labour exploitation. In particular more than one third of the workers interviewed identified it in Belgium, see FRA (2019), supra 
n.22, p. 67. 
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more that it appears from the file that it is the name A.A. himself who, through the 
intermediary of the person called A.K., asked to be able to work for the defendants, 
and that the record reveals that they too were in a precarious administrative and 
financial situation at the time.206 
 
In Belgium, there are two instances where the judge stated that the 2005 offence 
consisted of three elements, and not two:  
 
• Indeed, trafficking in human beings is constituted of 3 elements namely an action 
(transport, recruitment, accommodation), a means (use of force, constraint, situation 
of vulnerability, ...) and a purpose (exploitation of prostitution, exploitation of labour, 
servitude, ...).207  
• It follows that the abuse of a particularly vulnerable situation has proved to be both a 
constitutive element and an aggravating circumstance since the victims had no other 
alternative in this case.208 
 
The judicial understanding of the law in these cases is incorrect, the 2005 human 
trafficking offence only consisted of two constituent elements with the means as 
aggravating circumstances. Notwithstanding these two anomalies, in future cases, the 
judiciary makes explicit reference to the correct composition of the offence, requiring 
first the need to identify the action and purpose elements before considering the means 
as aggravated circumstances during sentencing.209 
 
Finally, the non-inclusion of the means as a constituent element brings into 




206 BE17 - Unofficial translation, original text: “il n'est pas suffisamment établi que les prévenus ont abusé de leur autorité sur le 
nommé A.A., ni qu'ils ont abusé de sa situation administrative et sociale précaire de manière telle qu'il n'avait pas d'autre choix 
véritable et acceptable que de se soumettre à cet abus, ce d'autant plus qu'il ressort du dossier que c'est le nommé A.A. lui-même 
qui, par l'intermédiaire de la nommée A.K., a demandé à pouvoir travailler pour les prévenus, et que le dossier révèle qu'eux aussi 
étaient dans une situation administrative et financière précaire à l'époque.” 
207 BE4- Unofficial translation, original text: “En effet, la traite des êtres humains est déterminée par 3 éléments à savoir une 
action (transport, recrutement, hébergement), un moyen ( recours à la force, contrainte, situation de vulnérabilité, …) et une 
finalité ( exploitation de la prostitution, exploitation du travail, servitude, ...).” 
208 BE5- Unofficial translation, original text: “II en résulte que l'abus de situation particulièrement vulnérable est avéré tant comme 
élément constitutif que comme circonstance aggravante dès lors que les victimes n'avaient en l'espèce, aucune autre alternative.” 
209 BE1, BE16, BE20, BE24, BE26, BE29, BE31, BE39.  
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In Belgium, the principle of irrelevance of consent has been affirmed. 210 
However, with its introduction there were fears that it would lead to a flood gate 
moment, whereby the scope of the offence would be widened to include persons who 
willingly consented to undignified working conditions in Belgium for a higher salary 
than in their country of origin. In practice, such a situation has not arisen, which Clesse 
et al attribute to the diligence of the judiciary in ensuring that the offence of human 
trafficking is preserved in its strictest terms. 211  Additionally, the recognition of 
aggravating circumstances in the majority of cases suggests that it would be rare for a 
judge not to have to consider the impact of such means on the individual’s agency.212 
Such an approach is vital to combating and overcoming a tolerance of exploitation – as 
discussed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the importance of focusing on the mens rea is also 
necessary so as to avoid social dumping whereby the state is seen to be tolerating or 
accepting practices that impact on vulnerable workers who can end up in a position of 
debt-bondage.213 
 
In England & Wales, the statute book was silent as to the relevance of consent 
from 2002-2009 for the offence of human trafficking. Subsequently, the irrelevance of 
consent to the action but not to the purpose element – contrary to the provision of 
irrelevance of consent in international and regional definitions where means have been 
used - is now explicitly stated in Section 2(2) Modern Slavery Act 2015. In stark 
contrast, the irrelevance of consent in Northern Ireland and Scotland is not restricted to 
the travel but encompasses all acts.214 As for the irrelevance of consent to exploitation, 
this issue was raised during the passage of the Bill but to no avail.215  
 
1.4. The forms of exploitation: an exhaustive approach with some flexibility?   
 
The Belgian human trafficking offence formally prohibits an exhaustive list of five 
forms of exploitation: prostitution of others, begging, put (in)to work [mise au travail] 
	
210  Rapport fait au nom du Groupe de travail traite des êtres humains, de Mme DÉSIR, 27 mars 2012, (Doc. parl ., Sénat, n° 5-
1073/1), p. 23. Huberts & Minet (2014), supra n. 16, p.15. CECLR, Rapport annuel 2009 - traite des êtres humains, 2010, p. 24. 
211 Clesse, Ch.-E., et al, La traite des êtres humains et le travail forcé, (Bruxelles: Larcier, 2014), p. 9-10. 
212 Huberts & Minet (2014), supra n. 16, p.16. 
213 Clesse, Ch.-E., et al, Traité des êtres humains/ Mensenhandel Mensensmokkel, (Brugge: Die Keure 2010), p.44 & p.56. 
214 Section 1(5) The Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2015, 
Section 1(3) Human Trafficking and Exploitation Act (Scotland) 2015. 
215 HL, Committee [1st sitting], 1 December 2014, Cols 1132-1133. 
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in conditions contrary to human dignity, organ removal and criminal exploitation.216 
Whilst the inclusion of the exploitation of begging extended the scope of 
exploitation,217 the formulation of this exhaustive list suggests that the offence is more 
restrictive than the previous article 77bis, whose unlimited scope meant that certain 
situations that were not explicitly mentioned could have amounted to a form of 
constraint or an abuse of vulnerability.218 The exclusion of the phrase “at a minimum” 
– contrary to the international and regional definitions - in the Law of 10 August 2005 
and the Law of the 29 April 2013, restricts the scope of exploitation to these five 
situations. Such an exhaustive approach risks the non-inclusion of new forms of 
exploitation subject to a legislative amendment. 219  
 
When it comes to labour exploitation, the scope of this form of exploitation is 
twofold: first it refers to those who put to work [la mise au travail] individuals in 
conditions contrary to human dignity; secondly, it also refers to those who allow/enable 
putting someone to work [permettre la mise au travail], which was not previously 
criminalised in the Criminal Code. 220  Furthermore, the characterisation of labour 
exploitation as “conditions contrary to human dignity” leads to a determination of a 
threshold that implies a minimum level of severity, which is indicative of the fact that 
the law on human trafficking does not seek to tackle the informal labour market [travail 
en noir]. 221 Instead, such a formulation sought to ensure that the domestic law went 
beyond the minimum standards required of the European legislation at the time (the 
2002 Framework Decision222) which determined that labour exploitation is considered 
to include at a minimum forced or compulsory labour or services, slavery and practices 
similar to slavery.223 
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of conditions contrary to human dignity was deemed 
	
216 Exposé des motifs du Projet de loi du 14 janvier 2005 modifiant diverses dispositions en vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite 
et le trafic des êtres humains, (Doc. Parl. St. Chambre, 2004-2005, DOC 51 1560/001),  p. 3; NB the forced criminality was added 
following a request from the Centre pour l'Egalité des chances et la lutte contre le Racisme.  
217 Huberts (2006), supra n.154, p. 7; Exposé des motifs du Projet de loi du 14 janvier 2005 modifiant diverses dispositions en vue 
de renforcer la lutte contre la traite et le trafic des êtres humains, (Doc. Parl. St. Chambre, 2004-2005, DOC 51 1560/001), p. 5. 
218 Beernaert & Le Cocq (2006), supra n.153, p. 371 
219 Beernaert & Le Cocq (2006), supra n.153, p. 368; Huberts & Minet (2014), supra n. 16, p.21. 
220 Huberts (2006), supra n.154, p. 9. 
221 Exposé des motifs du Projet de loi du 14 janvier 2005 modifiant diverses dispositions en vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite 
et le trafic des êtres humains, (Doc. Parl. St. Chambre, 2004-2005, DOC 51 1560/001),  p. 19 cited in Beernaert & Le Cocq (2006), 
supra n.153, p. 371; and Huberts (2006), supra n.154, p. 9; Clesse et al (2014), supra n.211, p. 27. 
222 Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings, OJ L 203, 1.8.2002, p. 1–4.  
223 Huberts (2006), supra n.154, p. 9; Clesse et al (2014), supra n. 211, p. 27. Conversely the research reveal that the courts never 
refer to the forms of exploitation listed in regional instruments when determining labour exploitation (see Chapter 9).  
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necessary to assist with judicial interpretation, where previously, difficulties in the 
interpretation of abuse of vulnerability led to the non-identification of human 
trafficking, even where there were indicators of such conduct such as confiscation of 
identity documents and poor working conditions. 224 Another reason for the focus on 
the notion of human dignity is that it is a legal term that is known in the Belgian 
constitution as well as in other areas of domestic law such as social security. 225 
However, despite its existence in Belgian law, it is important to note that the concept 
of human dignity is not legally defined and remains a vague concept.226 As such Clesse 
et al note that it is difficult to determine the extent to which it is possible to ‘transform 
a philosophical imperative into a juridical notion.’227 The legislative provided further 
input as to the understanding of the concept of human dignity in Annex 1 of the 
Directive of 14 December 2006, wherein human dignity is defined as:  
 
More precisely, violating human dignity means demeaning what characterises the 
human nature, namely the abilities of body and spirit: 
- Ability of body: the ability to move, to provide for someone’s own means, to 
seek treatment... It thus refers to the physical ability to support in a free or equal way 
someone’s essential means.  
- Ability of spirit: the social and intellectual abilities available in equal ways 
within society. 
If it can be considered that violating human dignity consists of depriving the individual 
of the exercise of one of these two abilities, it remains to be seen when the threshold of 
incompatibility with human dignity is breached/crossed.228 
 
Whilst the exact interpretation of economic exploitation with regards to 
conditions that are contrary to human dignity is left to the judiciary (as we will see in 




224 Huberts & Minet (2014), supra n. 16, p.35 
225 Huberts & Minet (2014), supra n. 16, p.36 
226 Vermeulen (2006), supra n.55, p.18. 
227 Clesse et al (2014), supra n. 211, p. 28. See also ILO (2009), supra n.159, p.59; Kurz (2008), supra n. 160. 
228 Circulaire n° COL 1/2007, supra n.194, annex 1. Unofficial translation, original text: “Plus précisément, porter atteinte à la 
dignité humaine, c’est avilir ce qui caractérise la nature humaine, c’est-à-dire, les facultés de corps et d’esprit :- Faculté de corps 
: la faculté de se mouvoir, de subvenir à ses besoins, de se soigner,… Il s’agit donc de la capacité physique à subvenir de façon 
libre ou égale à ses besoins essentiels.- Faculté d’esprit : les facultés intellectuelles et sociales mobilisables de façon égale au sein 
d’une société.Si l’on peut considérer que porter atteinte à la dignité humaine consiste à priver l’individu de l’exercice de l’une ou 
de ces deux facultés, reste à savoir à quel moment le seuil d’incompatibilité avec la dignité humaine est atteint.” 
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From the remuneration aspect, an income/salary manifestly not linked with a very 
important number of working hours effectively worked, eventually without resting day, 
or the provision of non-remunerated services can be qualified as conditions contrary 
to human dignity. If the remuneration given is inferior to the average monthly minimum 
income, as referred to in a collective agreement concluded within the National Labour 
Council, it would constitute for the trial judge an undeniable indication of labour 
exploitation. Working conditions contrary to human dignity can equally be established 
by the activity/work of one or more workers in a working environment manifestly not 
conform with the norms provided for by the Law of 4 April 1996 relating to the 
wellbeing of workers when executing their work.229 
 
Subsequent guidance as to the indicators of exploitation have been provided by 
a Circular of the College of Public Prosecutors [Collège des Procureurs généraux près 
les Cours d’appel], the indicators relate to: displacement, identity and travel documents, 
working conditions of trafficking victims, income of trafficking victims, 
accommodation, violation of physical integrity of victims, freedom to move of victims, 
and links with the country of origin of the presumed victims of trafficking.230 
 
Whilst the legislative was keen to ensure a distinction between illegal 
employment in the context of labour law and economic exploitation in the context of 
criminal law,231 labour exploitation is deemed to be understood in an expansive manner, 
in order to capture future iterations of the phenomenon.232 However, such a broad 
understanding does raise interpretative difficulties when it comes to determining the 
threshold between labour market abuses and conditions that are contrary to human 
dignity especially ‘in situations that do not present obvious signs of exploitation.’233 
	
229 Huberts (2006), supra n.154, p. 9. Unofficial translation, original text: “Du point de vue de la rémunération, un salaire 
manifestement sans rapport avec un très grand nombre d'heures de travail prestées, éventuellement sans jour de repos, ou la 
fourniture de services non rétribués peuvent être qualifiés de conditions contraires à la dignité humaine. Si la rémunération servie 
est inférieure au revenu minimum mensuel moyen tel que visé à une convention collective conclue au sein du Conseil National du 
Travail, cela constituera pour le juge du fond une indication incontestable d'exploitation économique. Des conditions de travail 
contraires à la dignité humaine peuvent également être établies par l'occupation d'un ou plusieurs travailleurs dans un 
environnement de travail manifestement non conforme aux normes prescrites par la loi du 4 août 1996 relative au bien-être des 
travailleurs lors de l'exécution de leur travail.” 
230 Collège des procureurs généraux, Circular n° COL 10/2004 du Collège des Procureurs généraux près les Cours d’appel, 
Politique de recherches et poursuites en matiere de traite des etres humains – adaptation de la directive du ministre de la justice 
(COL 12/99) (30 avril 2004), annex, pp35-38. Circulaire n° COL 1/2007, supra n.194, annex 2, pp4-8. 
231 Clesse et al (2014), supra n. 211, p. 27, Exposé des motifs du Projet de loi du 14 janvier 2005 modifiant diverses dispositions 
en vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite et le trafic des êtres humains, (Doc. Parl. St. Chambre, 2004-2005, DOC 51 1560/001), 
p. 19.  
232 Proposition de loi visant a modifier l’article 433 quinquies du code penal afin d’etendre la definition de la traite des extres 
humains a l’explotiation sexuelle, Doc. Parl. Ch. Repr. Sess. Ord 2010, no 0328/001, p. 4 cited in Clesse et al (2014), supra n. 211 
p. 28. 
233 Huberts & Minet (2014), supra n. 16, p.36. See also: Beernaert & Le Cocq (2006), supra n.152, p. 372-374; Clesse et al (2014), 
supra n. 211 p. 28. 
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Furthermore, with the entry into force of the Law of 10 August 2005, guidance on the 
meaning of exploitation in the context of labour confirmed that the interpretation of the 
concept “contrary to human dignity” should be ‘in accordance with the norms, values 
and criteria of the European Union and not of the country of origin of the victim at the 
risk of taking into account a commonly lower standard.’234 However, commentators 
such as Beernaert & Le Cocq have queried whether or not such a restrictive approach 
to human trafficking is sufficient to satisfy the international legal obligations, which 
requires the prohibition of forced labour, servitude and slavery. This critique such 
suggests that all forms of forced labour are contrary to human dignity as the latter has 
a larger material scope and consequently may be the subject of an evolutionary judicial 
interpretation that could be contrary to the principle of legality.235 Furthermore, we 
reiterate the observation by GRETA that the requirement to demonstrate the existence 
of conditions contrary to human dignity (the exploitation) is contrary to the 
international definition of human trafficking whereby an action that does not lead to 
exploitation still constitutes human trafficking due to the intention to exploit.236  
 
In order to address these concerns, the Law of 29 April 2013 amended and 
extended the meaning of economic exploitation to include the work or services of a 
person contrary to conditions of human dignity.237 The drafters recognised that the 
addition of services meant that a more evolutionary approach could be adopted allowing 
for flexibility of the types of exploitation that could be included in the material scope, 
such as domestic servitude, bogus self-employment and forced surrogacy whilst being 
in compliance with regional legal obligations.238  
 
In England & Wales, the initial introduction of a single offence for traffic in 
prostitution (Section 145(4) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002) was 
restricted to the exercise of control over prostitution by another. However, subsequent 
	
234 La Directive du Ministre de la Justice COL 10/04 relative à la politique de recherches et poursuites en matière de traite des êtres 
humains du 20 avril 2004 cited in Beernaert & Le Cocq (2006), supra n.153, p. 372. Unofficial translation, original text: “il y a 
lieu de se référer aux normes, valeurs et critères de l’Union européenne et non à ceux des pays d’origine de la victime, sous peine 
de prendre en compte une norme communément plus basse.” 
235 Beernaert & Le Cocq (2006), supra n.153, p. 372-374. 
236 GRETA (2013), supra n.1, paras 52-53. Also raised by Malpani, R., ‘Criminalsing human trafficking and protecting the victims,’ 
in Andrees, B., & Belser, P., (eds) Forced Labour: Coercion and Exploitation in the private economy (New York: Lynne Reiner 
Publishers, 2009) p.140. 
237 GRETA (2013), supra n.1, p.21. 
238 Rapport fait au nom de la Commission Justice de la Chambre, de MME Daphné DUMERY, 4 mars 2013, (Doc.parl., Chambre, 
Doc 53- 2607/004), p.10; Clesse (2013), supra n. 111, p.204; Centre fédéral pour l’analyse des flux migratoires, la protection des 
droits fondamentaux des étrangers et la lutte contre la traite des êtres humains, traite des être humain (2013) supra n.72, p. 40.  
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iterations led to a wider understanding of human trafficking for sexual exploitation.239 
Nevertheless, labour exploitation was still excluded, until the introduction of the 
offence of trafficking for exploitation (Section 4 Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004) which saw a drastic shift in the domestic 
understanding of exploitation, with an exhaustive list of four more forms of 
exploitation. 240  Accordingly, the combination of the two trafficking offences was 
deemed sufficient to ‘meet the minimum requirements of the UN protocol.’241  
 
In 2015, Section 3 Modern Slavery Act 2015 outlines the meaning of 
exploitation in the context of human trafficking as a categorical list of seven forms of 
exploitation, namely: slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour, sexual 
exploitation, removal of organs etc, securing services etc by force, threats or deception, 
and securing services etc from children and vulnerable persons.  
 
The legislative developments pertaining to the human trafficking offence have 
resulted in an increased recognition of the scope and scale of labour exploitation. 
Nevertheless, two aspects of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 require further attention. 
First of all, whilst the statute does not explicitly refer to the provision or request of 
services such as forced begging or criminal activities, 242 the Government contend that 
subjecting someone to “force, threats or deception” to induce them to provide 
“services” or “benefits of any kind” is sufficient to cover these forms of exploitation as 
well as any new forms of exploitation that may emerge.243  
 
Second, another issue of contention that arose during the drafting of the Modern 
Slavery Act was the discrepancy between a person who was subjected to exploitation 
listed in Section 3 but was not trafficked in accordance with Section 2. In particular, 
could an individual be deemed to have sufficient access to redress under the Section 1 
	
239 Sections 57-59 Sexual offences act 2003. 
240 GRETA(2012), supra n.5, p.23; unfortunately, no pre-legislative/ bill passage documents etc that demonstrate the choice of 
wording/forms of exploitation in particular sub-sections c and d; NB the draft bill did not list four forms of exploitation, simply 
three, no request or inducement to something, having been chosen on the grounds of personal characteristics.  
241 House of Commons Library (2003), supra n. 163, p.87. 
242 See Amendment 35 in HC, Public Bill Committee Modern Slavery Bill [Fourth and Fifth Sitting], 4 September 2014, Cols 123-
156, p.14. 
243 Modern Slavery Act 2015 (c.30) Explanatory Notes section 3(5); Modern Slavery Bill (HC Bill 8), 2014-2015 (as introduced in 
the House of Commons), 10 June 2014, Explanatory notes. 
This would include forcing a person to engage in activities such as begging or shop theft. It is not necessary for this conduct to be 
a criminal offence. HC, Public Bill Committee Modern Slavery Bill [Fourth and Fifth Sitting], 4 September 2014, Cols 123-156, 
pp.17-19. 
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standalone offences of exploitation since they are limited to three forms of exploitation 
listed in Section 3(1), but not the other forms of exploitation listed in Section 3(2)-(6). 
244 Ultimately, it was stated that the provisions in Section 1 were sufficiently broad 
enough to cover scenarios where a person who was not trafficked but had been 
exploited in accordance with one of the forms of exploitation listed in Sections 3(2)-
(6):   
 
Under clause 1, where you have slavery, servitude or forced labour, if somebody is 
forcing them to beg, you might say that that could be forced labour or compulsory 
labour, or you may be able to do it under some other common-law offences and statutes 
that we have. 245 
 
However, such a position is of particular concern to certain groups of potential 
victims: namely, children and those who are exploited for the purposes of benefit fraud. 
For child victims, especially in light of the absence of (a) specific provision(s) that 
tackled child trafficking/exploitation, this was a concern since ‘some of the things that 
children experience as exploitation do not fall neatly into that particularly strong 
definition [of slavery, servitude and forced labour].’ 246 The same principle applies to 
those who are being exploited for the purposes of benefit fraud etc, and do not per se 
have their labour or services exploited.247 Suggestions to close this gap by adding “or 
other forms of exploitation” (amendment 36 & 38)/“and/or any of the types of 
exploitation listed in section 3 of this Act” (amendment 37) to the wording of the clause 
that prohibited slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour were rejected.248 
The principle objection being that the standalone offences would then be unacceptably 
broadened in scope.249 As a result, the pre-legislative focus on the issue of human 
trafficking, 250  resulted in the presentation of exploitation in the context of human 
trafficking as a categorical and exhaustive rather than definitional. Consequently, the 
apparent deference to the understanding of the Article 4 jurisprudence provides 
	
244 See Amendment 29 in HC, Public Bill Committee Modern Slavery Bill [Second And Third Sitting], 2 September 2014, Cols 45-
122, p. 6. 
245 See evidence given by Alison Saunders, Director of Public Prosecutions in HC, Public Bill Committee Modern Slavery Bill 
[First Sitting], 21 July 2014, Cols 145-206, p. 5.  
246 House of Commons (2014), supra n. 178, p. 20.  
247 See also in the Netherlands, where compelled to undertake mobile phone contracts was considered to amount to human 
trafficking in Rijken, C., (ed.) Combating trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011), p. 
506. 
248 HC, Notices of Amendments as of 2 September 2014, Consideration of Bill Modern Slavery Bill, 2 September 2014, P.1.  
249 HC, Public Bill Committee Modern Slavery Bill [Second And Third Sitting], 2 September 2014, Cols 45-122, p. 16. 
250 Craig, G., ‘Human Trafficking and the UK Modern Slavery Bill’, (2015) Social Inclusion 3(1), 136-139, p.137; and Craig 
(2017), supra n.136, p.20. 
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flexibility and allows for the evolution of the understanding of exploitation but at the 
same time does not always provide clarity in the domestic context. This issue very much 
comes to the fore in England & Wales, as will be demonstrated in the following section 
when discussing the formal and substantive criminalisation of the standalone offences 
and the significant Article 4 jurisprudence that heavily domestic judicial precedent.  
 
2. Slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour in England & Wales: the 
legal framework  
 
In this section we will consider the legislative development of standalone labour 
exploitation offences in England & Wales only, as there are no standalone offences of 
slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour in the Belgian criminal law.251  
 
Before shifting the focus onto England & Wales, we will, however, briefly 
acknowledge reference to slavery and enslavement in Belgian law, that is made explicit 
in the context of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity.252 The 
Belgian authorities consider that the current legal framework, as outlined in the travaux 
préparatoires of the Criminal Code, to be sufficient to comply with the minimum 
obligation imposed by international instruments, which refer to forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, and servitude. 253 Whilst Belgian law is 
silent as to the meaning of exploitation in relation to the standalone offences, one 
reference is made to the meaning of “enslavement” in a 2007 Ministry of Justice 
Directive which states that ‘enslavement means the act of reducing a person to 
servitude, slavery or extreme dependency.’254 The Directive further states that the 
notions of slavery and debt bondage are defined with reference to the Slavery 
Convention of 1926 and the Supplementary Convention on the abolition of slavery, the 
slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery of 1956.255 In the absence 
of standalone offences in Belgium, the remainder of this section will solely consider 
the criminalisation, the judicial application and clarification of the composition and 
ingredients of the standalone offences in England & Wales.  
	
251 BE13, BE41, BE44. 
252 Article 136 ter-quater, Criminal Code, Book II, Title I, Chapter III. 
253 GRETA (2013), supra n.1, p.21; GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p. 38.  
254 Circulaire n° COL 1/2007, supra n.194, annex 1. annex 1, p.2. 
255 Circulaire n° COL 1/2007, supra n.194, annex 1. annex 1, p. 2. 
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2.1. Criminalising standalone offences in domestic law: from political 
resistance to proclamations of global flagship status256 
 
The introduction of the standalone offences into domestic criminal law was a process 
which was initially met with reluctance and trepidation.257 Whilst the signature and the 
ratification of the Council of Europe Anti-trafficking Convention led to a 
‘harmonisation of UK legislation with other European countries,’ the domestic criminal 
law was restricted since human trafficking (arranging or facilitation of travel) was a 
pre-condition for any prosecution involving labour exploitation.258 Such a position was 
rectified in a last minute House of Lords amendment to the Draft Coroners and Justice 
Bill 2009 (7 days prior to Royal Assent),259 in recognition of the inadequacy of the 
existing law whereby criminalisation of trafficking ‘does not apply where a person is 
subjected to forced labour conditions within the UK without having been trafficked.’260 
Resistance to the further criminalisation suggested that existing legislation - trafficking 
for labour exploitation, complicity in such trafficking, assault, false imprisonment, 
blackmail, harassment and a range of employment-related offences - was sufficient to 
comply with Article 4 obligations to protect people from slavery, servitude or forced or 
compulsory labour.261 Interestingly, the same argument arose in relation to the Modern 
Slavery Bill, where evidence heard by the Select Committee revealed ‘that [the 
prosecution] numbers are low, but “we get them on something else.”’ 262 We interpret 
such an assertion to mean that despite the provision of standalone offences, a gap in the 
current law on labour exploitation exists, particularly in situations where the threshold 
of the existing offences is not met.  
 
	
256 Home office, Home Secretary speech on modern slavery, Speech given by the Home Secretary on Modern Slavery on 4 
December 2013 at Reuters Conference, Published 6 December 2013; Prime Minister’s Office, PM speech to UNGA on modern 
slavery: 'behind these numbers are real people, Published 27 December 2017. 
257 See reference to the Government’s position in C.N. v. United Kingdom, 13 November 2012, Application No. 4239/0, paras 56-
58. 
258 Balch (2012), supra n.165, p. 11; Skrivankova, K., Between decent work and forced labour: examining the continuum of 
exploitation, JRF programme paper (November 2010), p. 8. 
259 HL, Public Bill Committee Coroners and Justice Bill [6th sitting] House of Lords 9 July 2009, Col 851; Amendment 15 in HL, 
Public Bill Committee Coroners and Justice Bill [3rd Sitting] House of Lords 28 October 2009, Col 399. The Bill as introduced 
did not refer to criminalization of labour exploitation offences, nor did it refer to any amendments to the existing trafficking law, 
Coroners and Justice Bill, Bill 9, 54/4. 
260 HL, Public Bill Committee Coroners and Justice Bill [6th sitting] House of Lords 9 July 2009, Col 852; See reference to Matrix 
Chambers members in HL, Short Debate: Immigration: Migrant Workers 27 October 2009 Vol 713, Col 1153. 
261 See referenc to Lord Bach in in HL, Short Debate: Immigration: Migrant Workers 27 October 2009 Vol 713, Col 1144; HL, 
Public Bill Committee Coroners and Justice Bill [3rd Sitting] House of Lords 28 October 2009, Col 1181. 
262 HC, Public Bill Committee Modern Slavery Bill [Fourth and Fifth Sitting], 4 September 2014, Cols 123-156, p.7. 
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The standalone offences of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour 
introduced in Section 71 Coroners and justice Act 2009 were subsequently repealed 
by Section 1 Modern Slavery Act 2015, disconnecting exploitation from the 
trafficking process and immigration framework.263  
Section 71 Coroners and justice Act 2009 
(1)A person (D) commits an offence if— 
(a)D holds another person in slavery or servitude and the circumstances are such that 
D knows or ought to know that the person is so held, or 
(b)D requires another person to perform forced or compulsory labour and the 
circumstances are such that D knows or ought to know that the person is being required 
to perform such labour. 
(2) In subsection (1) the references to holding a person in slavery or servitude or 
requiring a person to perform forced or compulsory labour are to be construed in 
accordance with Article 4 of the Human Rights Convention (which prohibits a person 
from being held in slavery or servitude or being required to perform forced or 
compulsory labour). 
 
Section 1 Modern Slavery Act 2015 
 (1)A person commits an offence if— 
(a)the person holds another person in slavery or servitude and the circumstances are 
such that the person knows or ought to know that the other person is held in slavery or 
servitude, or 
(b)the person requires another person to perform forced or compulsory labour and the 
circumstances are such that the person knows or ought to know that the other person 
is being required to perform forced or compulsory labour. 
(2) In subsection (1) the references to holding a person in slavery or servitude or 
requiring a person to perform forced or compulsory labour are to be construed in 
accordance with Article 4 of the Human Rights Convention. 
(3) In determining whether a person is being held in slavery or servitude or required 
to perform forced or compulsory labour, regard may be had to all the circumstances. 
(4) For example, regard may be had— 
(a)to any of the person's personal circumstances (such as the person being a child, the 
person's family relationships, and any mental or physical illness) which may make the 
person more vulnerable than other persons;   
	
263 Percival (2013), supra n. 165,  p.3. 
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(b)to any work or services provided by the person, including work or services provided 
in circumstances which constitute exploitation within section 3(3) to (6).   
(5)The consent of a person (whether an adult or a child) to any of the acts alleged to 
constitute holding the person in slavery or servitude, or requiring the person to perform 
forced or compulsory labour, does not preclude a determination that the person is 
being held in slavery or servitude, or required to perform forced or compulsory labour. 
 
Overall, there are no significant differences in the formulation of the criminal 
offences as introduced in 2009 and those that were amended in 2015. There is one 
significant distinction in the 2015 version, wherein the principle of irrelevance of 
consent was explicitly introduced in the Section 1(5) Modern Slavery Act 2015, prior 
to this, the irrelevance consent of the individual was not explicitly stated in statute. 
Indeed, the provision was not included in the first version of the draft bill when 
introduced into parliament. Subsequent efforts were made to introduce the irrelevance 
of consent to the standalone offences in order to clarify that ‘a person may still be in 
slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour even where physical escape is 
practically possible, recognising that people can be held in slavery by psychological 
means as well as physical restraint.’ 264  Of course, such an interpretation of the 
irrelevance of consent has subsequently been confirmed in the case of Chowdury, 
whereby the European Court affirmed that restriction is not a sina que non condition 
for forced labour (Chapter 3). The proposed amendments not only sought coherence 
with the same provision in the human trafficking offence but also the issue of consent 
was considered to be problematic when it comes to the identification, investigation and 
prosecution where it appears that a person has consented to their situation.265 The 
explicit reference in the statute to the irrelevance of consent ‘makes it clear for police 
officers, courts, lawyers and jurors that slavery, servitude and forced labour are 
complex situations, and that numerous factors can lead a person to consent to 
exploitation without necessarily meaning that the exploitation is not taking place.’266 
	
264 See Amendment 29 HC, Public Bill Committee Modern Slavery Bill [Second And Third Sitting], 2 September 2014, Cols 45-
122, p. 7-8; See Amendment 136 in HC, Notices of Amendments given up to and including Thursday 30 October 2014 
Consideration of Bill Modern Slavery Bill, As Amended, 30 October 2014; See Amendment 7 in HC, Modern Slavery Bill, 
Marshalled List of Amendments to be moved in Committee, 28 November 2014; HC, Modern Slavery Bill, Second Reading, 8 July 
2014, Col 180; HC, Report stage, 4 November 2014, Cols 720-721; HL, Committee [1st sitting], 1 December 2014, Col 1138. 
265 See reference to evidence from Riel Karmy-Jones, Peter Carter QC and Hope for Justice in HL, Committee [1st sitting], 1 
December 2014, Cols 1132-1133; HC, Report stage, 4 November 2014, Cols 710- 717; See Amendment 29 in HC, Public Bill 
Committee Modern Slavery Bill [Second And Third Sitting], 2 September 2014, Cols 45-122, p. 7-8. For previous problems with 
acquittals due to voluntary nature of entry into exploitative relationship, Craig Kinsella, see HC, Modern Slavery Bill, Second 
Reading, 8 July 2014, Col 180 
266 HL, Committee [1st sitting], 1 December 2014, Cols 1132-1133. 
	 257	
Such factors can include, psychological barriers, threats to the individual or their 
family, fear of authorities, debt bondage, dependency on exploiters for subsistence 
needs. 
Other than the inclusion of the irrelevance of consent, the legislative’s position, 
when it comes to a lack of willingness to provide further explanation as to the meaning 
and scope of the standalone offences, is testament to their similarity. Instead, the 
explanatory notes to both statutes cite the full provision of Article 4 of the ECHR and 
stipulate that the material scope and application of the offences is to be construed from 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as interpreted by judges in 
domestic case law, sentencing guidelines and legal guidance from the prosecuting 
authorities. 267  The principal reasons for this are threefold: i) to seek clarity of a 
complex subject; ii) to afford discretion to interpret statute as is the tradition in a 
common law system in accordance with case law changes and; iii) to allow ‘flexibility 
and effectiveness over time’ so as to ensure that the domestic law reflects developing 
international standards over time.268 Notwithstanding, Stoyanova contests a simplistic 
reproduction of Article 4 in national criminal legislation and instead asserts a preference 
for domestic legislation to be clear as to what is meant by further defining the 
offences.269 This is particularly of relevance when Article 4 itself does not further 
define the key terms of slavery, servitude and forced labour, instead it simply lists 
certain activities that do not fall within these terms. Furthermore, whilst awareness of 
the intricacies of the European case law on the part of judges is a reasonable 
requirement, it is less practical for prosecutors and police officers to keep abreast of 
developments, as ‘a result the lack of definitions in the [law] could lead to front-line 
	
267 HL, Public Bill Committee Coroners and Justice Bill [3rd Sitting] House of Lords 28 October 2009, Col 1182; HL, Public Bill 
Committee Coroners and Justice Bill [3rd reading] House of Lords 5 November 2009, Col 400; GRETA(2012), supra n.5, p.25; 
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (c.29) Explanatory Notes, s71; Modern Slavery Act 2015 (c.30) Explanatory Notes, s1. See 
also Northern Ireland The Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 
2015; Scotland The Human Trafficking and Exploitation Act (Scotland) 2015 in Home Office Analysis and Insight (2017), supra 
n.53, p. 2. 
268 HL, Public Bill Committee Coroners and Justice Bill [3rd Sitting] House of Lords 28 October 2009, Col 1182; HC, Public Bill 
Committee Modern Slavery Bill [Second And Third Sitting], 2 September 2014, Cols 45-122, p. 12. 
269 Stoyanova, V., ‘Article 4 of the ECHR and the obligation of criminalizing slavery, servitude, forced labour and human 
trafficking’, (2014) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 3(2), 407-433, p. 439-440. For instance, Stoyanova 
suggests that the action of “holding” another person in slavery should also be extended to “Reducing/rendering” another in slavery 
so as to capture those who acts as agents in the provision of labour, and not just the subcontractors, who on the existing description 
of the offence would be the principle offender; HL, House of Commons Joint Committee on the Draft Modern Slavery Bill Report 
session 2013–14, HL Paper 166, HC 1019, Published on 8 April 2014, p.45; See Amendment 30 in HC, Public Bill Committee 
Modern Slavery Bill [Second And Third Sitting], 2 September 2014, Cols 45, p. 6-7. 
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police officers or prosecutors failing properly to identify particular circumstances as 
falling within the scope of the offence.’270 
Whilst the aim of legislative reform was to increase prosecutions and the 
application of more stringent sentences by providing better understanding of labour 
exploitation, the meaning of these offences was not given the same attention as to the 
meaning of exploitation in the context of human trafficking; to the detriment of the 
standalone offences. 271 This can be deduced from the different versions of the Bill, 
where the composition of the offences – largely - remained unchanged.272 Since space 
was not given to elaborating the clarification of the material scope and meaning of the 
standalone offences during the legislative process, the courts and the judiciary remain 
on the frontline of determining exactly what is meant by labour exploitation in the 
context of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour.  
 
2.2. Interpreting the standalone offences ‘in accordance with Article 4 of the 
Human Rights Convention’ 
 
As we discussed in the previous chapter (Section 4), the role of the judge is to ensure 
that the jury understands the concepts and the relevant applicable law. As we have 
shown above, the formal criminalisation failed to further clarify the material scope of 
the standalone offences, simply stating that they had to be ‘construed in accordance 
with Article 4 of the Human Rights Convention.’273 The impact of this is clear from the 
file study, where we see that the introduction of the standalone offences meant that 
judges were ‘face[d] with a novel type of prosecution, with only Strasbourg 
jurisprudence to guide [them].’274 Significantly, the domestic courts did not look to 
other sources for guidance, such as international law and case law and guidance from 
the ILO. Thus, first instance judges were at times found to leave the jury with a lack of 
clarity, which ultimately led to a dilution of the law that was subsequently denounced 
on appeal. For instance, UK1 was sent to appeal leading to a highly significant Court 
of Appeal judgment in R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691. The role of the trial judge’s 
	
270 See Amendment 30 in HC, Public Bill Committee Modern Slavery Bill [Second And Third Sitting], 2 September 2014, Cols 45, 
p. 6-7. 
271 Craig (2017), supra n.136, p.20; Craig (2015), supra n.250, p.137. 
272 Except for instance introduction of irrelevance of consent, Clause 1, Modern Slavery Bill (HL Bill 69), 2014-15 (as amended 
in Committee), 11 December 2014.  
273 Section 71(1) Coroners and Justice Act 2009; Section 1(2) Modern Slavery Act 2015.  
274 R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 16, para 47 (UK1) and UK5.  
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handling of the definition of the standalone offences was assessed, wherein the 
appellate court held that:  
 
We do not think that, when read fairly as a whole, the judge's summing-up provided 
the jury with a proper definition of exploitation for the purposes of section 4 of the 
2004 Act. In describing the ingredients of the offence, the judge did not identify and 
explain the relevant core elements of Article 4. In our judgment, he focused too much 
on the economics of the relationship between the appellant and the complainant, thus 
diluting the test the jury had to apply to one appropriate to an employment law context 
but not strong enough to establish guilt of the criminal offence with which the appellant 
was charged. The economic context was not irrelevant. Germane as it was to the issue 
of exploitation, however, the alleged failure of the appellant to remunerate the 
complainant at, or anywhere near, the level of the national minimum wage was not 
determinative of her guilt. What the jury had to concentrate on in this case was not the 
fact that the complainant was paid “a mere pittance” or an “exploitative” wage, but 
whether, when the appellant arranged for the complainant to come to the United 
Kingdom, she had intended to exploit her in such a way as would violate her rights 
under Article 4. This was not a legal issue, but a question of fact. It did not entail the 
making of a value judgment about “the standards expected of employers towards their 
employees in this country wherever they may come from.”275 
 
In light of the lack of proper engagement with Article 4 of the ECHR, the Court 
of Appeal judgment in R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691 provides invaluable clarity in 
terms of outlining the regional interpretations of the standalone offences setting 
significant precedent for future jurisprudence.276 Not only, does the Appeal judgment 
emphasise that the formal and substantive prohibition of standalone labour exploitation 
offences adheres to the regional understanding outlined in Article 4 of the ECHR, but 
the file study reveals that subsequent decisions both at first instance and on appeal have 
maintained the connection with the Siliadin judgment. Judicial references to slavery in 
the file study are based on the understanding provided by the European Court in 
Siliadin, that ‘the essence of the concept of “slavery” is treating someone as belonging 
to oneself, by exercising some power over that person as one might over an animal or 
	
275 R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691, para 44 (UK1).  
276 R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691 (UK1); R v Connors [Luton] [2013] EWCA Crim 368 (UK4); R v Connors [Bristol] [2013] 
EWCA Crim 324 (UK5); Attorney General’s Reference (Nos 146 and 147 of 2015) (Edet) [2016] EWCA Crim 347 (UK15); R v 
Joyce [2017] EWCA Crim 337 (UK17); Attorney General's Reference (No.35 of 2016) (R. v Rafiq (Mohammed)) [2016] EWCA 
Crim 1368 (UK19).  
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an object.’277 Again, as with slavery, the judiciary followed the definition of servitude 
as provided by the ECtHR in Siliadin, that ‘the essence of the concept of “servitude” is 
one person's obligation to provide services to another, an obligation imposed by the use 
of coercion.’ 278 The Court of Appeal reaffirmed the understanding of servitude “as a 
particular serious form of denial of freedom”279 requiring the following three elements: 
the obligation to provide work or services through the use of coercion; the obligation 
to provide accommodation on premises; and the impossibility of changing status.280 
The judiciary distinguish forced or compulsory labour from slavery and servitude as it 
is not a condition or status (UK4). The test for forced or compulsory labour consists of 
two stages: the provision of work or services under menace of penalty where the work 
is undertaken involuntarily. 281 
 
The R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691 judgment attributes the material scope of 
the standalone offences to a “hierarchy of denial of personal autonomy,” with forced 
labour as the least serious and slavery as the most severe form of exploitation:  
 
In descending order of gravity, therefore, “slavery” stands at the top of the hierarchy, 
“servitude” in the middle, and “forced or compulsory labour” at the bottom. 282 
 
The categorisation and hierarchical understanding of exploitation in R v SK has 
been affirmed and applied in subsequent cases analysed in the file study.283 In addition, 
the Court of Appeal in R v SK ruled that the “concepts are not mutually exclusive,”284 
which is an interpretation consistent with European and international law and academic 
scholarship.285 Such recognition of the possibility of duality of circumstances requires 
consideration when it comes to the presentation of the offences on the indictment. For 
example, in some instances, the offences sit on the indictment in parallel: forced or 
compulsory labour and servitude (UK5, UK22), whereas in other cases, the offences 
are explicitly in the alternative: forced or compulsory labour or servitude (UK4, UK6, 
	
277 R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691, para 39. Applied by the judges in UK1, UK4, UK5, UK6, UK12, UK23. 
278 R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691, para 39. Applied by the judges in UK1, UK4, UK5, UK6, UK12, UK23. 
279 R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691, para 22 citing para 123 of Siliadin. 
280 R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691, para 22 citing para 123 of Siliadin. Applied by the judges in UK4, UK5, UK6, UK7, UK12, 
UK22, UK23, UK30. 
281 UK4, UK5, UK6, UK12, UK21, UK22, UK23 
282 R v SK para 24. 
283 UK4, UK5, UK9, UK12, UK17, UK23, UK25, UK28, UK30. 
284 R v SK para 40, also cited in UK5. 
285 Allain, J., Slavery in international law of human exploitation and trafficking, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 
p.144. 
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UK25, UK30). Similarly, the description of the offences sometimes leads to conflation 
suggesting that the distinction between offences is not so clear cut. For example, in 
UK9, whilst the hierarchical categorisation was affirmed, the distinction between 
forced labour and servitude was not always clearly presented by legal counsel:  
 
Many of the elements of servitude are present, although the Crown recognises that they 
were convicted in relation to forced labour and not servitude. but the crown makes it 
clear that the crown’s contention is that although this is not a case of servitude, for the 
reasons I have just given, this is the crown say at the top end of forced labour.286 
 
By virtue of the absence of a general offence of exploitation, forced or 
compulsory labour constitutes the threshold of exploitation in situations where there is 
no human trafficking. As a result, when determining the threshold of exploitation, it is 
important to consider the scope of such a hierarchy, especially where the definitional 
focus on the three forms of exploitation under Article 4 is extremely narrow, and 
excludes the other forms of exploitation that are applicable to the human trafficking 
offence (see Section 2.4).  
 
The domestic adherence to Siliadin must however be put into question as it is 
still very prevalent in the later cases in the file study. We suggest that it is vital for 
courts to ensure that the domestic application of these offences evolves in accordance 
with new and emerging case law. For instance, in UK12, servitude and forced labour 
were defined as a denial of geographic freedom. Whilst such an interpretation cannot 
necessarily be contested at the time of the case (2014), it is important to note that this 
is now a restrictive interpretation in light of the subsequent Chowdury case where it 
was confirmed that forced labour did not require a deprivation on the freedom of 
movement.287 Acknowledging the low number of criminal cases in first instance, let 
alone in the appellate courts, we believe that trial judges must nevertheless remain au 
fait with current regional developments.  
 
	
286 UK9 – Prosecution argument at Sentencing hearing, 23.10.13. 
287 Chowdury and others v. Greece, 30 March 2017, Application no. 21884/15, para 123. 
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3. Concluding Remarks  
 
In this chapter, we have discussed the legislative evolution of the criminal offences that 
prohibit labour exploitation in England & Wales and Belgium. Despite both 
jurisdictions initially making a connection between human trafficking and (irregular) 
immigration, there has been a shift away from immigration law towards criminal law. 
In Belgium, human trafficking became a separate human trafficking offence in Criminal 
Code putting an end to the conflation with the smuggling offence. In England & Wales, 
labour exploitation was originally prohibited in immigration law as part of the human 
trafficking offence, but then extended to include standalone offences and trafficking in 
criminal law.  
 
The shift away from immigration law when tackling labour exploitation in both 
jurisdictions is to be welcomed, as it ensures that the focus of efforts is on tackling the 
actual exploitation. Furthermore, it demonstrates an increased recognition, not only of 
the phenomenon but also of its impact on EU nationals and British and Belgian 
nationals. For instance, in Belgium, it appears that Belgian authorities have paid greater 
attention to the detection and identification of victims of human trafficking among 
Belgian and EU citizens.288  In England & Wales, since the enactment of Modern 
Slavery Act 2015, the legislation is being used as a springboard for domestic issues 
such as homelessness and county lines.289 Nevertheless, it is important to ensure that 
(irregular) third country nationals who are at risk of exploitation are afforded the same 
attention as EU nationals, and their access to justice is not restricted due to their (often 
irregular) migration status.  
 
With these observations in mind, there are a number of points for further 




288 GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p.24. 
289 Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, Understanding and Responding to Modern Slavery within the Homelessness Sector, 
January 2017; Home Office, Modern Slavery and Homelessness conference 2018, (October 2018); Independent Anti-Slavery 
Commissioner, County Lines: The children forced to sell drugs (October 2017 National Crime Agency, Latest threat update 
estimates at least 720 County Lines drug dealing lines, 28 November 2018; Crown Prosecution Service, County lines drug-dealer 
jailed under modern slavery laws, 4 October 2018; HM Government (21 March 2019), supra n.102, p.9-10. 
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Firstly, the “domestic” articulation of the human trafficking offences is 
fragmented in both jurisdictions as the means are not recognised as constituent 
elements (Section 1.4); in Belgium, labour exploitation is not articulated in accordance 
with the international and European (both Council of Europe and EU) legal standard 
(Section 1); in England & Wales, despite significant pre-legislative efforts to seek 
closer alignment with supranational definitions, the action element of the trafficking 
offences is restricted to the arranging or facilitation of travel (Section 1.1).  
 
Secondly, the human trafficking offence is priortised in criminal law. In both 
jurisdictions, the choice of tackling labour exploitation through criminal law led to the 
prioritisation of the human trafficking offence. In Belgium, this is exemplified by the 
restriction of labour exploitation to human trafficking related offences and the non-
recognition of standalone offences (Section 2). In England & Wales, this point is 
exemplified by the inclusion of broader meaning of exploitation in the human 
trafficking offence (Section 1.4). 
 
Thirdly, the scope of exploitation is broadly understood and requires 
further clarification to guard against confusion. Both jurisdictions demonstrated that 
the despite having an exhaustive and categorical approach to the forms of exploitation, 
these are in certain instances so broadly understood that they there is no further insight 
into the meaning of exploitation as a concept (Section 1.4).   
 
Taking these conclusions into account the following chapters continue to 
investigate how the judiciary interpret these criminal law provisions prohibiting labour 
exploitation and the extent to which the fragmented nature of the criminal legal 
framework impacts on their interpretation. The analytical framework developed from 
the legal analysis in Part I and the theoretical analysis in Part II will be the benchmark 
for the analysis and the chapter will discern the extent to which the judicial 






CHAPTER 9 – The judicial interpretation of the material scope of 










0. Introduction and structure of the chapter  
 
Whilst Chapter 8 has shown that the domestic criminalisation of labour exploitation has 
very different legal bases, very similar concepts are grappled with when determining 
the existence or the nature of the exploitation. As in Chapter 8, this chapter will 
continue to use the findings of the file study of criminal cases from 2010-2017 to 
analyse the judicial interpretation of the nature of exploitation. Unlike Chapter 8, where 
both the legislative and judicial approaches were analysed, this chapter will solely focus 
on the judicial interpretation of exploitation. 290  
 
In light of a very limited evidence base of the impact of the criminal justice 
response that emphasises prosecution and the role of the court in interpreting the 
international and regional definitions, we can see the added value of the jurisprudence 
analysis of two national legal orders. 291 Furthermore, in many instances there is not yet 
	
290 A note on semantics. In the present chapter when reference is made to the judiciary, the courts or judges, this is with direct 
reference to the file study sample and does not seek to infer a sweeping generalisation as regards all members of the judiciary in 
the jurisdictions subject to analysis. Where possible, findings from the file study are corroborated with literature and policy in the 
respective countries. 
291 Esser, L.B., & Dettmeijer-Vermeulen, C.E., ‘The Prominent Role of National Judges in Interpreting the International Definition 
of Human Trafficking’ (2016) Anti-trafficking Review, Issue 6, 91-105, p. 91. 
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a critical mass of case law in light of the very recent changes to domestic jurisdictions 
and where case law exists it predominantly focuses upon human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation. 292 A limitation of the focus on the criminal justice response is that the 
structural factors that contribute to exploitation – poor workers’ rights, susceptibility to 
exploitation in certain sectors, labour protection fragmented or non-existent, focus on 
restrictive immigration – are not addressed. However, it is hoped the analysis of the 
material scope of labour exploitation by the courts will contribute to a shift towards a 
broader handling of exploitation that will require realignment with other areas of law, 
beyond the criminal justice sphere.  
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 8, severely exploiting the labour of others is 
deemed to be sufficiently serious that it is prohibited in criminal law. As a result, in 
both jurisdictions, the judiciary assert that the behaviour must amount to criminal acts, 
and not just violations of employment laws (UK1), or the Belgian Social Criminal 
Code.293 In a similar vein, the Belgian cases further emphasised the need to recognise 
the “subtle distinction” (BE5) between exploitation and illegal working, with the latter 
not always amounting to exploitation. A similar discussion also arises when 
determining a distinction between abuse and exploitation, wherein the former is not 
serious enough to amount to criminal conduct.294 The articulation of such distinctions 
is not always clear cut. A certain amount of interpretative assistance has been provided 
in the travaux préparatoires of the Law of 5 April 2013, on the basis of indicators that 
refer to social criminal law. However, the possibility of making a clear distinction 
between illegal employment as mere violations of social criminal law and human 
trafficking for the purposes of labour exploitation is still put into question, as Clesse at 
al ponder: ‘How to distinguish between exploitation and undeclared work? By looking 
for an attack on human dignity. How to establish this infringement? By searching for 
offenses of social criminal law.’295  
	
292 Gallagher, A., ‘Editorial: The Problems and Prospects of Trafficking Prosecutions: Ending impunity and securing justice’, 
(2016) Anti-trafficking Review Issue 6, 1-5, pp. 4-5. 
293 BE29, BE31, BE39, BE41, BE44. See Allain (2013), supra n.285, p. 3 & p. 212; European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights, Severe labour exploitation: workers moving within or into the European Union States’ obligations and victims’ rights, 
June 2015. 
294 In BE2, the court made a distinction between abuse and exploitation, with the former not amounting to criminal conduct, leading 
to the acquittal of the defendant on six counts of human trafficking (the defendant was found guilty of a remaining count of 
trafficking). Here the court held that the situation did not amount to exploitation due to the absence of a complaint from the 
individuals regarding the dangerous working environment, the lack of evidence that the individuals had been working in 
circumstances where the well-being of the workers had not been respected, the hours worked (10-12 hours per day six days a week) 
and the non-payment of wages. 
295 Clesse et al (2014), supra n. 211, p. 29. Unofficial translation, original text: “Sur la base des ces indices, les jurisdiction devront 
différencier le travail non declaré de l’exploitation dans les conditions contraires à la dignité humaine. Autant dire que le serpent 
	 266	
 
With this chapter and the subsequent chapter, we answer the following 
subsidiary research question: How does the judiciary interpret the material scope of 
labour exploitation? 
 
In this chapter we will begin to resolve this conundrum by considering the judicial 
interpretation of the material scope of exploitation in the file study analysis and the 
judicial alignment with the analytical framework that we developed in the first two 
Parts of this thesis (Section 1). We will ask, to what extent do these conditions surface 
in the case law when interpreting the material scope of labour exploitation in law? We 
will see that whilst there are convergences with the conditions of exploitation that 
emerged from the legal and theoretical analysis in fact, the judiciary further builds on 
the theoretical conditions of exploitation as shown by the presentation of the legal 
elements of exploitation (Sections 2-7).  
 
1. The relationship between the theoretical model and the material 
understanding of exploitation in law  
 
Prior to discussing in more detail the judicial understanding of the material scope of 
exploitation in accordance with the elements of exploitation from the legal and 
theoretical analysis, we will first briefly outline the relationship between the theoretical 
conditions and legal elements of exploitation following the analysis of the file study. 
The below table provides an overview of the theoretical conditions of exploitation (in 
blue) and the constituent elements of exploitation in law as derived from the legal 
analysis (in green) and the judicial interpretation of the offences in practice (in orange). 
The extent to which they converge or diverge will be briefly explained below and will 
be referred to throughout the presentation of the constituent legal elements.   
	
The visual representation of the elements from the legal and theoretical analysis 
and how it aligns with the judicial interpretation of exploitation in the file study reveals 
both similarities and differences in the understanding of the material scope of 
	
se mord la queue. Comment faire la difference entre exploitation et travail non declaré? En recherchant une atteinte à la dignité 
humaine. Comment établir cette atteinte? En recherchant des infractions de droit pénal social.” 
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exploitation. As discussed in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, the key elements of 




Table 11: The building blocks of labour exploitation: the relationship between the theoretical 
conditions and the legal elements in light of the file study analysis   
 
As can be ascertained from the above table, most elements in law correspond to 
a theoretical condition. Whilst there are a significant number of convergences as with 
any categorisation, divergences have emerged. In particular, whilst they were not 
initially identified following the legal analysis in Part I, the file study reveals that lack 
of respect for human dignity is now also recognised by the judiciary as a legal element 
of exploitation. In addition, the analysis of the judicial interpretation of exploitation 
reveals two elements that have not yet been referred to, namely: dependency and the 
totality of the situation. Furthermore, in the theoretical model, the act of imbalance of 
bargaining power was primarily referred to prior to the undertaking of an exploitative 
exchange. However, in the file study, the imbalance of bargaining power implicitly 
emerges during the procedural stage but is not articulated as such. Instead, judges place 
an emphasis on the exercise of control over the person’s capacity or resources. In spite 
of the legal conditions being linear and consequential, there is one new element that is 
not featured in the theoretical conditions: dependence and lack of alternative. In 
theoretical terms, this element is very closely related to discussion around voluntariness 
(consent) and imbalance of bargaining power. However, the judicial analysis reveals 
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that it is indeed both an element that is prominent during (procedural) and after 
(substantive) exploitation.   
 
As we explained in Chapter 6, the theoretical conditions are presented according 
to three stages of the exploitation process: background, procedural and substantive. In 
the legal analysis this process has emerged with the judiciary ensuring an understanding 
of exploitation in its totality. In particular, the judges consider that when we speak of 
‘labour exploitation’ for the purposes of applying the human trafficking and standalone 
offences one does not have to only consider the working conditions, but all of the 
circumstances, including the circumstances of the individual before exploitation and 
the position of the individual after exploitation. The totality of the situation was not 
articulated as such in the typology of exploitation theories since the emphasis differed. 
For instance, some theories under the Redistribution Model were concerned about the 
background position of inequality whereas the basic needs model very much focuses 
upon the substantive outcome of the exploitation. Notwithstanding, the presentation of 
the elements of exploitation below will adhere to the process of exploitation by 
referring to the elements in order of consequence. 
 
The file study reveals that the judicial understanding of the material scope of 
exploitation appears to be more closely aligned with the Basic Needs Model and Human 
Dignity Model rather than the Redistribution Model. The emphasis on ex ante 
vulnerability rather than ex ante inequality asserts the role of the criminal law to protect 
those who are vulnerable to harm rather than securing social justice and equitable 
distribution of resources in society more generally. The law does appear to have a role 
to play when such a position is abused (through the exercise of control) and impacts on 
the dependency of the individual to the extent that they are left with very few alternative 
choices. Here, in alignment with the Basic Needs Model, the law seeks to ensure that 
individuals have access to a basic decent minimum wellbeing. Indeed, the legal 
approach appears to be retrospective, to intervene when the detriment to the individual 




2. Abuse of a position of vulnerability (Element I) 
 
The exploitation theories identified a position of inequality as a background condition 
that is instrumental to the subsequent imbalance of bargaining power (theoretical 
conditions I and II). As discussed in Chapter 6, the legal and theoretical analysis 
revealed a coherence between position of inequality in political theory and position of 
vulnerability in law. The analysis of the cases reveal that the understanding remains 
that there needs to be an inherent background feature that creates susceptibility to 
subsequent exploitation, however this is not expressed as a position of inequality, but 
rather as a position of vulnerability. The similarities between the two are that, both can 
be personal or structural and the existence of inequality or vulnerability per se, does 
not amount to exploitation, there needs to be something more. In exploitation theories, 
this was framed as ‘taking unfair advantage’ whereas in law it is framed as ‘abuse of a 
position of vulnerability.’ 
 
The abuse of a position of vulnerability is a well-known feature of Belgian law 
and is included in other legal provisions such as human smuggling, forced marriage, 
illegal adoption and slum housing.296 In the context of the domestic offence of human 
trafficking, however, the abuse of a position of vulnerability is an aggravating factor 
and not a constituent element of the offence. Similarly, in England & Wales, the abuse 
of a position of vulnerability is not a constituent element of the offence (see Section 2.4 
of Chapter 8). Regardless of the formal composition of the offence, the file study 
reveals that substantively, there is significant judicial weight given to the circumstances 
and the abuse of a position of vulnerability as a key aspect of determining whether or 
not someone was a victim of exploitation.  
 
In England & Wales, this is particularly the case when it comes to the judicial 
interpretation of the standalone offences – even though none of the definitions of these 
offences refer to the abuse of a position of vulnerability as a constituent element. For 
instance, the abuse of a position of vulnerability is referred to when determining the 
	
296  Article 77 bis, Criminal Code Human smuggling, Art. 391quater – quinquies, Criminal Code Illegal Adoption, Article 
391sexies, Criminal Code Forced Marriage, Articles 443decies - 433quiquiesdecies, Criminal Code Slum Landlord. For more 
details on this legal concept see Basecqz, N.C., ‘La protection pénale des personnes vulnérables dans l’environnement numérique’, 
in Jacquemin, H., & Nihoul, M., (eds) Vulnérabilités et droits dans l’environnement numérique (Bruxelles: Larcier, 2018), pp.136-
137. 
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level of coercion, control or deception (see Section 3) and when discussing the 
difficulty to change their status (see Section 4). 
 
The vulnerable position of an individual can be based on pre-existing personal, 
circumstantial or situational factors, which aligns with the theoretical understanding of 
a position of inequality.297 Section 1 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 reflects this by 
explicitly stating that the determination of exploitation should consider “all the 
circumstances” (s.1(3)), including any of the person’s personal circumstances (such as 
the person being a child, the person’s family relationships, and any mental or physical 
illness) which may make the person more vulnerable than other persons (s.1(4)(a)).298 
The provision was intentionally included to ‘reflect the position in case law.’299  
 
Different types of vulnerability are present in the file study. 300 In Belgium, 
whilst the courts affirm that vulnerability can amount to more than those listed in the 
legal text, 301  the principle form of vulnerability is the precarious or illegal 
administrative situation – as discussed in Section 2.3 of Chapter 8.302 The impact of the 
irregular status of the victims led to an imbalance of bargaining power. The courts 
recognised this in a number of decisions where the exploited parties would not be able 
to negotiate working conditions comparable to a regular worker (BE1); found 
themselves to be without any money and far away from any support networks e.g. 
family (BE4 & BE11); had no knowledge of the language, their rights,303 or of the 
cultural habits or the way of life (BE5 & BE16);304 had no insurance. In one case, a 
socially precarious situation not based on irregular migration status (no registered 
address and no social security protection) was identified by the judge (BE32).  
 
	
297 UNODC, Issue paper, The International Legal Definition of Trafficking in Persons: Consolidation of research findings and 
reflection on issues raised, (Vienna: United Nations, 2018), p.29.   
298 See for instance explanation of circumstances that make individual vulnerable in Section 1(4)(a) Modern Slavery Act 2015 
(c.30) Explanatory Notes. 
299 Modern Slavery Bill (HC Bill 8), 2014-2015 (as introduced in the House of Commons), 10 June 2014, Explanatory notes. 
300 For discussion on faces of vulnerability: economic vulnerability, social and cultural vulnerability, linguistic vulnerability, legal 
vulnerability See Radeva Berket (2015), supra n.67, p. 365-368.  
301 As stated by the Court de Cassation in Cass. 9 janvier 2002, JLMB 2002/37, p. 1625 and cited in BE5, BE11. 
302 In all cases expect for BE7, BE15, BE28, BE32; See categorization of vulnerability as “legal vulnerability” in p. 365-368.  
303 For discussion on categoriasation of vulnerability as legal vulnerability see p. 365-368; Anderson & Rogaly (2005), supra n.21, 
p. 52. 
304 For categorization of vulnerability as social and cultural vulnerability, linguistic vulnerability see Radeva Berket (2015), supra 
n.67, p. 365-368. 
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In England & Wales as the victims were all British nationals, EU Workers305 or 
legally resident third country nationals,306 vulnerability was not solely attributed to an 
administrative migration status. One exception includes the defendant fraudulently 
secured the entry of the complainant into the UK by changing his name and including 
him on passport as their adopted son (UK15). In contrast, the most prominent types of 
vulnerability amongst British nationals were homelessness, alcohol and drug 
dependency; isolation and estrangement from family and friends,307 and low level of 
intelligence.308 For the EU nationals, the most prominent form of vulnerability was poor 
socio-economic status where workers sought work as a result of an “economic 
imperative.”309  
 
In addition, the courts considered the extent to which the exploitative situation 
itself “created the vulnerability” due to force of circumstances.310  This was not a 
situation that was taken into account by the theoretical conditions of exploitation, where 
the inequality was very much focused on the circumstances prior to the exploitation. 
However, the courts identifies that there are a number of different reasons why an 
individual’s situation can become precarious or even more precarious as a result of the 
exploitation: undocumented status, homelessness, financial precarity etc. The courts go 
beyond assessment of the background conditions but also recognise that the creation of 
such vulnerability can be exacerbated by the dependence and isolation that is generated 
from the exercise of control/authority over the individual (see Section 3).  
 
Coercion sometimes results from the manipulation of a person’s vulnerability, for 
example, as a result of her isolation, her inability to sustain herself independently of 
those who hold sway of her, her fear of the police or of others. (UK8) 
 
	
305 UK7, UK19, UK24, UK25, UK27, UK28, UK31. 
306 UK1, UK9, UK 20 Also in Nos. 37, 38 and 65 of 2010 [2010] EWCA Crim 2880, para 4.  
307 UK4, UK5, UK16, UK17, UK21, UK22, UK23, UK30, UK31. 
308 UK4, UK8, UK12, UK14, UK16, UK23, UK30, UK31. 
309 UK3, UK7, UK19, UK25, UK27, UK28. For more discussion on the issue of economic imperative see Weatherburn, A., & 
Toft, A., ‘Managing the Risks of Being a Victim of Severe Labour Exploitation: Before and After the Modern Slavery Act 2015’, 
in Borracetti, M., (ed.) Labour Migration in Europe Volume II: Exploitation and Legal Protection of Migrant Workers (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018); Weatherburn, A., & Toft, A., ‘Managing the Risks of Being a Victim of Severe Labour Exploitation: Findings 
from a Research Project Exploring the Views of Experts in the UK’, (2016) Industrial Law Journal 45(2), 257-262. For 
cateogrisation of vulnerability as economic vulnerability see Radeva Berket (2015), supra n.67, p. 365-368. See also the findings 
of EU Agency for Fundamental Rights that identified “economic need” as a key vulnerability and a key risk factor that research 
participants had identified. Importantly, this was given higher importance by interviewed workers in the 2019 research than by 
professionals in the first stage of research, see FRA (2019), supra n.22, p. 65-70. 
310 UK1, UK3, UK4, UK5, UK12, UK14, UK21, UK22, UK23, UK31. 
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As to isolation, they point to the fact that he told you that he was forbidden to contact 
his family and was obliged to live at the […] site.(UK22) 
 
The Belgian courts also recognised that the position of vulnerability should be 
assessed according to the factual circumstances during and after exploitation. In BE7, 
the workers had legal administrative status with the correct work permits and residence 
documents, nevertheless, the court held that the vulnerability had been created by the 
control of the employer over the workers, the threats of losing job and the retention of 
documents. Similarly, in BE34, despite an illegal administrative situation, the health 
problems caused by the injuries following a work accident were deemed by the court 
to create the vulnerable position of the individual.  
 
As mentioned above, the position of vulnerability on its own is not sufficient, 
aligning with the theoretical understanding that position of inequality alone is not 
sufficient. Indeed, in law as with theory, it must be established by credible evidence 
that in addition to the existence of a vulnerability that it was known to the offender and 
was abused. 311  The knowledge of the position of vulnerability is necessary in 
establishing the mens rea element of the offence, to show that the defendant intended 
to exploit the individual.312 As a result, the defendant is seen to be making use of the 
vulnerability for their own benefit e,g, financial benefit313 or commercial advantage,314 
whilst displaying a lack of respect for the individual themselves. Such examples 
include, knowingly keeping the irregular workers off the books so that they were not 
identified by auditors (UK19). In Belgium, the abuse of vulnerability was often 
orchestrated by the deliberate choice of employing undocumented workers. In one case 
(BE6), the recruitment of illegal workers on low wages in order to gain the maximum 
profit from a cleaning sub-contract, wherein the terms and conditions were poor, e.g. 
one month free, competition in the sector. In another case (BE22), the workers worked 
at night to avoid inspection. Exploiters also deceived individual by offering to either 
	
311 UNODC Issue Paper (2018), supra n.297, p. 29. 
312 UK3, UK4, UK5, UK6, UK7, UK8, UK9, UK12, UK14, UK16, UK17, UK19, UK21, UK22, UK23, UK24, UK25, UK27, 
UK28, UK30, UK31. 
313 UK3, UK4, UK5, UK6, UK8, UK9, UK14, UK19, UK23, UK24, UK25, UK27, UK28, UK30, UK31. 
314 UK7, BE4. 
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provide assistance with regularising their administrative status or by promising regular 
wages upon regularisation:315  
 
That because of this situation of illegal residence, which is in this case the illegal 
administrative situation covered by the law, and its corollary, being in a state of need, 
it is understood that [victim 1] and [victim 2] had no other choice but to remain under 
the influence of the accused.316 
 
Other promise of benefits include marriage and return to country of origin 
(BE26). Another example includes, informing the victims that they could leave at any 
time whilst knowing that this was not a real possibility due to their illegal administrative 
situation and the need to feed their children: ‘the defendant knew that because of their 
irregular situation and the fact that they needed to feed their family, [victim 1] and 
[victim 2] did not have any real possibility of leaving him.’317 In some cases, the 
exploiter sought to exonerate their role by stating that they were offering the individual 
with something better than the alternative. For instance, in nine cases, the alternative to 
exploitation would have been homelessness or destitution,318 which was a defence 
argument that was dismissed by the judiciary (see Section 2.4, Chapter 8).  
 
The Belgian judiciary applies a three-stage test to determine the existence of the 
abuse of a position of vulnerability: the first two elements have already been discussed 
above, i) existence of a position of vulnerability (situation of weakness or precarity); 
and ii) knowledge and abuse of position of vulnerability. A third stage is added that 
requires that the knowing abuse of the position of vulnerability leads to an iii) inability 
to change status and no other alternative but to submit to the abuse. This latter 
requirement is similar to the understanding of servitude in England & Wales where it 
is necessary to demonstrate the “impossibility to change status” (see Section 2.3, 
Chapter 8). The manner in which the vulnerability of the individual is abused is through 
	
315 BE6 – The victim was black mailed upon recruitment with a promise that his migration status would be regularised and that he 
would receive normal pay. See also instances of false promises and financial control of workers in irregular migration status in 
FRA (2019), supra n.22, p. 62. 
316 BE6 - Unofficial translation, original text: “Qu'en raison de cette situation de séjour illégal, laquelle constitue en l'espèce la 
situation administrative illégale visée par la loi, et de son corollaire, étant un état de besoin, il se comprend que [victim 1] et 
[victim 2]. n'ont eu d'autre choix que de demeurer sous l'emprise du prévenu.” 
317 BE18 - Unofficial translation, original text: “le prévenu savait qu'en raison de sa situation irrégulière et du fait qu'il devait 
nourrir sa famille, [victime 1] et [victime 2] n'avaient pas la possibilité réelle de le quitter.” 
318 UK1, UK4, UK5, UK6, UK9, UK12, UK14, UK22, UK30. 
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manipulation 319  either leading to no alternative but to submit to the working 
conditions320 or an increased dependence on the exploiter for food, accommodation, 
money due to the lack of right to reside or work. Such abuse of socially precarious 
situations inevitably bolsters the dependence on or the exercise of control by the 
exploiter,321 an issue recognised by the courts. For instance, in one case (UK4), the 
courts stated that the low intellectual ability of the individual meant that they were 
easily manipulated. We will further consider dependence and difficulty in changing 
circumstances (Section 4), but for now we will consider the second element of 
exploitation which we believe is a key means of maintaining and indeed further 
exacerbating an individual’s position of vulnerability: the exercise of control over 
person’s capacity or resources. This condition is intrinsically linked to creating a 
situation of dependence that leaves the individual no other choice but to continue to 
submit to the ongoing abuse.  
 
3. Exercise of control over person’s capacity or resources (Element II) 
 
The common denominator is that the victim is subject to a degree of enforced control.322 
 
The above citation from the Court of Appeal judgment in R v SK [2010] refers to the 
“common denominator” between the standalone offences as control, thus reinforcing 
the position that these forms of exploitation are not mutually exclusive. The file study 
confirms this position wherein the exercise control over the individual’s capacity or 
resources is a key issue. 323 Again, as discussed in Chapter 6,  we see an alignment 
between the legal elements and theoretical conditions as we consider that the ability to 
exercise of control over a persons’ capacity or resources is made possible by an 
imbalance of bargaining power, however, the judicial understanding goes further by 
placing an emphasis on the means that are used to exert the exercise of control.  
	
319 UK4, UK8, UK21. 
320 BE6, BE8, BE13, BE36, BE41. 
321 BE7, BE8, BE16. 
322 R v SK EWCA Crim 1978, para. 40 (UK1).  
323 BE29: role of defendant in trans-European network; “It is apparent that when police investigations began the offenders used 
their control over some of their workers and former workers by attempting to persuade them to give untruthful accounts of working 
conditions” in R v Attorney General’s Reference Nos. 37, 38 and 65 of 2010 (Shahnawaz Ali Khan, Raza Ali Khan and Perveen 
Khan) [2010] EWCA Crim 2880, para 19; UK8 the judge directed the jury stating that the jury is entitled to conclude that whoever 
controlled [the victim’s] ID, controlled [the victim’s] freedom of movement in the UK; A relationship of subordination or control 
was present in the following case UK1, UK3, UK4, UK5, UK7,UK 9, UK12, UK14, UK15 ,UK19, UK20, UK21, UK22, UK23, 
UK24, UK25, UK27, UK28,UK30, UK31.  
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In Belgium, the inclusion of “taking or transferring control” as an action in the 
domestic offence of trafficking is deemed to be consistent with the regional definition 
of the action elements in the human trafficking offence. The Belgian courts have 
domestically interpreted this action as being synonymous to the exercise of authority 
[lien de subordination] an aggravating factor in the Belgian offence.324 Furthermore, 
considering the prevalence of cases where persons are working in an irregular situation, 
the existence of a contract of employment is not necessary to determine the exercise of 
authority in the context of an employment relationship.325  
 
In Belgium, the exercise of the control is a constituent element, and as such is 
sufficient to satisfy the action element of the human trafficking offence. It does not 
require evidence of any recruitment, transportation, reception or harbouring. This 
aspect of the definition has been interpreted as being equivalent to the sale [la vente] of 
a person (see Section 2.1, Chapter 8). Such an interpretation may well be necessary in 
the Belgium context in light of the lack of a standalone offence of slavery as it invokes 
the exercise of powers attaching to the rights of ownership. In England & Wales, the 
ability to fully discern the judicial understanding of the meaning of slavery is limited 
due to the very low number of cases dealing with slavery on the indictment.326 Where 
slavery is discussed, mostly in order to distinguish between servitude and slavery, it is 
however possible to identify that the exercise of control in the context of slavery is 
closely linked to the property paradigm. For instance, the reduction of an individual to 
that of an object is often referred to with the individual being ‘treated as an object or 
animal’ (UK23) or as ‘property, chattel, treated as a commodity’ (UK9). However, in 
one case (UK8), despite the factual circumstances indicating that the individual was 
‘treated as a commodity’, the victim was ‘sold for 5,000 GBP for the purposes of 
marriage,’ neither the indictment nor the court dealt with this as a case of slavery.  
 
More broadly, the exercise of control is exerted via the threats or use of physical 
violence and an aggressive personality (BE8). Similarly, in one British case, the court 
ruled that coercion is interpreted as the ability to persuade someone to do something by 
the use of force or threats (UK7). The Court of Appeal recognised that the exercise of 
	
324 Rapport fait au nom de la Commission Justice de la Chambre, de MME Daphné DUMERY, 4 mars 2013, (Doc.parl., Chambre, 
Doc 53- 2607/004), p. 8.  
325 BE18; Myria (2016), supra n.71, p. 153-154; Clesse (2013), supra n. 111, p.204.  
326 UK1 – holding another person in slavery, UK8 – human trafficking for slavery.  
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control, through use or threats of force was ‘to secure compliance with the demands of 
the Defendant’s family, and to instil fear of retribution into them if any one of them 
should try to leave the site of operations.’327 The below table outlines the multiple 
means used by the employers in the cases analysed to exercise control over the person 
and/or their resources, as outlined in the analytical framework that are derived from the 
international or regional legal instruments, such as the means in human trafficking 
offence or ILO forced labour indicators, as discussed in Part I : 
 
 Belgium England & Wales 
Use of coercion/deception 4 15 
Use of force: Physical and sexual violence to person 8 12 
Use of force: Physical and sexual violence to others 0 0 
Threats of force: Threats of physical violence to person 6 3 
Threats of force: Threats of physical violence to others 0 4 
Intimidation and threats 1 18 
Abduction 0 3 
Fraud e.g. false benefit claims, control of bank accounts, no 
social security contributions 
5 7 
Promise of benefit e.g. regularisation – to achieve act and/or 
maintain exploitation 
9  
Isolation 4 17 
Restriction of movement 10 14 
No restriction of movement 2 0 
Debt bondage 5 8 
Retention of ID documents 7 9 
Menace of penalty 6 10 
Relationship of subordination   9 0 
Table 12: Means used to exercise control over person or resources 
 
The means identified in the above table that are used to exercise control over 
the person or their resources are very closely aligned to the means that are identified in 
the supranational understanding of the offences. For example, in the context of forced 
or compulsory labour, the menace of penalty is understood to amount to compulsion, 
coercion and constraint and can be imposed directly or indirectly. The constraint can 
	
327 R v Connors [Luton] [2013] EWCA Crim 368, para 7 (UK4).  
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be physical, mental or caused by force of circumstances. The courts interpreted the 
latter form of constraint to include the creation of vulnerability during the exploitation 
period.328 As a result, the categorisation of the labour is irrelevant, the work can equally 
be carried out in legitimate labour market or in an illicit manner e.g. forced criminality 
(UK23). Similarly, the work can be conducted in a domestic setting, as part of a family 
context.  
 
Coercion to provide work or services is a constituent element of the offence of 
servitude. However, the courts have a mixed position regarding the existence of 
coercion, leading to a varied application in the context of the offence of servitude: in 
one case, the court held that the provision of work or services did not require coercion, 
the judge stated that: 
 
In my judgement, acts done to any party to the conspiracy, in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, in themselves do not have to involve an element of coercion to provide 
services, but be sufficient in overall context of the case for a jury to be sure that net 
effect would keep [name of victim] in that position.(UK20) 
 
In one case (UK22) the court stated that work or services are often provided 
through the use of coercion alternatively in another case (UK23), the court stated that 
the work or services must always be provided through the use of coercion. Similarly, 
in UK15 the vulnerability of the victim, was sufficient to demonstrate the existence of 
coercion, however in UK22, the court held that coercion must involve the presence of 
vulnerability and the use of threats or violence, which would amount to an abuse of 
position of vulnerability.  
 
The result of the use of these means to exercise control over the person or their 
resources reinforces the pre-existing imbalance of bargaining power. Unlike in the 
theoretical typology of exploitation where the imbalance of bargaining power is a 
background condition alone, the judges further discern the imbalance of bargaining 
power by the outcome of the exercise of control on the exploited party as opposed to 
the exploiter. We will discuss the impact on the exploited party below in Sections 4 and 
	
328 UK5, UK22, UK23. 
	 278	
5, however we will briefly consider the benefit of the exploiter. In the theoretical 
understanding of exploitation, there is no need for a benefit to materialise, however, the 
file study reveals that the result of the exercise of control, for the exploiter, is very often 
a disproportionate [financial] benefit, as noted by the court in UK30: ‘depriving them 
of the ability to make their own choices, provided you the ability to accumulate 
substantial wealth, your enrichment was on the back of their exploitation.’ For instance, 
the provision of both work and accommodation is seen as a way of reducing the overall 
costs, as illustrated by the court in BE3: ‘since he deducted the price that the work he 
had done, either for free or at a ridiculously low price, would have cost him… this 
provision of accommodation was intended to enable the defendant to make an abnormal 
profit.’329 The exercise of control is thus calculated as part of the business model, in 
order to maximise profit [le but de lucre poursuivi].330 For the Belgian judiciary, the 
pursuit of a financial benefit or pecuniary advantages is a sentencing factor, which is 
often referred to when determining the penalty:331 and is measured by comparing the 
affluent living standards of the exploiter in comparison to the workers who were 
maintained in precarious conditions.332 
 
4. Dependence and difficulty to change circumstances (Element III) 
 
The third element is indicative of the outcome of the abuse of position of vulnerability 
and the exercise of control on the individual exploited party: a position of dependence 
and a difficulty to change circumstances. 333 The latter was first discussed in relation to 
the legal analysis (Section 1, Chapter 4) however, the file study reveals that the 
judiciary place significant emphasis on dependence as an element of exploitation by 
recognising that such dependence can result from a situation that deteriorated over time, 
emphasising the fluidity of exploitation along a continuum. 334  Furthermore, the 
deterioration is very often the result of increased control of the exploiter and their use 
	
329 BE3 – Unofficial translation, original text text: “puisqu'il en retirait le prix que lui auraient coûté les travaux qu'il a fait 
effectuer, soit gratuitement, soit à un prix ridiculement modique….cette mise à disposition des logements avait pour but de 
permettre au prévenu de réaliser un profit anormal” 
330 BE1, BE6, BE9, BE10, BE21. 
331 BE1, BE5, BE7, BE11, BE12, BE13. 
332 BE20, BE22, BE26, BE32, BE34, BE43. 
333 The FRA recognised a number of risk factors which can lead to increased vulnerability to exploitation, including dependence. 
See also, Weatherburn & Toft, (2016), supra n. 309; Weatherburn & Toft, (2018), supra n. 309.  
334 Brennan, D., ‘Subjectivity of Coercion: Workers’ Experiences with Trafficking in the United States’, in Kotiswaran, P., (ed.) 
Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), p.139. 
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of coercion or deception – as discussed in the previous section - that facilitates 
dependence and ultimately the difficulty for the exploited individuals to change their 
circumstances (see below). 
 
In both jurisdictions, the file study illustrated a number of situations where the 
continuum of exploitation is applicable, including: where there is clear evidence of the 
deterioration of the relationship between the complainant and the exploiter;335 a shift 
from good working conditions to non-payment of wages (BE21); the complainant is 
groomed and/or conditioned to accept a particular situation336 and where some victims 
are better treated than others. For the latter, the treatment of the victim may be better 
for a number of reasons, including the exploiters belief that they are of more ‘value’ 
than others (UK4, UK31), or according to the migration status of the workers. For 
instance, in Belgium, in some cases, the treatment of the EU nationals was not 
considered to be severe enough to amount to human trafficking, and as a result they 
were removed from the indictment, whereas the illegally employed third-country 
nationals are not treated in the same way, which is closely interrelated to the assessment 
of the background conditions of the individuals to the actual situation of exploitation. 
In one case (BE47), for instance, the defendants were acquitted of human trafficking of 
the European workers.  
 
Dependence is not a constituent element of the offence in either jurisdiction. 
However, it has been shown that it is key to the determination of exploitation and has 
been explicitly mentioned by the courts, in combination with other elements, when 
interpreting exploitation.337 The dependence can be created in a number of ways but 
predominantly results from the exercise of control over the person or their resources. 
The types of dependence that have emerged include financial 338  (also, financial 
precarity imposed through force of circumstances) linguistic,339 subsistence (provision 
of food, accommodation and medical assistance),340 lack of rights awareness (BE5, 
	
335 UK1, UK3, UK4, UK15, UK20, UK23, UK24, UK30. 
336 UK6, UK15, UK21, UK30. 
337 BE5, BE7, BE13, BE15, BE16, BE26, BE29, BE38, BE42, BE43, UK4, UK8. 
338 BE1 – withholding wages due to poor workmanship, BE5 – debt bondage, BE6 – promise of normal wages upon regularisation, 
BE13 – debt bondage, BE15, BE29 – deliberate withholding of wages to make them dependent, BE32, UK3, UK4, UK5, UK6, 
UK7, UK8, UK17, UK19, UK23, UK24, UK25, UK27, UK28, UK30, UK31, BE42 . 
339 BE5, BE15, UK3, UK7, UK8, UK19, UK24, UK25, UK27, UK28. 
340 NB subsistence needs not always met. UK1, UK3, UK4, UK5, UK6, UK7, UK9, UK12, UK15, UK16, UK20, UK21, UK22, 
UK23, UK24, UK25, UK27, UK28, UK30, UK31 BE3 - Acceptance of acccommodation; BE8 – fear of losing accommodation; 
BE13 – properties owned by exploiter who also demanded rent; BE28 – accommodation; BE40 – medical assistance.  
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BE26) and legal status (BE36), indoctrination and dependence imposed by systematic 
approach to recruitment (UK4). Of course, in reality, such dependence emerges as a 
combination of factors: “situation of social, moral and financial precarity.” (BE5).  
 
The lack of financial resources – as a result of non-payment or withholding of 
wages - when coupled with the provision of other forms of subsistence such as 
accommodation, food, transport etc., can weaken the independence of the individual by 
tying them to the exploiter, leaving them with very limited alternative opportunities. 
Coercion and deception are also integral to the exercise of control that can be achieved 
via the creation of dependence. In particular, the British judges articulate this as the 
creation of dependence during the period of exploitation as a result of “force of 
circumstances.”341 
 
The impact of the exploitation on the individual can be characterised by a 
difficulty to change circumstances. 342 This assessment is prominent in the ECtHR case 
law in the context of the interpretation of involuntariness in context of forced or 
compulsory labour and servitude: 
 
The fundamental distinguishing feature between servitude and forced or compulsory 
labour within the meaning of Article 4 of the Convention lies in the victim’s feeling that 
their condition is permanent, and that the situation is unlikely to change. It is sufficient 
that this feeling be based on the above-mentioned objective criteria or brought about 
or kept alive by those responsible for the situation.343  
 
The concept is also prominent in the EU Directive’s explanation of abuse of 
position of vulnerability in Article 2(2) EU Directive 2011, as ‘a position of 
vulnerability means a situation in which the person concerned has no real or acceptable 
alternative but to submit to the abuse involved’. The Belgian law (Aricle 433 septies) 
explicitly asserts such a connection, wherein the aggravating factor of an abuse of 
position of vulnerability is premised upon a three-stage test as discussed above in 
Section 2. The third stage of this test states that ‘the person does not have another 
	
341 UK1, UK3, UK4, UK5, UK12, UK21, UK21, UK22, UK23, UK31. 
342 BE1, BE3, BE5, BE6, BE7, BE10, BE11, BE16, BE18, BE21, BE24, BE26, BE30, BE31, BE32, BE39, BE41; UK1, UK3, 
UK4, UK5, UK6, UK7, UK8, UK9, UK12, UK14, UK15, UK20, UK21, UK22, UK23, UK24, UK25, UK27, UK30, UK31. 
343 C.N. and V. v. France, 11 October 2012, Application No. 67724/09, para 91. 
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genuine and acceptable choice to not submit to the abuse.’ The Belgian courts have 
applied the test when determining whether the abuse of a vulnerability can be 
characterised as a situation whereby the individual has no other real alternative or lack 
of choice but to submit to the abuse:  
 
That it is indisputable that he has abused it [the precarious situation], [civil party 1] 
declaring that on several occasions his boss had told him that if he was not happy, he 
could leave; although the accused knew that because of their irregular situation and 
the fact that they had to feed their family, [civil party 1]. and [civil party 2]. did not 
have the real possibility of leaving him.344 
 
He was not happy, but he had no other choice because he was undocumented. That's 
why he was exploited.345 
 
For many exploited parties, by virtue of their administrative or socially 
precarious situation, the only alternative option to the exploitation was homelessness 
or destitution leading to the acceptance of abusive living conditions (BE3, BE41). 
Arguably, whilst the inclusion of such a standard is comparable to Article 2(2) EU 
Directive 2011, the Belgium application of this inability to change circumstances as 
part of an aggravating circumstance -and not a constituent element - sets a lower 
standard.   
 
The courts in England & Wales also make reference to the lack of alternatives 
the exploited party faces. The principle point of reference for the purposes of judicial 
interpretation was the understanding of the phrase “impossibility to change status.” In 
the Court of Appeal decision in AG Ref Nos. 37, 38 and 65 of 2010 [2010] EWCA Crim 
2880, the complainant’s decision to return to the UK was put into question. In response 
the complainants stated that they ‘were promised that their working conditions would 
be improved and the offenders’ behaviour towards them would change. They were led 
to believe that they were valued employees.’346 In the file study, the assessment of the 
	
344 BE18 - Unofficial translation, original text: “Qu'il est incontestable qu'il [la situation precaire] en a abusé, O.P. déclarant qu'à 
plusieurs reprises, son patron lui avait dit que s'il n'était pas content, il pouvait partir; Qu'or, le prévenu savait qu'en raison de sa 
situation irrégulière et du fait qu'il devait nourrir sa famille, O.P. et O.M. n'avaient pas la possibilité réelle de le quitter.” 
345 BE21 - Unofficial translation, original text: “Il n'était pas content mais il n'avait pas d'autres choix car il est sans papier. C'est 
pour ça qu'il était exploité.” 
346 R v Attorney General’s Reference Nos. 37, 38 and 65 of 2010 (Shahnawaz Ali Khan, Raza Ali Khan and Perveen Khan) [2010] 
EWCA Crim 2880, para 18. For further discussion of this case see Bowen (2017), supra n.122, p.219. 
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possibility of leaving the exploitative situation and thus changing their status was 
considered in a number of cases.  
 
In one subsequent case (UK9), the court ruled that the lack of choice emanated 
from ‘the violence, threat of violence and undercurrent of violence [that] pervaded the 
household.’ Similarly, in cases where there is an element of financial control, it is also 
considered as a means of control wherein the removal of funds, limits the means and 
opportunity for leaving (UK23). The same assessment was used for the discussion of 
loss, denial or restriction of geographical freedom, where despite it being used as an 
indicator of non-exploitation by the defence (UK1), the courts held that this was not a 
necessary element of exploitation (UK4 & UK15): ‘It was not necessary to prove that 
the complainants were physically detained or imprisoned because they were controlled 
by threats, exploitation and indeed infantilisation so that each of them was deprived of 
the resources and will to get away’ [emphasis added].347 In such instances, the court 
emphasised the restriction of their ability to change their circumstances, rather than the 
extent to which they were physically restricted in their movement.  
 
In such cases, a subjective test focusing on the state of mind of the individual 
was adopted to determine the extent to which the individual “finds” it impossible to 
change the status. In most cases the notion of “impossibility” was discussed in 
situations where the individuals had decided to leave but were persuaded/forced to 
return. For instance, in UK4, the complainants left but were persuaded to return because 
of false promises of pay and a preference of life with the defendant instead of “life of 
beggary on the streets.” Similarly, in UK31 both complainants were accommodated 
because they had nowhere else to go, but equally they could not change their status 
because otherwise they would have ended up destitute. Indeed, one complainant left the 
defendant’s house but came back because “he was incapable of surviving on streets.” 
In another case (UK22), the complainants were required to live on site and found it 
impossible to change their position in the family business. When they did manage to 
leave, the defendants searched for them and returned them to the site. Similarly, in UK5, 
the extent to which victims found it impossible to change their status was considered 
by the court. The judges, when ruling on a submission of no case to answer, took into 
	
347 R v Connors [Luton] [2013] EWCA Crim 368, para 7 (UK4). 
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account the evidence of others who had left and either returned willingly or who did 
not return at all, deciding that the different approaches of the various complainants, 
‘makes it impossible, in my judgment, for the jury to be sure of that element of the 
offence.’348 Thus, this element is also indicative of the distinction between servitude 
and forced or compulsory labour, as emphasised in the judge’s sentencing remarks: 
‘their return is no endorsement of that way of life as acceptable, but the exercise of that 
degree of choice serves to emphasise that this is a case of forced or compulsory labour 
rather than servitude.’349 However, the different outcomes for different individuals 
highlights the need for the circumstances to be assessed on a case by case basis as it 
will impact on the determination of dependence, the exercise of control, the abuse of 
vulnerability. Furthermore, such an assessment must take into account the extent to 
which the outcome is detrimental to the exploited party, as will be discussed in the next 
section.  
 
5. Lack of respect for human dignity (Element IV) 
 
The theoretical conditions of exploitation identified the need for a detriment to the 
exploited party, the assessment of which varied amongst theorists (harm, degradation, 
humiliation, lack of respect etc.). One point of convergence however, was that 
detrimental exploitation can also be mutually advantageous.  
 
The file study reveals that courts in both countries refer to a lack of respect for 
the human dignity of the individual when assessing the impact of the situation on the 
exploited party.350 However, the weight of these considerations differs, for instance, in 
Belgium, both a constituent element of the human trafficking offence and an aspect 
relevant for sentencing when making reference to the attack on the physical integrity of 
the individual and/or the lack of respect for the individual’s human dignity.351 Whereas 
in England & Wales, references to the lack of respect of the individual is prevalent in 
sentencing only and when considering the behaviour/intention of the defendant in order 
to determine the appropriate penalty to reflect the severity of the situation. For example, 
	
348 UK5, Ruling on submission of no case to answer 23.11.12, para 29. 
349 UK5, Sentencing remarks -19.12.12, para 50. 
350 UK4, UK5, UK6, UK7, UK8, UK9, UK12, UK17, UK20, UK21, UK 22, UK25, UK28, UK30, UK31. 
351 BE1, BE3, BE5, BE6, BE8, BE9, BE10, BE11, BE12, BE13, BE15, BE18, BE20, BE22, BE26, BE27, BE32, BE34, BE39, 
BE40, BE43. 
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in England & Wales, when discussing the standalone offences of slavery and servitude, 
the lack of respect of human dignity is at the fore of the discussion regarding the 
treatment of an individual as an object, a possession or property;352 as illustrated by the 
following examples:  
 
o You [D1 and D2] did not treat [V1] as a fellow human being. To you she was 
merely an object to be used, abused and cast aside at will. She was an ideal 
target for exploitation. You took full advantage of her extreme vulnerability.353  
o Exploitation of fellow human beings in any of the ways criminalised by 
legislation represents deliberate degrading of a fellow human being or human 
beings.354 
o These offences involved deliberate degrading of human beings. 355 
o [The] judge [was] entitled to conclude that you degraded the lives of victims 
each of whom you knew to be vulnerable and did so through fear. 356 
 
The above examples illustrate the emphasis placed on exploitation as 
degradation in the sentencing remarks and obiter dicta of the judgment and the legal 
arguments of counsel. 357 The following forms of degradation were referenced by the 
judges: in UK6 the defendants shaved the heads of the victims, in UK15 the defendants 
were accused of child cruelty, and in UK16 the defendants enforced drug use. Such 
degrading treatment represented a lack of respect for human dignity.  
 
Besides the explicit reference to human dignity as a constituent element of the 
human trafficking for economic exploitation offence in Belgium, we note that, in fact, 
the outcome of the situation of exploitation may not be of relevance to the determination 
of the material scope of labour exploitation in the context of human trafficking. The 
way in which the offences are formulated in both countries makes this apparent. For 
instance, the mens rea of human trafficking is ‘for the purpose of’ exploitation. Thus 
legally, a detriment is not a key requirement. This is also in line with the regional and 
	
352 UK1, UK5, UK8, UK9, UK20, UK22. 
353 UK9 - Sentencing remarks. 
354 UK12 - CPS – 17.1.14 – response to defence application to dismiss, Para 10. 
355 Attorney-General's Reference Nos 2, 3, 4 and 5 of 2013 (R v Connors & Ors) [2013] EWCA Crim 324 cited in R v Timothy 
Joyce [2017] EWCA Crim 337, para 24 (UK17). 
356 UK28 -Appeal judgment. 
357 UK9, UK12, UK16, UK28, UK30. The recent FRA research findings emphasised degrading treatment as one of the many forms 
of violence and threats that are used by exploiters as a strategy for maintaining the individual in a position of exploitation see FRA 
(2019), supra n.22, p.60. 
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international definition of human trafficking. However, in practice and as the file study 
demonstrates, the impact of such egregious exploitation in all cases amounts to an 
affront to the human dignity. It is for this reason that the next element to be discussed 
is deliberately paradoxical. The theoretical analysis reveals that a defect in consent is 
non-essential, whilst this remains to be the case in the legal analysis it is nevertheless a 
fil rouge that requires attention and consideration as will be further explained in the 
next section.  
 
6. The principle of irrelevance of consent (Element V) 
 
Both the legal and theoretical analysis of exploitation revealed that a defect in consent 
is non-essential, meaning that consent is irrelevant to the determination of the material 
scope of exploitation (Section 1, Chapter 4 & Section 4, Chapter 6). However, the 
application of the principle of irrelevance of consent in the file study can be described 
as a “double-edged sword.” Despite its irrelevance, it is nevertheless ever present in 
determining whether or not exploitation has occurred or not, indeed our findings from 
the file study align with Gallagher’s assertion, discussed in an earlier chapter, that 
‘consent is a sub-text at every stage of the criminal justice response to human 
trafficking’358 (see Section 2, Chapter 4). In this regard, it is important to reiterate that 
its inclusion in statute has not been straightforward, as we saw in Chapter 8. 
 
Despite the legislative discussion regarding consent, the file study reinforces its 
irrelevance.359 This principle is applied to those who have solicited the work in the first 
instance,360  consented at the point of recruitment, 361  facilitated the exploitation of 
others by having an active role in the recruitment of another362 and “appear” to consent 
to the working conditions even if they are exploitative.363  The following citations 
demonstrates that any assessment of the constituent elements should not take into 
	
358 Gallagher, A., ‘The International Legal Definition of “Trafficking in Persons”: Scope and Application’ in Kotiswaran, P., (ed.) 
Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), p. 96. 
359 BE5, BE11, BE13, BE18, BE31, BE35, UK21, UK25 Consent to travel i.e. human trafficking action, UK28. 
360 BE18, BE21, BE24, BE27, BE36, UK28. 
361 BE5, BE10, BE11, BE13, BE18, BE21, BE44, UK1, UK3, UK4, UK5, UK8, UK9, UK12, UK14, UK15, UK21, UK22, UK23, 
UK24, UK25, UK27, UK30, UK31. 
362 BE27, BE31. 
363 UK19, UK24, UK31 -returned to situation because of homelessness. 
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account the perception of the individual and their own subjective assessment of the 
situation: 
 
The notion of human dignity should not be assessed on the basis of the perception of 
the facts which was possibly that of [individual] at the beginning of the employment 
relationship.364 
 
In Belgium, in an earlier case (BE2 in 2010) one of the justifications for the 
removal of the human trafficking offence from the indictment pertaining to six potential 
victims of human trafficking was that they had not complained of the treatment – this 
did not occur in future cases where the individuals refused to request victim status 
(BE10 in 2012). Similarly, the fact that the individual did not leave the situation does 
not mean that the individual was willingly doing the job (UK21), in this instance there 
is a suggestion that the threshold is higher in the UK as it requires evidence of the lack 
of voluntariness, rather than threshold in Belgium where for economic exploitation, the 
consent of the victim is irrelevant. In such instances, where there is an apparent consent 
to accept and undertake the work offered, the prosecution will have to convince the 
judge and jury that the testimony of the victims and witnesses supports all the elements 
of the offence of trafficking or slavery by corroborating their testimony with other 
evidence to prove their dependency. 365 
 
It is common for potential victims to consider themselves not to be victims at 
all. For example, male victims may not believe their victimhood due to reasons of 
masculinity.366 The file study reaffirms that the understanding of ‘what constitutes 
exploitation is to be measured objectively against the standards in the country in which 
the exploitation takes place […] and not on the basis of the victim’s prior situation, his 
or her views about the exploitative situation, or his or her cultural, national or social 
background.’367 In both jurisdictions, the judiciary emphasised that the exploitation is 
be assessed according to the objective standards of England & Wales (UK1 & UK3) 
	
364 BE21 - Unofficial translation, original text: “la notion de dignité humaine ne doit pas s'apprécier sur base de la perception des 
faits qui était éventuellement celle de [individu] au début de la relation de travail.” 
365 Bowen (2017), supra n.122, p.219. 
366 Surtees, R., ‘Trafficked Men as Unwilling Victims’ (2008) St Antony's International Review, 4(1), 16-36. 
367 UNODC Issue Paper (2018), supra n.297, p.32. 
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and Belgium,368 respectively, and not the individual’s perception of what is acceptable 
or of the standards of their country of origin:  
 
[The] standards that you apply, indeed the standards that you as a jury by your decision 
help to set, are the standards expected of employers towards their employees in this 
country wherever they may come from.369  
 
In the Belgian file study where the majority of victims are working in an 
irregular migration situation, the salary and working conditions in Belgium are 
nevertheless an improvement in comparison to their country of origin. However, the 
Belgian law has made it clear that the situation of victims must be examined in function 
of Belgian working conditions and not in accordance with the conditions which are 
applied in their country of origin.370 This has been further reinforced by the judiciary 
(BE21, BE43). 371 Furthermore, the victim’s apparent compliance with a situation does 
not demonstrate consent but rather, could also be an indicator of the precarity of their 
situation more so than their satisfaction 372  and as a result the willingness to continue 
to work in exploitative conditions. Examples from the file study include, the hope of 
receiving wages at a future moment (BE29); fear of losing job (BE43 & BE45) and a 
lack of alternative (BE31). In particular, the lack of a complaint from a victim (BE2 & 
BE35) may not only be an indicator of the economic, psychological or physical pressure 
being put on the worker but is also not necessary for a criminal investigation to be 
initiated. 373  
 
In England & Wales, such instances have subsequently been characterised by 
the exercise of control and manipulation of the exploiters, which has meant that due to 
such an imbalance of power, the individuals were conditioned to the extent that their 
free will is overborne.374 For instance, the manipulation and the subsequent imbalance 
	
368 BE21, BE24 – appeal, BE43 
369 R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691, para 26. 
370 Article M3, 3.1, Service Public Féderal Justice, Circulaire du 23 décembre 2016 relative à la mise en œuvre d'une coopération 
multidisciplinaire concernant les victimes de la traite des êtres humains et/ou certaines formes aggravées de trafic des êtres 
humains (23 decembre 2016).  
371 The following was cited in BE21 G. Ladrière, « De l’abolition de l’esclavage en passant par le droit pénal social à la traite des 
êtres humains, mercuriale reprise dans la doctrine juridicitionnelle du droit pénal social, Larcier, p. 896». See also discussion of 
BE21 in Centre fédéral pour l’analyse des flux migratoires, la protection des droits fondamentaux des étrangers et la lutte contre 
la traite des êtres humains, traite des être humain (2013) supra n.72, p. 111. The following Court of Appeal judgment was cited in 
BE34 Cour d’appel de bruxelles, 16 novembre 2001, no du greffe: 1480. 
372 Corr. Nivelles, 4 june 2000. 
373 Clesse (2013), supra n. 111, p.227. 
374 UK3, UK4, UK5, UK6, UK8, UK9, UK14, UK16, UK17, UK19, UK21, UK23, UK25, UK27, UK28, UK30, UK31. 
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of power of the exploiter meant that the ‘imbalance [was used] as a tool in his coercion 
of V and his overbearing of V’s will’(UK4) and the exploited party was deprived of 
‘the ability to exercise free will, to make their own choice’(UK30). In such cases, the 
absence of a complaint does not mean that there was no exploitation, as this could be 
an indicator of the conditioned status of the individual, as a result of their will being 
overborne. 375 The emphasis here on overbearing an individual’s ability to exercise 
their free will reinforces the need to consider consent and involuntariness in all 
circumstances. In this regard, initial consent is irrelevant to the determination of menace 
of penalty and involuntariness, as it is necessary for the court to have regard for all 
circumstances of the forced labour (UK12). One indicator of involuntariness or 
coercion is the level of pay, which holds significant evidentiary importance (UK23), as 
it ‘bear[s] upon the employee’s ability to escape the employer’s control’(UK22). 
Similarly, the level of benefit or financial gain has also been referred to when 
determining the offence of forced labour.376 However, it is unclear as to what extent 
this benefit is valued as a “constituent element” (UK4) or an aggravating factor (UK5) 
of the offence.  
 
Similarly, the issue of consent is also a point of reference when it comes to the 
possibility of exiting exploitation, and the extent to which the victims are left with a 
lack of alternative (as discussed in Section 4). However, consent of the exploited party 
is irrelevant, even if the exploiter believes that their actions were implicitly consented 
to by the exploited parties continued presence. In two cases, the exploiters line of 
defence hinged upon the fact that the they had provided better conditions compared to 
the alternative e.g. homelessness, destitution, lower wages in country of origin. 
However, in both cases the judges overruled any consideration of the fact that 
exploitation was better than any alternative, as asserted by the judge in UK30:  
 
You delude yourselves by suggesting that the life you offered was better than the life 
on the streets. That misses essential points:  
o You deprived them of the ability to exercise free will, to make their own choice 
o They were stripped of dignity and humanity – consigned to a life of drudgery 
	
375 UK6, BE05, BE10, BE13, BE35. 
376 UK4, UK9, UK16, UK24, UK25. 
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o The product of their drudgery was your own enrichment, depriving them of the 
ability to make their own choices, provided you the ability to accumulate 
substantial wealth, your enrichment was on the back of their exploitation.377 
 
Similarly, in one case (BE3), the judge rejected the suggestion that exploitative 
circumstances in Belgium were still better than the situation they had known in their 
country of origin:  
 
That the accused speculated that the income that would have been promised to the 
victims in their country of origin would have been equal to, or even lower than, the 
unworthy salary he paid them in this case and the fact that the victims could not work 
lawfully in the kingdom and had, in fact, no choice but to work in these conditions to 
live [emphasis added].378 
 
Despite initial concerns regarding the inclusion of the principle of irrelevance 
of consent in law, discussed in Chapter 8, its application in practice aligns with the 
theoretical understanding of consent and can be characterised by an emphasis on the 
state of mind of the exploiter rather than the exploited party and an assessment of the 
situation in accordance with the objective standards of the country in which the 
exploitation takes place. In this regard, the practice in both jurisdictions affirms that the 
victim’s assessment of a “win-win” situation is not relevant to criminal prosecutions. 
The focus should be upon the intention of the perpetrator and the objective standards 
of the country in which the exploitation takes place: as such consent is irrelevant.  
 
7. Recognition of the totality of the situation (Element VI) 
 
In both jurisdictions, the judiciary give weight to the totality of the exploitation 
circumstances (before, during and after). Meaning, that it is not just the working 
conditions which are assessed, but also the background circumstances of the victim 
(before, during the exploitative situations and future prospects) and the living 
	
377 UK30 -Judge sentencing remarks.  
378 BE3- Unofficial translation, original text: “Que le prévenu a spéculé sur le fait que les revenus qu'auraient promérités les 
victimes dans leur pays d'origine auraient été égaux, ou même inférieurs, au salaire indigne qu'il leur a payé en l'espèce ainsi que 
de la circonstance que les victimes ne pouvaient travailler licitement dans le royaume et n'avaient, en fait, d'autre choix que de 
travailler dans ces conditions pour vivre.”  
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conditions. For example, in England & Wales, the prosecution place significant 
emphasis on evidence which demonstrates the totality of the situation e.g. in cases 
where victims are living in poor conditions, video recorded evidence or photographs of 
premises are helpful.379 However, there are anomalies in the file study to the assessment 
of the factual circumstances, highlighting the subjectivity of judges and the shift in 
emphasis to the “actual exploitation”. For example, in England & Wales, a situation 
was qualified as forced labour, even though the working conditions were not 
exploitative per se, however, the behaviour of the defendant in controlling other aspects 
of the victim’s lives was key to the judge’s appreciation of the situation – including the 
control of bank accounts and the provision of squalid living conditions.380 A final 
example demonstrates that where the defendant exercises control over both the working 
and living conditions, the situation can still be exploitative, even if the victim is not 
living in squalid conditions.381 
 
The file study reveals that an assessment of exploitation must go beyond the 
working conditions. In the file study, the judiciary demonstrates a consideration of other 
elements such as living conditions, access to adequate level of subsistence (including 
food and clothing) and access to medical care. These points will be addressed in turn: 
 
Living Conditions. The obligation to live on the premises is one of three constituent 
elements of the offence of servitude. does not refer to the state of the living conditions. 
In England & Wales, the provision of accommodation on or near workplace, 
withholding of wages, threats or use of violence was shown to add to the isolation and 
dependence of the individual on the employer.382  In Belgium, a number of cases 
required the individuals to live on site, and the abusive accommodation conditions were 
found to be contrary to human dignity. 383 It is interesting to note that in a number of 
cases, the court added that the obligation to live on the premises does not have to be 
exploitative per se. As a result, it is not necessary to “be living in squalor” or abusive 
living conditions (UK6, UK9). Ultimately, it is not necessary for the individuals to be 
	
379 Bowen (2017), supra n.122, p.215. 
380 UK7, UK19, UK24, UK27, UK28, UK31; UK24 [poor living conditions, not exploitative working conditions]. 
381 UK7, UK25 not living in squalor, BE20. 
382 UK1, UK3, UK4, UK5, UK6, UK7, UK12, UK14, UK16,UK21, UK22, UK23, UK27, UK30, UK31. 
383 BE3, BE4, BE5, BE8, BE10, BE14, BE16, BE20, BE21, BE24, BE35, BE27, BE28, BE30, BE32, BE33, BE36, BE38, BE41, 
BE47. 
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living in squalor, rather, the isolation and dependence that the provision of 
accommodation creates is the focus (UK7, UK25).  
 
Access to medical care. The file study in England & Wales reveals, in a number of 
cases, where the assessment of the situation also refers to the provision or non-provision 
of access to medical treatment: denial of access to healthcare;384 informal compensation 
mechanism for accident at work;385 registration with doctor;386 no registration with 
doctor (UK3); no sick leave/day off.387  
 
Subsistence needs. Reference to the subsistence needs is extremely relevant where the 
individual is reliant upon the exploiter in the totality of the circumstances e.g. provision 
of food, accommodation, linguistic support, transport and financially. Instead, the 
extent to which subsistence needs are met or not are very much linked to the 
dependency on the exploiter and the amount of control they have over their life. Where 
subsistence is mentioned, if refers to a lack of sufficient levels of food, clothes and 
possibility to maintain good hygiene standards. Similarly, as with living conditions and 
access to medical care, exploitation can still occur despite access to sufficient quantities 
of food (UK9, UK15). 
 
A final situation that emerged from the file study, which may appear to be 
paradoxical when discussing labour exploitation are circumstances wherein the 
working conditions are normal but the living conditions are exploitative or vice 
versa. In this regard, the judicial assessment of the totality of the situation reveals that 
it is not necessary for both living and working conditions to be exploitative, it can be 
one or the other. For instance, in one case, it was not the working conditions that were 
exploitative per se, especially where the work was conducted in the legitimate labour 
market:  
 
Whilst work was hard, V worked for legitimated companies, and his conditions of 
engagement were no different to other employees. He was provided with appropriate 
safety equipment and training; his shifts were no longer than other employees. He was 
	
384 UK1, UK12, UK4, UK20, UK28. 
385 UK19, UK28.  
386 UK1, UK15, UK20. 
387 UK1, UK22, UK28. 
	 292	
not deceived as to nature of his employment before he arrived in UK – he knew it would 
be manual labour and that it would be hard work. The gravamen of the crime is that 
he was not paid the wages he was due for his work. 388 
 
However, in recognition of the impact of the totality of the situation on the 
individual, despite the defence counsel seeking a ruling that such work could not lead 
to exploitation (also in UK30 & UK31), the judge qualified the situation as one of 
exploitation. Ultimately, the judges stated that such conditions exacerbate dependence 
and isolation which in turns impacts upon the restriction of freedom of movement and 
ability to change their situation. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
The analysis of the file study demonstrates that the judicial interpretation of the national 
jurisprudence has contributed to clarifying the material scope of labour exploitation. In 
this regard, the analysis of the judicial interpretation of domestic law has proven to be 
invaluable, especially in light of the lack of engagement by regional courts to further 
clarify the material scope of exploitation in the context of human trafficking and the 
three prohibited practices outlined in Article 4.389  
 
Throughout this chapter we have built on the discussion in Chapter 6 and 
continued to demonstrate the extent to which the judicial interpretation of the elements 
of exploitation in law align with the analysis of the law and political theory in Parts I 
and II. We do discern significant alignment between law and theory, however, the legal 
elements of exploitation are, in certain circumstances, articulated differently. In 
summary, the file study has revealed, a number of key constituent elements of labour 
exploitation in law that are present in both jurisdictions. First of all, the role of the 
exploiter demonstrates that situations of labour exploitation are the result of the 
knowing abuse of a position of vulnerability. The relationship between the exploiter 
and the victim is characterised by the exercise of control over the persons and/or their 
resources, leaving the individual in a position of dependence where there is a difficulty 
	
388 UK28 - defence submission on sentence, 1.6.17, para 5. 
389 See Stoyanova (2014), supra n.267 and Milano, V., ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on Human Trafficking 
in Light of L.E. v Greece: A Disturbing Setback?’, (2017) Human Rights Law Review 17, 701–727, p.711. 
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to change their circumstances. Consent of the exploited party, at any time, is 
irrelevant. The outcome of the situation, whilst it may or may not be (mutually) 
beneficial, is characterised by a lack of respect for human dignity. Finally, regard must 
be had to the totality of the situation (before, during and after exploitation). For 
instance, the circumstances of the exploitation itself does not only refer to working 
conditions (as they may not be exploitative per se) but also other factors such as living 
conditions.  
 
Taking these elements into account, it is important to ensure that any legal 
conceptualisation of exploitation reinforces a “change of imagery”390 in how a victim 
of labour exploitation is perceived, especially where there is evidence of consent or 
even initial solicitation of the employment, which has then led to a deterioration in the 
circumstances or the creation of the precarious situation.   
  
	




CHAPTER 10 - The judicial qualification of labour exploitation in 









0. Introduction and structure of the chapter 
 
Whilst the key elements of labour exploitation analysed in Chapter 9 are both 
illustrative of the judicial interpretation of the material scope of labour exploitation and 
crucial to the conceptualisation of labour exploitation in law that will be proposed in 
the next chapter (see Chapter 11), it is vital to acknowledge the practical way in which 
the judiciary qualifies the threshold of labour exploitation. With this in mind, this 
chapter discusses the juridical use of indicators, that cumulatively facilitate the 
assessment of a situation as exploitation (Section 1) and provide an example of how 
judges operationalise these indicators when assessing the severity of the exploitation 
when imposing a sentence (Section 2). To date the analysis has emphasised the judicial 
interpretation of the law in practice and the extent to which that aligns with the legal 
and theoretical analysis in earlier Parts of this thesis (Chapter 9), however in this 
chapter we seek to highlight the role of a judge’s subjective assessment of the facts 
before them when determining the threshold of exploitation. The chapter outlines two 
instances where the judge qualified the factual circumstances in front of them: first, 
when determining the nature of exploitation (does it exist or not) and secondly, the 
degree of exploitation (the severity or harm). This discussion goes beyond the 
interpretation of the law, and indeed is also applicable to other actors who play a role 
in the administration of the criminal justice process, such as law enforcement 
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authorities, prosecutors, etc., depending of the organisation of the criminal justice 
system in a given State.  
 
1. The judicial use of indicators to qualify the nature of labour exploitation  
 
We acknowledge that this chapter presents a nuanced perspective of the law in action. 
However, the inclusion of these emergent findings is of importance as they reveal that 
ultimately, in practice, the qualification of a situation as labour exploitation is achieved 
by the courts expressing their subjective assessment of the situation with reference to 
“indicators.”391 In particular, the courts use such indicators as grounds for their judicial 
reasoning when deciding whether elements of the material scope of exploitation can be 
derived from the factual circumstances, including for instance, the exercise of control 
or the existence of coercion. 392 
 
The England & Wales file study reveals that both the judiciary and the 
prosecution frequently make reference to indicators when interpreting the factual 
circumstances in order to determine the existence of exploitation (UK1):  
 
Consider all circumstances: […] Levels of pay – if you conclude that the only failing 
here was to pay less than should have been paid then the offence is not proved; Hours 
of work; Consent; Working conditions; Contract of employment/employment rights; 
Food; Debt; Living conditions; Use or threat of violence; Freedom of movement; 
Access to/availability of identity documents; Benefit payments – how were they claimed 
– where did the money go; Workers vulnerabilities -help or exploitation. 393 
 
The same is the case for Belgium where, as discussed in Chapter 8, the threshold 
of exploitation is ‘defined’ as working and living conditions contrary to human dignity, 
the meaning of which is clarified in the travaux préparatoires’ non-exhaustive list of 
indicators that were outlined in Chapter 8. 394 These indicators are operationalised by 
the judiciary in order to determine the ‘level of quality of life protected by respect for 
	
391 Circular n° COL 10/2004 (2004), supra n. 230, annex, pp35-38. 
392 Judges: UK5 – FCL, UK7 – Servitude, UK23 – FCL, UK30 – FCL; Prosecution: UK1 - FCL, UK4 - FCL, UK5 – FCL and 
servitude, UK6 – FCL and servitude, UK12 – FCL, UK19- FCL, UK24 – FCL, 
393 UK30 – Judge’s summing up 
394 Exposé des motifs du Projet de loi du 14 janvier 2005 modifiant diverses dispositions en vue de renforcer la lutte contre la traite 
et le trafic des êtres humains, (Doc. Parl. St. Chambre, 2004-2005, DOC 51 1560/001), p. 19. 
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others and a human existence whose basic preventions are guaranteed.’ 395  It is 
important to note that the operationalisation of these factors is subjective: ‘The judge 
shall, with [their] personal knowledge and appreciation of the degree of comfort and 
social protection to which a worker is entitled, determine whether or not the conditions 
of employment are contrary to human dignity on basis of the evidence.’396 
 
The following tables illustrate the operationalisation of the “indicators” in the 
file study and exemplify the need for a combination of factors that relate to both living 
and working conditions in order to be considered as exploitation. Very seldom will 
single factors alone lead to a conclusion that a situation amounts to exploitation.   
 
 UK1 UK4 UK5P397 UK5J398 UK6 UK7  UK12 UK19 UK23 UK24 UK30 








X X X X  X   X399 X X 
Retention of identity 
documents 
X X X       X X 
Isolation X X X X X  X400   X  
Psychological fear       X     
Exercise of control X401   X402   X403 X   X404 X405 
Use or threat of 
violence 
  X X  X X   X X 
Obligation to live on 
premises 
     X406      
Non-payment of 
social security, tax 
 X X  X   X407   X408 
	
395 BE13, BE32, BE35, BE47. See also Court of Cassation case referring to the notion of human dignity. Cass. P.12.0107. N, 5 
Juin 2012 cited in Clesse et al (2014), supra n.211, p. 27. Unofficial translation, original text: “niveau de qualité de vie protégé 
par le respect des autres et à une existence humaine dont les préventions de base sont guaranties.” 
396 Clesse et al (2014), supra n.211, p. 29. Unofficial translation, original text: “une appréciation subjective de la situation. Le juge 
devra avec sa connaissance personnelle et son appréciation du degré du confort et de protection sociale quel à droit un travailleur, 
détérminer si les conditions d’emploi sont ou non contraries à la dignité humaine grâce à la réunion de faisceau d’indices.”  
397 UK5P = prosecution operationalisation of indicators. 
398 UK5J = judge operationalisation of indicators. 
399 Tried to escape. 
400 Deprivation of contact with family. 
401 Physical exercise of control.  
402 Financial exercise of control: Deprivation of legitimate and alternative sources of income, namely state benefits. 
403 Opening of bank accounts and other fraudulent practices. 
404 email address, bank cards, subsistence – reliant for food, debt. 
405 Financial exercise of control: Debt. 
406 Food and accommodation. 
407 Kept off the books, not on payroll. 
408 Retention of benefit payments. 
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Absence of contract 
of employment 
 X X     X   X 
Nature of 
accommodation 
 X X X X  X  X  X 
Non-provision of 
adequate equipment 
 X X X X  X X409    
Provision of clothing   X    X     
Non-provision of 
info on workers’ 
rights 
 X X     X    
Misleading info 
about job and pay 
 X        X  
Table 13: Operationalisation of indicators of exploitation in England & Wales file study 
 BE2 BE4 BE5 BE6 BE8 BE11 BE16 BE17 BE18 BE21 BE24 BE26 
Precarious living & 
working conditions  




 X X X  X X  X X X  
Non-payment of 
regular wages 
  X  X  X X  X   
Lack of social 
security protection 
 X X   X X   X  X 
Dependence upon 
employer 
  X    X      




  X    X      
Lack of health and 
safety at work 
   X X   X     
Physical and verbal 
abuse 
    X        
Precarious living 
conditions 
     X       
Table 14: Operationalisation of indicators of conditions contrary to human dignity in Belgium file 
study 
	
In England & Wales, it is for the jury to decide whether or not these indicators 
amount to exploitation and the reasoning and elements considered by the jury to reach 
a verdict are not disclosed. Therefore, it is not possible to provide concrete examples 
	
409 Cash compensation for accident at work. 
410 No days off. 
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of their operationalisation when it comes to determining guilt. However, the indicators 
are used by the prosecution when presenting the factual circumstances of the case 
(UK5). When determining the “severity” of the exploitation in sentencing remarks, 
judges refer to a list of (non-exhaustive – UK5) indicators that justify the imposition of 
the sentence. For example, in UK21, the judge’s sentencing remarks refer to heavy 
manual labour, long hours, no sick pay, no record of employment, invisibility of 
workers to authorities, degrading treatment and lack of self-respect, substantial profit 
of the defendants.  
 
By contrast, in Belgium, where the judge has to motivate their decision in their 
verdict when determining the existence of exploitation, it is possible to provide a brief 
overview of the operationalisation of the instrumentalisation of indicators. Overall, as 
demonstrated, a combination of factors pertaining to the working and living conditions 
are required to determine whether a situation is contrary to human dignity (see table 
above). However, anomalies do exist. For instance, in one case, the court held that the 
working conditions alone were an attack on human dignity (BE18): 
 
According to the Court of Cassation, the "work performance" falls within the scope of 
the criminalisation of trafficking, provided that the person employed is impaired in his 
or her dignity, regardless of the duration of this impairment.411  
 
Similarly, another outlying example is where the court held, on two occasions, 
that an accident at work and the subsequent response of the defendant, was considered 
to be sufficient for the situation to amount to [working] conditions contrary to human 
dignity: 
 
The occupation of Mr (...) took place in conditions contrary to human dignity from the 
moment he suffered a serious accident at work.412 
 
	
411 Myria (2016), supra n.71, p. 153-154. Unofficial translation, original text: “Selon la Cour de Cassation en effet, la « prestation 
de travail » entre dans le champ d’application de l’incrimination de traite dès lors que la personne occupée à travailler est atteinte 
dans sa dignité, et ce quelle que ce soit la durée de cette atteinte.” 
412 BE34 - Unofficial translation, original text: “L'occupation de Monsieur (…) s'est déroulée dans des conditions contraires à la 
dignité humaine à partir du moment où il a été victime d'un grave accident du travail.” See also FRA research were workers had 
access to medical assistance withheld folowing accidents at work, FRA (2019), supra n.22, p. 48. 
BE41 - Unofficial translation, original text: “Au niveau moral dans le chef du recruteur, il suffit de démontrer que les conditions 
de travail sont contraires à la dignité humaine pour que l’infraction soit consommée.” 
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In one case, the commission of prostitution related offences was sufficiently an 
affront to human dignity to amount to putting someone to work in “conditions contrary 
to human dignity” within the meaning of Article 433 quinquies (BE45).413 With this in 
mind, and taking into account the lack of any other cases dealing with the prostitution 
milieu, there does appear to be a conceptual distinction made between human 
trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and human trafficking for the 
purposes of economic exploitation. However, as this is the only case of its kind in the 
file study, and in the absence of any other cases in this regard, it is difficult to draw a 
concrete conclusion on this point. 
 
In one case, whilst the wages were not low, the combination of the requirement to 
live and work in the same place, where living conditions were poor, amounted to 
conditions contrary to human dignity (BE20). Similarly, the courts have held on 
numerous occasions that neither retention of identity documents (BE13 & BE35) nor 
restriction of movement is necessary (BE13, BE28, BE35). However, in this regard, 
there is one case where the judge ruled that the fact that the workers had that the identity 
documents had not been retained and the freedom of movement was one of the 
indicators of no exploitation (BE22).  
 
Four cases led to acquittals as the judge determined that the working and living 
conditions were not contrary to human dignity.414 Overall, the non-payment of wages 
did not suffice for the conditions to be assessed as contrary to human dignity, in 
conjunction with extended hours and accommodation on site of work for 4 days and 
lack of safety equipment.415 Similarly, in BE22, the Court of Appeal acquitted the 
defendant of human trafficking,416  as the lack of a contract, no fixed hours, non-
payment of minimum wage and accident at work were not sufficient to establish the 
offence. For example, the long hours, non-payment of wages and one isolated and 
undetailed declaration by one victim of lack of security was not sufficient to be held to 
be contrary to human dignity (BE19).  
	
413 Article 380 Criminal Code prostitution related offences were listed on the indictment in BE45. Unofficial translation, original 
text : “de permettre la commission contre cette personne des infractions prévues aux articles 379, 380, §1 et 4, 383 bis et de mettre 
au travail ou de permettre la mise au travail de cette personne dans des conditions contraires à la dignité humaine.” 
414 BE2, BE19, BE22 – on appeal, BE37. 
415 BE19 – Unofficial translation, original text: “il n'est pas suffisamment établi que les travailleurs M.M., M.A. et A.M. ont travaillé 
pour le prévenu B.A. dans des conditions contraires à la dignité humaine. En effet, le seul fait de travailler un grand nombre 
d'heures et de ne pas avoir reçu l'intégralité de la rémunération qui était due.” 
416 NB social criminal offences were retained and the custodial sentence was reduced to a fine.  
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i) Non-payment of minimum wage as a key indicator of exploitation 
 
One indicator that deserves further attention due to its emphasis by the judiciary in both 
jurisdictions, is the non-payment of a minimum wage. Before moving to the judicial 
handling, it is important to note that, in England & Wales, non-payment of national 
minimum wage and national living wage, is a criminal offence, but is not included on 
the indictment of the cases in the file study.417 Whilst the opposite approach is adopted 
in Belgium, where the alleged social criminal offences appear on the same indictment 
as human trafficking and are considered as part of the same proceedings.418 In England 
& Wales, the non-payment of minimum wage is an evidentiary consideration but not 
an ‘acid test’.419 In Belgium, the assessment of the appropriate level of pay was either 
determined according to the national minimum wage420 and/or, as the majority of cases 
involved illegal work, the remuneration of works was compared to that of a worker, 
with a regular employment status, in the same work, with the same tasks and hours 
(BE16 & BE21).  
 
Generally, in both jurisdictions, it is accepted that the non-payment of minimum 
wage alone is not sufficient to qualify a situation as exploitation.421 However, a few 
anomalies do arise from the Belgian file study. In one case, the non-payment of wages 
alone was sufficient to amount to exploitation (BE3), and in another case, despite 
normal working conditions, the non-payment of wages amounted to working conditions 
contrary to human dignity (BE39). Conversely, in one case, the wages were paid as 
normal, however, the judge determined that the working conditions amounted to 
conditions contrary to human dignity e.g. the hours worked, the necessity to be 
accommodate on site in bad conditions, and the lack of safety equipment (BE20).  
 
	
417 Section 31 National Minimum Wage Act 1998, The National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015, No. 621, see Criminal Law 
enforcement policy and General Criteria for Prosecution Cases in Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 
National Minimum Wage Law: Enforcement Policy on HM Revenue & Customs enforcement, prosecutions and naming employers 
who break National Minimum Wage law (November 2017), pp. 14-20. There are civil enforcement options that can be applied, not 
just criminal proceedings, however it is not possible to determine from the file study whether or not civil proceedings were 
undertaken.  
418 BE1, BE2, BE7, BE8, BE12, BE23, BE24, BE25, BE27, BE29, BE30, BE33, BE34, BE35, BE36, BE39, BE41, BE42, BE44, 
BE45, BE47.  
419 UK1 see also UK4, UK8, UK19, UK21, UK30. 
420 BE1, BE6, BE13, BE18, BE22, BE31, BE35, BE41, BE45. 
421 R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691, para 26 (UK1). Kurz (2008), supra n.160, p. 317 - 330, p. 327. – cited in BE13 and BE41.  
	 301	
Low level of pay or non-payment of minimum wage holds significant 
evidentiary importance.422 For instance, in England & Wales, the level of pay may point 
to coercion (UK4 & UK5), inability to change circumstances (UK5) and 
involuntariness of work (UK21). This was affirmed by the Court of Appeal:  
 
Where it is alleged that one person has been compulsorily employed by another, the 
level of pay he or she has received, if any, may have evidential importance. It may point 
to coercion; it may bear on an employee's ability to escape from his or her employer's 
control. On its own, however, a derisory level of wages is not tantamount to 
coercion.423  
 
By virtue of the positioning of the prohibition of labour exploitation in the 
criminal law, the behaviour must reach a particular level of severity i.e. criminal, for it 
to be classified as exploitation. As a result, non-compliance with labour laws will not 
suffice. In determining whether or not such criminal behaviour exists, this section has 
shown that regard must be had to the totality of the situation and not just the working 
conditions. Furthermore, in order to assess the existence of exploitation, the courts will 
resort to the use of indicators. This was exemplified by the judicial assessment of the 
non-payment of wages in the file study which showed that whilst it may be that a single 
factor alone is not, in most cases, sufficient for exploitation. Instead, a combination of 
factors or indicators are needed to demonstrate whether or not exploitation has 
occurred. 
 
Once the courts – or in the case of England and Wales the jury – have assessed 
the existence of exploitation, an emerging issue from the file study was the second stage 






422 UK1, UK4, UK5, UK12, UK21, UK23, BE13, BE24 (Appeal), BE41. See also FRA research findings with worker’s where 
issues with pay was identified as one of the main labour law violations in cases of severe labour exploitaiton, in FRA (2019), supra 
n.22, pp.42-45. 
423 R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1981, para. 42 (UK1). 
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2. The judicial assessment of the degree of labour exploitation  
 
An emerging issue from the comparative analysis of the national legal orders is the 
judicial understanding of the degree of exploitation.424 So far in this thesis, we have 
focused upon the judicial interpretation of the concept according to the nature of the 
exploitation (i.e. does it exist or not), whereas the file study analysis reveals that the 
judicial assessment of exploitation is in fact twofold. First, the circumstances are 
considered to determine whether or not exploitation exists (nature), followed secondly 
by an assessment of the severity (degree) of the exploitation for the determination of 
the sanction. 425 The emphasis in this chapter on the degree of exploitation is premised 
upon the broader discussion regarding the positioning of exploitation in criminal law. 
The criminalisation of exploitation reflects the severity of the illicit conduct, which was 
noted by the Court of Appeal in R v Connors [2013] EWCA Crim 324, whereby the 
judge held that the imposition of a custodial penalty seeks to emphasise the role of the 
criminal law in providing protection to those who are vulnerable to exploitation.426 
 
This section will consider the assessment of the severity of exploitation, by 
providing an overview of the application of sentences by the judiciary, and the types of 
factors that are taken into account to determine the severity of the situation. The 
imposition of a sentence is decided by the judge taking into account the culpability of 
defendant, the harm caused to victim(s), the circumstances of the case, the impact of 
crime on victims, relevant case law, seriousness of crime and previous convictions of 
the defendant. Overall, the sentence must be fair, in accordance with the gravity of the 
offence and particular circumstances of offender e.g. suspended sentence of the 
defendant due to ill health/age in UK1. The sentence may be increased or decreased by 
aggravating or mitigating factors. 
 
2.1. The (non-)existence of sentencing guidelines for labour exploitation  
 
Sentencing guidelines are often provided to the judiciary to assist in determining the 
degree of culpability of the defendants and the harm caused to the victim, once it has 
	
424 We note that the degree of exploitation is not just relevant to the judges’ imposition of a penalty but also during prosecutorial 
and investigative stages, as highlighted by Gallagher in Gallagher (2017), supra n.358, p. 103.  
425 Bowen (2017), supra n.122, p.219. 
426 R v Connors [2013] EWCA Crim 324, para 10.  
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been found that the necessary elements of the offence are sufficiently established. In 
England & Wales, there are no official sentencing guidelines for labour exploitation 
offences: a gap which has been critiqued with calls for updates to the Sentencing 
guidelines and the Crown Court Bench Book to encompass directions on law on the 
Modern Slavery Act 2015.427 In the England & Wales file study, the lack of sentencing 
guidelines was considered to be problematic (UK25). However, the appellate case of 
Attorney-General's Reference Nos 37, 38 and 65 of 2010 (R v Shahnawaz Khan & Ors) 
[2010] EWCA Crim 2880428 is recognised as setting a precedent on an established list 
of sentencing factors, which, in the absence of official sentencing guidelines are ‘a 
measure of assistance’ as the ‘court offered an analysis of some of the relevant factors 
which might assist in the assessment of the seriousness of the offence.’ 429 The Court 
of Appeal held that the following factors should be considered when assessing the 
seriousness of the offence: 
 
(1) The nature and degree of deception or coercion exercised upon the incoming 
worker. Coercion will be an unusual aggravating feature in a case of economic 
exploitation. The gravamen of the offence committed against economic migrants is the 
deceitful promise of work on favourable terms;  
(2) The nature and degree of exploitation exercised upon the worker on arrival in the 
work place. This will involve a consideration both of the degree to which what is 
promised is in fact denied on arrival and the extent to which treatment in the work 
place offends common standards within the United Kingdom;  
(3) The level and methods of control exercised over the worker with a view to ensuring 
that he remains economically trapped;  
(4) The level of vulnerability of the incoming worker, usually economic but also 
physical and psychological;  
(5) The degree of harm suffered by the worker, physical, psychological and financial;  
(6) The level of organisation and planning behind the scheme, the gain sought or 
achieved, and the offender’s status and role within the organisation;  
(7) The numbers of those exploited;  
(8) Previous convictions for similar offences.430 
	
427 Percival (2013), supra n. 165, pp. 3-4; Haughey, C., Independent report, Modern Slavery Act 2015 review: one year on (2016), 
p.8 & p.24. 
428 Attorney-General's Reference Nos 37, 38 and 65 of 2010 (R v Shahnawaz Khan & Ors) [2010] EWCA Crim 2880 referenced 
by judges in UK3, UK17, UK20, UK24, UK31; UK1 - R v SK [2011] EWCA 1691 referenced by judges in UK24, UK23, UK12, 
UK 5, UK30, UK31. 
429 Percival (2013), supra n. 165, p.3-4. 
430 Attorney-General's Reference Nos 37, 38 and 65 of 2010 (R v Shahnawaz Khan & Ors) [2010] EWCA Crim 2880, para 17. 
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These factors have been further operationalised and explicitly acknowledged by 
the courts in all file study cases, not just human trafficking cases, but also cases 
involving the standalone offences.431 Since then, subsequent appeal judgments, have 
been of ‘considerable assistance and guidance’ for first instance judges when 
considering the sentencing. 432 Other sources have also been considered of relevance in 
terms of providing guidance in this regard. 433  In England & Wales, a number of 
aggravating factors have been explicitly highlighted in sentencing remarks: the 
deliberate targeting/recruitment (UK18); the profits gained (UK5); the degradation and 
abuse of power (UK30); the deceitful promise of work on favourable terms (UK24). 
 
A specific point of reference when sentencing, in England & Wales, is the 
hierarchical nature of the offences. As with the material scope of the offences (as 
described above) a discussion of the application of the hierarchical understanding of 
exploitation is necessary when it comes to sentencing. For instance, the fact that the 
offences of exploitation are “not mutually exclusive” means that the sentence for forced 
labour can be higher than a sentence for servitude. Whilst, some judges questioned this 
position stating that the sentence should respect the hierarchy (UK4 & UK5), the Court 
of Appeal, in 2013, held that the sentences can in fact be higher for forced labour than 
for servitude or slavery.434  
 
In Belgium, the means are understood as aggravating factors that are considered 
when sentencing as well as a number of factors that emerge from the file study: 
including the financial benefit sought; the application of the situation to a modern 
setting; the lack of respect for the human dignity of the individual; the agency of the 
victim in creating the situation of precarity / and knowingly working illegally;435 the 
abuse of the position of vulnerability of the individual, leading to a lack of an 
	
431 UK3, UK4, UK5, UK7, UK12, UK14, UK15, UK17, UK20, UK23, UK24, UK30, UK31. 
432 Attorney-General's Reference Nos 2, 3, 4 and 5 of 2013 (R v Connors & Ors) [2013] EWCA Crim 368 (UK4) referred to in 
UK7, UK 15, UK21, UK28, UK30, UK31; R v Connors EWCA Crim 324 [2013] (UK5) referred to in UK21, UK28; R v Joyce 
[2017] EWCA Crim 337 [UK17] referred to by UK28, UK30; Attorney-General’s Reference 2017 Re Zielinski [2017] EWCA 
Crim 758 referred to in UK31. 
433 UK5 - Sentencing remarks of the first instance case in UK4, UK24[prosecution counsel]; UK28 - reference to appeal case R v 
Mohammed Rafiq [2016] EWCA Crim 1368 [UK19], UK31 - reference to Blackstone’s criminal practice 2017 – para b2.208.  
434 R v Connors [2013] EWCA Crim 324, para 8 cited in UK17. NB in Australia the maximum sentence for slavery is 25 years 
imprisonment and for servitude is 15 years. Distinctions between the offences, reflected in the penalty imposed by the legislative. 
John Chelliah, J., ‘Labour exploitation: Recent examples from Australia’, (2016) Human Resource Management International 
Digest, 24(3), 4-6, p.4. 
435 2010-2015 only after 2017, agency of victim is NOT relevant to determination of compensation. 
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alternative; the wider societal impact such as impact on labour market, unfair 
competition for legitimate employers, encouragement of illegal working, fraud;436 the 
precarious situation of the defendant e.g. “historic” human trafficking victim (BE9), 
same vulnerable position as the victim (BE17); and the lack of safety at work (BE8). 
 
In one case in Belgium, the defendant had previously received victim status, as 
she had been identified as a victim of human trafficking. The court permitted a partial 
stay as a mitigating factor, taking into account that she was still in a situation of debt-
bondage:  
 
However, account will be taken of the lack of a known criminal record of the defendant 
and of the fact that she may have been obliged, having herself been a victim of 
exploitation and trafficking in human beings, to find herself another source of income 
in order to pay back those who, at another occasion, had abused her precarious 
situation. It is therefore justified to grant her a partial suspension, as specified in the 
operative provisions of this judgment, the defendant being in legal conditions in order 
to benefit from this measure. (BE9)437 
 
In England and Wales, the sentencing takes account of the admissibility of 
circumstances prior to 6 April 2010 (date of entry into force of S71).438 The situation is 
not so clear in Belgium, for instance, in BE11, the courts took “the length of the overall 
unlawful period” into account as an aggravating factor when sentencing (2001-2008); 
whereas, in BE13 the non-retrospective application of the law was applied to a case 
where the factual circumstances existed before the entry into force of the human 
trafficking offence (1 March 2003). The court held that only the facts from 12 
September 2005 onwards would be admissible. In BE36, the court amended the 
indictment for three of the civil parties where the indictment period preceded the entry 
into force of the law of 10 august 2005 which introduced article 433 into the penal code. 
As a result, the court had to determine facts on the basis of Article 77 of the Law of the 
15 December 1980 on the access to the territory, residence, establishment and alienation 
	
436 In BE2 court referred to the extent of the fraud imposed by the defendant. 
437 BE9 – Unofficial translation – Original text: “Il sera cependant tenu compte de l'absence d'antécédents judiciaires connus 
dans le chef de la prévenue et du fait qu'elle ait pu être amenée, ayant elle-même été victime de traite et de trafic des titres 
humains, à se trouver une autre source de revenus afin de pouvoir indemniser ceux qui, a une certain époque, avait abuse de sa 
situation précaire à elle. II est dès lors justifié de lui accorder un sursis partiel, tel que précisé au dispositif du présent jugement, 
la prévenue étant dans les conditions légales pour pouvoir bénéficier de cette mesure.” 
438 UK6, UK12, UK15, UK21, UK22, UK23. UK30 
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of foreigners, where it was necessary to determine whether the defendant had 
contributed to the entry and residence in Belgium – e.g. human smuggling. For all three 
victims, as they were already present in Belgium and approached the defendant looking 
for work, the constituent elements of the smuggling offence had not been established. 
 
2.2. Imposition of a penalty 
 
Since the judiciary consider labour exploitation to amount to criminal behaviour, a 
custodial penalty is always applied. In England & Wales, there are a handful of 
exceptions where the courts handed down suspended sentences even though the 
defendants were found guilty of trafficking or standalone offences, in one case due to 
ill health (UK1), and in two cases one of the defendants who had been involved in the 
fraudulent criminal activity (UK14 & UK23).  
 
In England & Wales, the length of the custodial sentence evolves throughout 
the sample. A trend of increasing penalties can be discerned from the file study, which 
corresponds to the legislative reform which increased the penalty from 14 years to life 
imprisonment, as well as the extensive attention paid politically and in public discourse 
to “modern slavery” and a shift in the societies collective consciousness to not tolerate 
exploitative conduct (UK24). 
 
It may be that society and government have been slow to wake up to this pernicious 
wrongdoing, but society and government have woken up – the relevant law – now 
known as modern slavery legislation – came into force in 2010. And the jury’s verdict 
made it crystal clear that society regards what was going on as completely 
unacceptable (UK30 – Judge’s sentencing remarks)  
 
Overall, the average length of a custodial sentence for modern slavery 
convictions is short (4 years’ imprisonment between 2014-2016) 439  and ‘some 
sentences have been regarded as derisory given the seriousness of the offences.’440 
However, a recent appeal case noted the increased maximum sentence under the 
	
439  National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General Home Office Reducing modern slavery HC 630 
SESSION 2017–2019 (15 December 2017), p. 44-45.  
440 Craig (2017), supra n.136, p.21. 
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Modern Slavery Act 2015 to life imprisonment and duly increased the sentence handed 
down at first instance from four years’ to seven years’ imprisonment. 441  
 
In contrast, as the maximum custodial sentence is five years, the custodial 
penalties handed down in Belgium are much lower. In addition, to the difference in 
maximum sentence, a number of factors could explain such a distinction. First of all, 
the duration of the offence is much shorter in Belgium, whereas in England & Wales, 
sometimes the indictment period is more than 10 years. However, it also be must 
recognised that the length of the sentence imposed does vary by taking into account 
other factors, such as i) the harm suffered to the individual or ii) the type of exploitation. 
For example, in BE39 the exploitation lasted seven years and the custodial sentence 
was 20 months, whereas in BE40, the exploitation lasted a couple of days, but the 
worker suffered significant physical harm leading to a four-year custodial sentence. In 
BE15, a case involving forced begging with an indictment period of 18 months, the 
sentence imposed was six years, despite an average sentence of approximately 18 
months. Parallels can be drawn here with the England & Wales, where in some 
instances a very high penalty was imposed in situations where the duration was very 
short, but the type of exploitation involved sexual offences and/or forced prostitution. 
For example, in UK25, a case involving forced labour as prostitution, the indictment 
period was less than six months, but the sentence imposed was significant for both 
defendants: 13 years 6 months and 8 years 5 months respectively.  
 
In both jurisdictions, the judge’s order subsequent restrictions on the 
defendants, following their custodial sentence: Serious crime prevention order (pre-
2015) (UK4 & UK5), Slavery Trafficking Prevention Orders (post-2015), 442 
Restrictions and Restraining orders. 443  In both jurisdictions, the conditions of the 
prohibitions relate to restrictions in employing, managing, owning businesses, 
properties, recruiting workers and managing bank accounts for third parties who are 
not family members. 
	
441  National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General Home Office Reducing modern slavery HC 630 
SESSION 2017–2019 (15 December 2017), p. 44-45.  
442 UK19, UK21, UK23, UK24, UK25, UK28, UK31. On use and role of serious crime prevention orders see evidence given by 
Ian Cruxton, Director of the organised crime command for the National Crime Agency HC, Public Bill Committee Modern Slavery 
Bill [First Sitting], 21 July 2014, Cols 145-206, p. 6-7; The Anti Trafficking monitoring group (2018), supra n. 97, p. 40.  
443 BE01, BE03, BE06, BE07, BE09, BE11, BE12, BE14, BE15, BE16, BE18, BE20, BE21, BE22, BE24, BE26, BE34, BE43, 
BE46. 
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2.3. Judicial weight afforded to the lucrative outcome of exploitation: an 
aggravating factor? 
 
In both jurisdictions, the file study clearly demonstrates that the outcome sought of the 
exploitation is a financial benefit;444 namely, the criminal benefit of the non-payment 
of wages,445 commercial benefit/gain, competitive advantage [BE]. In Belgium, the 
lucrative aim [but de lucre] is a significant factor when sentencing. Similarly, in 
England & Wales, the judges will consider when sentencing the aim of significant 
financial benefit and ‘the ability to accumulate substantial wealth, your enrichment was 
on the back of their exploitation’ (UK30). The lucrative aim of the exploitation 
enterprise is clear from the modus operandi of the exploiters in the targeted recruitment 
of particular type of workers. 446 In Belgium, targeted recruitment of undocumented 
workers meant that they can be paid less and disciplined with promises of regularisation 
and threats of denunciation to authorities: 
 
The defendants have benefited from a workforce which, having left his(/their?) country 
in search of a better salary, is placed in a clandestine situation, at the mercy of the 
requirements of the recruiter, accepting conditions that a worker regularly installed 
and employed on the territory would not tolerate.447 
 
The defendants deliberately recruited the victims in close proximity to closed 
reception centres, suggesting at a level of foresight in relation to their vulnerability 
brought about by their illegal administrative status.448 Similarly, in England & Wales, 
the defendants targeted the recruitment of homeless/destitute workers with drug and 
alcohol dependencies with the offer of work, accommodation, food and wages: 449  
	
444  “a business of economic exploitation. The motivation was financial.” [para 14], “the offender’s motive was greed and 
commercial gain.” [para 21] in AG Ref Nos. 37, 38 and 65 of 2010 [2010] EWCA Crim 2880. 
445 Intention to achieve maximum profit “le but de lucre”/financial benefit referred to in UK3, UK4, UK5, UK6, UK8, UK9, UK14, 
UK19, UK23, UK UK24, UK25, UK27, UK28, UK30, UK 31; Intention to achieve commercial advantage/competition referred 
to in UK7. 
446 Chelliah describes targeted recruitment of vulnerable and sometimes desperate people as a “predatory or exploitative business 
practice” in Chelliah (2016), supra n.434. 
447 BE1 - Unofficial translation, original text: “les prévenus ont profité d'une main-d’œuvre qui, ayant quitté son pays à la recherche 
d'un meilleur salaire, se trouve placée dans une situation clandestine, à la merci des exigences du recruteur, acceptant des 
conditions qu'un ouvrier régulièrement installé et employé sur le territoire ne tolérerait pas.” 
448 BE13, BE30, BE31, BE36, BE40, BE44, BE45. 
449 Homeless, alcohol and drug problems, unemployed – vulnerable adult males [UK4]; Specific/targeted selection of vulnerable 
people by D [UK5]; homeless/unemployed vulnerable adult men [UK6, UK23, UK30]; Specific/targeted selection of vulnerable 
people by D, prepared to work for limited pay, Isolation and personal characteristics [UK12]; Specific/targeted selection of 
vulnerable people by D, prepared to work for limited pay, Isolation and personal characteristics = unlikely to inform police [UK21]; 
Ideal targets – poor background. [UK25, UK27, UK28]; Poor rural background, and homeless [UK31]. See discussion on 
characteristic of the individuals that made them vulnerable to exploitation and impact of these characteristics on the criminal justice 
process in Bowen (2017), supra n.122, p.220. 
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You preyed on men who for a variety of reasons had fallen on hard time. Men 
who had become homeless, alcoholic, men with mental health problems. Men 
who for a variety of reasons, and to varying degrees, were vulnerable and easy 
to manipulate. Once located you exploited their natural desire to find, useful 
employment, somewhere to regards as home, simple in society – even the society 
you offered. Often these men were picked off the streets – you would drive 
around find people in the locality of hostels and night shelters, or those simply 
sleeping rough. [UK30 – Sentencing remarks] 
 
Does the judicial emphasis on the lucrative outcome of exploitation mean that 
it is a necessary requirement for human trafficking? For example, in one Belgian case 
(not included in case study due to language restrictions), the court acquitted the 
defendant because ‘the elements of the investigation did not establish that this situation 
had benefited the accused.’450 Moreover, the emphasis on the financial aim/outcome of 
the exploitation confuses human trafficking with human smuggling, where the financial 
aim is a key feature of the former, but not necessary for the latter, where ‘even in the 
absence of a financial aim [human trafficking] must be made punishable.’ 451  For 
Vermeulen, the emphasis on financial profit demonstrates a shift in the Belgian 
approach away from the international and European consensus.452 
 
2.4. Judicial assessment of the victim’s agency when calculating material and 
immaterial damages: a mitigating factor? 
 
In England & Wales, the calculation of proceeds of crime does consider loss of earnings 
as part of the assessment of the criminal benefit, however the compensation orders 
rarely reflect the payment of unpaid wages.453 Overall, the file study of England & 
Wales demonstrates a low award of compensation, which is consistent with overall 
compensation awards for victims of human trafficking: there have only been 11 
	
450 Corr. Gand (19e ch.), 6 avril 2009, T.G.R., 2009, p. 277 cited in Chronique semestrielle de jurisprudence, Revue de Droit Pénal 
et de Criminologie ( 2010), p.588. Unofficial translation, original text: “les éléments de l’enquête n’ont pas permis d’établir que 
cette situation avait profité au prévenu.”  
451 Vermeulen (2006), supra n.55, p 20-21.  
452 Vermeulen (2006), supra n.55, p 20-21.  
453 UK1, UK3, UK4, UK5, UK6, UK7, UK9, UK14, UK16, UK17, UK21, UK22, UK23, UK24, UK25. 
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compensation orders between 2014-2016.454 In contrast, in Belgium, the award of both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation and the calculation of payment of back 
wages is much more common.455 However, it is important to note that the Belgian 
judiciary has nevertheless emphasised the agency of the individual when discussing the 
degree of exploitation and the imposition of sentencing or compensation orders. In 
particular, the earlier cases in the file study revealed that the judiciary gave weight to 
the exploited party’s so-called contribution to creating such a precarious position in the 
context of an illegal administrative status. As such, when determining the pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary compensation, judges have, in some cases, withheld access to 
redress, based on an assessment of the role of the victim as a mitigating factor during 
sentencing.456  
 
Non-pecuniary compensation was withheld entirely or reduced in cases where 
the civil party/victim was deemed to have created the situation by knowingly working 
and residing illegally in Belgium:457  
 
• The precarious situation in which they found themselves and which was exploited by some 
defendants is the result of a situation created by the civil parties themselves: they 
knowingly left Brazil to come to work in Europe in conditions that they must have known 
to be painful [emphasis added]. 458 
• The complainant must therefore have known about the conditions that she would need to 
endure to survive in Belgium ... .. there is, on her part a tacit but aware acceptance of the 
risk she would run of finding herself in such a situation [emphasis added]. 459 
 
	
454 Hope for Justice, Traffickers forced to compensate their victims, 7 April 2017, 
455  In BE1: 4.732,96 euros and 8331,68 euros calculated respectively as back pay for two civil parties, court awarded as 
compensation. In BE2: 1.000,00 EUR as compensation for non-payment of wages.  
GRETA notes in Myria annual reports an increase in compensation awards to victims of trafficking during criminal proceedings. 
GRETA (2017), supra n.2, p.34. 
456 The same situation did not arise in the UK file study as the victims were UK/EU nationals or TCNs regularly residing in UK – 
However, “an asylum seeker working in breach of his conditions was unable to bring a discrimination claim against an employer 
because the employment contract was obtained by fraud. “The illegal conduct was… entirely that of the Applicant and it was the 
employer who was the innocent participant in what was in fact an illegal contract.”  V v. Addey & Stanhope School & Others, 
Court of Appeal - United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal, November 25, 2003, [2003] UKEAT 0565_03_2511, para 11. 
Cited in Anderson & Rogaly (2005), supra n.21, p. 51. 
457 BE29, BE31, BE39.  
458 Myria (2015), supra n.71, p. 116, Civil parties claimed 7500 and 10,000 euros non-pecuniary damage respectively but reduced 
to 1 euro by court. BE29 Unofficial translation, original text: “La situation précaire dans laquelle ils se trouvaient et qui a été 
exploitée par certains prévenus est issue d’une situation créée par les parties civiles elles-mêmes: celles-ci ont quitté le Brésil en 
connaissance de cause pour venir travailler en Europe dans des conditions qu’elles devaient savoir être pénibles.” 
459 BE31 Unofficial translation, original text: “La partie civile devait donc se douter des conditions dans lesquelles elle allait être 
amenée à survivre en Belgique…..il y a, dans son chef une acceptation tacite mais consciente du risque qu'elle courrait d'atterrir 
dans une telle situation.” 
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In further cases, the court ruled inadmissible access to pecuniary damage for 
back pay of wages. In these cases, the principle reason for enforcing such a mitigating 
factor was the need to secure the public interest, with the illegal employment deemed 
to be the pursuit of an illegitimate interest. As a result, compensation was initially 
denied as the wages from illegal employment were identified as an unlawful 
advantage.460 In the case of pecuniary damage, the courts position does appear to be 
divided as there are cases where, regardless of the illegal administrative status of the 
victim, the court awarded back pay of wages.461 Ultimately, the current position has 
been clarified by the Court of Appeal of Liège in 2016, who ruled that the fact of 
knowingly working illegally and contribution to creation of situation of precarity is not 
relevant to the determination of remedy: ‘the Court thus emphasises that it is irrelevant 
that the workers were recruited by the defendants after they arrived in Belgium of their 
own free will’462 reinforcing the irrelevance of consent. 
 
3. Concluding remarks  
 
The present chapter has added one more factor for consideration when conceptualising 
exploitation in law. In practice, its application will be twofold, in determining the 
existence of exploitation and then secondly how severe it is. The law in practice shows 
that indicators are used as a tool to assist the assessment of the judge, which as discussed 
is very much a subjective assessment. When it comes to qualifying the nature of 
exploitation it is clear that a number of indicators cumulatively are required, with the 
evidentiary importance of the non-payment of wages being a clear indicator of 
exploitative working practices. Of importance here, it has become clear that labour 
exploitation does not only refer to working conditions, but also other factors such as 
living conditions, wherein such conditions are “contrary to human dignity” (Belgium) 
and working conditions are not exploitative per se (England & Wales). Similarly, when 
it comes to the imposition of a penalty, the sentencing is determined by a number of 
different factors that can either aggravate or mitigate the final sentence imposed. Here 
we have identified two specific aspects that are of relevance to any conceptualisation 
	
460 BE6, BE12, BE24. 
461 BE1, BE2, BE7, BE8, BE16, BE22, BE27, BE30, BE32, BE33, BE36, BE42, BE47. 
462 Myria (2017), supra n.6, p. 121. BE42 - Unofficial translation, original text : “la Cour souligne ainsi qu’il est indifférent que 
les travailleurs aient été recrutés par les prévenus après qu’ils aient rejoint la Belgique de leur propre gré. ”  
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of exploitation, the benefit received by the exploiter as an aggravating factor (Section 
2.3) and the agency of the individuals as a mitigating factor (Section 2.4).  
 
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, qualification of exploitation is not 
only done by judges, but also by other actors at earlier stages in the investigative 
process. Therefore, in recognition of the subjective assessment that these actors will 
make and the possibility that it could be later rejected in court, we believe that a 
conceptualisation of exploitation in law will ensure that these indicators are applied in 
a more consistent manner, enhancing the effectiveness of the criminal justice system 

























CHAPTER 11 – A proposal for a conceptualisation of labour 








0. Introduction and structure of the Chapter  
 
The concept of labour exploitation has been extensively discussed in literature and in 
this work. Taking stock of the theoretical discussions on the components of this concept 
in law and political theory, as well as of its transposition in national legal orders, the 
time has come to propose an original contribution to these ongoing discussions.  
 
In this chapter we take into account the findings of the thesis and propose a 
conceptualisation of labour exploitation in criminal law. Building upon and refining the 
analysis of the theoretical conditions (Chapter 6) and the domestic application of human 
trafficking and standalone offences (Chapters 9 & 10), we extract and present the key 
components of a conceptualisation of labour exploitation. 
 
The primary purpose of the conceptualisation of labour exploitation is to 
provide a roadmap for the legal application of the concept in criminal law. The clarity 
engendered by such a conceptualisation goes towards setting the parameters of the 
material scope of human trafficking for the purposes of labour exploitation (see Section 
2, Chapter 1 for discussion on impact of lack of definition of exploitation). Moreover, 
by focusing upon a legal formulation of the concept, it is possible to conceive of its 
applicability beyond the scope of the human trafficking offence, as a standalone 
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criminal offence. In this regard, the legal conceptualisation not only provides clarity to 
the scope of labour exploitation within the paradigm of human trafficking, but also has 
additional functions relating to situations of labour exploitation that i) do not qualify as 
human trafficking due to a lack of constituent elements of the offence and/or ii) do not 
meet the definition of the forced or compulsory labour. Furthermore, it is also 
applicable to domestic jurisdictions where the standalone offences are not yet 
criminalised in national legal orders.  
 
Section 1 outlines the conceptualisation of the nature of labour exploitation in 
criminal law thus providing an answer to the final subsidiary research question: How 
can labour exploitation be conceptualised in criminal law? Section 2 reflects upon the 
application of the legal concept of labour exploitation in law offering further insights 
to ensure that its application is as effective as possible.  
1. The proposed conceptualisation of labour exploitation in criminal law  
 
The legal conceptualisation of labour exploitation in this Section adheres to the three 
stages of exploitation (background, procedural and substantive) that emerged from the 
theoretical understanding in Chapter 6. The legal conditions of exploitation presented 
here represent an enhanced articulation of the conditions of exploitation that have been 
discussed in both theoretical and legal terms in previous chapters (see Chapters 4, 6 & 
9).  
 
The proposed conceptualisation is robust in the sense that its conception is the 
result of theoretical and legal analysis. In particular, despite the misgivings and legal 
lacunas identified by academic scholarship, the findings reveal coherence in that the 
same concepts keep resurfacing, including, inter alia, vulnerability, exercise of control 
and consent. As a consequence, these and other conditions are incorporated into the 
proposed legal conceptualisation. As with our previous discussion of the conditions of 
exploitation, individually, they do not amount to labour exploitation, it is their 

































The conceptualisation is an articulation of exploitation that is not overly broad 
and ensures that the elements are easily ascertained. By building on the extensive 
theoretical and practical analysis and employing standardised language this 
conceptualisation goes well beyond the context of Belgium and England & Wales and 
can be applied to a broader legal context both in other domestic jurisdictions but also 
A knowingly taking unfair advantage of B’s position of vulnerability by means of 
the exercise of control showing a lack of respect for B’s human dignity, in order to 
gain a benefit. 
 
B’s position of vulnerability creates an imbalance of bargaining power between A & B. 
B’s position of vulnerability can derive from structural and/or personal vulnerabilities. 
B’s ex ante position of vulnerability leaves them with a lack of real and acceptable 
alternatives  
B’s ex post position of vulnerability, which can be created by a dependency on A, 
makes it difficult for B to change their circumstances due to a lack of real and 
acceptable alternatives 
 
Taking unfair advantage requires:  
i) knowledge of B’s position of vulnerability; and 
ii) knowing abuse of the vulnerability  
Unfair advantage is taken for the purpose of accruing a benefit 
It is immaterial whether the perceived benefit is received by B or is mutually advantageous 
for A. The benefit can be material or immaterial in kind.  
 
Exercise of control includes exercise of control or authority over a person’s capacity or 
resources, that can foster a position of dependency.   
 
Lack of respect for human dignity includes violation of human and labour rights, degrading 
and inhuman treatment and failure to secure a decent minimum wellbeing. 
 
The consent of B at any time is irrelevant.  
 
In determining whether B is being exploited, regard must be had to all the circumstances.	
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at a international level. The conceptualisation of exploitation will be further explained 
in the remainder of this Section, by reference to the conditions of exploitation.  
2. Background conditions  
 
The first stage of exploitation looks at the background conditions that can contribute to 
an increased risk of labour exploitation. Namely, a structural and/or personal 
position of vulnerability (Section 1.1) that leads to an imbalance of bargaining 
power (Section 1.2). Finally, we will discuss the impact of the background 
conditions on the ex ante consent of the individual (Section 1.3).  
 
2.1. Structural and/or personal position of vulnerability  
 
The ex ante position of vulnerability of the parties involved will be the focus of this 
section. Throughout the research a large number of different types of vulnerability have 
been identified in literature and in practice.1 Such a position of vulnerability can result 
from both personal and structural injustices: including social, legal, economic, political 
and geographical factors. 2 The existence of such injustices does not create exploitation 
per se, 3 rather they exacerbate the precariousness or vulnerability of the individual and 
ultimately, increase the risk of an individual being exploited. Thus, we must note that 
exploitation is not inevitable.  
 
The recognition of structural vulnerability, in particular, reinforces an 
understanding of labour exploitation based on the attributes of legal orders - domestic 
or otherwise - that shape power relations in labour markets as exemplified by the 
discussion of the Rantsev case and the Cypriot Artiste Regime in Chapter 1 (Section 
3).4 Similarly, recognition of the possibility of the State’s contribution to structural 
	
1 See Human Dignity Model and protection of vulnerable in Section 1.2, Chapter 5, abuse of position of vulnerability in file study 
in Section 2, Chapter 9, and vulnerability of individual as a sentencing factor in UK and aggravating factor in Belgium in Section 
Section 2, Chapter 10. 
2 For discussion of injustice at the structural level and whether or not it is necessary or sufficient requirement for exploitative 
transactions. is it sufficient. Zwolinski, M., ‘Structural Exploitation’, (2011) Social Philosophy and Policy 29(1), 154-179, p171; 
Stoyanova, V., Human trafficking and slavery reconsidered conceptual limits and states' positive obligations in European Law, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 289.  
3 Again for reiteration that not all injustices lead to exploitation, oppression and coercion can occur but not result in exploitation 
Zwolinski (2011), supra n.2, p172 & p. 178. 
4 For discussion on over emphasis on interpersonal or relation exploitation in literature rather than structural exploitation and the 
responsibility of states see Zwolinski (2011), supra n.2, p176; Mantouvalou V., ‘Legal construction of structures of exploitation’ 
in Collins, H., Lester, G., & Mantouvalou V., (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law, (Oxford University Press, 2018); 
Wolff, J., ‘Structures of exploitation’ in Collins, H., Lester, G., & Mantouvalou V., (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Labour 
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injustices will, as Radeva Berket stated, ensure consideration of ‘the different ways in 
which persons can find themselves in a vulnerable situation […] and more directly 
reflect reality.’5 In particular, such an approach will minimise the extent to which 
responses to human trafficking are premised upon particular attributes that exacerbate 
exploitation, such as gender, migration status and type of exploitation as discussed in 
Chapter 1 (Section 2.2). 
 
One small aside is needed to reiterate that any conceptualisation of labour 
exploitation that takes into account structural injustices must not overreach to the extent 
that issues of social justice are subsumed by the human trafficking/modern slavery 
discourse and should not let efforts to improve the policy areas that are also aimed at 
tackling social injustices fall by the wayside. In particular, certain structural 
vulnerabilities that are prominent in the file study analysis, such as homelessness and 
destitution, bring into question the effectiveness of other areas of domestic law and 
policy-making, such as the welfare State and the impact of a restrictive immigration 
policy. 6  The research has illustrated that structural aspects perpetuate not only 
vulnerability to exploitation but also exacerbate their duration. The file study in Part III 
exemplified this position in cases where the provision of accommodation by the 
exploiters reinforces their exercise of control over the victim’s circumstances. This 
feature of exploitation has been exacerbated by State policies such as the right to rent 
scheme introduced in England in 2016.7 The scheme placed a duty on all landlords to 
check the immigration status of any potential tenants. The High Court has recently ruled 
that the policy is unlawful as it is incompatible with right to private life and non-
discrimination.8 However, in the context of this thesis, we suggest that it is exactly this 
type of immigration policy that exacerbates the dependency of victims of labour 
exploitation on their exploiters for the provision of accommodation as elaborated upon 
in Chapter 9 (Section 4).  
 
	
Law, (Oxford University Press, 2018); Muskat-Gorska, Z., ‘Can labour make an effective contribution to legal strategies against 
human trafficking?,’ in Piotrowicz, R., Rijken, C., and Uhl, B. H., (eds) Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking, (Routledge, 
2017), p.460. 
5 Radeva Berket, M., Labour exploitation and trafficking for labour exploitation—trends and challenges for policy-making, ERA 
Forum (2015) 16, 359–377, p. 365. 
6 O’Connell Davidson, J., Why Marronage, not Slavery? The Case of UK Hand Car Washes, 28 November, 2018. 
7 Section 22, Immigration Act 2014 (c.22); Home Office, Press Release: Right to rent checks introduced for landlords in England, 
6 October 2015, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/right-to-rent-checks-introduced-for-landlords-in-england 
8 R (Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants) Claimant - and - Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWHC 452 
(Admin).  
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The position of vulnerability must be assessed with regards to all of the 
circumstances including pre-existing vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities created due to 
force of circumstances during exploitation, as we saw in Chapter 9 (Section 4). The 
jurisprudential examination of a position of vulnerability reveals an evolution in how 
this concept is handled with a shift away from the dominant approach to human 
trafficking that considers position of vulnerability ex ante and the trajectory to be 
trafficked rather than exploited, instead the focus is now also placed upon the 
exploitative situation of the individual. Thus, any conceptualisation of the nature of 
exploitation should take into account not only the root causes or background conditions 
elements that are known to increase vulnerability to labour exploitation but also the ex 
post position of vulnerability that may be created by force of circumstances during the 
exploitation.9 As we discussed in Chapter 9, the theoretical position places an emphasis 
on ex ante position of inequality whereas the understanding of the courts places an 
emphasis on the ex ante position of vulnerability. Regardless of how the background 
position of the individual is characterised, the common factor is that both may lead to 
an imbalance of bargaining power. Before turning to further explanation of this 
condition, it is reasserted that - just as with a position of vulnerability - a position of 
inequality due to an imbalance of bargaining power also does not automatically render 
a particular relationship exploitative, as will be further discussed in the next section. 
 
2.2.  Imbalance of bargaining power 
 
As we saw in Chapter 5 (Section 2), the theoretical models of exploitation very firmly 
focused upon the economic value of labour placing a significant emphasis on labour 
relations and the market place as the locus of exploitative relationships and transactions. 
However, in practice the courts recognised that labour exploitation can also arise in the 
private sphere within interpersonal relationships. 10  In the context of employment 
relationships, wherein an imbalance of bargaining power is an inherent feature, labour 
law seeks to uphold the international value that ‘labour is not a commodity’11 by 
	
9 Muskat-Gorska (2017), supra n.4, p.460. 
10 See Home office typology where the relationship between the offender and the victim is the basis for the typology of modern 
slavery offences: Labour exploitation = employment relationship: Victims exploited for multiple purposes in isolated 
environments; Victims work for offenders; Victims work for someone other than offenders. Domestic servitude = personal 
relationship: Exploited by partner ; Exploited by relatives; Exploiters not related to victims Home Office, A Typology of Modern 
Slavery Offences in the UK Research Report 93, Christine Cooper, Olivia Hesketh, Nicola Ellis, Adam Fair (October 2017).   
11 Muskat-Gorska (2017), supra n.4, p.460. 
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imposing protection of workers’ rights and protection of collective bargaining between 
the parties to the labour contract. This principle is enshrined by a number of legal 
doctrines including the doctrine of unconscionability, doctrine of justium pretium (just 
price theory) and defence of duress that seek to minimise the inequality by providing 
tools for ensuring, where possible, a level playing field. The research reveals that the 
commodification of the exploited party’s labour power is also a feature of exploitation 
that occurs in a non-market context, e.g. in an interpersonal or familial relationship, as 
a result of an imbalance of bargaining power. Therefore, in the absence of the legal 
protections offered by the labour law regime, it is important for other fields, such as 
criminal law, to recognise the possibility of exploitation of labour in the private sphere. 
 
The commodified individual, in both market and non-market relations, is taken 
advantage of in return for benefits - monetary or otherwise. Thus, regardless of the 
context, where an individual with very limited bargaining power exchanges their labour 
power, then labour commodification and exploitation coincide.12 It is important to note 
that whilst unequal bargaining power may be the hallmark of commodification,13 it is 
not an absolute condition: ‘unequal bargaining power consists in the greater ability of 
one party to walk away from a deal, yet the inability to walk away from the deal does 
not, in itself, imply any illegitimacy.’14 This point is the principal focus of the next 
section which discusses the impact of the balance of bargaining power on the ex ante 
consent of the individual in the context of exploitation.  
 
2.3.  Impact of imbalance of bargaining power on ex ante consent of individual  
 
Ultimately, for an imbalance of bargaining power derived from a position of structural 
and/or personal vulnerability to be considered as more than mere commodification, it 
must impact upon the decision-making capacity of the individual by fostering ex ante 
a lack of alternative options or a least bad position. As asserted in the legal and 
theoretical analysis in Parts I and II (Section 1, Chapter 4 & Section 2.2, Chapter 6) and 
the comparative legal analysis in Part III (Section 6, Chapter 9) of labour exploitation, 
the consent of the individual is an ever-present condition which is ultimately irrelevant. 
	
12 For discussion on commodification and to what extent it coincides with exploitation see Hill, J., ‘Exploitation’, (1994) Cornell 
Law Review 79, 631, p. 633. 
13 Sample, R., Exploitation: What it is and why it’s wrong, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003), p. 14.  
14 Sample (2003), supra n.13, p. 14. 
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In light of this, the role of consent in the legal conceptualisation of labour exploitation 
is once again paradoxical. On one hand, it is irrelevant i.e. is it possible to consent to a 
situation but for it still to amount to exploitation? On the other hand, the state of mind 
of the individual is attributed to the assessment of labour exploitation. We saw in 
Chapter 6 that it is important not to adopt an overly paternalistic approach that conflicts 
with the autonomy of the individual (Section 4). Still, the consent of the individual is 
nevertheless of crucial importance to the conceptualisation of labour exploitation, in 
determining the circumstances in which a position of labour exploitation is created (ex 
ante – considered here) and then maintained (ex post – discussed below). 
 
Admittedly, it is unlikely that persons willingly and gladly enter exploitative 
working conditions.15 Yet, it is important to recall that exploitation is a continuum. A 
recurring theme is that the initial demonstration of consent may have been expressed 
with regard to an offer of decent work, or indeed a lesser form of exploitation in 
circumstances whereby there was no other viable choice in the face of a lack of ex ante 
‘socially and economically attractive options.’16 With this in mind, where there is 
evidence of acceptance of an initial offer - even if based on defective terms and 
conditions - then there must be an objective comparison between the status quo ex ante 
and the opportunity for material gain that the offer promises (see Section 1.2 of Chapter 
5). 17 
 
Unfortunately, in the context of labour exploitation, opportunities are often 
misrepresented and the reality of the working and living conditions are not as 
envisaged. Coupled with a lack of awareness of workers’ rights, individuals very often 
endure such situations as, again, they lack a reasonable alternative.18 The means by 
which such a situation of exploitation is maintained is the focus of the next section 
which considers the procedural conditions that ultimately leads to a distinction between 
an individual’s poor decision making and those who have been compelled into making 
a choice that leads to exploitation.  
 
	
15 Roemer, J., ‘Should Marxists be Interested in Exploitation?’, (Winter, 1985) Philosophy & Public Affairs 14(1), 30-65, p. 46. 
16 See discussion of lack of alternatives, limited choice, inability to change circumstances in Section 2.1 Chapter 1; Section 3.2, 
Chapter 2; Section 2.2, Chapter 3; Section 4, Chapter 4; Section 4, Chapter 6; Section 4, Chapter 9.  
17 Zwolinski (2011), supra n.2, pp.154-179. 
18  Consider Chowdury judgment and the attitude of the authorities that the workers could have just gone and looked for a 
employment elsewhere in Greece. Chowdury & Others v Greece [2017] Application No. 21884/15, para. 28 & para.100. 
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3. Procedural Conditions  
 
The theoretical analysis reveals that labour exploitation occurs where the imbalance of 
bargaining power derived from a position of vulnerability is used as a tool of coercion 
or control by an exploiter in order to obtain compliance and achieve a benefit (Section 
1, Chapter 6).19 The imbalance of bargaining power is a key factor. Crucially, it is ‘the 
combination of the abuse of that power and the position of vulnerability of an individual 
that leads to a situation of exploitation.’ 20  We articulate this in our legal 
conceptualisation as the action of taking unfair advantage with a view to gaining a 
benefit, by means of the exercise of control. As with the background conditions, the 
procedural stage emphasises the impact of such exertion of control on the ex post 
consent of the individual.  
 
3.1.  Taking unfair advantage to gain a benefit   
 
The actions and intentions of the stronger party in an unequal exploitative exchange 
can be attributed to the act of ‘Taking unfair advantage …. in order to gain a benefit.’ 
The fulfilment of this condition requires a number of actions on the part of the stronger 
party, including inter alia, i) the knowledge of the position of vulnerability; ii) the 
decision to take unfair advantage of the position of vulnerability and; iii) the intention 
to accrue a benefit from the situation. 
 
First of all, the theoretical conditions of exploitation illustrate that the 
recognition of an imbalance of bargaining power and the inequality derived therefrom 
is not sufficient for labour exploitation, there needs to be more (Section 1, Chapter 6). 
Moreover, both the theoretical and jurisprudential analysis affirms that labour 
exploitation only arises where the exploiter uses the person’s vulnerability for an 
advantage in order to gain a benefit (Section 1, Chapter 6 & Section 2, Chapter 9).21 It 
	
19 For discussion on background injustices, especially those of a structural or institutional sort, leading to the establishment of 
inequalities between persons that can facilitate the exploitation of some by others see Zwolinski (2011), supra n.2, p159. Supported 
by Sample (2003), supra n.13. Ollus, N., & Jokinen, A., ‘Exploitation of migrant workers and trafficking in human beings: a nexus 
of the demand by employers, workers and consumers’, in Piotrowicz, R., Rijken, C., and Uhl, B. H., (eds) Routledge Handbook of 
Human Trafficking, (Routledge, 2017), p.479. 
20 Skrivankova, K., ‘Defining exploitation in the context of trafficking – what is a crime and what is not,’ in Piotrowicz, R., Rijken, 
C., and Uhl, B. H., (eds) Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking, (Routledge, 2017), p.109. 
21 For discussion on the use of vulnerability as abuse of vulnerability in Dutch case law see Esser, L.B., & Dettmeijer-Vermeulen, 
C.E., ‘The Prominent Role of National Judges in Interpreting the International Definition of Human Trafficking’ (2016) Anti-
trafficking Review, Issue 6, 91-105, p. 100. 
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must be noted that it is not for the exploited party to necessarily have created the 
position of ex ante vulnerability, ‘[exploitation] is the act of seizing that opportunity, 
not the act of seeking it, creating it, or discovering it.’22 The act of taking unfair 
advantage (as articulated in theory) or abusing the position of vulnerability (as 
articulated in law) can be identified where there has been a violation of principles of 
distributive justice, a failure to respect the persons or a deviation from the market norm.  
 
Secondly, the theoretical understanding of exploitation reveals that the act of 
taking unfair advantage does not require intent or awareness (Section 2, Chapter 5). 
However, legally, the formal criminalisation of the forms of labour exploitation 
discussed are crimes of intent, whereby the mens rea is either one of dolus specialis or 
dolus eventualis (Part I). 23 Therefore, it is contended that a legal conceptualisation of 
labour exploitation must require that the act of taking unfair advantage to be done 
intentionally or recklessly, as demonstrated by the formal and substantive 
criminalisation of labour exploitation in national legal orders in Chapter 8. The file 
study provides examples of such intentional acts by way of the targeted recruitment of 
individuals due to their irregular migration status (BE) or destitution (UK).  
 
The domestic implementation of both international and regional definitions of 
human trafficking demonstrates that the mens rea element of the domestic offence - as 
it is at the discretion of the State party - will vary according to its implementation in a 
domestic jurisdiction.24 For example, the file study of England & Wales highlighted 
that for a situation to amount to human trafficking, it is necessary that the intention to 
exploit (the person intends, knows or ought to have known that person to be exploited) 
be continuously present when facilitating or arranging travel of another person.25 
Alternatively, in some domestic settings, instead of dolus specialis, a lower threshold 
of mens rea is required, namely dolus eventualis wherein the foresight of the 
exploitation is a mere likelihood or possibility and does not require a degree of 
intention.26 The lower threshold of mens rea could further blur the distinction between 
	
22 Goodin, R., ‘Exploiting a situation and exploiting a person’, Reeve, S., (ed.) Modern Theories of exploitation (Sage Publishing, 
1987), p. 168. 
23 Article 5(1), Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children, supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, New York, 15 November 2000, UNTS, vol. 2237, p. 319, 
Doc. A/55/383; Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in 
Human Beings, Warsaw, 16.V.2005 (2005), para. 228; Stoyanova (2017), supra n.2, p. 45. 
24 Council of Euroep (2005), supra n.24, para.228. 
25 Stoyanova (2017), supra n.2, p. 45; Section 2(4) Modern Slavery Act 2015 (c.30).  
26 See example of French law in Stoyanova (2017), supra n.2, p. 45. 
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human trafficking and human smuggling, where it could be argued that smugglers have 
foresight or awareness that those who are smuggled are at a greater risk of exploitation 
and as a result exploitation is a likelihood or possibility. This situation could be avoided, 
however, should the dolus eventualis be attributed solely to the exploiter, as opposed 
to intermediaries, since the mens rea ‘to exploit something, […] is to do something 
beyond merely using it. […] you have to fit it into a plan or project of yours involving 
your control over the thing you use.’27 
 
The explanation of the role of the exploiter so far is very much premised upon 
relational exploitation and leaves a gap as to the standard for structural exploitation. As 
mentioned above, the theoretical models reveal that it is possible for labour exploitation 
to be unintentional.28 Again, such a scenario is not possible when criminalising labour 
exploitation due to the need for the exploiter to intend, have knowledge or ought to 
have known of the purpose of exploitation. Whilst, unintentional labour exploitation is 
not yet prohibited in law, the increasing recognition of the possible role of multiple 
actors embedded in complex supply chains that are protected by the ‘corporate veil 
doctrine’ may well further the rationale for reckless exploitation to be criminalised as 
a separate offence. 29 Indeed, in the corporate setting, an increased focus is being placed 
on strict liability for exploitation which by its very nature reduces the emphasis on the 
mens rea element. 30 As a result, ‘one can take an unfair advantage without directly 
interacting with the disadvantaged’31 in recognition of the theoretical understandings of 
exploitation on a macro level, i.e. between an individual and society as a whole.32 It is 
contended that a two-tiered approach to labour exploitation in law could be applied so 
that legal and policy responses to labour exploitation may adequately address the 
responsibility of those actors who foster the conditions of exploitation. For instance,  
the increased focus on the responsibility of businesses to ensure that there is no 
	
27 Wood, A., ‘Unjust exploitation’, (2016) The Southern Journal of Philosophy 54, 92–108, p. 94.  
28 Sample (2003), supra n.13, p. 58. 
29 Sinclair, J., ‘Strategic Litigation as a Tool to Combat Modern Slavery’, (2018) Journal of Modern Slavery 4(2), p. 47. 
30 For example, California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010 (US); Section 54, Modern Slavery Act 2015 (UK); Article 25 
Quinquies of Legislative Decree No. 231/2001, Administrative liability of the legal person for offences committed under Article 
600 (Slavery and servitude) and 601 (Trafficking) of the Italian Criminal Code (Italy); Article 5 Criminal Code provides for the 
criminal liability of legal entities including for human trafficking offence (Belgium). 
31 Fleurbaey, M., ‘The facets of exploitation’, (2014) Journal of Theoretical Politics 26(4), 653–676, p. 655; see also Skillman G., 
‘Ne hic saltaveris: the Marxian theory of exploitation after Roemer’, (1995) Economics and Philosophy 11, 309–331.  
32 Roemer (Winter, 1985), supra n.15, p. 31-32; Haynes, D. F., ‘Exploitation Nation: The Thin and Grey Legal Lines between 
Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers’, (2009) Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 23(1), 1 -70, p. 10-
12; Cohen, G.A., ‘The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation’, (Summer, 1979) Philosophy & Public Affairs 
8(4), 338-360; Hill (1994), supra n.12, p. 632. 
	 327	
evidence of exploitation in their supply chain could be further to hold States 
accountable for creating legal and policy structures of exploitation. 33   
 
Thirdly, the aim of taking unfair advantage must be to gain a benefit. However, 
it is important to note that such a benefit does not have to materialise. In exploitation 
theory Wertheimer writes that an exploiter may be considered to be “acting 
exploitatively” where A failed to gain from the transaction with B. 34 The definition of 
human trafficking also emphasises that whilst the purpose of labour exploitation must 
be identified, it is not necessary for the labour exploitation to have taken place. One 
reason for this is that human trafficking is deemed to be such a severe violation of 
human rights, due to the process (coercion/deception in transport/recruitment) that 
human trafficking (even without actual exploitation) should be prohibited. 35 Similarly, 
the legal conceptualisation of labour exploitation does not require the intended benefit 
to have been accrued, in recognition of the fact that the individual may nevertheless 
have experienced harm as a result of the means by which unfair advantage was taken 
of the position of vulnerability. (e.g. the coercion led to physical violence).36 It is further 
asserted that such an understanding can extend beyond the context of human trafficking 
or indeed, to those interpretations of human trafficking where the means is not a 
constituent element. The act of taking unfair advantage in the legal conceptualisation 
of labour exploitation is discussed in the next section as the exercise of control over the 
person’s capacity or their resources.  
 
3.2.  Exercise of control over the person’s capacity or resources 
 
The exercise control or authority over the person’s capacity or their resources is the 
principal means by which an exploiter takes unfair advantage of the position of 
vulnerability.37 We have seen throughout the thesis that the notion of control has been 
a key feature in both law and theory. The jurisprudential analysis in Part I revealed the 
	
33 R203 - Forced Labour (Supplementary Measures) Recommendation, 2014 (No. 203), Recommendation on supplementary 
measures for the effective suppression of forced labour; Human Rights Watch, Global treaty to protect forced labour victims 
adopted, 11 June 2014; OSCE, Ending exploitation, ensuring that businesses do not contribute to THB duties of states and private 
sector (7th Occasional Paper, 2014. 
34 Wertheimer, A., Exploitation, (Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 209. 
35 Stoyanova (2017), supra n.2, p. 42-43. 
36 Goodin, R., Protecting the vulnerable: a reanalysis of our social responsibilities, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 
p. 194.  
37 Wood (2016), supra n.27, p. 94. 
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extent to which courts interpret the rights of ownership as the exercise of control as we 
discussed in relation to the ICTY in Kunarac in Chapter 2 and the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in Brasil Verde in Chapter 3. The prevalent academic understanding 
of control aligns with the property rights paradigm wherein possession is regarded as 
sina que non slavery, as discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 3.3). The notion of control is 
also considered to be a crucial element to all the forms of exploitation enshrined in 
Article 4 of the ECHR. 38  Domestically, the Belgian human trafficking definition 
includes, as an action, the taking or transferring of control. Furthermore, the action of 
taking or transferring control has been interpreted by the Belgian judiciary as the 
exercise of authority [lien de subordination] as we discussed in Chapter 9 (Section 3). 
The comparative legal analysis provides examples of the means by which control is 
exercised over the person or their resources. Whilst, the means identified were very 
much similar to those that exist in the legal prohibitions of exploitation, they 
nevertheless all establish the exercise of control as the key outcome. However, it is 
important to note that, unlike the international and regional definitions of human 
trafficking, both domestic jurisdictions do not consider these means as a constituent 
element of the offence.  
 
Notwithstanding, for the purpose of our proposed conceptualisation of labour 
exploitation in law, it is contended that the notion of control is a key ingredient and can 
be of use when determining the state of mind of the exploiter, particularly, in relation 
to the act of taking unfair advantage of the position of vulnerability of the exploited 
party. This understanding reflects the theoretical articulation of an exercise of power 
by some over others, to the disadvantage of the less powerful.39 The link between the 
exercise of control in a theoretical Marxist sense and in relation to contemporary forms 
of exploitation is rooted in the control of the ‘process […] and exercise [of] a general 
repressive control of the labour force to prevent rebellion. 40  Application of this 
description to the context of labour exploitation can be interpreted as the fostering of 
dependency and creating a difficulty for the individual to change their circumstances 
as a result of a lack of alternatives, as discussed in the next section.   
 
	
38 See for example the AIRE centre intervention in C.N. and V. v. France, 11 October 2012, Application No. 67724/09, para 67. 
39 Arneson, R.J., ‘What's Wrong with Exploitation?’, (1981) Ethics, 91(2), 202-227, p.202. 
40 Crocker, L., ‘Marx's Concept of Exploitation’ (Fall 1972) Social Theory and Practice 2, p. 206. 
	 329	
3.3.  Impact of exercise of control on ex post consent of individual  
 
The emergent understanding of control, both in law and theory, is twofold, referring 
not just to control over the person’s capacity but also over their resources. In addition, 
a situation may deteriorate over time resulting in additional vulnerabilities that have 
been created by “force of circumstances,” as regularly referred to by the judiciary in 
the case law analysis and impact on the ex post agency of the individual (see Chapter 
9).  
 
A recurring issue throughout the thesis, is the creation of dependency and a lack 
of real and acceptable alternatives that impacts on the ability of the individual to change 
their circumstances or status.41 We have seen that both the European Court of Human 
Rights (Section 4, Chapter 2) and the British courts (Section 3.2, Chapter 8 & Section 
4, Chapter 9) apply the ability to change circumstances in the context of servitude only. 
Here, with regards to servitude, the element of the offence is strictly interpreted as an 
“impossibility” to change circumstances, due to the ‘the feeling that condition is 
permanent or unlikely to change.’ 42  However, in practice the overall judicial 
interpretation of a situation of exploitation places significant emphasis on the exercise 
of control and the extent to which such feelings of inability to change circumstances 
are ‘brought about or kept alive by those responsible for the situation.’ 43 The analysis 
of international and domestic jurisprudence demonstrates that the inability to change 
their circumstances does not have to be due to a restriction of movement or deprivation 
of liberty due to some kind of imprisonment, it can also be derived from a climate of 
fear, economic compulsion or a lack of access to basic needs. The broader application 
of this condition illustrates that the contemporary legal understanding of labour 
exploitation includes those circumstances that are created by a disproportionate 
dependency upon the exploiter and is not solely reserved for the most egregious forms 
of exploitation such as slavery or servitude. 
  
Finally, the individual’s state-of-the-mind must be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis, on the basis that they have difficulty in changing their circumstances as 
	
41 Supra n.16. 
42 C.N. and V. v. France (2012), supra n. 38, para 91, as discussed in relation to Chowdury in Chapter 3 (Section 5.2) and in the 
file study in Chapter 9 (Section 2, 4, 6).  
43 C.N. and V. v. France (2012), supra n. 38, para 91. 
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emphasised in the legal understanding of servitude (Chapter 2) and the discussion of 
the Chowdury case in Chapter 3 (Section 5.2). The focus on the individual’s perception 
of the situation is important to avoid an overly paternalistic approach to the autonomy 
of individuals’ decision-making as we highlighted in Chapter 6 (Section 4). The 
inability to change circumstances is also closely related to the outcome of the 
exploitation that will be discussed in the next section as the final stage of the 
conceptualisation of the nature of exploitation. 
 
4. Substantive Conditions 
 
The substantive stage of exploitation assesses the cumulative effect of the conditions 
that are outlined in the background and procedural stages. The outcome of the 
exploitation can be identified as the benefit, that does not necessarily only refer to the 
exploiter but can also be mutually advantageous for the exploited party. Regardless 
of such benefit, it is contended that law must, above all, acknowledge the detrimental 
outcome of exploitation as a lack of respect for human dignity. 
 
4.1.  Benefit and/or mutual advantage  
	
As presented in the procedural conditions of exploitation, an exploiter takes unfair 
advantage of the position of vulnerability with a view to gaining a benefit, whether it 
be material or immaterial. The theoretical and legal analysis has demonstrated that 
realisation of the perceived benefit is not actually necessary for the situation to be 
conceptualised as exploitation. However, as we saw in Chapter 10 (Section 2.4), the 
excessive or disproportionate accrual of a benefit may well impact on the assessment 
of the severity of the labour exploitation.  
 
Similarly, both the theoretical and legal analysis has shown that it is possible 
for a situation of labour exploitation to be mutually advantageous for the individual, 
but still, the receipt of a benefit does not preclude the identification of exploitation. In 
practice, such a scenario is illustrated by those cases where the exploited party may 
well have been remunerated to the extent that it was more than could be expected in 
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normal working conditions in their country of origin.44 In this regard, as demonstrated 
by the case law analysis, the deduction of wages and the non-payment of the minimum 
wage are of significant evidentiary importance when assessing a situation of 
exploitation, as we have discussed in relation to how judges qualify exploitation in 
Chapter 10 (Section 1).  
 
4.2.  Lack of respect for human dignity 
 
Having regard to the preceding conditions, the ultimate deciding factor when it comes 
to determining whether or not a situation amounts to labour exploitation is to consider 
whether the situation demonstrates a lack of respect for human dignity. In normative 
terms, human dignity is broadly understood, in recognition of its existing use in law 
(Belgium for example) and its pivotal role to ensuring respect for human rights and 
labour rights.45  
 
The comparative legal analysis highlighted the adherence to norms of human 
dignity as opposed to fairness. From the perspective of the Belgian case law, the focus 
was very much premised upon objective labour standards, as demonstrated by the 
inclusion of social criminal law offences on the indictment and the interpretation of 
conditions contrary to human dignity in the travaux préparatoires. Conversely, the 
emphasis in the England & Wales cases focused upon degrading and inhuman treatment 
a key component of the theoretical Human Dignity Model in Chapter 5 (Section 1.2). 
The degradation not only referred to inhuman physical treatment and abuse, e.g. 
shaving heads etc, but also to the deprivation of basic subsistence needs and the extreme 
dependency that ensued. It is, however, important to briefly reiterate that the stage in 
which the judiciary relied upon the condition of a lack of respect for human dignity 
does differ. In Belgium “living and working conditions contrary to human dignity” is a 
constituent element of the trafficking offence, whereas in England & Wales, the 
emphasis on the lack of respect for human dignity was predominantly utilised as part 
of the assessment of the severity of the situation when it comes to imposing sentencing 
	
44 Article M3, 3.1, Service Public Féderal Justice, Circulaire du 23 décembre 2016 relative à la mise en œuvre d'une coopération 
multidisciplinaire concernant les victimes de la traite des êtres humains et/ou certaines formes aggravées de trafic des êtres 
humains (23 decembre 2016).  
45 FRA research has also emphasised that respect for human dignity is at the core of EU fundamental rights protection, and is 
directly applicable to ensuring that workers’ rights are respected, see FRA, 2019, p. 27.  
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factors, and as such was not considered as an ingredient of the offences due to the 
adherence to the regional interpretation of supranational definitions. However, we 
consider the lack of respect to be a key constituent element of any conceptualisation of 
the nature of exploitation.  
5. Concluding remarks  
	
The goal of thesis was to present a legal understanding of labour exploitation that would 
be applicable to the human trafficking context. Here it is: 
 
A knowingly taking unfair advantage of B’s position of vulnerability by means of the 
exercise of control showing a lack of respect for B’s human dignity, in order to gain 
a benefit 
  
The legal conceptualisation of labour exploitation is considered robust enough 
to assist in the assessment of factual circumstances as to whether or not they amount to 
labour exploitation in the context of human trafficking. In particular, the 
conceptualisation of labour exploitation is hoped to assist where the factual 
circumstances do not adhere to the legal threshold of those forms of labour exploitation 
that are enumerated in the definitions. Above all, the conceptualisation of labour 
exploitation provides consistency and certainty, and will ensure that future situations 
of labour exploitation are recognised. Furthermore, the definition can also assist beyond 
the context of human trafficking and could well be considered as the legal threshold for 
future efforts at regulating exploitative working conditions e.g. in cases where forced 












0. Introduction and structure of the Chapter 
 
When discussing, in Chapter 4, the legal, political and moral obstacles to the legal 
clarification of labour exploitation we acknowledged that whilst there is a need to 
legally conceptualise exploitation, law alone is not the answer. In this chapter and in 
light of the findings of the file study (Chapters 9 & 10) and the proposed legal 
conceptualisation of labour exploitation (Chapter 11), we re-engage with this remark 
by presenting six reflections that must be considered when applying the legal concept 
of labour exploitation in practice (Sections 1-6):  
 
- The first reflection asserts the distinction between the nature of labour 
exploitation and the degree of labour exploitation (Reflection 1). Whilst the 
former has been the object of enquiry in this thesis, we assert that the latter must 
also be taken into consideration.  
- The second reflection revisits the discussion of the intended outcome of the 
human trafficking process: the exploitation. In this regard, we assert that 
trafficking is not equal to exploitation and as such must be given due attention 
when it comes to assessing the impact of the exploitation from the perspective 
of the exploited party, regardless of how they arrived in the situation (Reflection 
2). 
- The third reflection emphasises the need to recognise not only the centrality of 
exploitation but also the fluidity of the circumstances that in turn must be 
understood expansively to include not just working conditions but all of the 
circumstances of the exploited party (Reflection 3). 
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- The fourth reflection takes into account the hierarchical understanding of the 
existing forms of exploitation, whereby forced or compulsory labour is seen as 
the minimum threshold of exploitation in a labour context. We nevertheless 
assert that the threshold of labour exploitation should be premised upon an 
objective standard that constitutes a decent minimum of wellbeing (Reflection 
4). 
- The fifth reflection urges that efforts that seek to shift away from dominant 
responses to human trafficking, such as the focus on sexual exploitation through 
criminal justice mechanisms, must nevertheless be complemented by a labour 
approach (Reflection 5).  
- The final reflection accounts for a difficult task when applying the proposed 
conceptualisation of labour exploitation: labour exploitation needs to be 
contextualised but cannot permit a laissez faire approach that engenders 
tolerance of exploitation (Reflection 6).  
1. The distinction between the nature of labour exploitation and the degree of 
labour exploitation (Reflection 1) 
 
The first reflection asserts that the nature of labour exploitation is distinct from the 
degree of labour exploitation. First, it must be decided whether or not labour 
exploitation exists (nature) and then once this is done then it is possible to assess the 
severity of the situation (degree). The purpose of the thesis has been to conceptualise 
the nature of labour exploitation in law; however, it is impossible to entirely exclude 
discussion as to the degree of labour exploitation in law. In particular, an emerging 
issue from the comparative legal analysis in Part III was the determination of the degree 
(or severity) of exploitation as a key aspect of the judicial assessment. To this end, we 
have seen in Chapter 10 (Section 2) that in the domestic substantive criminalisation of 
labour exploitation the degree of exploitation is relevant to the sentencing phase.  
 
Taking into account the role of the judiciary in operationalising the degree of 
exploitation through sentencing, it is important to note that such an assessment is to be 
applied on a case by case basis (Section 2.1, Chapter 10). Whilst the comparative legal 
analysis demonstrates that the sentencing guidelines are not yet fully developed, 
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indicators are available to assist the judiciary in determining the severity of the 
situation.46 Where possible, the seriousness of the exploitation is objectively assessed 
according to the proportionality of the situation when compared with the terms of 
employment of legally employed workers.47 However, in some instances, where it is 
not possible to use an objective benchmark, the impact on the victims will be difficult 
to discern and remains a task for the judge to apply his/her own reasoning and decision 
making. Of course, the latter is very likely to be subject to dispute.48 As such, it is worth 
highlighting that a common ground for appeal in the file study of England & Wales was 
excessive penalty, however, in most cases, the appeal is dismissed. 49 
 
International and regional law has demonstrated that consent is irrelevant to the 
finding of the nature of exploitation, however in a domestic criminal judicial setting, 
the agency of the individual has been taken into account when assessing the severity of 
the situation as we discussed in Chapter 10 (Section 2.3).50 In particular, the file study 
provides examples where the judicial determination of the degree of the exploitation 
paid heed to the action of the individuals themselves that could be said to have 
contributed to their exploitation as it further entrenched their precarity (a form of 
tolerance of exploitation).51 To overcome any potential prejudices and regardless of the 
role of the individual, the law should ensure that the agency of the individual does not 
impact upon the assessment of the severity of the situation in the same way it does for 
the nature of exploitation. 52 It is also important to ensure that any assessment of the 
degree of exploitation does not impact on the finding of the existence of exploitation.53 
	
46 The Delphi indicators categorise three different strengths for indicators, that are in turn applied to each of the elements of 
trafficking (act-means-purpose), see ILO, Operational indicators of trafficking in human beings Results from a Delphi survey 
implemented by the ILO and the European Commission, Geneva, 2009. 
47 See for example respect for the principle of equal treatment with workers in Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment 
as seasonal workers, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 375–390 and Section 233, Chapter 18 of the German Criminal Code, as discussed in 
Section 2 of Chapter 1.  
48 Skrivankova (2017), supra n. 20, p.114. 
49 UK1, UK3, UK12, UK16, UK19, UK24, UK25, UK28, UK30. 
50 In the UK, the Court of Appeal court adopted a strict approach to the consideration of the situation as forced labour, wherein the 
apparent consent of the individual to the working conditions meant that the forced labour issue did not require serious consideration. 
Consent to the situation, despite a death threat if he did not return to the cannabis factory see R v N; R v LE (2012) EWCA Crim 
189, para 89-91, Para 91. 
51 Berntsen, L. E. Agency of labour in a flexible pan-European labour market: A qualitative study of migrant practices and trade 
union strategies in the Netherlands, Groningen: University of Groningen, SOM research school (2015). 
52 Vrijwilligheid en subjectief welbevinden bij so’s spelen geen rol, Hof Arnhem – Leeuwarden 16 maart 2017, ECLI: GHARL 
2017:2189; Council of Europe, 7th General Report on GRETA’S Activities (2018), p. 7. 
53 On the development of indicators on a scale of gradation (strong, weak) as ways of identifying the existence of exploitation see 
Rittich, K., ‘Representing, Counting, Valuing: Managing Definitional Uncertainty in the Law of Trafficking’, in Kotiswaran, P., 
(ed.) Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), p.254. See reference made by Gallagher on the assessment of degree of harm during prosecutorial and investigative 
stages in Gallagher, A., ‘The International Legal Definition of “Trafficking in Persons”: Scope and Application’ in Kotiswaran, 
P., (ed.) Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), p.96. 
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2. ‘Trafficking does not equate to exploitation’: 54 emphasising the actual 
exploitation rather than the means (Reflection 2) 
 
We have seen throughout the thesis that the offence of human trafficking becomes 
privileged over other standalone forms of labour exploitation (Chapters 1, 4, & 9). 
Exploitation is considered as a key element of the trafficking definition, however, since 
the Palermo Protocol does not include an obligation to do anything about exploitation, 
standalone forms of labour exploitation are potentially excluded, where the 
circumstances do not meet the requirement of the action and means constituent 
elements of the human trafficking offence as discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4. The 
emphasis remains on the acts and means that lead or facilitate the exploitation whether 
it occurs or not.55 As such, the “actual exploitation” is intrinsically linked to the process 
of human trafficking but is ultimately the end result. 56  
 
There are many paths by which a person arrives in a situation of exploitation.57 
Furthermore, the actual exploitation may arise in multiple situations both in domestic 
situations where there is no cross-border movement, or where there is a migratory 
journey, exploitation may not only occur at the destination but also in and around 
smuggling hubs and departure areas or during transit.58 Therefore, it is important that 
responses are designed to react to the “actual exploitation”, especially as it is not only 
	
54 Wijers, M., ‘Purity, Victimhood and Agency: Fifteen years of the UN Trafficking Protocol, (2015) Anti-Trafficking Review, 
issue 4, 56-79. 
55 Anti-Slavery International, Trafficking for forced labour in Europe: Report on a study in the UK, Ireland the Czech Republic 
and Portugal, (November 2006), p. 8. See for example paradoxical situation in Romania in which some situations where 
exploitation did not take place are punished more severely than situations where exploitation did indeed take place in Rijken, C., 
(ed.) Combating trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011), p. iii, p. 398. The restricted 
nature of the human trafficking constituent elements is not only problematic with regards to the exploitation, but also with regards 
to the coercion that could also be present in non-trafficking related exploitative circumstances. Lasocik draws attention to this point 
with reference to the inclusion of abuse of position of vulnerability that only becomes part of a criminal activity when combined 
with another element of the human trafficking definition e.g. the action in Lasocik, Z., ‘Human Trafficking: a challenge for the 
European Union and its member states (with particular reference to Poland)’ in Holmes, L., (ed.) Trafficking and human rights – 
European and Asia-Pacific Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 2010), p. 23; For further discussion on the creation of vulnerabilities as 
either intrinsic or pre-existing vulnerabilities or indeed those that have been created by the exploiter or by structural systemic issues 
Gallagher, A., & McAdam, M., ‘Abuse of a position of vulnerability within the definition of trafficking in persons’, in Piotrowicz, 
R., Rijken, C., & Uhl, B. H., (eds) Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking, (Routledge, 2017), p. 189. 
56 For discussion on trafficking as a process see Aronowitz, A., Human Trafficking, Human Misery: The Global Trade in Human 
Beings, (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press Inc., 2013), p. 1; Paavilainen, M., ‘Towards a Cohesive and Contextualised Response: When 
is it necessary to distinguish between forced labour, trafficking in persons and slavery?’, (2015) Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 5, 
158–161, p. 158.  
57 Allain, J., & Bales, K., “Slavery and its Definition”, (2012) Queen's University Belfast Law Research Paper No. 12-06, p. 2; 
Rijken, C., ‘Trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation: cooperation in an integrated approach’, (2013) European Journal 
of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21, 9-35, p. 13. See also Kelly, L., ‘“You can find anything you want”: a critical 
reflection on research on trafficking’ (2005) International Migration, 43(1-2), 235-265, p. 256. 
58 UNODC, Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants, (2018), p. 38-42.  
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those in an irregular position who are at risk,	59 but also those regular workers in the 
formal economy who may nevertheless be ‘subject to extensive rights violations, 
including confinement, passport confiscation, non-payment of wages, and physical 
violence or its threat.’ 60  With this in mind, any subsequent analysis of future 
interventions should, therefore, focus on the outcome, namely the exploitative working 
conditions, that may or may not amount to human trafficking, forced labour or slavery, 
but does amount to labour exploitation.61  
 
Interestingly, the centrality of exploitation emerges in the analysis of the 
domestic cases of human trafficking, whereby in practice, the actual labour exploitation 
triggers investigations. The file study reveals that every case consisted of actual labour 
exploitation and the prosecution and judiciary relied upon these factual circumstances 
in order to determine the existence of the offence and to demonstrate how a situation of 
labour exploitation has been created and maintained.62 In this regard we reiterate that 
only by recognising that trafficking does not equate to exploitation, can we make 
effective progress to its understanding. One way of achieving this could be the 
introduction of a general form of exploitation in law, which has in fact been 
unsuccessful as mentioned in relation to the UK in Chapter 8 (Section 2.4) due to 
concerns that a shift towards exploitation could dilute the high standards of human 
trafficking and slavery. However, recent calls for an additional legal instrument to 
clarify the meaning of labour exploitation could see more momentum in this regard at 
regional level.63 
 
Alternatively, rather than tackling the law at its source, there could be a shift 
towards a more victim centered perspective whereby regardless of the legal distinction 
between human trafficking and exploitation, there is recognition of the similarity of the 
individuals experience, either as a victim or worker. Where the abuse endured 
	
59 For discussion on legal distinction between smuggling and human trafficking, and those who willingly embark upon a journey 
in search of better job opportunities see Goodey, J., ‘Human Trafficking: Sketchy Data and policy responses’ (2008) Criminology 
and Criminal Justice 8, 421-442, p. 423. 
60  O’Connell Davidson, J., “New Slavery, Old Binaries: Human Trafficking and the Borders of ‘freedom,’” (2010) Global 
Networks 10(2), 244–61, p. 249. 
61 For more examples of proposal to focus on the situation of exploitation i.e. the forced labour element rather than the movement 
element see Anti-Slavery International (2006), supra n. 55, p. 7. 
62 Skrivankova (2017), supra n. 20, p.111. 
63 Council of Europe, Ready for future challenges - Reinforcing the Council of Europe - Report by the Secretary General for the 
Ministerial Session in Helsinki, 16-17 May 2019, CM-Public SG (2019) 1 01/04/2019, p.29. 
	 339	
constitutes criminal behaviour then,64  as such ‘victims of both wrongs need to be 
extended the same rights, regardless of how their experience is defined in legal terms.’65 
This is particularly important when it comes to the identification of victims, and the 
type of support they receive according to the category of offence they fall into, as Wijers 
stresses, ‘there is no reason why one category of victims of forced labour and slavery-
like practices should have access to assistance and protection and other categories not, 
simply because of the way they arrived in that situation.’	66 Thus regardless of their 
position in law, from the victim’s perspective, it is important to address the 
vulnerability that leads them to the exploitative situation, whether it is through 
economic migration or human trafficking.67 Ultimately, the rights of all victims of 
exploitation should be the same, regardless of whether they are subject to trafficking, 
forced labour, slavery or slavery like practices. 
 
There is one caveat to such a contention: a shift towards exploitation must be 
mindful of its application in the context of human trafficking.	 68  Any approach 
advocating a shift towards focus on “exploitation” must not ‘dilute the high standards 
required for slavery and trafficking in international law nor undermine future 
prosecutions.’	 69  A redirection must ensure that there is no watering down of the 
seriousness of the issue, ensuring that access to justice and redress for all victims is 
simply replaced with increased regulation. 70 For example, should measures seeks to 
label exploitative situations as ‘seriously oppressive employment relationships,’71 must 
secure ‘vigorous application of [labour law regulations] to cases that fall outside of the 
realm of trafficking or slavery but where victims are deserving of redress for labour 
exploitation.’72 In light of this very valid concern, it is therefore important to ensure 
	
64 Rijken. C., ‘A human rights-based approach to trafficking in human beings’ (2009) Security and human rights, 3, 212-222, p. 
213. 
65 legal provisions targeting victims of trafficking should be extended to benefit all victims of severe labour exploitation., European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Severe labour exploitation: workers moving within or into the European Union States’ 
obligations and victims’ rights, June 2015,p. 39.  
66 Wijers (2005), supra n.54. For example, under Article 8 of the Victim’s Directive, victims of criminalised forms exploitation 
have the right to access support services in accordance with their needs, regardless of having been trafficked or not, see FRA 
(2015), supra n. 70,  p. 20 
67 Ollus, N., ‘Regulating forced labour and combating human trafficking: the relevance of historical definitions in a contemporary 
perspective’ (2015) Crime Law and Social Change 63(5), 221-246, p. 241.  
68 Allain, J., Slavery in international law of human exploitation and trafficking, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), p.325-
326. 
69 Vijeyarasa, R., & Villarino J.M.B., ‘Modern-day slavery? A Judicial Catchall for Trafficking, Slavery and Labour Exploitation’ 
(2012) Journal of International Law and International Relations 8, 36-6, p. 41. 
70 Edwards, A., ‘Trafficking in human beings: At the intersection of criminal justice, human rights, asylum/migration and labor’, 
(2007-2008) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 36, 9-53, p. 45. 
71 Borrowing from the minority reasoning of Honourable Justice Kirby in The Queen v Tang [2008] HCA 39, August 28, 2008 
M5/2008, para 117.  
72 Vijeyarasa & Villarino (2012), supra n.76, p. 41. 
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that any shift in how to handle labour exploitation adopts an integrated approach that 
permits flexibility whilst giving equal weight to all forms of exploitation. Despite the 
importance of highlighting the possibility of such detrimental effects, we contend that 
the shift towards exploitation strengthens the framework for all those who are exploited 
as it will apply even where the action and the means do not exist, but actual exploitation 
has taken place.  
3. Labour exploitation as an all-encompassing, non-static phenomenon 
(Reflection 3) 
  
The third reflection emphasises the need to recognise not only the centrality of 
exploitation but also the fluidity of the circumstances that in turn must be understood 
expansively to include not just working conditions but all of the circumstances of the 
exploited party. 73  
 
We will first turn to the fluidity of the circumstances, by making use of the 
‘continuum of exploitation’ - as coined by Skrivankova in 2010 – which consists of a 
spectrum of labour conditions ranging from decent work to severe labour exploitation, 
including slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour. 74 Not only does the 
continuum help with the conceptual difficulty of distinguishing between “strong 
exploitation” (those forms that are prohibited in law) and “weak exploitation” (namely, 
the precarious, exploitative and normatively reprehensible situations that do not meet 
the legal threshold of these legal recognised form)	75	but	also	in	facilitating the shift 
towards an increased focus on the fluidity of exploitation in recognition of the fact that 
it is a non-static phenomenon. The latter recognises that an individual may well have 
initially consented to a particular set of circumstances, but either finds him/herself in 
an entirely different situation or indeed in a situation which has much deteriorated since 
	
73 Skrivankova, K., ‘Defining exploitation in the context of trafficking – what is a crime and what is not,’ in Piotrowicz, R., Rijken, 
C., and Uhl, B. H., (eds) Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking, (Routledge, 2017), p.115. 
74 Skrivankova, K., Between decent work and forced labour: examining the continuum of exploitation, JRF programme paper 
(November 2010), p. 19. For discussion on the utility of the continuum see Ollus (2015), supra n.72, p. 241; Andrees, B., & van 
der Linden, M., ‘Designing Trafficking Research from a Labour Market Perspective: The ILO Experience,’ (2005) International 
Migration 43(1/2), 66, p. 65; Anderson, B., Motherhood, Apple Pie and Slavery: Reflections on Trafficking Debates, Centre on 
Migration, Policy and Society, Working Paper No. 48, (University of Oxford, 2007), p. 11; Coghlan, D., & Wylie, G., ‘Defining 
Trafficking/Denying Justice? Forced Labour in Ireland and the Consequences of Trafficking Discourse’, (2011) Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies 37( 9), 1513-1526, p, 1518. 
75 For further discussion see Kotiswaran, P., ‘From sex panic to extreme exploitation: revisiting the law and governance of human 
trafficking’ in Kotiswaran, P., (ed.) Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p.13.  
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the initial consent, as identified in the file study (Section 4, Chapter 9). Here, the 
continuum accounts for the possibility that decent working conditions may deteriorate 
into exploitative working conditions.76 The theoretical understanding of exploitation 
also recognises that a very normal situation can lead to labour exploitation due to the 
inherent vulnerability or need of the disadvantaged party that may have been created as 
a result of the unfair conditions in the exchange, as discussed in relation to the Human 
Dignity Model and Basic Needs Model in Chapter 5. Ultimately, the continuum 
captures the complexity of the situations that can occur along the spectrum, as the file 
study reveals. 77 Therefore, an understanding that labour exploitation can result from a 
deviation from standard working conditions is useful to understanding the fluidity of 
the concept and for triggering a right to remedy.78  
 
Secondly, as well as recognising the fluidity of the circumstances, it is also 
important to recognise the totality of the situation, thereby shifting away from a 
restrictive reading of exploitation that focuses solely upon labour conditions. Both the 
theoretical models of exploitation and the legal analysis of supranational and national 
legal orders confirm this and illustrate that exploitation is an all-encompassing 
phenomenon and is not restricted to working conditions. It is, therefore, necessary to 
go beyond the mere economics of the situation (Section 2, Chapter 5). The international 
and regional definitions of the standalone forms of servitude and slavery explicitly hint 
that the status or condition impacts on more than the working conditions (e.g. serf’s 
obligation to live on premises and the exercise of powers tantamount to ownership 
leading to the reduction to an object), the analysis of both regional and domestic 
jurisprudence confirms that the assessment must consider all circumstances, including 
living conditions, access to medical care and provision of subsistence (Section 7, 
Chapter 9 & Section 1, Chapter 10). The assessment must also go beyond the immediate 
factual circumstances of the case and regardless of the source of the ex ante and ex post 
vulnerabilities (structural or personal) of the exploited party. For example, the 
undocumented migrant status of the applicants in Chowdury and civil parties in the 
Belgian cases and the destitution of the victims in in British cases were all assessed by 
the courts as factors that exacerbated their position of vulnerability before, during and 
	
76 Skrivankova (2010), supra n.80. p. 19. 
77 Skrivankova (2017), supra n. 81, p.112. 
78 FRA Definition cited in Skrivankova (2017), supra n. 81, p.113. 
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after the exploitation.79 The situation in Chowdury, and indeed, in many of the cases 
analysed, demonstrates the importance of recognising the concept of labour 
exploitation as a process, whereby background, procedural and substantive conditions 
must be taken into account. This can be achieved where the circumstances of a situation 
of exploitation are assessed recognising both the fluidity of exploitation as a continuum 
and the totality of the situation. 
 
4. The threshold of labour exploitation as a decent minimum wellbeing that 
guarantees respect for human dignity (Reflection 4) 
 
The analysis of the existing legal definitions revealed an enumerative approach that 
presented the forms of labour exploitation as a hierarchy.80 This approach was coined 
by the European Court and reinforced in England & Wales by Court of Appeal in R v 
SK and subsequent case law. However, the forms of exploitation in the Palermo 
Protocol ‘do not impart nor imply a hierarchy of severity; severity of exploitation and 
resulting harm is to be determined by an assessment of the factual circumstances of the 
specific case, not the type of exploitation.’ 81 Similarly, the ICTY in Kunarac rejected 
the hierarchical conceptualisation of slavery, servitude and forced labour and advocated 
a shift towards a more comprehensive understanding of labour exploitation as a general 
umbrella concept. Thus, the question remains, what is the threshold of labour 
exploitation?  
 
Following the theoretical exploration and the comparative analysis of two 
domestic legal frameworks, it is purported that the threshold of labour exploitation 
should be premised upon an objective standard that constitutes a decent minimum of 
wellbeing. 82  This benchmark draws heavily upon the Basic Needs Model whilst 
	
79 Chowdury and others v. Greece, 30 March 2017, Application no. 21884/15, para.95.  
80 In European Court, see Siliadin [2005], supra n.129, para.123- 124 citing Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium, Commission's report 
of July 9, 1980, Series B no. 44, p.30, paras 78-80. Courts acknowledged that the prohibited practices in Article 4 as ‘descending 
types of slavery’ and distinct concepts, see Keane (2013), supra n. 174, p. 183. In Australian High Court, in R v Tang confirmed 
that the ‘harsh and exploitative conditions do not themselves amount to slavery,’ the offence is distinguishable in law on the basis 
of whether a right of ownership is being exercised. It is also important to note that the Australian Criminal Code provides the 
possibility ‘to apply overlapping offences to the matter at hand’ see Tully (2010), supra n.138, p. 418. See Section 3.1, Chapter 2.	
81 UNODC, Issue paper, The International Legal Definition of Trafficking in Persons: Consolidation of research findings and 
reflection on issues raised, (Vienna: United Nations, 2018), p 32. 
82 See discussion of objective standard that emerged from “Chinese Restaurant Case” Supreme Court judgment in the Netherlands 
in Esser, L.B., & Dettmeijer-Vermeulen, C.E., ‘The Prominent Role of National Judges in Interpreting the International Definition 
of Human Trafficking’ (2016) Anti-trafficking Review, Issue 6, 91-105, p. 100; Rijken (2011), supra n.55, p.500. 
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ensuring that the human dignity of the individual is not violated as well as ensuring 
sufficient revenue to purchase the goods necessary to live a distinctly human life 
regardless of background e.g. migration status. Such an understanding already exists, 
to a certain extent, in the Belgian national legal order. The legal formulation of 
economic exploitation as “conditions contrary to human dignity” is interpreted as 
safeguarding a particular level of quality of life that guarantees respect for others and  
to guarantee a certain quality of life and to protecting human existence through the 
provision of basic needs, as the Belgian file study revealed in Chapter 10 (Section 1). 
Another example of such a standard is the development of a living wage, that is 
premised upon the need to ensure that subsistence needs are met to ensure a decent 
quality of living.83 Indeed, labour law standards in general can be of assistance, as the 
rationale for different legal standards in this context seek to achieve an optimal level of 
labour protection.84 In the context of labour exploitation, the threshold would seek an 
optimal level of decent minimum of wellbeing that guarantees respect for human 
dignity.  
 
The application of an objective standard must consider the agency of the 
individual, which may manifest as: i) a waiver of any future labour abuse/exploitation 
as a result of initial consent to the misrepresented situation; ii) a negation of labour 
exploitation following the acceptance of standards that are similar to those of the 
country of origin; and iii) a perception of the individual as a willing party as a result of 
the use of subtle forms of coercion - as opposed to an individual who is compelled to 
work as a result of the use of force. However, in Chapter 6, the theoretical analysis 
reinforced the principle of irrelevance of consent as it may be the result of compulsion, 
a demeaning choice or the least worse option (Section 4). The legal analysis also 
adopted the same position as highlighted in Chapter 9, in recognition of the fact that 
the individual may have been manipulated, conditioned or had their will overborne, the 
consent of the workers to labour standards that are not in compliance with the legal and 
policy framework of that country is not taken into account (Section 6). A point of 
consensus throughout the research is that the objectives standards of the working 
	
83 Wolff, J., ‘Structures of exploitation’ in Collins, H., Lester, G., & Mantouvalou V., (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Labour 
Law, (Oxford University Press, 2018), p.117. 
84 See ILO Decent Work Agenda.  
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conditions in that country are to be applied (Section 2.3, Chapter 1; Section 4, Chapter 
6; Section 6, Chapter 9).85  
 
Thus, an application of a sufficiency standard in law would comprise an 
objective measure of the basic minimum well-being, whereby the situation is assessed 
regardless of the consent of the individual to any of the conditions, ensuring a zero-
tolerance approach to labour exploitation. Three limitations to the sufficiency standard 
must be addressed: first of all, it is important to ensure that any regulatory measure of 
sufficiency in a free market political economy does not reinforce a rationalisation of 
labour exploitation, whereby ‘employers, and sometimes even the legislators who draft 
support for such exploitation, will assert that the exploited person is better off than they 
would be without the job.’ 86 Secondly, the autonomy of individuals must be respected 
and any imposition of an objective standard must not be too paternalistic. And finally, 
it may be very difficult to find a consensus on the enforcement of such a standard, as 
there will be a need to take into account the historical development of labour regulation 
and the disparity between different approaches in national contexts as we will discussed 
in the next section.87  
 
These limitations are guarded against by premising the legal application of the 
sufficiency standard on the norm of dignity and by building on already existing 
understanding of “decent work.” The threshold of the objective decent minimum of 
wellbeing can be adapted from the “decent work” paradigm that considers non-decent 
work to encompass those employment relationships that lead to precariousness for the 
worker involved. 88 However, it must be noted that the current emphasis on non-decent 
work is very much premised upon market relations. Therefore, in order to be applicable 
in a non-market relation context, it is important that the objective decent minimum 
threshold captures the totality of the situation (including living conditions) as emerged 
from Chapter 9 (Section 7). The threshold of labour exploitation must be objectively 
determined according to a sufficiency standard measured in accordance with a decent 
minimum wellbeing that guarantees respect for human dignity, irrespective of consent. 
	
85 Esser & Dettmeijer-Vermeulen, supra n.89. 
86 Haynes, D. F., ‘Exploitation Nation: The Thin and Grey Legal Lines between Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers’, 
(2009) Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 23(1), 1 -70, p. 24-25.  
87 Intervention by Samwer, J., ILO Conventions and labour standards, AHRI Conference paper, 2017 [on file with author], p.4.  
88 Barnard, C., ‘Non-standard employment: what can the EU do? in New forms of employment in Europe’, (2016) Bulletin of 
comparative labour relations 94, 55, p.58. 
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The operationalisation of this threshold may well encounter some initial 
teething problems when it comes to the assessment of conditions in an inter-personal 
relationship. As we have seen, the courts are reluctant to interfere in situations that are 
derived from cultural expectations or traditional norms such as M & Others v Italy & 
Bulgaria [2012] discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 3). Nevertheless, it is contested that 
the application of an objective norm premised on dignity will enable the courts to 
determine what is acceptable to society in accordance with ‘the prevailing norms in 
their temporal and geographical context’ as suggested by the Australian High Court in 
Tang discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 3.3).  
 
5. A criminal justice approach must be complemented by a labour approach 
(Reflection 5) 
 
We have seen in Chapter 4 that the neo-abolitionist movement has thus far resisted a 
shift away from dominant responses such as the focus on sexual exploitation through 
criminal justice mechanisms.89 However, we believe that the legal clarification of 
labour exploitation must also be complemented by a labour approach.90  
 
A labour perspective will overcome existing problems that emerge from a 
restrictive migration lens that currently prevents all individuals who are exploited from 
accessing redress regardless of their migration status.	91 A robust labour approach must 
account for the economic, social and cultural disparities that foster the vulnerability and 
	
89 See neo-abolitionist and marginalization of labour exploitation due to focus on sex exploitation and lack of consideration of 
ESCR e.g. economic disparities in Chuang, J., ‘Rescuing trafficking from ideological capture: prostitution reform and anti-
trafficking law and policy,’ (2010) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 158(6), 1655-1728, p. 1683 & p. 1726. Muskat-Gorska, 
Z., ‘Can labour make an effective contribution to legal strategies against human trafficking?,’ in Piotrowicz, R., Rijken, C., and 
Uhl, B. H., (eds) Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking, (Routledge, 2017), p.460-461. 
90 Shamir, H., ‘A labor paradigm for human trafficking’, (2012) UCLA Law Review 60, 76 – 136, p. 91; Skrivankova (2010), supra 
n.80, p. 29-30; Muskat-Gorska (2017), supra n.96; Bravo, K., ‘Free labour! A labour liberalisation solution to modern trafficking 
human beings’ (2009) Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 18, 545-615; Pope, J., ‘A free labor approach to human 
trafficking’, (2010) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 158, pp. 1849- 1875. 
91 See provisions on Outstanding wages (Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3) Complaint mechanisms (Article 13.1) and Residence permits 
(Article 13.4) in Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum 
standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals but poorly implemented see 
PICUM Position Paper, Employers’ Sanctions: Impacts on Undocumented Migrant Workers’ Rights in Four EU Countries (April 
2015); PICUM, Summary of findings in Belgium and the Czech Republic on the implementation of the Employers’ Sanctions 
Directive (2017).  
On role of protectionist migration policies on susceptibility of workers to exploitation see discussion of the Employers Sanction 
Directive as being indicative of the acceptance of illegal employment and the increased risk of exploitation/human trafficking 
whilst only focusing on irregular third country nationals to the exclusion of EU citizens or nationals that may well be subjected to 
exploitative working conditions in Rijken, C., ‘Trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation: cooperation in an integrated 
approach’, (2013) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 21, 9-35. 
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lack of choice very often encountered by potential victims of labour exploitation.92 For 
instance, Ollus & Jokinnen stress that a labour approach would need to tackle issues 
such as the social construction of demand for cheap labour,93	 that Chuang describes as 
‘the larger socio-economic forces that feed the “emigration push” and “immigration 
pull” toward risky labour migration practices in our globalised economy.’94  
 
A labour approach already has a strong normative legal foundation, with Article 
6 of the ICESCR stating that: ‘everyone has the right to the opportunity to gain a living 
by work he or she freely chooses or accepts’. Human rights law further reinforces the 
protection of all workers regardless of migration status in the UN Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and 
more recently in Objective 6 of the Global Compact on Migration which seeks to 
facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work.	
A shift in focus onto the promotion and protection of rights, would no longer require 
the status of the individual to be labelled e.g. migrant, national/citizen, illegal, legal, 
smuggled, trafficked etc. Indeed, the 2018 UNODC Global study on smuggling of 
migrants emphasises the multiple identities that migrants can hold, either 
simultaneously or over time and the complexity that this entails in terms of legal 
protections and rights. 95 Furthermore, we must account for the fact that the migration 
status of an individual is not static and can fluctuate overtime and, in some instances, 
as Lewis et al contend, such changes can even increase the precarious position of 
workers.96 Thus, bearing in mind the complexity of such circumstances, we concur with 
research findings that stress the need to guarantee all workers’ protection from 
exploitation by guaranteeing their basic labour rights regardless of migration status and 
securing their access to justice e.g. loss of earnings.97 
 
	
92 On dominance of criminal justice responses etc to human trafficking and failure to take into account fundamental economic 
principles and forces and their effects on both licit and illicit traffic and trade. Bravo (2009), supra n.85, p. 559. 
93 Ollus, N., & Jokinen, A., Trafficking for Forced Labour and Labour Exploitation – Setting the Scene, in Ollus, N., & Jokinen, 
A., & Aromaa, K., (eds.) Trafficking for Forced Labour and Labour Exploitation in Finland, Poland and Estonia, FLEX-HEUNI 
(2011), p.474. 
94 Chuang, J., ‘Beyond a snapshot: Preventing human trafficking in the global economy’, (2006) Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 13(1), 137-163, p. 140.  
95 UNODC, Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants, (2018), p.42. For further discussion on the complexity of labelling and 
categorising migrants see McAdam, M., ‘Who’s Who at the Border? A rights-based approach to identifying human trafficking at 
international borders,’ (2013) Anti-trafficking Review issue 2, 33-49and IOM (2003), p. 7. 
96 Lewis, H., Dwyer, P., Hodkinson, S., & Waite, L., (eds) Precarious lives: forced labour, exploitation and asylum, (Bristol: 
Policy Press, 2015), p. 21. 
97 Anti-Slavery International (2006), supra n. 55, p. 6; Plant, R., ‘Foreword’, in Andrees, B., & Belser, P., (eds) Forced Labour: 
Coercion and Exploitation in the private economy, (New York: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2009, p. xiii. 
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Protecting the human rights of exploited workers will however require 
consideration of the neoliberal nature of the global economy	that has seen a proliferation 
of non-standard work practices, deregulation, flexbilisation and casualised, low paid 
employment. 98 Additionally, the current approach to tackling labour exploitation has 
directly evolved from the responses to human trafficking to sexual exploitation. As a 
result, they have focused upon a victim centred approach, which is premised upon the 
individual’s situation after the exploitation has occurred. The application of a labour 
approach would assist in ensuring a sense of balance between the needs of the victim 
once they have been identified post-exploitation and, as Muskat Gorska advocates, 
‘intervention into the exploitation cycle before the employment situation – individual 
or collective – turns into forced or trafficked labour.’99 We suggest that addressing non-
compliance with labour market standards, which according to Ollus & Jokinen are more 
easily detectable and are often precursors to trafficking,100 would ensure prevention 
efforts are more effective. To this end, it is important to recognise Edwards’ call for a 
labour market approach to comprise the strengthening of labour institutions and the 
supervision of labour standards in both origin and destination countries.101 
 
The strength of engaging with a labour approach is premised upon its ability to 
regulate and intervene in the labour market where problems arise in an employment 
context. However, it must be noted that the current approach to minimising the abuse 
of unequal bargaining power is limited to political structures dealing with conventional 
labour markets. Therefore, in order to effectively tackle exploitation by applying a 
labour approach, we must consider Zatz’s insistence that the labour market must allow 
for the inclusion of non-market forms of work in its ambit clearly demonstrating that 
the prohibition of exploitation is grounded as a foundation a labour law.102  
 
Whilst adopting a labour lens has its advantages in so far as it recognises the 
inter-linkages between migration, labour and trafficking, we do acknowledge the 
limitations of such an approach. For instance, it can downplay the serious human rights 
	
98 Anti-Slavery International (2006), supra n. 55,  p. 12; Omar Mahmoud, T., & Trebesch, C., ‘The economics of human trafficking 
and labour migration: micro-evidence from Eastern Europe’ (2010) Journal of comparative economics 38, 173 -188, p. 176; 
Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.77, p. 19. Ollus & Jokinen (2017), supra n.100, p.473. 
99 Muskat-Gorska (2017), supra n.97, p.460-461. 
100 Ollus & Jokinen (2017), supra n.100, p.476. 
101 Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.77, p. 41. 
102 Zatz, N., ‘Discrimination and labour law’, in Collins, H., Lester, G., & Mantouvalou V., (eds) Philosophical Foundations of 
Labour Law, (Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 171-172. 
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violations that occur throughout the process and can also cause difficulties in the 
context of redress or compensation since existing mechanisms in labour law do not 
have the same forms of remedy as the criminal law.103 Furthermore, efforts must be 
made to remove restrictions of access to the labour market that can be the catalyst for 
migrants seeking access to the illegal labour market and economic sectors where the 
risk of exploitation is higher.104 Consequently, the possibility of enforcement of these 
restrictive immigration measures leads to a lack of willingness to mobilise and take 
action against mistreatment at work.105 Furthermore, the nexus between migration and 
labour regulation also leaves workers’ vulnerable to exploitation without sufficient 
information on their rights at work, right to redress and right to access social security.106 
Such limitations can be avoided, and in this regard, we must insist on the existence of 
a distinct firewall between a labour approach that seeks to combat exploitation in the 
labour market and migration measures that are designed to control and restrict 
immigration but can fuel exploitation, such as enforcement of measures that seek to 
minimise illegal working but can be to the detriment of the safeguarding of the 
fundamental rights of irregular workers. 107  Once again, whilst it is important to 
acknowledge such limitations, we once again stress that these limitations can be 
overcome with the application of a comprehensive, multi-pronged approach. 
6. Using fundamental rights to balance between a contextualised understanding 
and a tolerance of labour exploitation (Reflection 6) 
 
The need for a contextualised understanding of labour exploitation has not only 
emerged from the findings of the thesis but is also a key assertion made in the UNODC 
Exploitation Issue Paper stated that ‘cultural and other context-specific factors can play 
a role in shaping perceptions of what constitutes exploitative conduct for the purposes 
of establishing trafficking.’ 108  However, we suggest an element of caution when 
	
103 Edwards (2007-2008), supra n.77, p. 43. 
104 See for instance asylum seekers, 9 months restriction on access to labour market for asylum seekers, in Article 15(1), Directive 
2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants 
for international protection, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 96–116; In practice, most Member States have introduced a lower time limit, 
see European Parliamentary Research Service, (2015) Work and social welfare for asylum- seekers and refugees Selected EU 
Member States, p.35. See for admitted migrants restrictions on freedom of choice of employment, ILO, Access to the labour market 
for admitted migrant workers in Asia and related corridors (February 2019).  
105 Lewis et al (2015), supra n. 103, p. 36. 
106 Anti-Slavery International (2006), supra n. 55, p. 11. 
107 International Organisation for Migration Is trafficking in human beings demand driven? A multi-country pilot study, Anderson, 
B., & O’Connell Davidson, J., Migration Research Series (2003), p. 7; FLEX, Risky Business: Tackling Exploitation in the UK 
Labour Market, (FLEX 2017), p.23.  
108 UNODC, Issue Paper: The Concept of "Exploitation" in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol (New York: United Nations, 2015), 
p.22, p.119, p.123; See also UNODC (2018), supra n.102, p. 24. Gallagher (2017), supra n.53, p. 103.  
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seeking to allow such flexibility in order to contextualise a situation (including the 
agency of the individual) as it may lead to an overly laissez-faire approach allowing for 
a tolerance of exploitation. Such a balancing act, we believe, can be achieved by 
ensuring that the protection of fundamental rights is at the core of any assessment of 
labour exploitation. 
 
The international and national legal analysis demonstrates the contextual nature 
of exploitation by significant deference to national legal orders in the interpretation of 
international definitions of exploitation. To this end, in Chapter 1 we discussed the 
international definition of human trafficking and its value as an instrument that provides 
for the minimum standards or the lowest common denominator with the non-exhaustive 
list of exploitation and a lack of monitoring mechanism placing the onus on States to 
decide what constitutes human trafficking (Section 2.3). The flexibility permits States 
to determine the threshold of labour exploitation in accordance with their contextual 
variations (Section 1).  
 
Furthermore, the contextualisation of labour exploitation in the findings 
suggests that the labour market is not always the locus of exploitation. The cases in the 
UK, whereby an individual’s identity was being exploited for the purposes of benefit-
fraud leading to debt bondage, shifts the locus of exploitation. Whilst, these fraudulent 
misrepresentations were almost always accompanied by a form of labour exploitation, 
it demonstrates that there is a need to assess the totality of the situation, including living 
and working conditions. It may be that “hidden third party exploitation” makes it 
difficult to discern the locus of the exploitation, wherein working conditions are not 
exploitative per se, e.g. tied accommodation, unlawful deductions, non-payment of tax, 
controlling of bank account, obligation to purchase services e.g. transport/clothing/ 
translation.109 The law must recognise and understand these different contexts to ensure 
the inclusion of non-market relationships within the material scope of exploitation as 
the theoretical models demonstrated in Chapter 5.  
 
The legal analysis has revealed that labour exploitation must not only be 
contextualised in accordance with the standards of society, but also on a case by case 
	
109 Skrivankova (2017), supra n. 81, p.115. 
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basis, as assessed in relation to Tang & Kunarac in Chapter 4. Concretely, where the 
complexity of the circumstances in the domestic cases often involves large numbers of 
witnesses/civil parties, it is important for each individual to be assessed separately, as 
it is possible that the relationship between the exploiter and the exploited party is not 
always the same (Chapter 9). For instance, some exploiters value certain individuals 
more than others, leading to a different degree of mistreatment and quality of 
relationship (Section 4). In particular, it is important that the agency of the individual 
is assessed according to their personal circumstances and not in comparison with 
another exploited party.  
 
Overall, it is important for any understanding of exploitation to adopt an 
individualistic tailored approach that takes into account both labour and human rights 
standards. The recognition of structural and relational exploitation and vulnerabilities 
in the typology and conditions of exploitation in Chapters 5 & 6, further emphasises 
that a one-size-fits-all approach will not be appropriate when taking into account the 
complexity of the phenomenon of labour exploitation and different affects it has on 
different individuals as we saw in Chapter 9 with regards to different individuals being 
treated differently by the exploiters (Section 4).  
 
Whilst the need to contextualise the interpretation of labour exploitation has 
been clearly presented, there is a need to ensure that such contextualisation does not 
constitute an overly laissez faire approach wherein a particular situation of exploitation 
is tolerated. The issue of tolerance of exploitation emerged in both the supranational 
legal analysis in Chapter 4 as well as in the typology of exploitation theory in relation 
to the Basic Needs Model in Chapter 5 and as a caveat to the conditions of exploitation 
in Chapter 6. Quite simply, in this regard, exploitation should be tolerated in non-ideal 
conditions wherein its prohibition or legal intervention would do more harm than good 
and as a result is the lesser of two evils. Such tolerance is, however, not absolute and 
as such exploitation (where justified) should be overlooked (not erased or cancelled).  
 
The principal source of such tolerance is the lack of political will to ensure that 
such exploitative conduct is not tolerated. Historical accounts of the political and 
economic interests of the states involved in drafting the international legislation are 
indicative of such tolerance, as demonstrated by the incremental approach adopted to 
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the prohibition of forced or compulsory labour discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 1.1). 
The same position is evident in a contemporary context where, in the context of 
globalisation and deregulation, acceptance of exploitation is vital to upholding the 
power or prosperity of the economic or political elite.110  
 
The legal handling of labour exploitation reinforces such a perception; wherein 
a global prohibition regime exists but lacks the proper enforcement for it to be 
meaningful.111 The role of legal regulation is important here for two reasons. First of 
all, despite the moral paternalism of the legal regime when it comes to the most severe 
forms of exploitation e.g. slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour and human 
trafficking for labour exploitation, lesser forms of exploitation remain tolerated 
whereby they may well be regulated by civil or administrative sanctions but are not 
necessarily effectively implemented. 112  Secondly, where exploitation is formally 
prohibited, the substantive application of the law is in fact strategic, and could be 
interpreted as tolerance of exploitation. This has emerged from the file study, where 
there has been an overwhelming emphasis on homeless British nationals who are 
exploited by the Irish travelling community on the one hand, and on the other the 
Belgium system has a heavy focus on those who are undocumented and working in the 
informal labour market. The tolerance of exploitation and how it is regulated in law, is 
dependent upon the assessment of the wrong that is being punished, as it has a net cost 
to society, and not necessarily to the individual. 113 For example, in the case of England 
& Wales, the emphasis on the “hostile environment” as the priority of immigration law, 
has led to an emphasis on tackling “modern slavery” through the lens of homelessness, 
county drug lines and exploitation of minors, which accounts, perhaps, for the lack of 
undocumented migrant workers as victims in criminal cases. Conversely, Belgian’s 
emphasis on the combination of the criminal prohibition of human trafficking with 
social criminal law offences has led to an emphasis on the employment context and, by 
consequence, enforcement and regulation of labour standards. Evidently, there are 
limits to the intervention of criminal law, and as a result, it is for alternative forms of 
regulation to also be considered, 114 such as established principles in other areas of 
	
110 Hathaway, J. ‘The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human Trafficking,”” (2008) Virginia Journal of International Law 49(1), 1-
59. 
111 See Chapter 3 on reinforcing and strengthening the prohibition of forced or compulsory labour in Sections 2-4.  
112 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.34, p. 305. 
113 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.34, p. 308. 
114 Wertheimer (1996), supra n.34, p. 309. 
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private or administrative law including, inter alia, the regulation of freedom of contract, 
the application of the doctrine of unconscionability, the defence of economic duress 
and the prohibition of abuse of dominance.115 These particular mechanisms may also 
be more suitable to those situations of labour exploitation that may arise from the shift 
in the landscape of the contemporary labour market, but only should they be effectively 
implemented.  
 
In particular, it is important to ensure that any conceptualisation of labour 
exploitation avoids co-opting a paternalistic approach that fails to sufficiently take into 
account the autonomy of the individual. However, there is increasing evidence that 
individuals are using their agency in a way that may contribute to the precarious nature 
of their employment.116 The increasing shift away from the Standard Employment 
Relationship (SER) and workers’ opting for other forms of more flexible employment, 
that may in some instances impact negatively on individuals, as such forms of 
employment lead to precarious working conditions, particularly in working hours and 
income.117  Furthermore, in light of the previous discussion on structural forms of 
vulnerability, it is important to note that these new forms of employment adversely 
impact low skilled workers and vulnerable groups of workers e.g. young workers, 
female workers, migrant workers.118 With this in mind, commentators have suggested 
that the validity of legal paternalism is justified, in a global era where ‘the inherent 
imbalance in power between employers and unorganised employees has not vanished, 
but rather has intensified.’119 
 
The extent to which exploitation is tolerated, depends upon the willingness to 
accept its inevitability as a consequence of the structural factors that contribute to its 
	
115 For discussion on doctrine of unconscionability in contract law see Hill (1994), supra n.12, p. 633 & Wertheimer (1996), supra 
n.34, p. 49 &76.  
For discussion on defence of economic duress & prohibition of abuse of dominance in competition law see Pınar Akman, The 
relationship between economic duress and abuse of a dominant position, Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly  2014, 
1(Feb), 99-13.  
For discussion on inequality of bargaining power in contract law see Wertheimer (1996), supra n.34, p. 50 & p. 65. 
116 See discussion on strategic acceptance in Berntsen, L. E., ‘Reworking labour practices: on the agency of unorganized mobile 
migrant construction workers,’ (2016) Work, employment and society 30(3) 472 –488.  
117 Kenner J., ‘Inverting the Flexicurity Paradigm: The United Kingdom and Zero Hours Contracts,’ in Ales E., Deinert O. and 
Kenner J., eds., Core and Contingent Work in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis (Hart: 2017), 153-183; Kenner J., 
‘Uber Drivers are ‘Workers’ – The Expanding Scope of the ‘Worker’ Concept in the UK’s Gig Economy,’ in Kenner J, Florczak 
I & Otto M (eds), Precarious Work. The Challenge for Labour Law in Europe (Edward Elgar, 2019, Forthcoming).  
118 See for example, the overview of zero-hours contracts in Deakin, S., ‘New Forms of Employment: Implications for EU Law – 
The Law as It Stands’ in Blanpain, R., Hendrickx, F., and Waas, B., (eds) (2016) New forms of employment in Europe, Bulletin of 
comparative labour relations Volume 94, 43. 
119 Dahan, Y., Lerner, H., Milma-Sivan, F., ‘Global justice, labor standards and responsibility,’ (2011) Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law 12, 439, p. 456. 
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creation. The factual circumstances in Chowdury presented in Chapter 3 highlighted 
such a situation, whereby the domestic authorities had engendered a systemic 
acceptance of the non-payment of wages to irregular migrant workers. One societal 
consequence of such acceptance of dismal working conditions for this particular group 
of labourers, that are known to be at increased risk of abuse in the employment context, 
arguably stems from the ‘the normality of labour exploitation under capitalism.’120 The 
European Court however did not accept such a justification premised upon “coercive 
governance” for the exploitation endured by the migrant workers and placed greater 
emphasis on the protection of their fundamental rights regardless of their migration 
status.121 The role of the national courts is also of significance in this regard, when 
ensuring that the penalty imposed is sufficient to recognise the impact of the exploiter’s 
actions not only on the individual but on society overall.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
	
The effectiveness of the proposed legal conceptualisation of labour exploitation 
presented in Chapter 11 will depend upon other factors both within and beyond the 
parameters of the law. To ensure that any application of the legal conceptualisation of 
labour exploitation is as effective as possible we have, in this chapter, presented six 
reflections that have emerged from the findings of this thesis. However, it is important 
to note that we do not seek to present these reflections as an exhaustive list of factors 
to be considered. Indeed, others may well arise in different legal, social and economic 
contexts, thus requiring continuous assessment and reflection.  
	
120 Manzo, K., ‘Modern slavery, global capitalism and deproletarianisation in West Africa’ (2005) Review of African Political 
Economy 106, 521-534p. 523. 
121 Berman, J., & Friesendorf, C., ‘EU Foreign Policy and the Fight Against Human Trafficking: Coercive Governance as Crime 













1. Summary of findings 
 
The overall objective of the thesis was to conceptualise labour exploitation in order to 
better clarify the material scope of the concept in the context of human trafficking law 
and to consider its applicability as a standalone form of exploitation. In order to reach 
a scientifically robust response to the overall purpose and object of enquiry of the thesis 
the analysis not only consisted of a cross-disciplinary exploration of law and political 
theory, but also engagement with supranational and national legal spaces. 
 
1.1. State-of-the-art legal understanding of labour exploitation in international 
and regional law (Part I) 
 
The first part of the thesis identified the state-of-the-art legal understanding of labour 
exploitation in international and regional law. The principal forms of exploitation 
analysed included human trafficking for the purposes of labour exploitation (Chapter 
1), slavery, practices similar to slavery and servitude (Chapter 2) and forced or 
compulsory labour (Chapter 3).  
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In Chapter 1, we demonstrated that despite the increased recognition of human 
trafficking for the purposes of labour exploitation at the supranational level, following 
the international definition of human trafficking and the expansion of its scope to 
include labour exploitation there is still a lack of clarity regarding the scope of the 
exploitation concept. This is principally the result of a categorical, non-exhaustive 
approach to the purpose element of exploitation and its lack of definition in law. 
Consequently, the lack of a definition of exploitation in human trafficking has led to a 
number of issues, namely a conflation and confusion in terminology that has fostered 
a stereotypical understanding of labour exploitation leading to a fragmented and 
inconsistent domestic implementation that perpetuates legal uncertainty. Such issues 
have been further perpetuated by a lack of guidance and assistance from international 
and regional bodies to ensure domestic application provides for legal certainty and the 
limited judicial engagement with human trafficking in regional courts. This has been 
notably demonstrated by the European Court of Human Rights Article 4 jurisprudence 
which has not yet provided clarification of the material scope of the provision, despite 
human trafficking being held to fall within the material scope of Article 4 even though 
it is not explicitly mentioned, in light of the “living instrument” doctrine.  
 
Chapter 2 considered the global prohibition mechanisms of slavery, servitude 
and practices similar to slavery that have led to a stimulation of shared values, a 
voluntary prohibition of slavery by State parties and the gradual elimination of the 
origins and causes of this conduct. However, despite the global prohibition making 
headway, a lack of adequate international implementation and enforcement of the 
existing international legislation has seen a resurgence in contemporary forms of 
slavery, that require continued engagement with the prohibition of slavery. In contrast 
to the case law on human trafficking, the recent but limited judicial engagement with 
slavery, servitude and practices similar to slavery provides an important platform from 
which to re-engage with the better handling and demonstration of intolerance of such 
conduct. 
 
Chapter 3 illustrated that forced or compulsory labour has seen legal and policy 
developments in light of the need to adapt to the contemporary context that is 
predominantly characterised as a shift from a State sponsored activity to a form of 
exploitation that predominantly occurs in the private economy. The judicial 
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understanding of forced or compulsory labour – albeit limited - has provided critical 
insight into the key features of exploitation such as the exercise of control that fosters 
dependence and lack of viable alternatives.  
 
Despite these important judicial developments for all forms of labour 
exploitation, the understanding of labour exploitation in law remains ambiguous due to 
the absence of a legal definition. Chapter 4 tackled this issue by taking stock of the 
state-of-the-art understanding of labour exploitation in law by identifying the key 
emerging elements of exploitation and the key obstacles that continue to hinder the 
legal clarification of exploitation. The focus on exploitation in the human trafficking 
definition is of critical importance when the international definition is increasingly 
being recognised as a pivotal aspect to the anti-trafficking and modern- abolitionist 
movement. The identified obstacles arising from a lack of definition, whilst not 
insurmountable, still impact on the overall objective of clarifying the scope of 
exploitation in law, in order to determine the threshold between non-exploitative 
circumstances and exploitation. Part I of this thesis concludes that the lack of 
engagement by the international community in clarifying the legal scope of exploitation 
leaves the issue both politically and legally hanging in the balance.   
 
1.2. Exploration of exploitation and its constituent conditions in theory (Part 
II) 
 
Taking into account the situation as to the state-of-the-art legal understanding of 
exploitation, Part II shifted the disciplinary lens onto exploitation in political theory as 
a way of assisting with the legal conceptualisation of exploitation. Chapter 5 explored 
the conceptualisation of labour exploitation in theory. The resulting typology of 
exploitation reflects the wide-ranging understanding of exploitation across the 
spectrum of political theories, with three models of exploitation identified: 
Redistribution Model, Human Dignity Model and Basic Needs Model. One 
commonality that emerged from all three models is the need to ensure that any 
conceptualisation of exploitation goes beyond economic relations by incorporating 
non-market relations. The exploration of exploitation in political theory raised an 
important issue: the non-interference with exploitation. The theoretical tolerance of 
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exploitation does not seek to discard the moral wrong of exploitation, but rather permits 
it to be overridden in certain circumstances. The tolerance of exploitation is closely tied 
to the work of scholars who insist on the importance of ensuring that any efforts at 
tackling human trafficking or exploitation do not fail to acknowledge the structural 
factors that can contribute to the creation and maintenance of the phenomenon in a 
global market economy. 
 
Chapter 6 used the typology of exploitation theories to identify the conditions 
of exploitation in theory and to highlight where there are synergies with the legal 
elements identified in Part I. This first step towards a conceptual clarification of 
exploitation categorised the process of exploitation into three stages: background, 
procedural and substantive. Within each of these stages, the following conditions 
were identified:   
• Background conditions - imbalance of power and position of vulnerability 
• Procedural conditions - taking unfair advantage and consent 
• Substantive conditions - benefit and detriment.  
 
These conditions of exploitation individually do not amount to exploitation. 
However, cumulatively they may be indicative of exploitation.  
 
1.3. The formal and substantive criminalisation of labour exploitation in 
national legal orders: Belgium and England & Wales (Part III) 
 
The findings in the first two substantive parts of the thesis contributed to the 
development of an analytical framework which was used to comparatively analyse the 
formal and substantive criminalisation of labour exploitation in two national legal 
orders: Belgium and England & Wales. Following an overview of the methodological 
considerations and the contextualising features of the file study in Chapter 7, Chapter 
8 analysed the formal and substantive criminalised of labour exploitation in the 
domestic legal orders. The analysis considered the formal legal development and the 
substantive judicial application of the offences of labour exploitation in the two case 
studies. The analysis revealed that the “domestic” implementation of the human 
trafficking offence is fragmented, with non-inclusion of the means elements as a 
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constituent element of the offence in both jurisdictions and in England & Wales, the 
action element is restricted to the arranging or facilitation of travel only. Secondly, the 
human trafficking offence is given primacy in criminal law, as exemplified by the 
non-recognition of standalone offences in Belgium and a wider understanding of 
exploitation in the context of human trafficking as compared to non-trafficking 
situations in England & Wales. Thirdly, the file study revealed that the scope of 
exploitation is broadly understood but requires further clarification to guard 
against confusion.  
 
The role of the judiciary in providing such clarification was considered in 
Chapter 9, with an analysis of the judicial interpretation of the domestic legal 
framework that criminalises labour exploitation. The analysis of the judicial 
interpretation of domestic law has proven to be invaluable, especially in light of the 
limited ECtHR jurisprudence on Article 4. Despite some key differences between the 
two jurisdictions, the file study revealed, a number of key elements of labour 
exploitation that emerged in both. First of all, the role of the exploiter demonstrates 
that situations of labour exploitation are the result of calculated decision making, such 
as targeted recruitment wherein a position of vulnerability is knowingly abused for 
own benefit, whilst displaying a lack of respect for human dignity. The relationship 
between the exploiter and the victim is characterised by the exercise of 
control/authority over the totality of the situation, leaving the individual in a position 
of dependence where there is a difficulty to change their circumstances.  
 
In Chapter 10 we further illustrated the nuance of law in action, by discussing 
the judicial use of indicators as a tool to assist the qualification the nature of 
exploitation. These indicators emphasise that the assessment of exploitation does not 
only refer to working conditions but also to living conditions. The use of indicators is 
also used when determining the penalty, wherein the assessment of the degree of 
exploitation gives weight to the benefit received by the exploiter as an aggravating 
factor and the agency of the individuals as a mitigating factor.  
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2. The answer to the research question  
 
The thesis embarked upon an exploration of the understanding of exploitation in both 
law and theory with a view to furnishing a response to the main research question: how 
can labour exploitation be conceptualised in law specifically in the context of human 
trafficking and should it be established as a standalone criminal offence? 
 
First of all, we will address the first part of the research question: how can 
labour exploitation be conceptualised in law specifically in the context of human 
trafficking?  
 
The findings from the research have led to an evidence-based articulation of a 
legal conceptualisation of labour exploitation (Chapter 11).  
 
A knowingly taking unfair advantage of B’s position of vulnerability by means of the 
exercise of control showing a lack of respect for B’s human dignity, in order to gain 
a benefit. 
 
We believe that the proposed conceptualisation identifies the constituent 
elements of exploitation that are necessary to determine whether or not the provision of 
work or services has been abused. The proposal’s use of standardised language and its 
development in light of existing law and practice means that it offers an opportunity to 
strengthen the existing responses against the exploitation of other’s work or services. 
In this regard, the proposed conceptualisation provides clarity to the law in four ways:  
i) in light of the non-exhaustive categorical enumeration of forms of 
exploitation in the human trafficking definition, it provides clarity as to the 
scope of labour exploitation within the paradigm of human trafficking;  
ii) in view of the three constituent elements of the human trafficking definition, 
it can apply to situations of labour exploitation that do not qualify as human 
trafficking due to the absence of one or more of the constituent elements of 
the trafficking offence itself; 
iii) in light of limited case law, it can be operationalised to better understand 
the material scope of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour; 
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iv) where slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour are not formally 
criminalised as standalone offences, it offers an alternative avenue for 
protecting those who are vulnerable and may be exploited.  
 
The findings and the proposed legal conceptualisation of labour exploitation 
resulting from this scientific research are primarily aimed at an academic audience and 
engaging with the academic literature exploring the topic of labour exploitation and 
human trafficking. In particular, the proposed conceptualisation not only builds upon 
and integrates itself in the current debate of these topical issues but also formulates 
original findings and insights.  
 
Furthermore, taking into account the principal data sources and the main 
concerns raised in scholarship regarding the lack of understanding of the material scope 
of labour exploitation for practitioners, this research also aims at offering assistance 
and guidance to the judiciary when seeking to implement the domestic legal framework. 
This thesis not only presents an up-to-date and informed analysis of the national case 
law in this field but also offers a possibility for judges to obtain clear information on 
the trends emerging in the case law. The analysis may also be of interest to judges active 
in other countries, or in supranational courts, such as the ECtHR, as it offers a 
comparative law approach to the issue, taking as case-studies two States representative 
of different legal traditions (civil law and common law). 
 
Finally, the research also contributes to ongoing and emerging policy-debates 
and thus also targets policy-makers and other stakeholders interested in the evolution 
of the approach towards human trafficking and labour exploitation at national, 
European and international level. 1  The conceptualisation of labour exploitation is 
particularly of utility with regards to the further elaboration of legal measures, soft or 
	
1 International: Intervention by Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, especially Women 
and Children on the need for a broader application of labour exploitation in presentation given at JUSTICE AT LAST - European 
Action for Compensation for Victims of Crime International Exchange Seminar 27-28 May 2019.  
Regional: Council of Europe, Ready for future challenges - Reinforcing the Council of Europe - Report by the Secretary General 
for the Ministerial Session in Helsinki, 16-17 May 2019, CM-Public SG (2019) 1 01/04/2019, p. 29; Directorate General for 
External Policies of the Union, Study on Contemporary forms of slavery, (December 2018), p.6.  
National: See Dutch Conceptual Framework developed as part of the labour exploitation thematic programme by the Inspection 
Service in 2016 with categorisation of serious disadvantage and serious violations A form of social economic crime in which 
employers consciously and intentionally violate laws and regulations. This concerns workers who are not exploited in the strict 
sense (in accordance with Article 273f) or for which this is not proven, but who have to do with underpayment, long working days, 
fines and (sexual) intimidation, and as such “become serious disadvantaged.”, Inspectie SZW, Jaarverslag 2016, p.24 and 
Intervention by Luuk Esser, Dutch National Rapporteur at FNV Expertmeeting arbeidsuitbuiting, Utrecht, 21 November. 
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binding, that will determine future engagement with this issue. As can be seen from the 
recently adopted reforms that form part of the labour mobility package under the 
European Pillar of Social Rights including the newly adopted Directive on transparent 
and predictable working conditions and the imminent establishment of the new 
European Labour Authority. 2  It may serve to improve the policy response to human 
trafficking and its adequacy to address the conundrum of behaviours relating to the 
exploitation of the work of others. 
 
Secondly, we refer to the second part of the research question: should labour 
exploitation be established as a standalone criminal offence?  
  
The research question makes reference to labour exploitation as a standalone 
criminal offence and in light of current efforts at national, regional and international 
level, it would appear that this would be a logical place to start. However, the research 
has highlighted that the situation is much more complex than merely introducing a new 
crime - be it domestically, regionally or transnationally - and as such a much more 
nuanced approach must be adopted (see Chapter 12). Taking into account the criticism 
of any approach that is overly focused upon criminal justice and the need to move 
beyond the criminal law to also consider regulatory efforts to combat structural 
exploitation we believe that the legal conceptualisation of exploitation is robust enough 
to be applicable beyond the context of criminal law. The significance of the 
conceptualisation is not about where it is positioned, but rather that regardless of how 
it is implemented the material scope will be consistent by virtue of the identification of 
the key elements of the concept. The comparative analysis revealed that despite the 
application of two very different approaches in practice, the core components of the 
understanding of exploitation are the same (Section 1, Chapter 9). It is these core 
components that are reflected in the proposed conceptualisation.  
 
Furthermore, the application of the conceptualisation will inevitably vary. As 
the findings of the research showed, the understanding of exploitation in law is twofold 
	
2 See for instance the recent adoption by the Council of two key developments in the labour mobility package of the European 
Pillar of Social Rights, namely the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Transparent and Predictable 
Working Conditions in the European Union; Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European 
Labour Authority, amending Regulations (EC) No 883/2004, (EU) No 492/2011, and (EU) 2016/589 and repealing Decision (EU) 
2016/344 adopted on 13 June 2019. 
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with a distinction made between nature and degree (Chapter 10 and Section 2.1 in this 
chapter). Here we emphasise that the proposed conceptualisation of exploitation 
outlines the nature of exploitation. How it is applied in practice can differ according to 
the weight given to the degree of exploitation as will be reflected in the penalties e.g. 
administrative or criminal or quasi-criminal (Section 1, Chapter 12).  
 
Finally, it is important to stress that any imposition of a general offence of 
exploitation would not replace any of the existing forms of exploitation that are 
prohibited, either as standalone offences or in the context of human trafficking. Instead, 
the threshold of a general offence would represent a lower form of abuse that fills the 
regulatory gap that currently exists in the “grey area” between forced or compulsory 
labour and labour rights violations (Section 3, Chapter 12). The proposed 
conceptualisation, in this regard can be likened to the Dutch approach whereby a 
distinction is made between exploitation in the context of human trafficking and social 
economic crimes that are labelled as serious disadvantages or violations.  
 
Ultimately, the proposed conceptualisation of exploitation provides significant 
guidance as to the material scope of existing or even future regulatory efforts to tackle 
labour exploitation.  
3. Added value of the legal conceptualisation of labour exploitation  
 
The inclusion of contemporary forms of labour exploitation in Target 8.7 of the 
Sustainable Development Goals, has been heralded as ‘a historic opportunity’,3 as it 
reinforces the global recognition and ensures global engagement to combat 
contemporary forms of exploitation.4 However, in turn, there is a concern that efforts 
to implement the ambitious and far-reaching 2030 Agenda will be jeopardised by a lack 
of sufficient resources and a fragmentation in implementation efforts, as identified by 
the emergence of different initiatives that foster a “cherry-picking” response to different 
targets and goals. 5 Another example of continued calls for improvement to the existing 
	
3 UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, Doc. A/72/139, 
(United Nations, 2017), p. 13. 
4  Dottridge, M., ‘Trafficked and Exploited: The Urgent Need for Coherence in International Law’, in Kotiswaran, P., (ed.) 
Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), p. 78. 
5 UN (2017), supra n.3, p. 15-18. 
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legal and policy frameworks that seek to tackle exploitation is the recent 
recommendation that the European Parliament should ‘adopt a new resolution on 
contemporary forms of slavery, acknowledging the definitional challenges posed by the 
concept and recommending the assessment of the possibility of drafting a new 
international treaty at the universal level.’6 These proposals can be compared to the 
diverging initiatives taken in the late 1990s, revealing at the time an increasing shared 
concern regarding trafficking in human beings, but a lack of a consistent approach. Like 
the adoption of the UN protocol containing the internationally agreed definition of 
human trafficking helped to clarify the debates, the conceptualisation of labour 
exploitation responds to a similar logic. It intends to bridge these various initiatives in 
offering a generally applicable concept that allows to clarify the behaviours covered by 
the notion of labour exploitation in criminal law. The concept proposed can serve as a 
basis for further discussions. Yet there is clearly more to be done.  
 
Taking into account the purpose and target audience of this proposed legal 
conceptualisation of labour exploitation as outlined in the previous section, the 
following points outline its added value in a contemporary setting:  
 
i) Provides legal certainty of the material scope of exploitation element in 
the human trafficking definition.  
The formulation of the legal conceptualisation of labour exploitation is considered to 
be logical as it is built on existing concepts and legal principles that are already applied 
in the context of human trafficking. The exploitation element provides a framework 
from which the factual circumstances can be assessed, permitting for flexibility should 
new trends emerge in the human trafficking phenomenon whilst ensuring consistency 
in application when combined with the other constituent elements of the human 
trafficking offence.   
 
Such legal certainty is not only relevant to the judiciary, but a whole range of 
actors who are engaged in the prevention and prosecution of human trafficking as well 
as the identification and protection of victims. For instance, the features of exploitation 
that are instilled in the legal conceptualisation are of utility for frontline professionals 
	
6 Directorate General for External Policies of the Union (2018), supra n.1, p.53.  
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who can use it as a tool when working with potential victims to explore their lived 
experience of exploitation.7 
 
ii) Moves towards an offence of general exploitation in national legal orders  
In addition to the criminalisation of human trafficking for the purposes of sexual 
exploitation, national legal orders also include in their criminal legal framework 
offences that prohibit forced prostitution of others that are more broadly referred to as 
sexual exploitation offences. In the same vein, it is contended that the legal concept of 
labour exploitation could form the basis for an offence of general exploitation that can 
be applied to national legal orders. The suggestion of the adoption of a general offence 
was broached in the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, but 
ultimately did not find traction and remains sidelined. We support the efforts made to 
introduce the offence in such a way that moved beyond the categorical approach and 
sought to capture the essence of exploitation, particularly with reference to the means 
used to exert control over an individual and the agency of the individual and their ability 
to escape from the situation.8 A true conceptual clarification of general offence of 
exploitation in criminal law will require a definitional approach, which this thesis offers 
by way of the conceptualisation of labour exploitation.  
 
iii) Facilitates formal and substantive regulation of labour exploitation 
beyond criminal law 
The need for regulatory plurality has long been voiced by those who recognise that 
criminal law is one piece of the regulatory puzzle that aims to tackle human trafficking 
and others forms of exploitation in the context of the global labour market.9 For such 
pluralism to be achieved in practice, it will require not only further engagement with 
ensuring the effectiveness of criminal justice response but also reflection upon the gaps 
	
7 For example, following preliminary presentation of research findings to social workers at PAG-ASA, a specialized human 
trafficking centre in Belgium, one worker informed the researcher that they had used the conceptualization of labour exploitation 
as a tool whilst engaging with a potential victims and explaining the availability of victim support and assistance in Belgium.  
8 See amendments tabled in Committee Stage in both Houses during passage of the Modern Slavery Bill, Amendment 25 in 
Committee Stage see HL, Marshalled list of amendments to be moved in committee 28.11.2014, Amendment NC17 in Committee 
Stage, see Notice of amendment given on 28 August 2014 and Amendment NC4 tabled in in Committee Stage, see Notice of 
amendments given up to and including 16 October 2014.  
9 See discussion in Chapter 4 on need to ensure labour approach is integrated in measures taken to tackle labour exploitation. 
For further discussion on labour approach see Shamir, H., ‘A labor paradigm for human trafficking’, (2012) UCLA Law Review 
60, 76 – 136. Muskat-Gorska, Z., ‘Can labour make an effective contribution to legal strategies against human trafficking?,’ in 
Piotrowicz, R., Rijken, C., and Uhl, B. H., (eds) Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking, (Routledge, 2017); Bravo, K., ‘Free 
labour! A labour liberaliszation solution to modern trafficking human beings’ (2009) Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems 18, 545-615; Pope, J., ‘A free labor approach to human trafficking’, (2010) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
158, 1849- 18755.  
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in existing labour law frameworks that in some instances foster exploitation.10 The 
application of the legal concept of exploitation provides a legal standard that can be 
applied in multiple regulatory regimes, thereby overcoming the “grey area” between 
extreme exploitation and instances of exploitative labour practices.  
 
iv) Emphasising the primacy of human rights  
The human rights-based approach to combating human trafficking has been at the 
forefront of efforts to develop a comprehensive and holistic response to tackling the 
phenomenon.11 We believe that the legal conceptualisation we propose here furthers 
this goal by adopting a true human rights lens, when asserting that the substantive 
outcome is an affront to the human dignity of the exploited party.12 Indeed, human 
dignity is a pillar of fundamental rights protection, as illustrated by the EU Charter 
Explanatory Notes that states that the inclusion of human trafficking stems directly 
from human dignity. 13  As has been done in the present thesis, ‘exploitation is 
understood as the assault on workers’ dignity through the instrumentalisation of labour 
for economic gain without respect for the minimum conditions of human existence or 
the inherent value and worth of the worker herself’.14 As a consequence, addressing 
exploitation must be accompanied by appropriate measures that ensure the worker’s 
dignity is secure. This can be achieved by adopting a human rights-based approach in 
conjunction with an emphasis on securing the core international labour standards.15 
 
4. Outlook and suggestions for future research  
 
As mentioned above, it is hoped that the application of the conceptualisation of labour 
exploitation in criminal law is not only useful for the clarification of the exploitation 
	
10 Plant, R., ‘Combating Trafficking for Labour Exploitation in the Global Economy: The Need for a Differentiated Approach’, in 
Kotiswaran, P., (ed.) Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 339-340. 
11 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human 
Trafficking E/2002/68/Add.1 (United Nations, 2002); Vermeulen, G., La politique belge en matiere des traite des etres humains: 
Etat des lieux, évaluation et options futures, Fondation Roi Baudouin (2006), p.65. 
12 Rittich, K., ‘Representing, Counting, Valuing: Managing Definitional Uncertainty in the Law of Trafficking’, in Kotiswaran, P., 
(ed.) Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), p.247-248. 
13 Explanation on Article 5 — Prohibition of slavery and forced labour, Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
OJ C 303, 14.12.2007. 
14 Rittich (2017), supra n.12, p.248. 
15 FRA research has also emphasised that respect for human dignity is at the core of EU fundamental rights protection and is 
directly applicable to ensuring that workers’ rights are respected, see FRA, 2019, p. 27.  
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element of human trafficking for labour exploitation but also to a number of situations 
where the legal clarification of exploitation is not clear (see Section 2). With such a 
goal of application in mind, and the recent international and regional impetus to seek 
definitional clarification of exploitation in law, we identify three issues that can further 
ensure a vigorous and robust application of the proposed conceptualisation:  
 
The choice of two comparative jurisdictions has ensured diversity, however 
their focus remains Eurocentric. Comparisons have been made with other national legal 
orders, where appropriate. However, the application of the proposed conceptualisation 
would be further enhanced by investigating the judicial application in non-European 
domestic legal orders in light of other regional developments. For example, in Australia 
following the entry into force of the Modern Slavery Act 2018 and in the Brazilian 
context following the 2016 judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
Brasil Verde.  
 
Whilst the focus in the present thesis has been restricted to the criminal justice 
domain we have always been mindful of and acknowledged the need to apply a 
conceptualisation of labour exploitation beyond the criminal law, as we discussed in 
Chapter 12 (Section 6). In particular, it is clear that in order to truly tackle human 
trafficking and exploitation, there is a need for regulatory plurality. In this regard, 
further exploration of the proposed conceptualisation of exploitation should be 
undertaken in the context of labour law, for instance by exploring the content of 
employment tribunal judgments and the application of social criminal law frameworks 
in order to assess if and how the criminal law conceptualisation should vary across 
different areas of law. This will greatly enhance the value of the proposed 
conceptualisation as criminal law concepts are often restrictively interpreted in order to 
ensure legal certainty.   
 
Finally, in order to be applicable to efforts seeking to combat structural 
exploitation, the application of the legal conceptualisation of exploitation needs to be 
further assessed in light of the complexity and multiplicity of actors potentially 
involved in the chain of exploitation. One limitation of the current articulation of 
exploitation, is the emphasis on the role of the exploiter – that corresponds to the 
requirement of intent for criminal liability to arise. However, in the context of structural 
	 367	
exploitation, the conceptualisation could be modified so that unfair advantage could be 
taken of the imbalance of bargaining power without knowledge of the position of 
vulnerability. Here, the Dutch Supreme Court Decision could be used as a yardstick, 
whereby the threshold of conditional intent meant that it was sufficient for the misuse 
of vulnerability to have been unconscious, with mere recognition of the vulnerability.16 
The application of this conditional mens rea into a corporate setting will require further 
research, as it must not dilute the meaning of exploitation and could also blur the 
boundaries between injustice and abuse that is not prohibited or regulated by law. Such 
considerations should be subjected to further analysis in order to clarify the exact scope 
of any legal obligations in the context of structural exploitation.  
 
Overall, the proposed conceptualisation is a good starting point as it provides 
consistency and certainty for future efforts seeking to tackle labour exploitation. In 
addition it reflects the necessity of further academic engagement with this topic, 
especially in light of the apparent shift by the international community towards the 
adoption of a broader understanding of labour exploitation in a global, neo-liberal 
context that has seen both a diminishing role for national State based regulatory 
mechanisms and an increased precarity of working conditions.  
 
	
16 Rijken, C., (ed.) Combating trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011), p. 499; UNODC, 
Issue paper: Abuse of a position of vulnerability and other “means” within the definition of trafficking in persons (New York: 




























i. Background circumstances of the exploited party  
a. Social 
b. Economic  
c. Cultural  
d. Religious  
e. Political  
f. Psychological  
g. Personal  
h. Migration status  
i. Other 
ii. Relationship between exploiter & exploited party 
a. Direct (A-B) 
b. Indirect (A-B-C/Complex supply chain) 
c. Familial (family member/relative) 
d. Personal (friend/ friend of friend/acquaintance) 
e. Professional (employer) 
f. Other  
 
2.	Procedural	conditions:	taking	unfair	advantage	and	consent		
i. Role of the exploiter  
a. Employer 
b. Labour provider  
c. Facilitator e.g. driver, landlord etc  
d. Other  
ii. Attitude of the exploiter  
iii. Means of control persons’ capacity or resources  
a. Deception, Coercion, Fraud  
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b. Restriction of movement, Isolation  
c. Threat or use of force (physical/sexual) 
d. Intimidation and threats  
e. Retention of identity documents  
f. Withholding wages  
g. Debt bondage  
h. Abusive working and living conditions 
i. Excessive overtime  
j. Abduction  
k. Abuse of power or vulnerability  
l. Giving payment or benefits  
m. Exercise of control  
n. Condition is unlikely to change  
o. Obligation to live on premises  
p. Other 
iv. (In)voluntariness of the exploited party  
a. Lacking resources/ needs & sufficiency standard 
b. Lack of alternative  
c. Other 
 
v. Working and living conditions  
a. Length of working day  
b. Remuneration  
c. Subsistence needs (transport, food, medical care etc.) 
d. Accommodation  




i. Benefit (actual or perceived) to exploiter  
ii. Benefit (actual or perceived) to exploited party 
iii. Detriment to exploited party  
a. harm  
b. affront to human dignity 
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c. lack of respect 
d. degradation 







Annex 2 – List of cases accessed in Belgium (BE) and England and 
Wales (UK) 
 
Code Case citation 
BE01 Corr. Charleroi, 19 mars 2010, 7ème chambre 
BE02 Corr. Bruxelles, 20 avril 2010, 58ième chambre 
BE03 Corr. Charleroi, 23 avril 2010, 7ème chambre 
BE04 Corr. Dinant, 5 octobre 2010, 10ième chambre 
BE05 Corr. Tournai, 4 novembre 2010 
BE06 Corr. Charleroi, 10 december 2010, 7ème chambre 
BE07 Corr. Charleroi, 18 mars 2011, 7ème chamber;  
Cour d’appel de Mons, 26 juin 2015, 4ième chambre 
BE08 Corr. Bruxelles, 58e chambre, 10 mai 2011 
BE09 Corr. Bruxelles, 29 juin 2011, 58ième chambre 
BE10 Corr. Mons, 26 juin 2012, 10ieme chambre correctionnelle 
BE11 Corr. Tournai, 6 septembre 2012, 19ième chambre correctionnelle 
BE12 Corr. Charleroi, 26 octobre 2012, 7ème chambre correctionnelle 
BE13 Corr. Liege, 14 janvier 2013, 14ème chambre correctionnelle;  
Tribunal d’appel Liege, 8 mai 2014;  
Cour de cassation, Bruxelles, 8 octobre 2014 
BE14 Corr. Bruxelles, 22 janvier 2013, la 58ième chambre correctionnelle 
BE15 Corr. Nivelles, 25 janvier 2013, 6ième chambre correctionnelle 
BE16 Corr. Liege, 26 mars 2013;  
Cour d’appel de Liege, 26 juin 2014, 6ème chambre 
BE17 Corr. Bruxelles, 26 mars 2013, 58ème chambre 
BE18 Corr. Charelroi, 26 avril 2013;  
Cour d’appel de Mons, 13 janvier 2016, 4ème chambre 
BE19 Corr. Bruxelles, 28 mai 2013, 58ème chambre 
BE20 Corr. Charleroi, 7 juin 2013, 7ème chambre 
BE21 Corr. Nivelles, 26 juin 2013, 6ème chambre 
BE22 Corr. Liège, 2 septembre 2013, 14ème chamber;  
Cour d’appel de Liege, 12 mars 2015, 6ème chambre 
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BE23 Corr. Bruxelles, 6 janvier 2014, 58ème chambre 
BE24 Corr. Charleroi, 21 mars 2014, 7ème chambre;  
Cour d’appel de Mons, 10 février 2016, 4ème chambre 
BE25 Corr. Bruxelles, 3 avril 2014, 59ème chambre;  
Corr. Bruxelles, 19 fevrier, 2015, 59ème chambre 
BE26 Corr.Liège, 28 avril 2014, 14ème chambre 
BE27 Corr. Luxembourg (Arlon), 8 MAI 2014, 7ème chambre;  
Cour d’appel de Liège, 14 janvier 2016, 6ème chambre 
BE28 Corr. Hainaut, Division Charleroi, 13 octobre 2014;  
Cour d’appel de Mons, 24 février 2015, 3ème chambre 
BE29 Corr. Bruxelles, 30 octobre 2014, 69ème chambre 
BE30 Corr. Bruxelles,11 fevrier 2015, 49ème chambre 
BE31 Corr. Bruxelles, 1er avril 2015, 69ième chambre 
BE32 Corr. Brabant Wallon, 2 avril 2015, 6ème chambre 
BE33 Corr. Namur, 5 mai 2015, 12ème chambre 
BE34 Corr. Brabant Wallon, 6 mai 2015, 6ème chambre correctionnelle 
BE35 Tribunal du travail francophone de Bruxelles,18 juin 2015, 4ème chambre 
BE36 Corr. Bruxelles, 19 juin 2015, 59ème chambre 
BE37 Corr. Liège, 29 juin 2015, 18ème chambre 
BE38 Corr. Namur, 29 juin 2015, 12ème chambre 
BE39 Corr. Bruxelles, 04 septembre 2015, 69ème chambre 
BE40 Corr. Bruxelles, 9 septembre 2015, 54ème chambre 
BE41 Corr. Liège, 8 février 2016, 18ème chambre 
BE42 Corr. Namur, 9 février 2016, 12ème chamber;  
Cour d’appel Liege, 8 decembre 2016 
BE43 Corr. Hainaut, division Mons, 21 avril 2016, 8ème chambre extraordinaire 
BE44 Corr.Liège, 25 avril 2016, 18ème chambre 
BE45 Corr. Bruxelles, 25 mai 2016, 59ème chambre 
BE46 Corr. Hainaut, division de Charleroi, 6ième chambre correctionnelle 




Code Case citation 
UK1 R v SK (unreported, 16 March 2011) Southwark Crown Court 
R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691 
UK2   R v RB (unreported, 11 August 2011) Southwark Crown Court 
UK3 R v AO, AZ, MN and others (unreported, 19 April 2012) Croydon Crown Court  
UK4 R v WC, JJC, JC, MC, JC (unreported, 12 July 2012) Luton Crown Court  
R v Connors [2013] EWCA Crim 368 
UK5 R v JC, JC, MC, WC, BC (unreported, 19 December 2012) Bristol Crown Court  
R v Connors [2013] EWCA Crim 324 
UK6 R v WC, JC, JC (unreported 7 January 2013, 30 May 2013) Southampton Crown 
Court 
UK7 R v DS, RU (unreported, 22 February 2013) Portsmouth Crown Court  
UK8 R v IB, AS, PD, KM, AK, AK, NK (unreported, 10 October 2013) Preston Crown 
Court 
UK9 R v TA, IA, FA (unreported, 23 October 2013) Manchester Minshull Street Crown 
Court  
UK10 R v JG (unreported, 18 June 2014) Preston Crown Court  
UK11 R v JR (unreported, 26 September 2014) 
UK12  R v DD, TD, DD (unreported, 24 October 2014) Cardiff Crown Court 
UK13 R v BS (unreported,9 March 2015) Preston Crown Court 
UK14  R v HC, MJ, PJ, II (unreported, 8 June 2015) Oxford Crown Court 
UK15 R v EE, AE (unreported,7 December 2015) Harrow Crown Court 
Attorney General's Reference (Nos. 146 & 147 of 2015) (Edet) [2016] EWCA 
Crim 347 
UK16 R v GP, VJ, AP (unreported, 11 December 2015) Nottingham Crown Court  
UK17 R v TJ (unreported, 17 December 2015) Oxford Crown Court  
R v Joyce [2017] EWCA Crim 337 
UK18 R v RV (unreported, 5 February 2016) Hereford Crown Court 
UK19 R v MR, MP, MD (unreported, 18 April 2016) Leeds Crown Court  
Attorney General's Reference (No.35 of 2016) (R. v Rafiq (Mohammed)) [2016] 
EWCA Crim 1368 
UK20 R v SA, DP, ZA (unreported 1 April 2016) Woolwich Crown Court  
UK21 R v WC, PC, PJC, LC (unreported, 24 May 2016) Cardiff Crown Court 
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UK22 R v JM, SL (unreported, 17 June 2016) St Albans Crown Court 
UK23 R v HC, MJ, CJ (unreported, 31 August 2016) Oxford Crown Court  
UK24 R v KM, EM (unreported, 23 January 2017) Nottingham Crown Court 
UK25 R v JO, AL, LP, SF (unreported, 3 February 2017) Manchester Crown Court 
UK26  R v DA (unreported, 19 May 2017) Snarebrook Crown Court 
UK27 R v RM, PM, SM, SS (unreported, 30 May 2017) Newcastle Crown Court 
UK28 R v SB (unreported, 15 June 2017) Nottingham Crown Court  
UK29 R v EB (unreported, 3 July 2017) Manchester Crown Court  
UK30 R v MR, BR, PR, JR, NR, ER, MR, JR, PR (unreported, 12 September 2017) 
Nottingham Crown Court  




Annex 3 – Coding template for data collection 
 
1) Details of the case and factual circumstances  
a) Title/ case number, date  
b) court (first instance, appeal) and location 
c) judge 
d) procedural issues 
e) special measures 
f) offence(s) on indictment 
g) type of exploitation(s) 
h) verdict & sentence 
i) parties involved (civil parties, defendants, victims)  
j) Economic sectors where exploitation took place 
k) Working conditions 
l) Living conditions 
m) Role of the defendant 
n) The relationship between the defendant and the victim  
o) The background circumstances of the victim  
 
2) Judicial weight given to the factual circumstances in determining the 
exploitation  
 
a) Background factors: position of the individual (background, vulnerability), 
migration status, psychological status, physical status e.g. disability, continuum  
b) Procedural factors: (non)use of coercion by defendant & (in)voluntariness of 
the victim (consent and agency), inequality in bargaining power (conditions of 
exchange: lack of alternative), intention to exploit, exercise of control 
(resources and/or person), 
c) Substantive factors: excessive benefit/loss, mutually advantageous, no actual 
benefit, real benefit, harm or otherwise impact on victim, lack of respect, 
sufficiency.  
 
3) Reference to existing legal standards in judicial reasoning 
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4) Other factors of relevance 
a) Immigration status: undocumented and illegal working 
b) Criminality of victim (non-prosecution principle)  
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